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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to achieve both a theoretical and empirical
understanding of the local public inquiry system in the context of
controversial North Sea oil and gas onshore developments. Part one
develops a theoretical framework within which an analytical vocabulary
is generated to describe the case studies in part two. it is
argued that a concept of the political process which acknowledges that
power and participation are inextricably bound together in public
institutions is particularly appropriate for studying an institution
such as a local public inquiry because it is both an instrument of
government and a means of ensuring the fulfillment of 'natural
justice' to individuals affected by planning and development issues.
Part one develops this idea first through an historical examination of
the concept of 'natural justice1 as a conflict between 'common-sense'
notions of justice and 'formal' legal and administrative interpretations
of what is 'fair', and then as a theoretical debate between the
critical theory of Jurgen Habermas and the systems theory of Nicklas
Luhmann. Part one concludes by arguing that the essence of the
tension between Habermas and Luhmann articulates the tension between
'common-sense' notions of justice and 'formal legal' notions and
that by using the vocabulary of 'classification and framing of
knowledge' developed within educational sociology by Basil Bernstein,
the Habermas-Luhmann debate can be condensed into an analytical tool
enclosed within one theoretical structure. Power and participation
as inter-connected forms of political engagement are expressed within
the concept of the 'classification and framing of knowledge' as
conflicting patterns in the relationship between knowledge and
information and the institutional procedures that process that
knowledge and information.
Part two explicitly seeks to use the concept of the 'classification
and framing' of knowledge to make visible the principles of power
and social control that operate in large public inquiries. Attention
is focused on local public inquiries into North Sea oil and gas onshore
development; the case studies of the Cromarty Firth, Dunnet Bay and
Drumbuie are described to illustrate how the 'classification and framing1
of knowledge operated in the Highlands in the 1970's. The case of
Shell/Esso's petrochemical development in Fife is examined in detail
to describe, first, the nature of participation and discontent within
the local public inquiry system, and secondly, the relationship between
the formation of local opposition in the form of an action group and
the nature of the constraints imposed upon that organisation by the
local public inquiry system.
Part three attempts to clarify the theoretical and practical problems
involved in reforming the local public inquiry system within the terms
established by this thesis. The work of Jurgen Habermas is considered
pivotal for developing a critical sociology of the public sphere.
It is tentatively suggested that the new social movements rooted in
ecology and opposition to nuclear power could be the bearers of an
emerging critical theory of society and technology which might
the grounding for a unified theory and practice which could lead to
institutional change in society generally and in the planning sphere
in particular.
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This thesis is concerned with public inquiries in the context of North
Sea oil and gas onshore development.^ Its objective will be to
examine the public inquiry instrument in its own right rather than
treat it primarily as a source for gathering data about the social
and economic controversies constituting its business. The focus will
be on the public inquiry system as a mode of public political involve¬
ment in planning controversies and not directly a study about
'development1. Nevertheless I conceive of my project very much within
a framework that seeks to understand the social impact of oil on
Scotland, particularly in the 19701s at the height of the scramble for
North Sea oil and gas resources. All the major public political
controversies surrounding the onshore development of oil resources
have resulted in major public inquiries. My aim is to understand the
place of the public inquiry instrument in those controversies.
One of the most significant effects of oil on Scotland has been the
forced re-consideration of values and priorities about the environment
and economic development by government and local authorities due to the
pressure to change the established use of land for onshore oil
and gas developments. This thesis will be examining the pressure to
build oil rigs and petro-chemica1 plants in locations generally
regarded as unsuitable for such industrial projects. The discovery of
North Sea oil and gas challenged the existing values and priorities in
local planning in the 19701s. Land which had previously been zoned
for agriculture, tourism and recreation or even as part of inalienable
National Trust land, became, suddenly, important for national economic
(21
goals. As Robert Moore highlights in relation to Peterhead and
George Rosie for the Cromarty Firth area^, places considered to be
outwith the central avenues of strategic industrial location suddenly
became areas of supreme national and international significance for no
other reason than geography. One result from this geographical
proximity to North Sea oil exploration was the sudden influx of multi¬
national executives hunting for industrial sites. There was a
proliferation of oil related industrial schemes that generated a great
deal of concern among many people, not the least significant being
social scientists, about the social impact of oil and industrialism on
communities traditional ly
(iv)
rooted in agriculture, fishing and tourism.
The pace of change that overtook Scotland in the 1970's had more
impact on the imagination of people than on the actual rate of
economic development or institutional change. In retrospect it is
possible to see that many of the great plans for industrialising the
Highlands have not materialised, although in Ross-shire the scars of
bad planning exist and have been made all the more stark when compared
with the official euphoria described so well by Rosie in his book
Cromarty: The Scramble for Oil.^ Politically nationalism had an
upsurge and decline, and the promise of some form of devolved political
control to Scotland has not as yet been fulfilled. The spirit of
challenge felt in Scotland in the 19701s was fleetingly captured in
The Red PcfWon Scotland^ where a variety of socialist challenges to
the changing oil rich and capitalist-controlled Scotland were sketched
by a motley collection of social scientists and trade unionists. That
book typified at least a period of vigour in Scottish economic and
political life. It was a vigour that was also alive at a community
level. The Red Papw was evidence that there was a consciousness, at
least within the labour movement and environmentalist movements, of
the negative aspects of North Sea oil and gas onshore development.
There was an awareness of the dangers that might be caused to
Scotland's social and economic structure by transitory industrial
projects which caused maximum community dislocation for a minimum
benefit to the locality. In a national and international context North
Sea oil may have been seen as a great economic boon. However at a
local level it seemed to many to be having an impact which merely
exacerbated social and economic problems that had not been efficiently
resolved in the many decades before oil arrived. More specifically,
the urgency felt at central government level for an early start to oil
production appeared to many observers in Scotland in the 1970's to be
manifesting itself alarmingly as a systematic attempt to either
eliminate local constraints on oil development or at least minimise
the effectiveness of the public inquiry system in oil and gas develop¬
ment controversies. It was through the many large public inquiries
that many local people and objectors groups made their public challenge
against the oil companies and an unsympathetic government machine.
The public inquiry instrument became the sole means whereby ordinary
(v)
people affected by onshore oil and gas development made their
objections known. The 1970's saw the emergence of a major conflict
between the power of multi-national capital and central government
and local action groups who were able at least to slow oil development
down by using what little participatory and democratic rights they had
within the public inquiry system.
Although major public inquiries have marked out development
controversies for the public imagination and for social scientists,
their significance in determining the nature and outcome of those
controversies has been overlooked. In general, the form which
research on public inquiries normally takes is either to focus
singularly on the technical issues raised during proceedings (for
example, the safety of technology in Petrochemical plants or the
possibility of leakage of radioactivity in nuclear power plants) or
concentrate on the instrumental ideologies of competing interest
groups and official policy (for example, environmentalists challenging
government motorway policy). No doubt both approaches can yield
valuable information about technical controversies, official policies
and competing value systems but very little about public inquiries as
institutional mechanisms and as instruments of government. What I will
be seeking to do is to examine technical controversies and instrumental
ideologies, not in themselves, but as phenomena that can indicate how
public inquiries operate and effect public participation and decision¬
making. More importantly, I think the area of public inquiry research
is, on the whole, largely descriptive and in need of a theoretical
vocabulary through which systematic observations of the system can be
made. Those public administrators and political scientists who have
written on public inquiries have done so without developing an adequate
theoretical framework through which to make sense of the object of
their study. The classic texts on public inquiries from public
administration, for example, tend on the whole to describe the subject
matter and range of issues covered by public inquiries, the procedures
normally followed and the various administrative problems of the
system with respect to cost, its relationship with the law courts and
government. They tend to describe what 'appears' without pursuing any
form of critical analysis. Wraith and Lamb's Pub 1ic 1nquiries as an
Instrument of Government is an example of this type of work.
(vi)
The attention given to the subject of public inquiries in the context
of the social impact of oil has been scant. The tendency has been to
look past the public inquiry instrument in the rush to get access to
information either about technological controversies or land use
speculation or general policy issues. Little, if any, attention has
been paid to the institutional system within which those issues are
shaped and given public meaning as part of the planning process. I do
not wish to discuss public inquiries abstractly. The subject does
need to be located in the real issues and controversies about oil,
technology, economic development and the environment. However, unless
attention is paid to the specific nature of the public inquiry system
and some effort is expended on attempting to theorise it, there is a
danger that in the rush to amend and improve its 'procedures', sight
is lost of what it is that is problematic about public inquiries in
the first place. Brief mention can be made here of some examples
where the public inquiry system has been examined in a context of
confusion about what is problematic about it^ first in the context
of concern about 'participation' in planning in the 1960's,
culminating in the Skeffington Report and then in the late 19701 s and
1980' s with the rise of the nuclear power controversy.
There was a widespread alarm among politicians, amenity societies and
the public at large in the 1960's about the lack of involvement by
ordinary people in the planning process, That concern was in a
context of changing social conditions and political expectations.
Emerging concerns about ecology and the built environment were coupled
with political radicalism as the youth counter-culture of the sixties
seriously questioned the continuing obsession with economic growth,
property speculation and the "white heat of the technological
revolution", whose virtues were extolled by Harold Wilson. The
material prosperity felt in 1963 found expression in speculative
development projects, often involving the construction of roads and
offices with little regard for the social aspects of the spatial
organisation of society. The Town and Country Planning Act (Scotland)
1969, aimed to crystallise these concerns and provide the citizen with
statutory rights for receiving information about planning matters and
being involved with the decision-making process, The Skeffington
Committee sat to work out how that could best be implemented.
(vii)
Skeffington1s conclusions can best be illustrated by a brief
examination of the vocabulary adopted.^
At the bottom of page 2b through to page 29 and 32 to 35 of the Report
the tasks and activities of 'the public1 and 'the Council' are
presented in parallel. While the Council 'announce', the public 'hear
about it'. While the planners collect data from the public, the
Council 'analyse' the data and 'define objectives'. While the public
'discuss' plans and make 'representations', the Council 'consider'
comments and representations subject to revisions and submissions to
the Minister. The public inquiry is at the end of this process,
presumably considered as a mechanism of last resort should there still
remain active objectors not put off by the tokenism of Skeffington's
concept of 'participation'. What is striking about that period is
the way 'participation' was treated as an appendage of the planning
system rather than an integral moment of the system. 'Participation'
seemed to be a concept that was newly discovered^ a concept that
could be 'added in' or grafted on to the general planning process.
Importantly, the concept of 'participation' was seen in terms of the
public being informed about issues and objectives with nothing at all
to connect it to the process of determining those issues and
objectives; the agenda setting function remained located elsewhere.
What was clearly overlooked was that the root cause of discontent in
planning then, as now,was the fact that the problems of planning and
public inquiries are not so much a question of the lack of
participation, but rather the form participation takes.
Skeffington led nowhere but the issues of democratic planning and
public participation were raised yet again in the 1970's with
notoriety attaching to the big public inquiries into North Sea oil
onshore development (which alerted my attention to public inquiries
and which I will examine in some detail) and the emergence of the
nuclear'power controversy. The Windscale public inquiry led to David
Pearce et al publishing a book which considered the problems of the
(8)
public inquiry instrument in some detail. Unfortunately Pearce
et al commit similar conceptual errors to Skeffington with respect to
the notion of 'public participation'. Using a perspective that
combines pluralist political theory, where the only interests
(viii)
exercising power and influence are those that are observable, and a
concept of 'rationality' rooted in cost benefit analysis, Pearce et al
argue that the local public inquiry system is so inadequate to handle
the nuclear controversy that there is a great danger of
uninstitutiona1 action spilling over into civil disobedience and a
breakdown of an orderly and 'rational' assessment of issues. By
adopting the use of Planning Inquiry Commissions instead of local
public inquiries, and establishing a permanent Energy Policy
Commission, the aim would be to ensure a greater level of public
participation in the nuclear debate and more 'efficient' dissemination
of information to the public. There is an absence of any recognition
of wider power structures that might mediate the experience of
participation created by these new institutions,
Again the real problem is not that of finding a place for public
participation in the decision-making process as such but rather the
form which the participatory experience takes. This is not sophistry.
The existence of public inquiries already embodies certain rights of
participation, albeit for most participants not statutory rights. The
problem has always been about the effectiveness of public or citizen
input into decision-making and the lack of real agenda-setting power.
Policies and decisions are not made in contemporary industrial
societies by the'rational' policy-maker, as Pearce et al imagine.
Political and economic power structures effect the possible options
open to decision-makers and public participation. The real task is
to examine the dialectical interplay between administrative power and
participatory rights in decision-making. Participation is not an
external variable of the political process but an immanent moment of
political and institutional systems in liberal democracies. It is
because of this fact that there is a contemporary legitimation problem
with public inquiries. Participation must mean effective influence.
It was this very interesting problem of a tension between power and
participation in the context of North Sea oil development controversies
that attracted me to the subject of public inquiries. Convinced that
a critical sociology could provide useful insights into the
phenomenon of the big public inquiry, in a way so far absent in
existing literature, I engaged in this research project. I could find
(ix)
no systematic work that had been undertaken by sociologists on the
subject, although as I have already mentioned there were many
references to public inquiries but always in the context of examining
(9)
technical issues or interest group confrontations. This was
particularly curious given that there has been a long-standing
interest in the more general subject of public participation within
the social sciences. Public inquiries, after all, represent one
of the few, and one of the oldest, institutional systems in Western
societies which allow a form of open public involvement in the
decision-making process. Where specific mention has been made of the
public inquiry instrument it has been either complacently described as
an efficient and fair mechanism for resolving planning conflicts or
alternatively described variously as a 'farce' or a ' charade' .
My view is that such conclus ions-are both wrong and founded on an
inadequate understanding of public inquiries born of a neglect of




THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND PARTICIPATORY POLITICS
One of the enduring problems for political sociology has been to
derive a unified conception of the 'political' which can accommodate
the classical Aristotelian conception of politics as participation and
the modern conception of politics as power, derived particularly from
the writing of Machiavelli and Hobbes. The problem of reconciling
these two dimensions of the 'political' is all the more compelling in
advanced industrial societies faced with the dilemma of sustaining
democratic institutions and public traditions within the context of
the growth of the state apparatus, especially with the increasing
intervention of the state in advanced capitalism.
This tension between the 'two politics' can be a useful conception
through which an understanding of the political and legal context of
modern society can be grasped, and more particularly, the public
inquiry system that is the central concern of this thesis.^ The
main argument of this chapter will be that the participatory notion
of politics as competitive interaction between people within a
democratic public sphere, debating and forming opinions about public
matters, and acting as a countervailing force to governmental and
state institutions, is attenuated in modern society, but has not been
totally eradicated. The idea of 'participation' will be viewed as an
institutionalised normative constraint on power. My task will be to
examine the thesis that there has been a 'fall of public man' and a
disintegration of the public sphere. However, I wi11 not proceed by
an exclusive analysis of power and the state. A focus which turns
attention towards new modes of legitimation based on technical
imperatives derived from the politica1-administrative dilemmas of the
state is also required. The specific problem that must be isolated
is the way in which modalities of participating within the political
process change over time and can be the focus of manipulation and
state intervention. The philosophical consideration of a pure theory
of politics based on participation or a pragmatic view based on the
complexities of modern power structures is redundant; participation
and power are inextricably linked in the modern political system.
Weber's observation that all political regimes must seek legitimation
- 2 -
of their power base encapsulates the necessity to integrate normative
(2
and structural features of political power. The important questions
are what limits are placed upon participatory politics by the realities
of existing power structures and vice versa and what resources
mediate the two politics creating the conditions under which a balance
can exist between the normative and the structural dimensions of
politics?
Participatory politics within the public sphere is threatened by new
modes of technocratic legitimation and I will develop my analysis of
this problem further on, but first 1 must tackle the thesis that
modern capitalist society is characterised by a declining public
culture and a loss of the sense of the 'political1. This question is
essential for placing in context the more grounded analysis of the
public inquiry system.
The Demise of a Public Culture
The distinction between public and private realms of human action has
grown in significance with the attempt to understand the political
obstacles confronting public participation in decision-making. A body
of literature has grown in the 20th century offering varying insights
on the 'fall of public man',^ 'vita activa',^ 'the active society1^
(6)
'the sociological dilemma of the public household' and the
're-feuda1isation of the public sphere'.^ The different
perspectives on the question of the relationship between the public
and the private requires to be ordered and critically assessed in
order that a distinct conception of the problem may be formulated. An
immediate classification can be made on the different analyses of
politics and the public sphere in terms of the location of the
analysis; writers such as Sennett, Bell, and Arendt locate their
analysis at the level of specifying a 'public culture1 or a 'civic
culture1, which is either under threat from the onslaught of
privatising modern culture or the destruction of a pure realm of
politics. By contrast, the critical theory of the state by Habermas
and Offe, which 1 will discuss further on, locates its analysis of
political action firmly within the orbit of the relationship between
the state and economy. The development of this analysis, while
- 3 -
sharing some features of the 'public culture' theorists, offers an
explanation more materially located in terms of politica1-administrative
and economic processes.
A recent example of sociological writing on the question of the
nature and problems of the contemporary public sphere has been
presented by Richard Sennett in The Fall of Public Man. In a wide
sweeping discussion on theatrical styles, politics, and urban
transformations since the 18th century, Sennett develops an analysis
that somewhat reverses the traditional concerns of classical sociology;
the fetters on human development come not from the tyranny and
dehumanising forces of impersonal social structures and institutions
as in the classical sociology of Tonnies, Simmel and Marx, but from
the tyrannies of an overly 'intimate' society where public interaction
has been transformed into 'psychic encounter'.
"In a sense, I am turning around the argument David
Riesmann made in The Lonely Crowd. Riesmann contrasted
an inner-directed society, in which men pursued actions
and made commitments based on goals and sentiments they
felt within themselves, to an other-directed society, in
which these passions and commitment depend on what people
sense to be the feelings of others. Riesmann believed
American society, and in its wake Western Europe, was
moving from an inner- to an other-directed condition.
The sequence should be reversed. (my emphasis) Western
societies are moving from something like an other-directed
condition to an inner-directed condition - except -fAat- in
the midst of self-absorption no one can say what is inside.
As a result, confusion has arisen between public and
intimate life; people are working out in terms of personal
feelings public matters which properly can be dealt with
only through codes of impersonal meaning." (8)
Sennett's formulation of the modern dilemma is in some respects a
re-statement of a central problem first identified by C. Wright Mills:
the linkage between what Mills called the "persona! troubles of
(9)
milieu" and the "public issues of social structure". Troubles for
Mills occur within the character of the individual. They are
fashioned out of the daily conflicts and difficulties of an individual's
immediate relationships and obligations. 'Issues' are the projection
onto the public stage of those personal troubles in a co-ordinated
claim for action which transcends each specific milieu. The political
question which arises from this distinction is how to establish a link
between private troubles and public issues, whether it be those
concerned about the 'health' of the democratic polity or the Marxist
concern for transforming a 'class in itself into a class for itself'.
Sennett's lament is founded on his observation that in modern society
a culture of narcissism reigns and so the private and public sphere
are no longer connected in a politically meaningful way. The
explanation for the disconnection lies in the demise of a public
culture as manifest in various cultural practices.
The work of Sennett can be seen as part of a re-alignment of liberal
intellectuals in America described by Etzioni and others under the
rubric of Neo-Conservatism.^ A central feature of this movement
is the concern for the recovery of a 'public philosophy'. The
traditional pluralist assumptions about a 'participant-a11 egient
civic culture', described by Almond and Verba in the 1960's,^^ have
given way to a concern that narcissism and modern hedonistic culture
ta/e destroyed a presupposed consensus about moral and political
values, mediating institutional structures and pluralist political
system. Sennett is, for example, concerned about the 'loss of public
restraints upon the self' and the 'tyrannies of intimacy'. There is
a hearkening back towards a golden age when people were imbued with
'civitas'. Sennett may not share all aspects of Neo-Conservatism but
The Fall of Public Man does seem to have elements of Neo-Conservatism
within it.
The theme of a 'degeneration of the public' political dimension of
social life has found echoes in a range of other work as part of the
same intellectual movement. Daniel Bell has perhaps been the most
active analyst of the public sphere in recent times representing the
liberal academic tradition of American sociology. In his The Cultural
Contradictions of Capitalism the dilemma of modern society for him
lies securely in the contradiction between an economy that is
"functional, efficient, economising, rational, bureaucratic and
hierarchical" and a culture that celebrates the hedonistic and is
'passionately devoted to self-fulfilment'. This major cultural
contradiction is the central feature of all western societies which
Bell argues are now experiencing the declining force of the Protestant
ethic. The selfishness of public actions and perspectives has led to
a lack of 'consensual agreement on the normative issues of
distributive justice1.
"Western society lacks both civitas, the spontaneous
willingness to make sacrifices for some public good,and
a political philosophy that justifies the normative
rules of priorities and allocations in society." (12.)
It is when Bell talks about the loss of 'civitas1 in relation to the
need to establish "that spontaneous willingness to obey laws, to
respect the right of others, to forego the temptations of private
enrichment at the expense of the public weal - in short to honour the
(13)
city of which one is a member," that the conservatism of his thesis
reveals itself. The resolution of conflict within Neo-Conservatism
has to be based on the restoration of the 'bourgeois virtues' such as
the work ethic, deferred gratification, prudence, diligence, trust¬
worthiness, sexual restraint and moderation. A return to the
classical liberal notion of a 'meritocracy' combined with a
conservative concept of the free market distinguishes the strange
amalgam that constitutes the Neo-Conservative public philosophy.
However this type of political analysis merely assumes that a return
to a fundamentalist form of market capitalism will furnish the
requisite ethics for a revived public and civic culture. It fails to
comprehend that the lack of a public philosophy is not so much at the
level of a 'cultural contradiction' or 'psychology of privatism' as
an artefact of the specific forms of institutional life in modern
capitalist society. The analysis emanating from Neo-Conservatism is
ungrounded in political and institutional analysis. It lacks an
awareness of the difference between attitudinal problems in
contemporary society and the failure of political institutions as
mechanisms for allowing public participation in society. Political
institutions often constrain the forms participation can take within
them. The general lament from Bell, Kristol, Lipset and others
labelled Neo-Conservative is that too many sectional and selfish
demands are made upon an overburdened political system. Their concept
of a public philosophy and a healthy public sphere seems to be one in
which there exists a vague ungrounded notion of self-sacrifice for
the 'public good'. The public sphere loses any sense of an arena
- 6 -
where public issues can be openly discussed and where a greater level
of public participation in decision-making might enliven democracy. I
will argue below, for example, that political rights of participation
have been secured as normative principles in the historical process
of institutionalising public freedoms. Those rights of participation
provide immanent standards of judgement against which the public
institutions of state and economy are legitimised. However, often
those rights of participation can be manipulated and compromised as
part of dialectical tension with institutionalised forms of political-
administrative power. One might suggest it is worth examining the
extent to which public participation and 'public oriented1 behaviour
is attenuated by the economic forces held to be so important by Neo-
Conservatism for recovering their idea of a public philosophy.
C. Wright Mills' much earlier classic analysis of The Power E1ite
shifts the argument of the degeneration of the public sphere slightly
away from the contemporary debate about a loss of 'public culture',
towards the idea of a 'mass society' as a concomitant change to
(14)
increasing concentrations of power.
"The structural trends of modern society and the
manipulative character of its communication technique
come to a point of co-incidence in the mass society
.....segregating men and women into narrowed routines
and environments.....masses in metropolitan society
know one another only as fractions in specialised
milieux: the man who fixes the car, the girl who serves
your lunch, the saleslady, the woman who takes care of
your child at school during the day. Sunk in their
routines, they do not transcend their more or less
narrow lives. They do not gain a view of the structure
of their society and of their role as a public within
it." (15)
The imagery of a completely atomised and powerless collectivity of
people is strong in Mills' work. It is problematic because it
suggests there is hardly any potential for public political action.
Power is seen as being highly concentrated and the political will of
the population is depressed. It is difficult to see how meaningful
political action would be possible either in structural or
motivational terms from the analysis offered by The Power Elite.
- 7 -
This kind of analysis of one-way movements towards a shackled public
political action is also one of the tendencies in the early Frankfurt
School of critical theory. However, the Frankfurt School's concern
about the debilitating influence of the modern mass media on class
consciousness contributes towards the theoretical identification of
the public sphere as a problematic institutional space. Horkheimer,
Adorno and Marcuse share a similar focus on the interpenetration of
the public and private spheres in late Capitalism because of the
extensive reification of modern culture.
The main thrust of Frankfurt theory is derived from an extension of
Marx's analysis of the fetished nature of commodity production. Like
Lukacs, the Frankfurt School base their analysis of late-Capitalism
on a Marx/Weber synthesis. The category of 'commodity fetishism' as
reification refers not only to alienated economic relationships, but
through 'rationalisation' the idea of reification extends to all
spheres of the social structure. Weber's concept is treated as being
paradigmatic of the 'hidden dynamic of the developed capitalist system'.
Perhaps the most specifically stated position on modern culture and
po1itica1 a 1ienation is contained in Adorno's Theory of Culture which
I must necessarily only sketch. Its importance lies in the
identification of the interconnection between modes of thinking and
perception and political action. That relationship was understood in
rather pessimistic terms by Adorno. In his Negative Dialectics
Adorno distinguishes between 'Identity Thinking', 'Non-Identity
Thinking' and 'Rational Identity Thinking'.^ ^ 'Identity Thinking'
suggests a typical way of conceptualising the world by presuming that
the concepts employed or articulated are rationally identical to the
objects they focus on or refer to. Within the Marxist framework Adorno
would argue, for example, that the concept of freedom does not
correspond to the actual experience of reality in Capitalist society
confronting human beings and their relationships with each other. A
concept is what a predicate stands for; concepts and properties of
concepts pertain to objects. Adorno worked with the idea that an
object (capitalist market economy,for example) does not fulfil its
concept (freedom). There is incongruency between the concept and the
object it identifies. His idea of 'Non-1 dentity Thinking' refers to
the ability actually to perceive this incongruency between a concept
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and its objects; 'Rational Identity Thinking1 specifies a condition
where an object actually has all the properties of its ideal state.
'Identity Thinking1 is reinforced and reproduced by what the Frankfurt
Theorists saw as the awesome power of the 'culture industry'.^^
This concept referred to the mass media and the expanded reproduction
of cultural forms and leisure in late capitalism. The rise of the
'culture industry' underwrites or supports the organisationa1
principles of modern society or the regimentation and subordination
of people to the dictates of capitalist development. (Bell has argued
that the Protestant Ethic 'contains its own contradiction', hence the
contradiction between a hedonist culture and rational market economy.
By contrast the Frankfurt School believed that the expanded reified
culture of capitalism, produced and sold by the culture industry,
feeds and supports capitalism.) The source of cultural production and
the media through which it is presented become disjointed and the
former subordinated to the commercial dictates of the latter,
Marcuse's one dimensional man thesis is a further development of this
(l8)
general line of thought. The possibilities for an active critical
public evaporate. The only hope emerging from Frankfurt School
pessimism is the generative force of marginal culture forms as the
repository of genuine critical values and the ultimate ability of a
biological and psychical escape from the repressions of modern society
in some way hardly made clear. The interpenetration of the public
and private spheres seems complete within this perspective.
The work of Hannah Arendt is more promising. A concern for the loss
of the public dimension of politics is interwoven with her search for
the 'human condition1, and the work of Arendt can be presented first
through her conception of power and secondly by illustrating how her
view of power relates to her theory of politics and the public realm
in modern society. Her ideas on the political and that of 'vita
activa' represent an approach to modern political problems which
shares much of the pessimism about the loss of a sense of the political
and a decline in the 'public realm' emanating from the Neo-Conservative
perspective, however, she identified significant political ideas which
may assist our understanding of politics as a form of participation
in society.
it might be helpful to understand Arendt's conception of power more
clearly by distancing it from the more conventional view offered by
Weber, among others. Weber's view of power can be understood as a
teleological model because it reposes on the idea that once an
individual or interest group has selected the means most appropriate
for attaining the goal or goals set for themselves, goal attainment
will depend on the ability to overcome obstacles presented by other
actors intervening in the process of negotiating the desired ends. To
the extent that obstacles can be removed by making other actors behave
in a way desired then 'power' can be said to be exercised. Power is
simply, in this instance, the bringing about of consequences desired
with no restriction imposed by other actors. "Power means every
chance within a social relationship to assert one's will even against
(19)
opposition". Now Arendt's conception of power differs from this
notion because she importantly differentiates between power aimed at
attaining success of a particular will or interest; its instrumental
function, and power which is generated collectively for concerted
action by common agreement; power as a communicative function.
Now it is important to further distance Arendt's emerging conception
of power from that commonly associated with Parsons. He concep¬
tualises power as "the general capacity of a social system to get
things done in the interest of collective goals". Here consent from
the governed must be mobilised in order to yield binding commitment
towards the political leadership and their decisions for the
collective good. Power is the capacity of a social system to attain
collective goals. Parsons is simply restating the teleological
conception of power in systems theory vocabulary; in Weber's sense
of power A wins over B because of more resources or strength or
whatever, and in Parsons sense A wins over B because of the right
given by some collective agreement from say, C,D,E, and F which B
also abides by and accepts. At best Parsons conflates the
teleological with the communications concept of power. There is no
sense of the distinction between instrumental action and communication
aimed towards agreement in the work of Parsons. Agreement for Arendt
is often treated as an end in itself and not necessarily instrumental
for attaining other goals. This seems to be an important distinction
which can contribute much to a project that seeks to conceptualise a
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dialectical politics of power and participation. Arendt therefore
differentiates between 'power' which she views in terms of a
communications process aimed towards generating collective agreement,
and 'force' which corresponds most closely to the teleological
conception of power favoured most commonly in the sociological
literature. (The Parsonian critique of C. Wright Mills' zero-sum
concept of power becomes increasingly irrelevant with this further
distinction because it too is classified as teleological.)
For Arendt:
"Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act
but to act in concert. Power is never the property of
an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in
existence only so long as the group keeps together.
When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we actually
refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people
to act in their name." (21)
Arendt is able to keep separate the notion of 'the power of agreement-
oriented communication to produce consensus' from 'force' which is
aimed at the control and manipulation for specific individual or
group interests. Power, we may say, lies in the institutionalising
of the capacity or facility of a community to seek consensus through
debate and reason.
"it is the people's support that lends power to the
institutions of a country, and this support is but the
continuation of the consent that brought the laws into
existence to begin with All political institutions
are materialisations of power; they petrify and decay
as soon as the living power of the people ceases to
uphold them. This is what Madison meant when he said
'all government rests on opinion', a word no less true
from the various forms of monarchy than for democracies."(22)
The importance of developing this distinctive conception of power lies
in Arendt's concern to establish an understanding of political
institutions as both the consolidation of collectively agreed upon
norms and values in the processing of specific affairs and problems
of life and as the political effect of publicly produced opinion. To
the extent that institutions defend and extend the protection of
liberties against blatant force they also manifest and express this
important communications concept of power which is ultimately founded
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on consensus which could be rationally justified and validated by
reference to common understandings of what is morally and normatively
agreed upon and commonly understood. This is what legitimacy must
ultimately mean. This idea can be clarified by briefly unpacking the
philosophical roots of Arendt's The Human Condition. Eventually this
work will need to be rescued from its consensual and idealistic over¬
tones, but it nevertheless has an important contribution to make
towards conceputa1ising a space for participatory political forms.
By distinguishing 'Work', 'Labour' and 'Action' Arendt wishes to
assert that within the latter concept lies the most important basis
of the human condition, that of the praxis of speech and
intersubjective understanding. Work is understood by Arendt to refer
to the creation of artefacts of utility or use-objects and man takes
on the status of the artisan by the ability to create objects which
can serve instrumental ends or means. This is distinguished from
Labour which is the activity which provides the means of consumption
in order to sustain life itself. Human beings must engage in a
circular relationship with nature in order to win from her food and
materials to exist. Labour reflects 'the reproductive cycle of the
metabolic process'. Labour is expired in order to consume to live.
So by contrasting the idea of Action to Work and Labour, Arendt seeks
to show that it is within Action, that is by using speech and
establishing common understandings between men that their distinctive
humanity is achieved. And importantly it is only within what she
terms the public realm and with the practice of politics that Action
i s rea1ised.
"Because of its inherent tendency to disclose the agent
together with the act, action needs for its full appearance
the shining brightness which we once called glory, and which
is possible only within the public realm." (23)
The two most important concepts for understanding Hannah Arendt's
work are now revealed: that of Action as the embodiment of those
uniquely human qualities of speech and understanding, and the
institutional "space of appearances" within which these qualities
find true expression. And it is also with the statement of these two
concepts that the. rhrust of her critique of modern society comes to
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fruition and connects with her conception of power. She observes a
withering of the public realm as social and economic questions and
interests enter and dominate the public political sphere, where only
an instrumental conception of power is conceivable in modern society
with the growth in the state and corporate interests. There are
similarities with Habermas1 analysis of the public sphere, as we .shall
see, but there are also fundamental differences regarding how this
malaise should be understood and resolved.
The theme of the withering of the public realm becomes a dominant one
in Arendt's writing, and having outlined the key concepts of her
argument, it is worth exploring it in more depth in order to identify
its insights and weaknesses.
Arendt relies on an Aristotelian conception of politics. Within that
classical tradition a clear distinction is drawn between techne and
praxis, or the distinction between making and doing. Praxis is
Aristotle's concept for man's free action or that which makes him
truly human and virtuous. It corresponds to, or is interpreted by
Arendt as Action and is further based on the classical Greek
distinction of the private and public realms. It is only by 'Action'
within the public realm that true virtue can be realised because it
is a realm devoid of the necessities of Work and Labour which are
integral parts of the private realm. The concept of politics within
this tradition is based on men freely combining to deliberate on 'the
good life' through dialogue and reason. Politics within this frame¬
work has a specificity which clearly demarcates it from other human
practices. It is in other words a 'pure form of polities'.
There are, of course, damaging criticisms that one can make of
Arendt's rather Utopian concept of politics. Margaret Canovan for
example identifies an unresolved tension throughout Arendt's work
(24)between elitism and a profound interest in 'action' and democracy.
On the one hand there is the great defence of the classical concept
of the Greek polis and" the very democratic idea of a communications
concept of power rooted in the public sphere. On the other hand,
there is a hostility towards any force or interest that would seek to
destroy the purity of the political realm by introducing economic and
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social questions into it, which by their nature are divisive and
mundane, as the following quote demonstrates:
"The fact that political 'elites' have always determined
the political destinies of the many and have, in most
instances, exerted a domination over them, indicates...
the bitter need of the few to protect themselves against
the many, or rather to protect the island of freedom
they have come to inhabit against the surrounding sea
of necessity." (25)
There is an unusual utopianism in Arendt's notion of the public
sphere. It might even be described as absurd in relation to the
realities of modern politics. Hanna Pitkin suggests that the heart
of the contradiction in Arendt's thought lies in the misinterpretation
or misunderstanding of Aristotle; whereas Arendt understands the
purpose of the public realm to be the rather individualistic pursuit
of personal virtue and greatness where men "distinguished themselves1"'
and ensured "immortal fame", Aristotle conceived of the polis as a
place to seek justice. (26)
"Aristotle's account, then, does not give rise as Arendt's
does to a sense of the citizen's anxiety and egotistical
striving for Aristotle, what makes political activity
valuable, what holds the polis together, and makes the
citizens more or less willing to share in the burden....
of public affairs is justice. For Aristot1e....po1itics
and justice are also about economic privilege and
social power." (27)
The idea of a degenerate public sphere based on the intrusion of
social questions into the political arena therefore seems odd when
related to the realities of the modern polity. Arendt is, of course,
too reliant on a rather individualistic interpretation of the
classical Greek conceptualisation of the public and private spheres
and gives the false impression that the historical direction has
necessarily been a one-way movement towards a loss of the political
dimension in social life because of a decline in civic virtue, and
the increasinq intrusion of divisive and mundane social and economic
(28)issues. This general form of theorising the historical changes
in the public sphere seems to place Arendt's work in the same body
of literature discussed above in so far as civic orientation is
destroyed by materialism and the forces of modern consumer society.
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The idea of the degeneration of the public sphere in her work allows
no conceptual space which can be created for a reaction against
politically constraining processes and institutions and seems to
allow no path back towards the desired goal of a healthy discoursing
'politically oriented1 public.
However, I think this interpretation goes too far in the case of
Arendt. Her communications concept of power based ultimately on the
idea of common understandings, capable of discursive validation and
embedded in specific institutional practices is an important idea that
can be rescued from her otherwise idealistic, and overly romantic,
political philosophy. This concept of power I will argue has echoes
in the work of Habermas and E.P. Thompson and implies a normatively
based political perspective on law and institutional rights which I
hope to establish by the end of this chapter. Both the strengths and
weaknesses of Arendt's position can be further highlighted in relation
to Habermas1 work on the public sphere.
Politics and Rational Discourse
The difficulty of positing an overwhelming process of constraint and
domination which does not allow for a purposive meaningful reaction
by subjects is addressed by Habermas. His work is very much a
re-appraisal of early critical theory and also importantly Habermas'
intellectual project includes an appreciation and critique of Arendt's
acknowledgement of the political public sphere as an authentic
(29)dimension of social life. Through an analysis of Habermas' more
substantively political writings I wish to conceptualise the problem
of the public sphere in terms of a central contradiction of modern
society pointed up by his work; that of a major tension between the
'political' or practical mode of problem resolution and decision¬
making and the 'technological' or instrumental mode. My argument to
follow will stress that this tension between political and normative
based legitimations and those based on instrumental means-end
technical criteria, provides important leverage for understanding the
general dilemma of advanced industrial societies and the specific
political controversy which forms the focus of this thesis.
Habermas essentially began his intellectual project by taking
seriously the analysis of the contemporary decline of the political
public sphere offered by Arendt and outlined above. Arendt's idea of
a communications concept of power presaged much of Habermas1
reformulation of the theoretical framework for a critical socia 1-theory.
His major work The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere
sought to ground the insight historically and shape it into a far more
powerful theoretical and political tool.^1^ It provides the starting
point for my analysis of the public sphere.
What first must be theoretically recovered and historically delineated
is the very idea of the 'public' and the 'public sphere'. This task
is presented by Arendt as an enquiry into the classical political
heritage of the distinction between the private and public realms in
ancient Greece. Habermas begins by focusing on the historically
changing mediation between the state and civil society in the develop¬
ment of capitalism. What is important for him is the genesis of the
institutiona1isat ion of a normative concept of democracy. It is
essentially a theoretical and historical approach to understanding
the development of political and social forms which once secured
individual spheres of autonomy in the development of Capitalism out
of Feudalism.
The concept of the public sphere, while derived from the classical
Greek conception of a domain distinct from the worldly concerns of the
private sphere, can be more usefully seen as part of the changing
relationship between an increasingly public state apparatus and civil
society.
In presenting his thesis on the 'structural transformation of the
public sphere1 Habermas clearly distinguishes between its historical
and empirical specificity and its theoretical and normative utility.
His main objective is the latter and it is that dimension of his work
(31)that I too wish to emphasise.
It Is only with the decline in the complex network of private rights
and obligations characteristic of the feudal nexus that the concept of
a state apparatus with a distinctly public character becomes a reality.
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Poggi's analysis of the development of the modern state parallels and
supports Habermas1 approach and can be helpful here in locating the
(32)
emergence of a politically significant public political sphere.
Feudalism as a political structure of mutual private rights and
obligations was characterised above all else by the assimilation of
the private domain of the powerless within the prerogatives of the
wealth, power and influence of the feudal lord's private household.
Whereas the normative structures of the feudal nexus bound lord and
serf together, there was no fully developed state apparatus and
codified laws to ensure the fulfilment of those feudal rights and
obligations. The model of the private household is important for
stressing the continuity between private power and public
domination.
The public sphere in the feudal period up until about the 12th and
13th century, was nothing more than a representative sphere for the
public display of monarchical might and the display of power by feudal
lords in their relations with each other. There was, of course, no
sense of a political society beyond those relationships.
The crucial point I wish to emphasise is that the development of a
distinctly public dimension to monarchical power in the absolutist
period, and the growing state apparatus in the development of the
capitalist mode of production, Is crucial for understanding the
development of the distinction between the public and private spheres
as we might conceptualise this distinction in modern society. The
overall argument advanced by Poggi in which the transition of feudalism
to absolutism is mediated by the phenomenon of the Standestaat must be
left unexplored here. However, his general argument is useful. The
development of the modern state out of the systems of feudalism, and
on the continent the Standestaat, was characterised by the increasing
success of the absolute ruler to integrate and concentrate national
power in one centre rather than within a plurality of dispersed power
centres. The concentration of power in the absolutist period crucially
led to the emergence of civil society as the state's institutions
around about the 10th and 11th century (court and ministerial and
administrative systems) became increasingly public in the
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consolidation of national jurisdiction over an increasingly powerless
aristocracy.
"The state's codes and statutes, of course, had to be
officially promulgated and published, printed in vulgar
tongue, widely diffused Thus the state had moved,
as it were, up and away from the larger society to a
level of its own, where specifically political personnel
and functions were concentrated." (3*0
In Britain, and on the Continent, the state began to address the
population as private individuals "the state addressed them in their
capacity as subjects, taxpayers, potential military draftees.
Civil society had emerged but was subordinate to the rule of king and
state. It is at this point that the theoretical and historical
analysis of the public sphere must concentrate its focus: the
emergence of a political challenge to the state within civil society
at the inception of developing capitalism* it is at the point where
the conflict between anciens regimes and the new social, political
and economic order began that a politics based on the challenge of
a discoursing bourgeois public became significant. The development
of a distinct social, political and economic identity for the
propertied and commercially oriented bourgeoisie occurred within the
midst of absolutism. The contours of a distinctly class society,
based on competing economic Interests and differential location to
the centres of power and control, emerged out of the conflict between
the developing hegemony of the capitalist mode of production over
vestiges of feudalism and traditionalism.
The nature of the political challenge to the absolutist system was not
a purely overt clash of different economic interests. Its nature is
extremely important for laying the theoretical foundations for my
analysis in subsequent chapters.
The crucial starting point for understanding the development of the
mediation of the public sphere in the relationship between the state
and civil society is to recognise that the absolute state was able to,
and did, accommodate the burgeoning market activity of the growing
commercial bourgeoisie. As Poggi interestingly remarks in relation
to the reasons why the bourgeoisie posed a throughgoi ng political
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challenge to the old order.
"In my view, such bourgeoisies were politically
radicalised and 'energised' by components of them
distinct from the entrepreneurial groups.... These
components were involved particularly in intellectual,
literary and artistic pursuits, and had been
developing a distinct social identity - that of a
pub lie, or rather, at first, of a variety of publics." (36)
The period from approximately the mid 18th century to 1870 in Europe
saw the beginning of the creation of a public sphere that had
significant political consequences. The development of an
increasingly public political form created from above by the growth
in the state apparatus came to be complemented from below by the
gradual institutiona1isat ion of criticism and controversy in the
form of literary salons, publishing houses, scientific societies,
and the development of the daily and periodic press. The emergence
of 'public opinion' as a mediation between state and civil society
became developed.
"A reasoning public might lead the civil society to break
through the passive, subject position in which the official
power sought to confine it. The reasoning public not only
dared to open debate on matters that those powers had ever
treated as arcana imperi but threatened to extend that
debate to wider and wider social circles in order to
increase its support." (37)
It was this political challenge of a discoursing public rather than a
call for respect to markets that posed the real challenge. It is
precisely this political challenge posed by a discoursing public
which provides the basis of the critical social theory of Jurgen
Habermas. He was concerned initially with historically and
institutionally delineating those political forms which established
a normative concept of democracy in liberal capitalism. Overall his
project can be understood as an attempt to identify social and
political forms which can, and historically have, secured public
freedoms in order to argue for their radica1isation and adaptation
(• lOj
to contemporary conditions in late capitalist society. Against
Marx, Habermas has always argued that class interest embodied in
legal forms (bourgeois norms generated by the sphere of circulation)
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is not the only mediation between the state and civil society. The
public sphere, as an attendant development of the modern state, was
premised on the idea of reason as a countervailing power to the state
in opposition to the particular interests of the monarchy. The
importance of this phenomenon lies in the fact that political and
social questions were opened up for consideration by a reasoning
public for the first time. Historically the emergence of 'public
opinion1 came to have a specific political effect by influencing the
actions of governments. The significant aspect of this for Habermas'
task of revising critical theory was the very idea that dialogue and
public discussion could take the form of generating normative
evaluations which influenced and directed the political process in
the development of the modern state at all.
The central feature of Habermas1 focus on the emergence of a
discoursing bourgeois public is to recover theoretically the
important normative and legal principles embodied in the literary
salons, political societies and the press of the 18th and 19th
centuries, in order to establish a social theory in which reason and
discourse constitute the core. This has a political as well as a
theoretical objective; to investigate the idea of the public sphere
as an institutional space where public opinion can be formed and be
influential in directing social and political processes and
theoretically to ground that investigation in an analysis of
language, knowledge and human interests in order that the basis of
a non-distorted communication process can be conceived within areas
of public freedom still to be won and sustained in modern society.
This political and theoretical task is a most important idea to be
underscored. The thesis that the public and the public sphere have
disintegrated in modern society is re-shaped when it is realised that
unlike Sennett, Arendt and the early Frankfurt School, Habermas is
arguing for a recognition that certain political and legal principles
of criticism and democracy have been institutionalised in the course
of the historical process. They must be identified and recovered in
order that a genuine democratic politics based on public openness and
discussion can be defended against tendencies which would eradicate
those gains, and further that any gains that exist must be extended
and placed on a firmer social and political base.
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In Strukturwandel Habermas steers a course between the neo-Aristote1ian
Arendt and the overly pessimistic Marxism of the Frankfurt School, and
in doing so attempts to locate our understanding of the public sphere,
democracy and political action on firmer ground.
Arendt had argued, from an essentially elitist position which
contained elements of anti-modernism, that the great political model
of the Greek polis should be sought. Her writing is really a
lament for its passing. The public sphere for her should similarly
be exclusively concerned with a pure politics untarnished by divisive
social and economic questions. She argues that it is the intrusion
of modern society into the political arena that destroys the interest
free interaction of the political public sphere. Habermas1 position
is quite different. The theme of Strukturwandel is what Jean Cohen
(A 1)
calls, the "renormatisat ion" of the democratic state. That is,
opening the ends of economic, political and social policy and
practice to ethical, rational and public reflection. In other words,
the social and economic questions which Arendt holds to be divisive
and destructive of the public sphere are the very subjects which
should be open for public debate, reflection and action. It is the
lack of opportunity for democratic reflection on these issues that
destroys the public sphere, not their intrusion.
It is by a similar reconceptual I sation of the political question of
emancipation and freedom that Habermas distances himself from the
early Frankfurt School. Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, for example,
tended to equate objectivation with alienation (two concepts kept
separate in Marx, the former representing the externalising of man's
human achievement in objects through labour, the latter the severing
of the relationship between subject and object). The Frankfurt
School consequently rejected all bourgeois institutions in total.
They were unable to identify any emancipatory moment in social and
political institutions that were the product of social processes
dominated by the values of bourgeois freedom. The idea of created
increments in freedom containing a rational core capable of recovery
and extension were ignored by the early critical theorists but
evidenced throughout Habermas1 work.
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The crucial theoretical idea recovered by Habermas from the historical
analysis of 18th and 19th century public institutions is that of an
open and free community debating and forming common perspectives on
problematic issues. This communicative model, Habermas argues, first
established itself in the forms and relationships of the bourgeois
family. Jean Cohen, for example, draws attention to the subsequent
development of this phenomenon both in terms of the political public
sphere and Habermas1 theoretical interpretation of it.
"Habermas locates the emergence of the bourgeois public and
the separation of state and civil society not in liberal
capitalism, but rather in the framework of 17th and 18th
century absolutism. Despite the regulative activity of the
mercantilist state in trade, production and labour, and
despite its role in integrating production and consumption
into a national market network, the developing system of
contracts, private law and private enterprises remained
distinct from the political apparatus. Although inter¬
vention by the state into private systems was always
possible, it presupposed a distinction between private and
public spheres Accordingly, the core institutions of
modern society - the bourgeois family, civil society, the
literary and political public - are analysed both in terms
of the 'increment in freedom1 which these structures
institutionalised as well as their limits. Habermas1
strategy is to articulate the institutional gains of
modernity (universal norms) and to preserve them. Thus
in so far as the norms of 'humanity' and 'intimacy' based
on free individual choice are located in the intimate and
not, as in the Greek model, in the public sphere, there
is an emancipatory moment inherent in the bourgeois family."(42)
How the historical model of the public sphere rooted in the private
sphere of civil society has important theoretical consequences
because its emancipatory potential is not dependent on the non¬
intrusion of state and economic institutions into ever more areas of
social life, e.g. the repoliticisation of economy and society. As
has been described above, the distinction between the state and civil
society predates the emergence of what Bell would call 'the public
(43)household' and the crucial state and economy distinction. An
independent private sphere pre-existed and embodied historically
gained liberties which Habermas presumably would always conceive of
as a model and potential resource for reaction against total
political domination by an unregulated state capitalism. This point
is merely to underscore the difference between Habermas and those
theorists who locate public freedom at the level of the state and
economy relationships. "The uniqueness of the bourgeois as opposed
to the Greek public, is that it consists of private persons
publicly assembled in the social sphere already individuated via the
(MO
family and the market". This point will be important to retain
as I turn to consider the theme of the repoliticisat ion of civil
society in modern capitalism and the thesis of the dissolution of
the public sphere.
The Repoliticisation of Civil Society: The Demise of a Public Culture
Re-Examined
The central theme emerging from my discussion so far needs to be
stated clearly. At the outset I suggested that the concepts of power
and participation as the foundation for two distinct politics is
unsatisfactory; they are inter-related dimensions of the political
process. I have so far formulated this axiom in terms highlighted
by Arendt's, and in turn Habermas1, communications concept of power
based on institutionally secured rights of 'participation' which is
distinguished from power based on coercion or force. The argument
being advanced here is that rights of 'participation', among others,
have been historically gained and once secured provided a constraint
upon the actions of the powerful and the prerogative of institutional
processes. The general categories of rights secured in the course
of the development of the modern state and civil society are (a)
freedoms reflecting the emergence of the public as a politically
relevant sphere of private persons such as freedom of opinion, speech
and press and freedoms of association and assembly, (b) the establish¬
ment of rights protecting the intimate sphere such as personal freedom
and the restricting of search and seizure, and (c) rights securing
civil society such as the protection of private property and equality
(Z, 5)before the law.
Now I must hasten to add that I am discussing the institutionalisat ion
of a bourgeois concept of democracy. The concept of democracy
embodied in public institutions was historically fought for and won
by the propertied bourgeoisie. In capitalist society those principles
will tend to express bourgeois ideology. They are victories of the
bourgeois public, as Habermas rightly emphasises. However, regardless
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of how far these principles and norms are distorted by the hierarchy
and inequalities of the class structure of capitalist societies, they
are nonetheless significant principles which Habermas provocatively
argues should be retained. The obvious intention is that they can be
extended ultimately to a society less exploitative by first identify¬
ing how they are distorted in contemporary public institutions. The
incorporation of these principles in constitutions of formal
democracies established immanent standards against which institutions
of the state are still forced to legitimate themselves. However only
in so far as there exists an institutional space which will subject
state policy and decision making to a radical public scrutiny, based
on general rather than particular class interests, can it be said
that those principles are firmly secured or capable of extension. It
is the problematic question of how far or to what extent there has
been a closing down of institutionally secured public space for
political criticism and participation in decision-making that must
be examined. My view is that Habermas1 historical analysis of the
public sphere shows that this question must be approached by a
perspective which does not eradicate normative and legal victories
which already secure a yardstick against which the state is judged.
It is also important not to theoretically eliminate any possibility
of political action and controversy over those very secured normative
and legal victories. As Thompson clearly shows us in Whigs and
Hunters, the law, and by extension, the principles of establishing
public political institutions, are not mere shams. They are the
product of social and political struggles. The question of interest
is the way in which participatory principles of politics and legal
rights are manipulated and distorted In the course of both the
political and legal process. Therefore 1 will examine the thesis of
a demise of the public sphere in terms which view principles of
power and participation in law and politics as dia 1ectica11y related.
By this I mean that contradictions and change in public institutions
are rooted in the incompatibility between their instrumental and
expressive tasks. The question now focuses on the dialectical
relationship between the power of the capitalist state, grappling
with the problems of crisis management of the economy>and the public
sphere which allows public participation and access to the political
and administrative institutions of capitalism as part of the
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legitimatory ideology of 1ibera1-democracy.
The crucial question posed to the modern capitalist state is what
forms of political participation are compatible with the management
problems of the economy and society experiencing recurring crisis?
I intend to pursue one significant response to that question in a
following chapter by discussing science and technology as a
contemporary legitimating ideology. However it is first important
to examine why this legitimatory ideology takes on a significant
political position. This requires a broader focus on the political
problems for democracy in late capitalism - a problem not rooted in
a narcissistic, hedonist culture which saps the public political
virtue of the citizen, but rooted in the political strategy of state
intervention in capitalist society essentially contradictory and
crisis ridden.
The state and public sphere should be seen as mutually constraining
and dialectically related institutional systems. The growth of the
state is inextricably coupled with the growth in the public sphere
and the institutionalisation of legal and normative entitlements,,so
the question of whether or not there has been an attenuation of the
public sphere in late capitalist society must be based on an
understanding of the capitalist state. Unlike the theories of Sennett,
Bell, Arendt and the Frankfurt School the emerging critical theory of
the state locates the political crisis of the public sphere within
the relationship between the capitalist state and economy, not in the
realm of culture. An elaboration of the critical theory of state and
economy will provide an important building block for a theory of the
public inquiry system.
The general thesis underlying the critical theory of the state and
economy is found in the work of James O'Connor, Claus Offe and
(47)Habermas. Their basic premise is that the expanded function of
the state in 20th century capitalism is itself a source of
dysfunction and crisis. (Contrary to the view that the state has
produced a crisis-free stabilization and integration of advanced
capitalist societies.) In order to fulfil its expanded functions
the state has relied upon three main resources which have now become
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problematic, namely, fiscal means, administrative rationality, and
importantly for my focus, the reliance on mass loyalty. If preferred,
these three resources can be understood as the central means through
which three central concepts are elaborated. Fiscal crisis (O'Connor),
Administrative Recommodificat ion (Offe) and Legitimation Crisis
(Habermas). These concepts can be related together in a unified
critical theory of the state.
First, O'Connor's study elaborates the overall framework. The
capitalist state must try and fulfil two basic and often mutually
contradictory functions, accumulation (the state must try to maintain
or create the conditions in which profitable capital accumulation is
possible) and legitimation (the state must try to maintain or create
the conditions for social harmony).
"A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive forces
to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of
the other classes loses its legitimacy and hence undermines
the basis of its loyalty and support. But a state that
ignores the necessity of assisting the process of capital
accumulation risks drying up the source of its own power,
the economy's surplus production capacity and taxes drawn
from this surplus." (48)
This perspective is developed into a theory of how and why the
state's functions have grown and what kind of stresses, particularly
budgetary stresses, have resulted. In answering the question what
is the rationale behind the burgeoning state budget, O'Connor
provides a structural theory of public finance. He argues that the
state expenditures have a twofold character corresponding to the
capitalist state's two basic functions of accumulation and
legitimation, namely social capital and social expenses respectively.
Social capital breaks down into social investment and social
consumption (equivalent to Marx's distinction between constant and
variable capital). Social investment entails expenditure on projects
and services which increase the productivity of labour power and
hence lead to greater profitability. Examples are state financed
industrial development sites, or loans and grants for new plant,
roads or manpower development programmes. Social consumption relates
to expenditure on projects aimed towards reducing the reproductive
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costs of labour, like the provision of welfare services, education
and training schemes, and the underwriting of urban, suburban and
rural developments. Social expenses are expenditures which are
directly and explicitly required to maintain social harmony. These
are expenditures on projects and services which O'Connor describes
as aimed towards "repressive and materially co-optive forms of
internal and external social control" which are not even indirectly
productive. The police and military are obvious examples of this,
but projects of various kinds in the area of social work, and
community work could be conceived in terms of this social control -
legitimation task. It is important to stress, especially in
relation to this latter dimension, that all state actions contain a
mixture of these components. However, it is O'Connor's claim that
some state actions and agencies do express one or another of these
dimensions in relatively pure form.
Now the significance of this perspective is to point to a 'fiscal
crisis' which arises in the modern capitalist state as the two
branches of expenditure become unbalanced through political and
administrative overload on state finances. A gap between state
expenditure and revenues arises. This can be theorised further by
reference to the work of C1 aus Offe and his concept of adm?ni strative
recommodificat ion, which specifies the underlying nature of the
(*»9)
structural crisis of the capitalist state.
Offe argues, that as the capitalist state cannot organise production
directly, (property is private and institutionally secured as such in
capitalism) then political power depends indirectly on the volume of
private accumulation (through tax appropriation). The occupant of
a power position in a capitalist state is powerless, therefore,
unless the volume of the accumulation process provides the material
resources necessary to promote political goals. So as the state
depends on the process of accumulation beyond its power to control,
then state personnel are interested in creating the conditions
conducive to accumulation. Thus institutional self-interest of the
capitalist state depends on guaranteeing and safeguarding a healthy
accumulation.
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However, the democratic and representative institutions of the
capitalist state tend to obfuscate the interconnection and dependence
of political programmes on the accumulation process. The democratic-
political process of elections, lobbying and pressure group action
gives the appearance of a political-administrative system that is
adaptable to, and the outcome ofjelectoral preferences and choices.
Offe however describes this in terms of the dual determination of
political power e.g. the institutional forms of government are based
on access via democratic and representative processes whereas the
material content of political programmes is determined by the course
and further requirements of the accumulation process. There is a
crucial contradiction here for politics in late capitalist societies;
the dual determination of political power can mediate and can
compromise the relationship between the state's political-democratic
and politica1-administrative institutions in favour of the latter.
But as I have argued democratic rights, principles and expectations
must be viewed as constraints on state power and action. They are
indicative of institutional space fought for and secured historically
by both the bourgeoisie and the trade union and labour movement.
These institutional rights and normative expectations are both a
resource for action and focus of control. Popular democratic struggle
can extend them and defend them in relation to the state as an arena
of class and popular democratic struggle. Social and political forces
within the state will aim to limit their extension and impact on the
management of the capitalist economy and society. This fundamental
contradiction of capitalism's political and economic equilibrium can
best be fostered when every owner of a unit of value (be it labour or
capital) can successfully exchange it as a commodity within the market.
Herein lies the point of balance between economy and politics within
the capitalist society. It can simply be understood in terms that
people will acquiesce and be supportive of the system as long as they
are able to participate within it.
Both O'Connor and Offe argue that de-commodificat ion is a structural
feature of late capitalist development. The commodity form of labour
tends to lose its exchange value as capitalist development proceeds
because the anatomy of capitalism becomes dominated by the dynamism
of a capital intensive monopoly sector, whereas the labour intensive
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private sector becomes less functionally relevant, and more vulnerable
to cyclical market crisis.
The central thesis being argued within the emerging critical theory
of the capitalist state is that the self-corrective mechanisms of
market capitalism working on the exchange of commodities (goods,
labour and capital) become increasingly incapable of organising
social life. Labour and capital which are thrown out of commodity
form find it difficult to be re-integrated without state help. As the
state depends on accumulation which in turn depends on an expanded
ability for an exchange of commodities, as units of value, then the
common denominator of state activities is to guard the commodity form
and ensure as far as possible an expanded exchange of commodities in
labour capital and goods. The state in late capitalism has more and
more to adopt interventionist strategies which entail expenditure in
an expanded state budget, as O'Connor describes, in order to
administratively recommodify units of value displaced by capitalist
development. The process of administrative recommodificat ion under¬
lies the growth in state budgets and the rise of fiscal crisis, and
importantly indicates the increasingly important role for the state
in regional development politics in areas like Scotland confronted by
oil development. The contradictions of the late capitalist state are
built on the tendencies for increased taxation and state regulation as
the apparatus of state management grew on the one hand, and became
increasingly incapable of meeting economic and political expectations
of the electorate on the other. In short, state intervention and
involvement in the economy and society politicises and subverts the
marketfe normative system of possessive individualism. It becomes
increasingly visible that exchange relationships are sustained by
political and administrative acts of the state. The labour and
capital relationships become increasingly dependent on political
rather than market criteria.
It is these underlying tensions therefore that provide an under¬
standing of the economic and political background of many of the
large public inquiry controversies, particularly in the context of
North Sea oil and gas development. The strategic importance of many
onshore development projects can be comprehended, I would suggest,
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precisely in terms of the wider fiscal and social contradictions
analysed by Offe and O'Connor. These contradictions provide a frame¬
work within which the specific tensions of the state and public
enquiry system can be located. I will work through these and specify
a place for the public inquiry within this process.
Both Offe and Habermas have argued that the forms of reaction adopted
by the Capitalist state to resolve the tensions and dilemmas I have
discussed are largely unworkable. The use of bureaucratic means to
develop a direct productive role in the economy for the state is
inefficient and inflexible. It can lead only to what Habermas
describes as a 'rationality crisis'. Greater central planning of the
economy can be in conflict with the essentially private nature of
investment and development decisions within capitalism. The option
of increasing public participation in decision-making can lead to the
subordination of capitalist interests to popular-democratic and
working-class interests. The real issue is that although these
devices are largely contradictory in terms of some functional notion
of 'the needs of capital', they are variously adopted because the
state cannot have a prior vision of 'functional imperatives'. The
basic tension within the state between accumulation and the need to
justify its workings in terms of social and political legitimations
remains a dynamic contradiction through which an understanding of
capitalist society and its institutions can be achieved. However, it
must be seen less in functionalist terms than within the framework
of the dialectical concept of politics I have been alluding to.
Bob Jessop assists here in complementing this general perspective in
relation to the state by stressing that the capitalist state is a set
of 'institutions and apparatuses of political representation and
intervention'. The element of administrative power and intervention
is constrained by the fact that
"Democracy is an aspect of the institutional structure of
the state: in the context of capitalist societies it refers
to the legal entitlement of 'citizens' to participate in
the determination of policies to be executed by the state in its
capacity as sovereign legal subject and to the conditions of
existence of such participation (eg. freedom of speech, freedom
of association, free elections). Citizenship involves the
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institution of individual juridical subject endowed with
specific political rights as well as obligations and the
extension of this legal status to all adult members of
society without reference to their class position or other
attributes. Popular-democratic struggle in capitalist
societies is concerned with extending the scope of citizens
rights of participation to include more of the 'people'
within the category citizens, and to institute the legal
conditions appropriate to democracy. Moreover because
formal democratic institutions do not guarantee that
control by the 'people' popular-democratic struggle also
encompasses struggle to establish and maintain the social
conditions in which such control is realised." (50)
it is therefore important to retain the idea that the state consists
of a 'contradictory unity' between 'institutions and apparatuses of
political representation and intervention'. The recent debates about
corporatism have highlighted this tension. Jessop has argued that
corporatism, while not a new mode of production and political system,
is a distinct mode of political interest mediation. The emergence
of direct management relations between the state, organised labour
and big business over the running of the economy has resulted in what
Habermas has described as the 'refeuda1isat ion of the relations of
production'. The state uses private interests as part of its
management structure bypassing the public sphere. A distinct
corporate sector of politics has emerged. However, while the
strategic economic interests are integrated within an emerging
corporate sector there remains a pluralist sector which functions as
a forum for various pressure group poli-tics within the public sphere.
As Alan Cawson suggests:
"The interpenetration of groups and the state apparatus
develops unevenly according to the changing requirements
for capitalist reproduction at different stages of
development. It is most highly developed and
institutionalised where co-operation is most indispensable
in the pursuit of collective goals such as stable prices
and regulated income growth in the post-war period, and
least developed in sectors where market mechanisms can
continue to operate, sometimes alongside direct state
provision." (51)
The 'contradictory unity' between 'corporate' and 'pluralist' sectors
of politics can be formulated in terms of a tension between the
categories social investment and social consumption contained in
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O'Connor's work. Saunders has usefully suggested that this tension
can be understood as a contradiction between different levels of the
(52)
state. Whereas central government has a concern with social
investment and the direct productive support of private interests as
an integral part of the centralised management of the economy, local
government is more concerned with social consumption policies.
So reformulating the core dialectical relationship between power and
participation as modes of political engagement, it is possible to
understand it as, first^ a contradiction between two sectors of
politics determined largely by the strategic needs of capital
reproduction (relations between big business and organised labour
will be part of a 'corporate sector', pressure groups operating in
issue areas of non-strategic economic significance will be part of
a pluralist sector) and secondly between different levels of the
state (between central and local government over social investments
and social consumption).
However, the overall process is incomplete.
"The imperatives of rationalisation and planning which
characterise the advanced capitalist state impose
specific requirements for interest representation and
legitimacy participation. Apart from the need to
regulate the economy, the trend towards corporatism
can be observed in land-use planning, local government
and in many other areas of established public
policy." (53)
The separation of 'corporate' and 'pluralist' sectors of politics
is really only an analytical separation. The degree of corporatism
in contemporary society is growing with the complexity of the
economy into areas hitherto not considered to be economically
strategic. However there is also emerging a struggle between
popular pressures for democracy in decision-making which pulls the
opposite way to the demands of economic planning. This is particularly
the case in areas of politics such as land-use planning and the
environment, where the political units are local action groups,
amenity societies and pressure groups which are more accustomed to
tackling local planning authorities than multi-national companies
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and central government seeking to sponsor developments that have
implications for national economic policy.
The real dilemma with respect to the big public inquiries in the
context of large scale North Sea oil and gas projects, is that they are
located on the seams of an overlap between issue areas and pressure
groups derived from the 'corporate' and 'pluralist sectors', and
between centralised planning for national objectives and local
government planning for local spatial and social needs. The economic,
environmental and planning issues relating to all of the case studies
to be discussed blur the neat distinctions drawn in the recent
discussions. Local planning issues have taken on strategic national-
economic significance.
With respect to the public inquiry system it emerges as a unique
institutional apparatus that sits on top of the contradictions
referred to. It contains within it the contradictions of attempting
to resolve the conflict between issue areas and interests determined
at the level of corporate relations with the state and between
concerns that are sponsored by popular democratic pressure groups
concerned with local issues and the environment. It also has to
resolve the contradiction between a planning system that is designed
to determine needs at the local level yet process development
applications considered to be of national economic significance by
central government.
The real issue emerges that the public inquiry system is itself an
embodiment of the contradictions referred to. It at one and the same
time seeks to be 'an instrument of government1 and also an
institutional mechanism for allowing democratic participation in
planning matters. Underlying all the major planning controversies
processed by the public inquiry instrument is the explicit tension
between corporatist and democratic forms of interest mediation. Prior
to most major inquiries there are, as an integral part of large scale
development projects, corporatist style exchanges between the state
and the developer outwith the public sphere. These private meetings
and relations are often defended in terms of commercial security but
such 'private' exchanges concern those who wish the public sphere to
be the main arena of open evaluation of projects and the determination
of public policy. The public inquiry instrument can often be a brief
'democratic' stage that intervenes in an ongoing corporatist form of
(54)
processing planning applications. The state often prefers to
incorporate vociferous objectors'organisat ions into direct discussions
out of the public sphere after the completion of a public hearing. I
will illustrate this factor with reference to the case of the Moss
Morran controversy. This is just to underline that the fundamental
tension between corporate planning and democratic accountability
remains an essential element of the contemporary planning public
sphere and gives rise to large scale public criticism coupled with
official concern about inefficiency.
0
It therefore must be emphasised that the central feature of the public
inquiry institution and of politics more generally is the dialectical
tension between power and participation as modes of political
engagement. The idea of there being a 'legitimation crisis' or a
'contradiction'of the state highlights the necessity to retain a
notion of social and political action, and importantly, retain a
conception of the political process which acknowledges the real
institutionally secured rights for people to participate. Forms of
participation are secured by administrative and legal rights which
hinder the arbitrary use of power.
It is often the exercise of participatory rights or the attempt to
extend them that generates the 'contradiction' or the
'legitimation' prob 1 em. Wi thout some form of political life within the
public sphere or without the concept of a pluralist sector to
challenge the actions of the corporatist state, there would exist no
problem. However, the issues are not straightforward and in the
following chapters I will seek to outline how these tensions discussed
here work themselves out within the specific institutional setting of
the public inquiry system, in particular within the phenomenon of




The emerging critical theory of the State discussed in Chapter 1
stressed how the capitalist state is essentially defined by the
fact that it is excluded from direct control over the organisation
of the accumulation process. From the work of Claus Offe, James
O'Connor and Jurgen Habermas, ^ a distinctive theory of the
Capitalist State has emerged which seeks to conceptualise the
structural interconnection between the accumulation process and
state policy formation.
The Capitalist State is structurally oriented towards the support
and reproduction of the capitalist accumulation process upon which
all state power and political programmes ultimately depend, and
as such it has a class-specific bias because State policy and inter¬
vention strategies will have an institutional self-interest in a
healthy capitalist economy. However, two important issues arise
as part of this perspective. First, the operation of democratic
political processes tend to conceal the fact that State action
and policy is crucially dependent upon the accumulation process
and not on the political preferences of individuals or groups
involved in the political process. Secondly, if this general
perspective is extended to the politica1-administrative use of
public inquiries as an instrument of government, then the public
inquiry can be seen as a politica1-administrative process within
which there is a tension between an instrumental function to
process and mediate major planning issues relating to the location
of industry and an expressive function to legitimise decision¬
making by allowing participation and a public hearing to any
individual or group affected by planning schemes.
The public inquiry system, as an instrument of government, is
ostensibly "used by the State as a method of determining its own .
actions, and of informing the Minister's mind". The main issue
- 35 -
arising from my mode of analysis is to demonstrate that the public
inquiry instrument conceals the actual basis of the decision¬
making process by facilitating controversial industrial projects
as part of the overall accumulation cycle while fulfilling its
legal and normative requirement to provide a public hearing to
give legitimacy to decisions actually determined by criteria related
to the structural needs of capital.
My premise is that through a critical theory of the State it should
be possible to understand the workings of the public inquiry system
as an integral part of the wider accumulation process.
I argued in Chapter 1 that 'power' and 'participation' are
inextricably linked together in the modern political process.
Indeed, my argument suggested that a normative concept of democracy
has been historically institutionalised and once certain rights
and conventionally accepted norms are secured they create a set of
immanent standards against which political institutions must be,
and are, judged and constrained. The public inquiry system,
therefore, should be understood within this general mode of
analysis. It represents the Institutional embodiment of basic
popular, judicial and administrative rights for access to the
politicaI-administrative decision-making apparatus on matters of
planning and development. However, while the public's legally
secured right of access to the politica1-administrative process
can be understood as an integral mechanism of the State's interest
in accumulation, it can never be totally determined by it. If
we presume that the public inquiry instrument is geared towards
assisting the accumulation process, then opposition forces
working through the planning process, in order to legitimise
effectively, must necessarily have freedom to occasionally
interfere with the efficient attainment of this goal. If this
were not the case then 'planning democracy' would be unlikely to
generate any level of public participation in decision-making at
- 36 -
all. Therefore, the crucial question is what features of the
current public inquiry system will ensure that the accumulation
goal is not damaged? The answer may well lie in the nature of
both the legal foundation of public inquiries and the form
participation takes within them. In this chapter 1 will
examine how the idea of 'natural justice1, as a foundation of the
legal and democratic nature of the public inquiry system, operates
to condition the democratic process.
Legal and procedural structures may be viewed as selective
mechanisms which assist in the overall task of minimising the degree
of compromise that industrial and economic goals must make to
the demands of public participation in decision-making. The
problem which a comprehensive theory of the public inquiry system
must satisfactorily resolve is the fact that the public inquiry
instrument, theorised as a dimension of politica1-administrative
State action, may be structura I ly geared towards facilitating the
accumulation process but is also situationa11y exposed to the
presentation of crucial information or evidence which may inhibit
or prevent an inquiry decision being made In favour of capital.
A decision by both a Secretary of State and an inquiry Reporter may
find against capitalist development for reasons that cannot be
anticipated by a purely structural perspective. Organised oppos¬
ition against a development may also be a crucial determinant of
policy outcome and decision-making, but more fundamentally, it
must be recognised that all administrative action within the
1ibera1-democratic state is legally subject to judicial review.
The structural theory of the Capitalist State must be accepted as
providing the framework within which the bias and constraints on
decision-making must be located, but such a perspective, of itself,
is inadequate either to explain the anomalies in the system
where capital projects are prevented or to account for the special
relationship between the law and public administration in a capital¬
ist society constitutionally founded on 1ibera1-democratic
traditions .
(2)
Following Offe, we may say that the capacity for the State
to act in favour of the accumulation process, by facilitating
major industrial location and planning proposals, depends upon a
'dual determination of political-administrative power',
(a) by its material content, the use of political power in general
is controlled by the course and further requirements of the
accumulation process;
(b) by its institutional jform, the power to decide on major
planning proposals is determined by the rules of natural
justice.
What is now of interest is how even the situational features of
inquiry procedure can themselves be interpreted in terms which
facilitate the structural bias of the system, while also ful¬
filling their legitimatory functions of ensuring formal 'justice'.
Natural Justice
The key issue that I. wish to give emphasis to here is the difference
between 'formal legal conceptions' of 'natural justice' and what
we might describe as 'common-sense conceptions'. Whereas the
very concept of 'natural justice' is held to parallel and be
derived from socially generated 'moral principles', it has become
a rather imprecise and insecure legal principle relating to formal
judicial assumptions about what constitutes a 'fair hearing' and
'bias' in administrative law.
It is often overlooked, especially in structural theories of the
State and economy and within the more reductionist variety of
Marxism, that historically state action has been operative within
both the confines of the rule of law and "communal, reasonable use
conceptions of property rights". The work of E.P. Thompson on the
rule of law and the 'moral economy of the crowd' is instructive for
(3)
asserting this important relationship. Thompson's general
argument is that the legal process must be taken seriously as an
arena of social struggle within which the working class and other
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popular-democratic interests have managed to secure rights over the
centuries. To this extent we can understand Thompson as providing
the working class complement to the building of democratic and
political rights described by Habermas in relation to the bourgeoisie.
Law within this perspective is not treated as being a mere sham,
a tool of manipulation by the dominant class. For Thompson,
'class struggle was expressed and mediated through the forms of
1 aw 'j
"Tf the law is evidently partial and unjust, then
it will mask nothing, legitimise nothing, contribute
nothing to any class hegemony. The essential pre¬
condition for the effectiveness of law, in its
function as ideology, is that, it shall display an
independence from gross manipulation and shall seem
to be just. It cannot seem to be so without upholding
its own logic and; criteria of equity; indeed, on occa¬
sion, by actually being just."
w
Now this is a very important corrective to economic reductionist
perspectives on the 'law1. It provides an important guiding
framework within which to theorise the relationship between State
political and administrative action and the public inquiry
instrument. The concept of 'natural justice' is the foundation
of all political-administrative action within the 1ibera1-demo¬
cratic tradition of the British State, and can only be understood,
I submit, within the perspective illustrated by Thompson. His
analysis of the 181h century crowd reminds us of the distinction
between 'the rule of law and the rule of absolute arbitrary force'.'**
Rural people in the 18th century doggedly clung to popular and
communal conceptions of justice and invoked the elaborate texture
of customary consumer protection regulation as a moral basis for
violent collective action to enforce a "just price" in the sale of
grain. Thompson points to how the poor have often articulated
their needs and grievances in terms either of the law or commonly
(6)
understood rights, even on the gallows.
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Similarly, the rules of 'natural justice', in the history of public
administration, can "be traced back to medieval precedents, and,
indeed, they were not unknown in the ancient world." ^ The
concept of 'natural justice' as it relates to administrative action
is based on common conceptions of justice requiring impartia 1
adjudicators and fair hearings. Wade argues that "in their medieval
guise they (rules of natural justice) were regarded as part of
the immutable order of things, so that in theory even the power
(8)
of the legislature could not alter them". The history of
public law and administration locates this important principle
at the level of everyday meaning and testifies to its significance.
In 1610 Chief Justice Coke actually declared that "an Act of
Parliament would be void if it made a man judge in his own cause
(9)
or was otherwise against common right and reason".
In a famous textbook case City of London v. Wood in 1701, Chief
Justice Holt stated "it is a very reasonable and true saying, that
if an Act of Parliament should ordain that the same person should
be party and Judge it would be a void Act of Parliament."
The idea informing these comments was that "natural justice,
natural law, and law of God and common right and reason were all
aspects of the old concept of fundamental and unalterable law".
What is sociologically interesting about the phenomenon of 'natural
justice' (in relation to my argument in Chapter 1) is thefact that
common conceptions of justice provided the initial impetus for ad
hoc institutional forms. The origins of the public inquiry system
have been located as far back as the reign of Henry VI I as part
of the early enclosure movement. Although Wraith and Lamb say
that "in earlier centuries enclosure had been carried out by
various methods, often by agreement, sometimes with harshness,
(12)
seldom with any objective appraisal of conflict of interest",
it is also the case that the affront to common conceptions of
reason and fairness gave rise to various forms of justification,
which occasionally meant public meetings and early unsophisticated
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forms of public inquiry being held. Of course, more often than
not, overt violence and lrough and ready1 justice was delivered.
However, what is also noticeable about the enclosure movement is
the lengths that were often adopted to justify action. The
period from 17^5_1845 is particularly worth examining. This
period was probably the height of the enclosure movement and the
device of a Private Bill was used frequently to obtain Parliamentary
approval for land enclosures. It was a form of petitioning
Parliament for the right to enclose land, often sponsored by a
village. It represented the need publicly to justify the
change of use proposed for an area of land, often requiring a maj¬
ority support from the affected locality. It contained within it
the requirement that enc1osure Commissioners examine the strengths
and weaknesses of the application. Importantly, a legislative
process which was often cumbersome and costly in time and money
prevented the arbitrary power of vested interests and local gentry
from depriving commoners of use rights on common lands, at least
without first having to participate in formal, legal and adminis¬
trative processes.
The pressures publicly to justify acts of enclosure in accordance
with the concept of 'natural justice', culminated in the Enclosure
Act of 1801 with a code specifying the need for the "proving of
the several facts".
"And whereas disputes may arise concerning the
boundaries of parishes, manors, hamlets and
districts, to be divided and inclosed.,...
Be it enacted "
(13)
As Wraith and Lamb state:
"What was enacted was an ad hoc commission of
inquiry, whose meetings were to be publicly
advertised according to the custom of the time
and place, and to whom anyone could make "
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"representation or complaint on the basis of
maps and plans which also were to be publicly
displayed".
m
The important point to emphasise is that up until 1845 when the
General Enclosure Act was passed, the important constraint upon
arbitrary power and action was the requirement to justify inten¬
tions first through local public hearings and secondly through
Private Bills submitted to Parliament as the recognised arena for
processing 'the people's will'. The acceptance of 'common
rights of reasonable use' as a normative standard underlay the
legal requirement of the Private Bill. However, from 1845 onwards
ironically we begin to see both the emergence of the public inquiry
system as we know it in contemporary society and also the beginning
of a shift in the interpretation of the concept 'natural justice'
away from a concept of 'common right and reason'. The 1845
Act contained the legislative device known as the Provisional
Order which came to replace the Private Bill. Whereas the
latter was an application to Parliament the former was an
arrangement whereby the State executive effectively took over
control of such applications. The executive of government In the
form of a specific ministry received the application for a Provisional
Order to change the use of land and it was the ministry not Parlia¬
ment that appointed an inspector to investigate the application.
This created a problem about 'natural justice' and accountability
that would reveal itself in the 20th century.
The interesting point about the General Enclosure Act of 1845, the
Public Health Act of 1848 and the Local Government Act of 1858
was that they signalled, by the use of Provisional Orders, the
intervention of the State as executive directly into the area of
the quasi-judicial, control of planning. This change took place
at a time when the enclosure movement had almost finished. Only-
common lands of outstanding natural worth remained. The middle
and upper classes were beginning to recognise the Impact of
industrialism and commercialism on their lives. Previously it was
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the lower classes who had experienced the full negative force of
the enclosure movement, but by the mid 19th century it is possible
to argue that the beginnings of the contemporary conflict between
development and preservation can be found with the middle class
concern to preserve leisure habitats and avoid the worst of urban
decay. The concept of 'natural justice' related increasingly
to the highly circumscribed notion of the individual's right to be
heard on matters affecting their lives and property (rooted in the
bourgeois conception of argument and reason identified, for
example, by Habermas), The concept of 'natural justice' came to
relate increasingly to the idea of an individual's right to be
heard. What actually happened was the transformation of the idea
of public inquiries as forms of adjudication rooted in the public
sphere, as they had been under the system of Private Bills prior
to 1845, into 'instruments of government1 by the emphasis given to
the audi alteram partem principle and the gradual neglect of the
nemo judex in causa sua principle; whereas the former relates to
the provision for individuals to be given an opportunity to be
heard, the latter relates specifically to the issue of impartiality
in adjudicators. The historical prominence of the former
principle as the core of 'natural justice' in puhlic administration
coincided with the use of Provisional Orders rather than Private
Bills and the shift of planning and development control from
Parliament to the Executive. The concept of 'natural justice1
also at this time began to be disconnected from a set of principles
built on actual living practices. It began to be an imprecise
notion no longer materially located in 'common-sense' understand¬
ings but became instead increasingly connected with some abstract
idea of reason to be interpreted by lawyers and public adminis¬
trators .
The concept of 'natural justice', the public administration textbooks
inform us, has fundamentally changed its role within the modern
state. Its task is no longer to destroy enacted law but has become
a mode of lu 1 fi 11 ing enacted law.
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"Its basis now Is in the rules of interpretation.
The courts may presume that Parliament, when it
grants powers, intends them to be exercised in a
right and, proper way. Since Parliament Is very
unlikely to make provision to the contrary, this
allows considerable scope for the courts to devise
a set of canons of fair administrative procedure,
suitable to the needs of the time".
It is clear that commonly understood conceptions of justice have
become one step removed from the community public sphere which gave
them life. They are now under the control of legal interpreters.
What is or is not a valid interpretation of an unbiased and fair
hearing must be passed through and processed by the elaborate net¬
work of legalistic structures which constitute the judicial review
of administrative action. However, even though the conception of
'natural justice' is no longer informed directly by the conceptions
of the ordinary man and now articulates a formal legal judgement
of 'fair' administrative action, it is also quite clear that it
must still relate to 'common right and reason' in order to retain
some force. Or must it? Thompson is right to argue that a
blatantly biased interpretation or use of the law will legitimise
and mask nothing. The vast legal apparatus does provide a general
countervailing force against arbitrary administrative power and is
an important element for understanding the actual operation of the
modern State(a fact that somecontemporary'analysis of the modern
State fail "to gfasp/Tn particular the structuralist Marxism of
Althusser and Poulantzas) . However, as I hope to show, the
legal interpreters can both fulfill the dictates of the principles
of 'natural justice' and also leave them unfulfilled in terms of
a 'common conception of natural justice'. By examining the progress
of the 'natural justice' concept, we are also charting the develop¬
ment of the public inquiry system and its growing unpopularity for
adjudicating major planning controversies. We will also be
reaching an understanding of the legitimation crisis the system
is now experiencing. It is my intention to Illustrate further
on how the inadequacies of the Institution and the principles
upon which it is founded are generating modes of political action
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within the public sphere of planning which may not threaten the
public inquiry system or the State, but certainly testify to a
major disjunction between 'formal' and 'common-sense' views of
administrative justice. However, 1 must demonstrate my argument
by examining the concept of 'natural justice' within the development
of judicial review of administrative action in the 2Qth century.
The idea of 'natural justice' has become recognised as the British
(l8)
equivalent of 'due process' The first decisions in which
the rule applied to administrative cases as a modern legal concept
were in the 19th century. The audi alteram partem rule became the
most prominent legal principle sustaining 'natural justice' against
the growth of central and local administrative authorities in the
19th century. The legal significance of the rule can be
illustrated by the specific cases of legal precedent upon which
the principles of natural justice were evoked in order to cancel
out or set aside administrative acts which were considered to be in
breach of the basic principles of an unbiased adjudication and/or
a fair hearing.
Whereas earlier examples of the principle related more specifically
to common rights and reasonable use and to the expectation that
a person be judgedty an independent adjudicator, that is, someone
unlikely to receive a direct benefit from the outcome of a decision,
(the nemo judex in causa sua principle) later examples seem to have
hinged more specifically on either the issue of prior notice of a
hearing or the issue of failing to give an individual a fair
opportunity of answering the case against him (the audi alteram
partem rule). This coincided, as I mention above, with the
development of public inquiries as 'instruments of government'.
An important textbook case can be cited. Under an Act of 1855
it was established that no one could erect a building in London
without giving seven days notice to the local board of works.
The board was empowered to demolish any building failing to
comply with the Act. One builder did fail and the local
authority demolished his building. However, the builder
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subsequently was able to claim damages against the local authority
in Cooper vs, Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) where the local
authority claimed their action was purely administrative but the
court took the view that they had no power to act uwithout first
asking him (Cooper) what he had to say for himself". The judges
involved in the case variously referred to "the plainest principles
(19)
of justice" and to the "violation of natural justice". The
emphasis was on audi a 1tera^i partem and not on nemo judex in causa
sua, as it has been for all subsequent judgements relating to public
inquiry decis ions,
The cases under which the rules were applied at the end of the
19th century were instrumental in confusing the relationship
between what was and was not administrative action and establishing
when administrative action became judicial. The Cooper vs. Wands¬
worth case, for example, was taken as representing a paradigm
case of a local authority acting judicially. Quoting Justice
Byler from the case "it seems to me that the Board were wrong
whether they acted judicially or ministerially. I conceive they
acted judicially, because they had to determine an offence,
and they had to apportion the punishment as well as the remedy."
The confusion arose because lawyers were attempting to extend legal
considerations into administration and submit the latter to the
former instead of viewing natural justice as applying to both
legal and administrative spheres distinctly. It was never
clear whether public inquiry procedures should follow judicial
practices. This very confusion was to lead later to tendencies
which seemed to err first in one direction, allowing administrative
action greater arbitrary power, and then in the other. The
first half of 2Qth century was characterised by uncertainty about
the relationship between the law and the State's administrative
practices. Specifically, the controversy regarding the uncertain
meaning of ' quas i-j ud i.c i al ' within public inquiries, led to the
virtual release of the State and administrative action from
judicial control from the 19201s until the late 19501s, while
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still paying lip service to the idea of 'natural justice'. It
allowed a host of interpretative accounts justifying what can be
understood as the temporary abandonment of the rules of 'natural
just ice'.
"The state of the law at the outbreak, of the First
World War can be briefly restated. Judicial tribunals
empowered to deprive persons of their liberty, impose
financial burdens on them and ascertain.their legal
rights had to observe the audi alteram partem rule.
So had arbitrators and government departments when
called upon to decide questions of law and fact in
situations resembling 1ites inter partes,"(21)
However, from 1920 onwards this general view changed. in an
important case involving an alien deportation, the Venicoff case,
the Home Secretary claimed that he was "exercising purely executive
functions, importing no duty to act judicially," The courts
supported this view, as de Smith states in reference to the
Venicoff case:
"The court laid emphasis on the amplitude of the
Secretary of State's discretion, the context of
emergency and the impracticability of giving prior
notice in such a case; the impact of the deportation
order on personal liberty was treated as an irrelevant
consideration, and the feasibility of requiring a
hearing after the order had been made but before it
had been executed was not canvassed in the judgements."/22)
The textbooks refer to a substantial period in British administration
in the 20th century when there was the "debilitation of the rules
of 'natural justice'. There was talk about the 'path of deviation'
when audi alteram partes lost its force as a defence against
(23)
political-administrative tradition.
Four general principles subsequently arose which conditioned the
courts' role in relation to administrative action during the
thirty five years up until the publication of the Franks Report
on public inquiries in 1957, First, emergency situations
like wars or the general strike meant the government took upon
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itself unusual powers over people and property. The courts were
generally reluctant to scrutinise the exercise of powers which some
lawyers and judges no douht thought were expedient and necessary.
Keith Middlemas, for example, points to the growing concern and
interest within government at the time of the 1920rs for 'opinion
(24)
management'. The seeds of corporatist bias which by-passed
the public sphere, and so shielded government policy and decision¬
making from public scrutiny, were firmly sown at the end of the
first world war. Middlemas refers to the victories felt
to have been won in the British Cabinet 1920-22 by manipulative
strategies, stating "it was clear government was shifting away
from reliance on coercion to a much subtler concept of imposing its
(25)values by persuasion and political education". Such strategies
were no doubt aimed at the judiciary as much as the wider public.
Secondly, the audi alteram partem rule as a common-law standard
applied by courts to administrative decision-making, was further
undermined by a view of ministerial power which tied it to
Parliament as the responsible controlling institution rather than
the law. The Ministers' responsibility to Parliament was seen by
some courts as protecting them from judicial review, and hence not
requiring the courts to set minimum procedural standards to be
observed in the decision-making process. Thirdly, the extension
of the former points meant that there was an implicit assumption
that the role of the courts in relation to administrative process
should be one of rigorous self-restraint. Fourthly, the dominant
legal opinion up until the 1950's was that the Secretary of State's
actions were executive not judicial,being concerned with the admin¬
istration of public policy rather than the adjudication of legal
conflicts. In the Electricity Commissioners (1924) case, Lord
Justice Atkin stated "certiorari (and prohibition) would issue
to any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions
affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act
(26)
judicially." Now what this actually meant was that it was
unnecessary to adhere to the principles of natural justice by the
implication from the nature and effect of the powers exercised,
but only if there was "an obligation to follow a judicial-type
procedure." This was a strange judgement for it was precisely
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this issue that had not been clearly determined with respect to
public inquiries. An Individual's rights could be violated in any
case without the necessity of a judicial procedure, This surely
highlights my general line of argument that 'natural justice' came
to be interpreted narrowly in terms of formal legalistic processes
rather than in terms connected with a wider social sense of justice
The general movement away from a definition of'natural justice' rooted
in common-sense and reasonable use towards a narrow procedural
interpretation continued throughout the 1930's and 19^0's. There
was however an attempt in the areas of public health, housing and
town planning legislation to spell out the procedural conditions
under which enforcement powers were exercisable. By specifying
procedural rules, the common-law was seeking clearly to demarcate
those cases where the rules of 'natural justice should apply. Two
significant points arise from this development, First> the law,
in its customary fashion, attributes rights conforming to legally
defined categories of peop1e, either as owners, lessees and
occupiers (in some cases). An acquiring authority, for example,
in cases of compulsory purchase, had to give public notice to those
defined within the statutory rules, individually. Those who had
not been given an explicit right to prior notice or opportunity
to be heard "found difficulty in persuading the courts that
implications affording ttew such a right ought to be read into the
(27) •
enabling Acts." The wider implications of this point will
be discussed later in relation to the legal exclusion of third
party interests. A brief mention should perhaps be made, however,
that the law's individualistic focus fails to acknowledge the
violation of 'natural justice' for those not included within the
formal legal categories or those interests that might be threatened
at a collective or community level. Secondly, the law made a
rather artificial division specifying when a Minister was acting
administratively and when acting judicially. In general, a
Minister was considered to be acting "purely administratively"
and not compelled to take account of the rules of natural justice,
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unless objections to a scheme or project had been made. In
compulsory purchase schemes, for example, the period up to the
posting of notices to execute work was considered not to require
quasi-judicia1 practices. However, Ministers were able to advise
and consult with local authorities on building and planning
matters, indicating their approval of a particular scheme in advance
of objections. These exchanges were often based on privileged
access to government documents from other Ministerial departments
which were not available either to be examined by the public, or
more to the point, questioned by objecting parties. Discussion
by Ministers and Local Authorities could continue on matters
indirectly related to the planning proposal even after objections
had been lodged. The consultation with other government departments
was allowed to continue without public participation even after
the conclusion of the public inquiry or tribunal. And, further,
it was not until the post-Frank era of 1958 onwards that inspectors'
reports were made public after the decision had been made. These
were blatant dilutions of the rules of natural justice while
formally recognising them. By acknowledging only procedural forms
rather than just content the courts and administrators 'had their
cake and ate it too1.
Many public inquiry hearings, specifically those under the New Towns
Act 19^6, illustrate a further example of how formal interpretations
of natural justice predominate. For example, under the New Towns
movement the government was both initiator and confirming
authority of draft orders specifying sites for new towns. In
Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning (the Stevenage
Case) it was objected that 'natural justice had been violated
because the Minister had not called for evidence in support of
his own draft order (A draft order defines the exact area on the
(28)
map that the proposed town should be sited.) It was held
to be an invalid claim because the public inquiry was concerned
about the objections to the draft order not the order itself.
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The judgement was eventually sustained by the House of Lords, The
Minister's actions were deemed to be "purely administrative" and,
interestingly,'natural justice would only have been violated
according to the House of Lords judgement had the Minister failed
to consider the inquiry report or the objections. Again it was
underlined by the lawyers that natural justice only really applies
to the extent that judicial procedural requirements are specified
by statute. Significantly the nemo judex in causa sua principle
was not cited in a case where it seemed most pertinent.
The content of the rules of 'natural justice' does not actually
specify how they should be fulfilled. For example, lawyers extending
the judicial experience into administrative procedures, have
argued that the rules of'natural justice' do not actually require
public hearings, nor do they require a verbatim transcript, oral
hearings, or that the decision be made by those who heard the evidence,
nor do they actually require legal representation, cross-examination,
rules of evidence nor that the decisions be based on evidence. It
seems obvious that this allows great scope for j ud ic ia1 interpre-
tation of the concept. The entitlement to be heard, format of a
hearing and the conduct of a hearing are unspecified by the very
principle which provides the basic yardstick of our political
administrative practices.
Wraith and Lamb allude to a distinction which seemed to inform many
of the Law Lords' minds up until the late 1950' s. That distinction
seems to have been that between 'acting in a judicial spirit',
which seemed to mean only that a Minister be guided by some vague
notion of judicial fairness, and 'acting judicially', which meant
being required to act within a court of law which followed strict
judicial procedures, A Minister was held to be adhering to the
principles of 'natural justice' If the former principle was
followed. So there was no requirement for formal procedural
rules to be followed for the decision to have a concern for
public openness or debate. The emphasis was placed on 'trusting
the Minister to act i.n a judicial spirit'; it was not necessary,
/
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it seems,that such a 'spirit1 be demonstrated publicly. Some
judges followed this interpretation while others were concerned
that there should be a substantive demonstration that 'natural
justice1 had not been violated; Wraith and Lamb state
"The courts continued for some years to play
variations on the theme of the administrative
and judicial concepts, and the extent to which
procedures should reflect one or the other. The
lower and higher courts differed from one another
in particular cases to an unusual extent. In the
Stevenage case it was possible for three
courts to reach three different conclusions as
to whether the Minister and his officials had been,
or indeed whether they ought to have been, free
from 'bias' or not". ^9)
In the period up until the Franks Committee Report in 1958 the
area of the judicial review of administrative action was chaotic
However in the Post-Frank?period there has been the virtual
abandonment of judicial review in terms of the case law characte
ising 1920-1950.
"During the first half of the twentieth century
the courts were concerned to ensure that the
procedures followed before, during and after a
public inquiry did not violate the rules of
natural justice. From the 19601s onwards
procedures were to be governed more and more
by rules laid down in statutory instruments, and
the courts were only to come into the matter on
appeal, if it was alleged that the rules had
not been observed", ^q)
What this actually meant was the reduction of'natural justice'
in public inquiries to a strict procedural interpretation of the
audi alteram partem principle. The principle of nemo judex in
causa sua was reduced to the issue of bias in adjudicators in
terms of pecuniary interest or personal involvement. It had
been virtually abandoned In public administration in any case,
with,It seems,the assumption of the integrity and virtue of mode
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lawyers and state administrators. The important point to emphasise
is that 'bias' within law can only be effectively attached to an
individual legal subject. Procedural structures and institutional
systems of state policy and decision-making are not included within
this aspect of the laws purview.
The very imprecision of the audi alteram partem rules can be viewed
as part of the tendency towards a preference for a varying interpre¬
tation of the concept of 'justice' by modern lawyers and administrators
in the post-war period. The rules were certainly not a rigid set
of norms with a fixed content, but neither were they so variable and
open to interpretation as to allow their arbitrary use. This seems
to be exactly how they were applied throughout most of this century.
The crucial distinction between 'formal' and 'common sense' views
of natural justice can be seen to be particularly underscored by
the use of inflexible procedural principles after I960. The
'creative' interpretation of the principles of audi alteram partem
in the 20th century was possible only after a political climate
had been created in which 'common right and reason' presented less
of a collective challenge to the interpretation of law than an
individualistic one. Audi alteram partem affected only individuals
as the bearers of individual rights in cases affecting their private
property. As planning controversies came increasingly to involve
those without a legal right of participation within the public
inquiry.system (third parties) and embroiled them in controversies
with wider political implications, the force of common sense
conceptions of justice have again come to challenge the system more
and more - a point which will be discussed in detail later. Common
conceptions of justice or injustice need collective involvement
in an issue to enable them to emerge, just as the concept of the
'moral economy' suggests in Thompson's study of the 18th century
crowd. It is only when the public inquiry becomes an instrument
mediating in controversies where the participants are no longer
individual objectors or complainants but community action groups
or pressure groups, that the disparity between formal legal rights
and procedure and commonly conceived views of 'fair administrative'
practice becomes apparent. My argument is aimed against the
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complacency of the administrators of the public Inquiry system
who today maintain that the vast majority of cases Involving a
public inquiry are without controversy, or are adequately accommo-
(31)dated by the existing structure and procedure. These cases
are without exception those that involve only two parties, often
one of the parties being an Individual appellant. The law in
these cases individuates and obscures common relationships between
(32)
people. For example, members of a community who are subject
to compulsory purchase orders as part of un urban renewal programme
will relate to the planning authority through the public inquiry
as individuals, with their compensation and problems assessed
on the basis of the specificity of the individual case; 'natural
justice1 in such cases will be exhausted by the evaluation of
justice as it meets an individual's circumstances and individual
perceptions. The community case is a level of consideration very
rarely addressed by local public inquiries. In such a system
the formal requirements of 'natural justice' are easily fulfilled
because of the control over procedures held by lawyers and
administrators, with virtually no challenge possible from what
amounts to an administratively divided community. This issue
has been crystallised in the controversy over the legal right of
third party interests.
Third-Party Interests and Rights
The public inquiry system operates under a common myth. Wraith
and Lamb point out, for example, "a popular assumption has arisen
over the years that a planning inquiry Is an occasion when everybody
affected fcy a development has the right to debate what ought
to happen, and that the inspector should award the verdict to the
winners". This is far from the reality of the situation. The
architects who have fashioned the current system over the years
have interpreted the role of public inquiries "to control develop¬
ment in the public interest.not to confer new rights on members
(33)of the public," This has been the general view taken of public
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inquiries, under the Town and Country Planning Legislation,
particularly. The legal basis of the planning system does not
allow a legal right to make representation at a public Inquiry to
anyone who does not have a direct interest in a planning proposal.
This situation has been highlighted in recent years because there
has been public pressure which has challenged the assumption that
public inquiries are arguments between people with a legal
interest (i.e. an appel1 ant or project developer and the local
planning authority). Recent events in planning controversies
have revealed the true legal status of public participation in
public inquiries to the public when they have observed on the
media people being physically removed from umpteen inquiries by
policemen acting at the request of the inspector. The controversies
involving the English motorway scheme led to disruptive scenes of
(34)this kind. A recent public inquiry held in Ayr into
proposals by the Atomic Energy Authority to test the geological
suitability of rock near Loch Doon as a repository for radioactive
waste, was again the scene of some disruption when the inquiry
Reporter reminded protesting members of the public that their
participation in proceedings was at his discretion. The implicit
threat of being removed from the hall should the hearing not
remain orderly had a quietening affect on many third party
interests. John Tyme's motorway opposition campaign frequently
forced the inquiry inspector to issue the threat that he would,
'hold the pub 1ic inquiry in prIvate session1, A contradiction
with greater irony would be hard to find. Further on in this thesis
I will discuss the controversy surrounding Shell/Esso's proposals
to build a petrochemical complex in Fife. Following the public
inquiry into this development proposal, and the approval by the
Secretary of State for Scotland, local objectors as third party
interests challenged the Secretary of State's decision on legal
grounds, although they did not in fact have a secured legal right
to do so. My main interest, therefore, is to point out that it
is possible for effective third party public political pressure
to force a full participat ion wi th i n the planning system even
when there is no legal basis for that participation.
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In 1957 a major public inquiry controversy took place into a
proposal by an Essex landowner to develop his land by quarrying
chalk. It became known as the 'Chalkpit case' and it Ps significant
because it highlighted the situation of third party interests,
At the public inquiry a vast amount of technical evidence was
submitted by neighbouring farmers alleging that chalk dust would
be injurious to their crops and livestock. The Inspector at the
inquiry agreed with this view and refused the application only to
have it overturned by the Secretary of State nine months later.
The reason for the final approval of the application was due to
extra information received by the Minister from the Department
of Agriculture after the conclusion of the inquiry. This
information was not made available to the third party objectors.
The adjoining landowners applied to the High Court to challenge
the Minister's decision on the grounds that there had been an
infringement of the rules of natural justice with the ultimate
hope that the courts would set it aside. The court, in fact,
failed substantively to give any consideration to the appeal at all
because as third party interests the applicants had no legal status.
Wraith and Lamb underline the point that "they had only appeared
at the inquiry because the inspector had exercised his discretion
in their favour, and they were aggrieved only in a general and not
(55)
in a legal sense".
It is worth emphasising again at this juncture that in the post-
Franks period the courts can only ensure that the rules of natural
justice are 'formally' applied. As long as a Minister has
complied with the formal procedural rules which constitute the legal
conception of 'natural justice' then his decision following a public
inquiry Is unchal lerrgaable. The narrowly conceived procedural rules
in no way articulate a broad consensual view of what Is fair.
Third party interests in recent inquiries have increasingly rejected
this legalistic and narrowly conceived view of natural justice.
Since the Chalkpit case the public, through various action groups
presenting evidence at public inquiries, have Issued a constant
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challenge to the system. People have understood the idea of fair
procedure and'natural justice* in terms which includes their right
to full participation and recognition within the planning system.
They have understood'natura1 justice in terms which insist that all
information relevant to a development proposal and the process
of deciding upon its merits be made public. They have also
insisted upon the right to challenge the current view of what
constitutes 'natural justice' in the appeal courts, albeit
unsuccessfully.
In a seminal paper on public inquiries Derek Senior makes the following
remark which is worthy of quotation:
" it now seems to be taken for granted, everywhere
outside Whiteha11, that the (Chalkpit) appeal inquiry
was primarily the trial of a dispute between a third
party and the appellant and that the inspector was
acting as Judge, whose verdict could not in justice
be reversed until the third party had been given a
chance to rebut the 'evidence', factual or advisory,
that prompted the reversal".
However, on considering the general hostility of the public to
the inquiry system, aid implying a divergence between common-sense
views of fair procedure and that which formally obtains in the
planning system (excluding a legal status for third parties) he
reflects on,
"the power of public opinion, without benefit of
legislation, to transform in ten short years the
whole nature and function of a piece of governmental
machinery, merely by misconceiving its purpose
A public institution is not what its creators
intended, or the law lays down, that it should
be but what it has become in the public mind."
(37)
What Senior is describing is the force of pressure emanating
from ordinary people over the past twenty years challenging the
formal conceptions of fair procedure because it does not relate
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substantively to how people generally conceive of the concepts
'justice' or 'fair'. The reaction of the public has effectively
altered the reality of public inquiry procedures, although the
legal basis remains unaltered:. This in itself Is surely of
sociological significance. This theme will emerge further on
when 1 examine the formulation and presentation of opposition
to a development proposal of Shell/Esso's in Fife, There I will
examine and describe how local people viewed the planning process
and determined their political strategy in relation to those
perceptions. They had to overcome formal procedural structures
which seemed to restrict the scope of evidence and be somewhat
removed from their sense of fairness.
The issue of third party interests goes to the heart of the problem
this thesis is examining. There is an assumption that there is
something which is identifiable as 'the public interest' which can
best be safeguarded by pol i t lea 1-admi n i'strat i've decision-making
(■tON
processes removed from the public sphere. It is clear that
the system of planning inquiries has been built on the idea that
its task is to be informed by and listen to the public but not
be persuaded by(public debate and scrutiny. However, public
inquiries give the appearanee of being a forum- for publ ic
influence and participation in policy formation. The public
inquiry system straddles the line between the state and the public
sphere. It confuses and mystifies its own institutional boundaries.
Out of this confusion arises a major affront to common-sense concep¬
tions of justice. People have become increasingly critical of the
system and have believed the main remedy for the existing malady
lies in some form of procedural change.
The Question of Institutional Change and Natural Justice.
There arises a major paradox within the planning system; public
inquiries are supposedly designed for the mediation in planning
conflicts relating to the pattern of land use in a given locality,
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yet many of 'the Big Public Inquiries' in recent years have hinged
on matters relevant to national policy and national economic
development. Many people involved in planning Inquiry controversies
have felt frustrated by the inability to address or Influence wider
public policy issues relating to development proposals,
The Franks Committee on Tribunals and Inquiries in 1957 highlighted
the problem In this way:-
"From the point of view of the citizen what begins
in many ways like an action at law, with two or more
parties appearing before a judge-like inspector and
stating their case to him, usually in public, is
thereafter suddenly removed from public gaze until
the ministerial decision is made. Often the main
factors seem to have counted for little in the final
decision. New factors - they may have been considerations
of broad policy - have come in so that the final decision
does not seem to flow from the proceedings at the
inquiry", ^ j
One reason why major public inquiries generate so much confusion in
the public's mind is because they have tended to address large develop¬
ment issues which have never been rigorously incorporated within
a national level policy. For example, North Sea Oil and gas develop¬
ment particularly lacks a national level policy for development
both onshore and in the North Sea, There are no.unambiguous policy
guidelines on land use relating to North Sea development that have
been subjected to a rigorous public and parliamentary debate,
Further, it has been argued, that there appears to be a lack of
confidence among the public who tend to believe that policy formation
and review is secretive, even to the point of negating Parliamentary
Control. Therefore the large public inquiry has more and more
come to be seen as one way in which influence can be exerted by
the ordinary public on public policy. However, even within the
existing planning framework there is a built-in structural constraint
on the interrogation of government policy. Civil servants, for
example, occasionally submit policy statements as part of public
inquiry evidence but they are not permitted to answer questions
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relating to those policies, This invariably means there can be no
challenge made against the assumptions underlying government
statistics, forecasting and the.methodologies which inform the
construction of public policy. The large and hard fought
Motorways opposition campaign led by John Tyme frequently encount¬
ered the official refusal to disclose the method whereby different
pricing structures and traffic forecasts underlying proposals were
made. In a House of Lords Debate on the motorway controversy
Lord Foot (Chairman of the Dartmoor Preservation Association)
highlighted the issue with reference to an inquiry in Plymouth in
1974.
"We were presented with a multiplicity of forecasts
and extrapolations as to what would be the traffic-
flows in the years 1980 and 2000 coming from all
kinds of different sources. Plymouth City Council
had their own extrapolation which differed fundamentally
from those of the Department of the Environment
one witness from the Department of the Environment
was in favour of one extrapolation, while another
was in favour of a different one. It is absolutely
intolerable that objectors to a scheme who say 'there
is no need for this' should not be. allowed to challenge
not the policy, but the assumptions of that which the
Department of the Environment choose to make",^^
Indeed the extent to which national level policies should be openly
discussed in local public inquiries has been a central issue in
recent controversies and one of the main contradictions of the
use of local inquiries for large scale projects and schemes with
national importance.
Without national guidelines on major development programmes a
confusion arises between national and local levels of the problem
with the result that national dilemmas have been given priority
in a decision making process supposedly constituted to deal only
with local planning issues. The public inquiry instrument
therefore in itself becomes a device for limiting the access of
the public to the central policy questions. By using the local
public inquiry instrument to process major technological and
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industrial developments rather than a more broadly constituted
system, the State is able to shield policy formation from public
scrutiny yet give the appearance that an open and democratic
forum has been created; for public discussion. The public inquiry
becomes an instrument for the management of public opposition to
State action (state action can be understood more broadly than
simply Government action - it incorporates the vast machinery of
political administrative processes involved in the formation and
operationa1 ising of public policy on an ongoing basis).
Not surprisingly there has been a vigorous criticism of the
public inquiry system as it applies to large scale development and
planning issues over the last thirty years. The major public inquiry
controversies connected with North Sea Oil and nuclear power have
intensified that criticism and re-opened a debate about institutional
„ „ (42)structures.
Recent concern about public inquiries has arisen despite two 'official'
attempts to reform the system. First, the Franks Committee on
Public Inquiries sat from 1955-1957 and established standards and
guidelines for public inquiries which still apply today. For this
reason they are worth examining. Secondly, the 1971 Town and
Country Planning Act allowed for the use of a Planning Inquiry
Commission. it Is of interest why a PIC format has, to date,
never been used In a major planning controversy.
The Franks Committee
.The public concern about the fairness of the public inquiry system
between' 1920-1955 culminated in a Royal Commission being set up to
investigate the system and make proposals for change. The
committee began its work in 1955 and published its Report in July
(43)
1957, The Council on Tribunals and inquiries Act dated the
1st August 1958 more or less incorporated the recommendations of
the Franks Committee, The early publication date Is revealing bqth
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about how urgentfyit was felt that the public inquiry system
should be rescued from the public criticism, being made about its
flagrant violations of 'natural justice1, and also how narrowly the
problem must have been interpreted to get agreement about proposed
reforms so quickly.
The most basic point that emerged from the Report was that the public
inquiry process can be divided into three distinct periods; before,
during and after. It considered the only problem with the system
related to the periods before and after the inquiry hearing. It
was satisfied with the procedures during the inquiry as long as
basic principles of 'openness, fairness and impartiality' were •
observed. So as a general rule it recommended that proceedings should
be public; legal representation should be unrestricted; questioning
of parties and witnesses should be freely allowed.
However, there were more obvious areas of disquiet which the Committee
believed required attention. It was felt that far better notice
should be given to people who would be adversely affected by a
proposal. Not only more advanced warning but more information should
be available so that people knew the case they had to answer. It
also stressed that such information should clarify the relation¬
ship between a particular planning proposal and the wider context
of ministerial policy, although it supported the view that public
inquiries should not be used to discuss and criticise public policy.
After the conclusion of the inquiry the Committee favoured the now
customary practice of pub 1ishing the inspector's report, A
standing supervisory body called the Council on Tribunals was also
to be set up. There was to be a right of appeal on fact, law, and
merits and supervisory jurisdiction by the courts should be reasserted
after the confusions I have discussed above.
Perhaps one of the most interesting facts which emerged from the
Report was the recognition that the screening of public policy
criticism from the public within the public inquiry did not mean
that decisions could not at least be based upon facts agreed by
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all parties to an inquiry. In other words, not only was the
Inspector's report to be published but all participants within
the inquiry were to be given the opportunity to challenge the
interpretation or recording of facts in a draft version of the
report. This proposal was adopted only in Scotland, It was
felt to be impracticable in England due to the greater volume of
inquiries. New evidence received after the closing of a public
inquiry was to be circulated to all parties who were to be
given the right to make their observations known. However, again
the ambiguous issue of 'policy matters' was to be excluded from
such practice.
The Franks Committee served to underline the gross violations of
the'natural justice principle which characterised most of the
period up to the 1950's, and indeed many of its recommendations,
which were 1ater embodied inthe 1958 Act,seemed reasonable. However
it singularly failed to understand the political problems of planning
in a broad perspective (it failed to allow third parties a legal
status while effectively recognising this need), and more generally
it failed to anticipate circumstances where a local public inquiry
would be inadequate to mediate in conflicts with complex national
political and economic implications. It is precisely the emergence
of what the Outer Circle Policy Unit call the phenomenon of the
'Big Public Inquiry' that was not anticipated by the Franks
Committee, but which has given rise to wide concern about public
(kk)
participation and control in contemporary society. It is a
phenomenon that has generated concern that major issues of public
safety and the environment may not be subjected to the broad
based public scrutiny they require. In other words, the current
concern lies in the fact that the 'Big Public Inquiry' is based
on the same effective procedures as a controversy about the
siting of, for example, a fish and chip shop, and it is being
used where a broader based; and more rigorous system is required.
The ideas of 'participation' and 'natural justTce" now articulate
a more general issue of political and legal control within our
political system. The overall structural balance of power
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between the State and the public sphere becomes of central
theoretical significance; it is the structurally generated space
for public control and involvement in decision-making which is
now at issue and the infringement of'natural justice'as it pertains
to whole communities whose existence can be threatened by major
development proposals, be it oil development or nuclear power.
The Planning Inquiry Commission.
The political dilemma which is emerging is one of how to process
planning issues of growing scale and complexity with the existing
institutional instrument of a Big Local Public Inquiry, It confronted
the Government many times in the 19601s with the conflict over a
natural gas processing plant at Bacton in Norfolk, a hovercraft
terminal at Pegwell Bay in Kent and the third London airport at
Stan'Sted. These controversies culminated in the publication of
a Government White Paper 'Town and Country Planning' which was
published in June 1967, Among other issues discussed in the
White Paper it was stated1 that:
"The Government are also reviewing. the procedures for
cases that raise wide or novel issues of more than
local significance. When issues of this sort arise,
the ordinary public local inquiry is not satisfactory
either as a method of permitting the full issues to
be thrashed out or as a basis for a decision which can
take into account a whole range of practicable
alternatives",
(45)
The result of this concern was the inclusion of a procedure known
as the Planning inquiry Commission in the Town and Country Planning
Act of 1968 which was later embodied in sections 47, 48 and 49 of
the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 or the 1972 Act for Scotland.
The legislation set general guidelines when a PIC might be appropriately
used. There are two grounds upon which a Minister can bring into
being this special inquiry procedure. Paraphrasing section 48(2)
of the 1971 Act, a PiC can only be set up when the Minister concerned
concludes;
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(1) that there are considerations of national or regional importance
which require evaluating but that proper evaluation cannot be
made unless there is a special inquiry for the purpose; and
(2) that the technical or scientific aspects of the proposed
development are of so unfamiliar a character - so new, so
strange - as to prejudice a proper determination of the
question of whether or not the development should be permitted
unless there is a special inquiry for the purpose.
The customary single inspector would be replaced by a team of invest¬
igators consisting of a chairman and not less than two or more than
four other members (This is specified by section 47(2) of the Act.)
The interesting factor which emerges from this new procedure is that
consideration of alternative sites for a development can be
incorporated within the Commissions remit. Under the local
inquiry procedure the specific site under the planning proposal is
the only one the developer or the inspector has any obligation to
assess. Neither the planning authority nor the Minister can
compel the developer to go elsewhere or even give consideration to
alternative sites. With the PIC it would be possible to institute
a series of local public inquiries into specific alternative sites.
Additionally a PIC can be created after first holding a local
public inquiry which may identify issues of such complexity that
thereafter it might be better to consider them within a broader
decision-making framework. The structure of the work undertaken
by a PIC would fall into two stages. First, there would be a
broadly based assessment of the proposal on the basis of "evidence
provided by the providers of the scheme, the local planning authority,
government departments and interested individuals and organisations,
including the amenity societies". Second, the public inquiry
system would become operative and the presentation and defence of
evidence would then be assessed by the Commission taking anything
up to two years after the initial proposal was made.
- 65 -
Now it is clear that the time, cost and the broad based approach
to assessing issues, would be unlikely to endear the Planning Comm¬
ission to Government, The only example of a procedure similar to
a PIC was the Roski.ll Commission into the third London Airport,
The involved use of a cost-benefit analysis of all quantitative and
qualitative matters led to severe criticism, all of it justified.
The result is that several planning controversies have technically
qualified to be considered by PIC, including many oil related
developments, yet the procedure remains unused.
The reasons why it has never been used have been framed in terms
of flaws in the procedure. Peter Shore, as Minister of the
Environment in 1978,suggested thrat stage one of the procedure would
prejudge stage two. Preliminary conclusions arrived at after
initial consideration would be bound to prejudice the local
public inquiry stage. This presupposes that many development issues
are somehow not prejudiced by the government's published policy
preferences and in the case of motorway and North Sea Oil develop¬
ment sites, have not been prejudiced by sequences of public
inquiries establishing or excluding many issues of principle. In
the case of Motorway schemes the snake effect of an incomplete
motorway section can hardly be said to have no implications for
future inquiries. This objection only requires procedural re¬
organisation which would allow stage two matters to be part of the
thorough-going public debate which would normally be stage one.
Shore's reasoning seems rather odd. However, as the PIC would be
constituted as a Royal Commission it is generally argued that
evidence presented to such a forum should not be subjected to
cross-examination. The issue of subjecting public policy to
criticism and determination outside of Parliament is again one
crucial issue cited. Yet another interpretation of the PIC is
that it still cannot actually enforce consideration of alternative
sites if a developer doggedly refuses to make a series of separate
applications. It can incorporate an alternative site analysis
but it is still; conditioned by the site specific proposal of the
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developer, and requires a cooperative attitude from the development
app1icant.
Consequently, it has been suggested a PIX would not effectively
advance beyond current procedures. A recent research project on
public inquiry procedures and the problem of PIC asks "Whatever
happened to the PIC? Apart from Peter Shore's 1978 speech we have
little to go on in terms of public statements. We can only
(47)
speculate". This is not my view. It is necessary to
adequately theorise the issues in broader terms. Public statements
are often post hoc rationalisations for inhibitions on action of
a broader complexity. They are very often indications of-what Peter
Berger would call 'bad faith', Procedures are created by
politicians and administrators and can be altered or renewed by
them. However what is required is to understand the political-
administrative use of procedures not simply as enabling structures
which allow participation within the planning system but also as
instruments of power and control. In the next chapter I wish to
integrate the different strands of my discussion in terms of my
original theme; that power and participation are mutually constraining
processes within the political-administrative system.
Concluding Remarks
It is clear that the idea of 'natural justice' has more than a
symbolic status within contemporary public administrative practice.
It crystallises, for me, the essence of the problem being confronted
whenever the nature of the contemporary public sphere is being
analysed, 'Natural justice in contemporary society provides both
a principle of participation in and exclusion from the political-
administrative process. It is founded on the inter-connection
between moral and legal principles of 'fairness' and jiustice. It
has, as I have argued: in this chapter, become an object of formal
manipulation by lawyers and adm.inistrators,yet it also provides a
standard against which public administrative action must legitimise
itself. No matter how much the concepts of 'fairness, openness
and impartiality' are appropriated by lawyers and administrators for
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formal procedural Interpretation, they also have meaning in terms
of 'everyday common-sense', and it is this fact that gives rise to
the problems currently being experienced by the local public inquiry
system. The example of the Motorway campaign in England through¬
out the 19701s illustrates the dialectic contained within the
concept of 'natural justice'. It was no use whatsoever for inquiry
inspectors or Ministers of government to plead that they were
rigorously adhering to procedural rules established by Franks.
If that meant the exclusion of whole areas of information and
important issues from public discussion, then the objectors resorted
to a vast array of strategies of disruption in order that their case
was fully heard. John Tyme's book Motorways versus Democracy
is a detailed account of the rejection of formal concepts of
administrative procedure and fairness, Tyme describes the anger
and frustration of ordinary people confronted by a planning system
that seemed to be organised to prevent open public discussion
rather than facilitate it,
"For it is my conviction that so long as institutional
protection is absent only ordinary, common-sense people
banded together, people untainted by sick dreams of the
great technocrats, can halt the drive towards social
and political disaster."
Tyme goes on to dedicate his book,
"To all those who have had the courage to stand up
(or sit down on the floor) and be counted, who by
their actions constituted a bright candle in an
otherwise darkening world."
(50)
Not all opposition campaigns are as vociferous or as disruptive as
Tyme's. Nevertheless, the dialectic of power and participation
contained within the public inquiry system, and revealed by the
Motorway campaigners is inherently present in the public inquiry
system as a whole. The main axis of conflict within the inquiry
system has been the different conceptions of how justice can be
obtained.
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There are as 1 have already mentioned two distinct elements within
the rules of 'natural justice'; the principle of nemo judex in causa
sua which specifies that an adjudicator be disinterested and unbiased,
and the principle, which is most prominent in contemporary public
administration, audi alteram partem which specifies that parties to
an inquiry be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.
These distinguishable principles, 1 would argue, are manifestly cont¬
radictory within the present system. Whereas the latter clearly
refers to procedures, the former, whether acknowledged by the courts
or not, more substantively raises questions about what constitutes a
'fair hearing'. Contemporary opponents of the system have argued
that very often the State is both judge and jury in its own trial.
And it could be argued that the structural relationship that I have
posited between the nature of State action aid the needs of the
accumulation process at the beginning of this chapter do not make
public inquiries neutral instruments of government. The
question of interest and bias is, it seems, too difficult to substantiate
judicially. As de Smith indicates;
"One may predict that if an objector sought to impi^n ,
for example, a structure plan on the ground that the
Secretary of State was biased or likely to be biased
The courts would apply a test not dissimilar from that
laid down in the Stevenage Case.....They would quash
the plan if the objector were able to show either
that the Secretary of State had irrevocably decided
to approve it before he went through the motions of
considering the objections and the report of such
persons as. he had appointed to a public examination
of the i ssues, or that- he had acted in bad faith for
an Improper purpose; but such allegations are
exceedingly difficult to substantiate".
Even in such cases as Stevenage, referred to above, there is a
withdrawal from the nemo judex in causa sua principle and refuge
taken in the purely- procedural principle which is itself difficult
to prove unfulfilled. v
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It is impossible to use the process of judicial review of adminis¬
trative action to argue that there is what Offe calls 'a dual
determination of political power' because, as I have already
mentioned, the law can only relate to legal subjects not Institut¬
ional systems. It follows therefore that there will be no recogni¬
tion of the special structural relationship between the structure of
State action, policy formation and the needs of capital accumulation.
Arguments relating to these relationships will therefore not be
recognised nor admitted either as relevant for the proceedings of
a local public inquiry or for appeal to the courts as criterion for
> '
a violation of natural justice; procedural form,not content, is the
sole yardstick of whether 'natura1 justice has been met.
I believe, that the principle of nemo judex in causa sua logically
implies the determination of decision-making power rooted within a
public sphere separate from the State. It logically implies
adjudicators who are not part of the po1 itica1-administrative
structure of the State nor bound by the purposes of State action.
Further if interpreted in a way which recognised that bias can inhere
in the structure of institutional systems and not just in the
personal frailties of individual administrators or lawyers, then
the nemo judex in causa sua principle could make a difference to
quasi-judicia 1 procedures. The nemo judex in causa sua principle
supports the very important idea of the public inquiry system as
separate from the control of the State, as an institution distinctly
of the pub!ic sphere rather than an instrument of government. It
is in fact a principle that would tend to negate the public inquiry
as an instrument of government, especially when it is the State
that has a direct interest tn the issues being decided. The ideas
of 'disinterest' and 'unbias' are central to the principle. Whereas
audi alteram partem is more manifestly satisfied by the fulfillment of
formal procedural principles nemo judex in causa sua is not.
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However, this distinction is only made in order to underscore the
contradictory nature of the concept 'natural justice1;,, and to assert
that underlying the sociological contradiction i will be discussing
there lies a significant contradiction within jurisprudence partly
caused by the neglect of one principle and .the total emphasis placed
upon the other. This tension will be theoretically explored in
the next chapter where I will only be sociologically formulating
a tension that, I would argue, is already rooted in the very consti¬
tution of British political administration. The Idea Informing my
argument is that the neglect of' the nemo judex In causa sua principle
is inextricably linked to the principles of control and power in
society. By exploring the institutional discourse sponsored by
public inquiries in pursuit of'natural justice', the underlying
principle of control and power In contemporary industrial society
can be made visible.
CHAPTER 3.
THE CLASSIFICATION AND FRAMING OF KNOWLEDGE:
THE CONSOLIDATION OF AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
"I believe that as a result of our inquiry
processes we can make better informed decisions
which fit the facts and which fit into national,
regional and local objectives; second, our
inquiry system enables us to hear and to have answered
the legitimate anxieties of people who have the
right to express their concern; third, the public
examination of these large questions assists us in
achieving a measure of consent when final decisions
are made My concern is to try to strike the
right balance between efficiency and speed in decision¬
making on the one hand and on the other to satisfy
myself on the issues and to see to it that the
public are convinced of the fairness of the decision¬
making system".
(Peter Shore, as Secretary of State
for the Environment during a visit
to the Selby Coalfield 1977. Quoted
in F. Sandbach (Environment, Ideology
& Policy p.116.)
At this point I wish to highlight the theoretical implications of
the analysis I have offered in the last chapter. There is a
need to explore theoretically the tension alluded to in Peter
Shore's statement between efficiency and speed and that of the
publics assurance of fairness. So far I have been working towards
a dialectical concept of politics consisting of the contradiction
engendered by two distinct levels of socia 1-consciousness.
Whereas power po1itics articulates the structural and systemic
properties of institutions which subordinate individual action
and participation within the public sphere, participatory politics
articulates the created and creative space which concerted
social action can make within the public sphere.
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The politics of power is rationalised in terms of efficiency and
expediency. I have tried to show how the evolving judicial
concept of 'natural justice1 similarly corresponds to the
procedural demands of an administrative system controlled by
formal legal and politica1-administrative personnel. 'Natural
justice' no longer has meaning in terms of common-sense but is
formally interpreted by the judiciary and administrators to
refer to formal procedural structures. By contrast the politics
of participation viewed in terms of normative rights of access
to the political process for ordinary people corresponds with
a level of social consciousness rooted in everyday social situations.
I referred to 'common-sense' views of 'natural justice' to express
the situational interpretation of norms and procedural fairness.
In short, power and formal conceptions of 'natural justice' are
dia 1ectica11y opposed to participation and common-sense conceptions
of natural justice. This statement leaves the analysis at an
unsatisfactorily simplistic level.
The problem which I have isolated, and which confronts people when
they become embroil led in the public inquiry system, is the appearance
of an institutional process which is founded on 'natural justice' but
only appears to allow a full participation by people in its work.
Public inquiries supposedly defend the right of people to,be heard
without bias on matters affecting their daily lives, property or
rights. While agreeing with Thompson's important comment that "if
the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing,
legitimise nothing, contribute nothing to class hegemony",^
I hope I have demonstrated that 'natural justice' as interpreted
by the courts and administrators gives the appearance of fairness
but substantively fails to 'fulfil its own concept'. To use
Adorno's concepts referred to in Chapter 1, people are led into
an institutional situation where it is difficult to transcend
identity thinking; 'natural justice' does seem to uphold "its
own logic and criteria of equity". However, the possibilities
for rational identity thinking are never totally foreclosed.
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The tendency for people to perceive a difference between formal and
common-sense concepts of Viatural justice1 must always remain.
This general tension between power and participatory concepts of
'natural justice1 is embodied in the idea of 1inauthenticity1,
The most sustained application of this concept is in Amitai
(2)Etzioni's The Active Society. Etzioni pursues the institut¬
ional and human ingredients of a society where the 'societal super¬
structure is immediately responsive to human needs.' He talks
about 'authenticity' existing "where responsiveness exists and is
experienced as such". The idea of authenticity requires that
social actors be conscious, committed and hold a share of the
societal power. However, he suggests it is "the fate of
inauthentic man that what he knows does not fit what he feels,
and what he affects is not what he knows or is committed to do".^
The important idea which Etzioni is seeking to develop relates to
situations where institutions give the appearance of responsiveness
when their basic condition is manipulatory and unresponsive. He
distinguishes between outright alienation and inauthenticity. in
the former case there is no confusion, the institution is blatantly
partial.
"Objectively both alienating and inauthentic
conditions are excluding, but inauthentic
structures devote a higher ratio of their efforts
than alienating ones to conceal their contours
and to generating the appearance of responsiveness.
(My emphasis)
Inauthenticity is precisely the concept which unambiguously in¬
corporates the perspective on 'the law' which E.P. Thompson
adopts. It conceptualises clearly the problem of a public inquiry
system within which 'natural justice' is founded on procedural
forms rather than the content of discourse. Inauthenticity
encapsulates the problem, both theoretical and political, of an
institutional system that seeks to straddle the boundaries between
the state and the public sphere; a system giving the appearance of
a quasi-judicial process while remaining controlled by the political
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administrative centres of state power. The concept of 'inauthenticity'
articulates the denial of nemo judex in causa sua in practice while
forma 11y"acknowledging it in principle.
The idea that institutions are not blunt and blatant instruments of
manipulation is secured by employing the concept 1inauthenticity1.
The consciousness of people and their commitment to political and
social action is a central feature of the concept. When objectors
cause a disturbance within a public inquiry; when they accuse the
inspector of conducting 'a farce'; when they believe that the
decision is a foregone conclusion decided by the Secretary of
State over golf with the managing director of a large oil
company, they are well aware of the 'inauthenticity1 of the
institution they are participating in. However, 'inauthenticity,
once perceived, can lead to wider forms cf political action over the
very unresponsiveness of the system, and is likely to be a spur to
action rather than passivity. This is a problem for the p1anning
system. The institutional dilemma it faces is founded on the
administrative task of both allowing yet limiting participation
by the public. It must use procedural and administrative devices
to control the participatory process whereas the public, formed into
action groups and pressure groups, will seek to challenge the
use of administrative power in the planning system to limit their
participation. This is particularly the case where large
developments and contentious ecological and political issues are
being decided. The planning system consistently attempts to absorb
protest without seeking to resolve the underlying causes of the
protest. Now this general dilemma can be understood more broadly
by presenting ' inauthenticity' as embodying not only a tension
between power and participation or formal and common-sense concepts
of'natural justice1 but also as two mutually contradictory modalities
of grounding decision-making; one which follows the logic of a
systems rationality and one which follows the logic of a
discursive rationality. I. propose to illustrate this first
through the debate between the systems theory.of Niklas Luhmann
and the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas, ^ and then through
the educational sociology of Basil Bernstein, which , I wi11 argue,
converts that theoretical debate into an analytical tool.
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Luhmann Versus Habermas
The debate between Luhmann and Habermas turns around the question
of how modern politica1-administrative systems can resolve legitima¬
tion tensions; either by an open and free discoursing public within
authentic public institutions or by 'procedures' which seek to
eliminate complicating claims on the politica1-administrative
system while at the same time assuring the public that efficient
decision-making is proceeding.
Luhmann to a large extent pursues a similar project to Habermas.
He is concerned about the question of how and to what extent
the concept and function of public opinion has changed. Luhmann,
like Habermas, argues that there is a discernible difference between
the early bourgeois public sphere and the present situation in
advanced capitalist societies. Whereas Habermas argues that a
"collective social function must be found for public opinion."
Luhmann rejects this as an impossible solution for a society
particularised into specialised systems.
The general premise of Luhmann's approach is the belief that the
complexity and tihe pace of change in advanced industrial societies
is so great that a decision-making process is now required which
can respond immediately to issues and conflicts. The traditional
means of arriving at a consensus about political questions have
become obsolete.
"If the social system of a society is highly
complex, the legitimation of political power can
no longer be left to a presupposed morality
A power is legitimate which admits and even inst¬
itutionalises, its own process of legitimation.
In addition it must be guaranteed that obligatory
decisions are accepted as a premise of behaviour
without prior specification of the decision." ^
The controversial nature of Luhmann's theory lies in his abandonment
of moral concepts such as good, truth or justice. He strongly
asserts that decisions should be disconnected from the collective
values and motivations of the po1itica1 community. It should be
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'procedures' utilised in arriving at a decision rather than the
underlying principles involved in the decision whi.ch should be
acceptable to the public.
There should be, in other words, a complete separation of the
legitimacy of a decision from its factual or moral content.
The controversial nature of Luhmann's theory should not blind us to
its theoretical usefulness for providing one side of the adminis¬
trative mechanism of public inquiries. Luhmann's work is also
valuable because he theorises the administrative action of the
state from the position of its 'steering' role. He points up the
rigidity and structural constraints systematically used to
manage and limit the participatory claims of groups on the state.
Unlike Parsons' structural functiona1ism Luhmann presents a
functional structural theory of politica1-administrative systems.
The structures and boundaries of systems are not given as they are
in Parsons work. Instead the structures and boundaries of the
system become amenable to functional analysis. The central
administrative task of any system is how to maintain its structure
in the face of threats, problems and demands from a complex
environment. System maintenance and practice are intrinsic to
the very theory of what a system is. Put differently, systems theory
becomes one with the practice of maintaining a given system in
relation to its environment which will always be more complex.
Functionalist theories in sociology have always lost their force
by an inability clearly to specify a systems boundary and
unambiguously identify the system's goal states. However for
Luhmann this very difficulty is what distinguishes his systems
approach. He takes the problem of the inner-outer relationships
between a given system and its environment as the focus for
political analysis and as the central political dilemma facing
the complex administrative institutions of late capitalist
societies. Given his basic premise that modern societies are
characterised by their growing complexity, then the structure of
a system must exclude more states than the environment can assume
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in order to 'survive' and continue to fulfil its tasks. The
weight of Luhmann's analysis, suggests consciousness about political
administrative strategy In coping with a systems external relations.
The inner-outer relationships are manipulated in accordance with
options and problems confronting the system.
"According to this usage, complexity is a measure
of the number of events and states of a system
(self-complexity) With their stabilised boundaries,
systems form and maintain islands of lesser complexity;
the order of a system is less probable than that of
its environment. It is a condition of self
maintenance of a system that it can assume suffic¬
iently many states to enable it to adapt to the
changing events in the environment. Its self-
complexity must suffice to permit system maintaining
reactions to changes in the environment that affect
the system". ^
The idea which emerges from this systems analysis is the fact that
Luhmann understands system self-maintenance in terms of the ability
of the system to master and control that portion of the world that
is actually relevant to the persistence of the system. Complexity
reduction becomes the crucial task involved in se1f-maintenance.
New this complexity reduction is accomplished first by the very
formation of institutional structures; all institutions in
Luhmann's perspective are "congealed reduction of world complexity".
To some extent an institution need only exist to reduce the complexity
of its environment because it crystallises in its very structure
accepted modes of operating and secured expectations about
institutional behaviour. This is in fact similar to the argument
I have also made, particularly in chapter 1 with respect to rights
of participation (Luhmann too holds to a 'communication concept of
power' but quite different to that of Habermas). The second
mode of complexity reduction depends upon the inner-system processes
themselves. A major paradox arises in this second mode because
system maintenance at one and the same time requires the reduction
of the complexity of its environment while also heightening its
own se1f-comp1 exity.
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For example, Luhmann unlike most other systems theorists accepts
"meaning" must be incorporated within his systems analysis but
in such a way that it becomes functional for the system; "meaning"
becomes a way of heightening self-complexity rather than setting
limits on the system by complicating matters. in other words,
"meaning" becomes the integration of information and knowledge
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to add to the armoury of possible actions for the system.
The paradox for Luhmann lies in the fact that "meaning" reduces
complexity by enabling the system to be flexible and adjust to new
"meanings" but he tends to downplay the fact that it also increases
complexity by heightening the administrative dilemma of deciding
between increasingly varying alternatives for action. In other words,
'complexity reduction' does not necessarily lead to greater
decision-making efficiency and unless 'procedures' can convince the
public that they can actually deliver efficiency in decision-making
then their legitimacy will be threatened. Politica1-administrative
systems in the real world are unlikely to be flexible enough to
fully incorporate all the demands made upon them. '1nauthenticity'
arises therefore because the criteria for excluding demands is
the inability of the system to cope with some information rather
than its rejection after a wide evaluation of all issues. Luhmann
acknowledges that only systems with high levels of internal compl--
(9)
exity will be efficient and flexible enough to ground legitimacy.
However, this problem is surmountable in empirical terms by the
growing functional importance of science as the leading sub-system
in modern society. It becomes a 'sense system' reformulating dem¬
ands in a form capable of processing by the po1itica1-administrative
system. The important point about scientific modes of reasoning
is that they be compatible with a systems rationality. For
example, communication between different systems (i.e. economic
political and scientific) for Luhmann depends on what he calls
the "actua1isation of shared sense". So there must evolve both
a 'language' which becomes the mode of
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communication between the different 'systems' and a mode of
Cio>
excluding 'non-shared sense'. Science is regarded by both
Luhmann and Habermas as the dominant 'sense system' in advanced
industrial societies - it takes on a leadership role. However,
they interpret its role differently.
The project for society as Luhmann sees it is to achieve an
altered conception of politics. The task is to 'link scentific
self-investigation to structural selection'. The decision¬
making process must therefore either become dominated by scientific
experts or the public must formulate their demands in terms
approved of by the politica1-administrative centre and must rely
on experts processing their claim in terms of system needs.
Most political-administrative systems in industrial society seek
to resolve the dilemma created by their inability to achieve
'inner states of heightened complexity', and hence resolve their
credibility crisis, by seeking to ground legitimacy on scientific-
technical rationality rather than in terms of traditional
democratic, normative and common sense perspectives. Efficiency
and rationalisation become competing bases for grounding legitimacy
with those based on democratic traditions. Whereas scientific-
technical modes of reasoning are viewed by Luhmann as aiding the
operational flexibility of systems, I prefer to see them instead
as a mechanism of complexity reduction for a system seeking to
avoid the complicating issue of basing decisions on normative
criteria. "Meaning" which is not resolvable by technical
criteria therefore has to be excluded.
Within the planning system two related processes are operating:
(a) Politica1-administrative systems operating in a complex
environment must adjust their internal decision-making structures
to a state of "heightened complexity" to enable decisions to be
made quickly and efficiently and generate confidence in the
"procedures" not the underlying principles of the decision.
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Local public inquiries are unable to adapt to a changing and
complex economic, pqli.ti.cal and technological environment. A
system with a low state of internal complexity is currently being
used to deal with highly complex problems. However, what Luhmann
fails to highlight in his analysis is that institutional systems
with inflexible structures and low levels of inner-systemic
complexity actually decrease complexity by acting as 'blockages';
their very simplicity blocks out complicating demands and
problems by diverting that energy elsewhere. There is a reservoir
of political frustration created by the inability of 'radical'
information, knowledge or 'unshared sense' to penetrate the
system. This 'blocking' process is a political and administrative
option used by the state whenever the local public inquiry rather
than a Planning Inquiry Commission is used, or whenever public
inquiries are restricted to the consideration of specific remits
relating to highly circumscribed technical issues which systematic¬
ally exclude normative issues and 'radical' information and
knowledge.
(b) The dilemma of how to control this diverted political
frustration can be partly resolved if the problems created
for decision-making by the introduction of complicating moral
values can be excluded so that the distinction between good and
bad become meaningless in administrative terms. If legitimation
can be based on the assumption that choices are technical rather
than political; if it can be assumed that the ends of 'efficient'
decision-making aremore important than the means; if 'complexity
reduction' can be presented as being an essentially apolitical
dilemma confronting a 11 social systems, then the idea of an
expanded form of public participation can be rejected. Luhmann
is presenting us with a clever conservative sleight of hand.
The dominance of science and technocratic modes of reason are
discussed as if they are an integral part of the process enabling
systems to heighten their selective capacity. However, it is
the 'procedures' that are supposed to legitimise the system not
the 'sense system'. In fact the 'procedures' are often inadequately
adapted to their tasks in actual administrative systems
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and technical vocabularies are used as a legitimatory device to
conceal an inability of the system to absorb and handle complicating
demands. Technical vocabularies become instruments of complexity
reduction obfuscating many moral, social and political issues.
So (a) frustrates and diverts political action and (b) seeks to
depoliticise that frustration by converting politics to administra¬
tion and truth to scientific validation.
The politica1-administrative system must seek to transform
conflicts in society "from an immediate conflict into a regulated
verbalised struggle for influence on decision-making centres".
This is done by channeling conflicts towards specific decision out¬
comes by processes similar to public inquiries:
"At the beginning, real uncertainty with regard
to the result has to be structurally guaranteed,
this means power has to be suspended in order
that participation can be motivated at all. The
participants have to assume roles which require
complementary behaviour, as, for instance, to
be answerable for their position they also have
to be requested to give binding accounts of
their position of which their opponents can depend.
Only in this way can a process of controversial
communication occur in which issues can be defined
better and alternatives can be eliminated to the
extent that the final decisions can take place
with a minimum of selectivity and, therefore
with little social impact".
In this quote Luhmann is describing a framework for decision-making
which contemporary public inquiries seem to adhere to. It is
premised on the idea that debate must move towards the reduction
or shaping down of complex arguments, of limiting and closing off
alternative formulations of problems which might be dysfunctional
for the objectives of the political systems as a whole, or put
differently, demands which are not in accordance with the
existing hierarchies of power controlling the political system
are systematically screened out.
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Habermas develops his argument from a similar position of
symmetry between participants in a decision-making forum, but
deviates markedly on the direction in which discussions should
flow. There are two essential notions in his approach to free
communicative action; first, his basic model reposes on the
idea of a consensus of truth arrived at through argumentation,
and second,the not ion of 'an ideal speech situation1 which is
counterfactua11y based on the background assumption that there
are no structural limitations placed on the selection and use
of "speech acts". As the parameters for obtaining a free
communicative process are established, Habermas provides us
with a methodological aid for examining the actual 'systematically
(12)distorted communication' in public institutions.
Within Habermas' formulation policy and decision-making should be
based on submitting information, policies and statements to
discursive validation in an authentic public sphere. In order to
be certain that any consensus arrived at is 'true' and 'genuine',
conditions must exist to permit a progressive radica1isat ion of the
argument. There must be"the freedom to move from a given level of
discourse to increasingly reflected levels." In addition to dis¬
cursively evaluating theories, problematic statements, and norms
there must also be the opportunity to "call into question and
modify the originally accepted conceptual framework There must
be the freedom to reflect on the systematic changes in these concep¬
tual systems in an attempt to reconstruct the progress of knowledge
(critique of knowledge) and to reflect on our need structures on
the state of our knowledge and our capabilities (cognitive-political-
(13)will formation)" Participants in this type of discourse must
accept the force of the better argument. It is through argumentation
and reason that a true from a false consensus can be distinguished,
Habermas argues. He uses the 'ideal speech situation' to posit
the structural parameters within which this distinction can be
made possible. There has to be a forum free from constraint where
all participants can "at any time initiate and perpetuate a
discourse", or "put forward or call into question, ground or refute
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statements, explanations, interpretations and justifications so
that in the long run no opinion remains exempt from consideration
and criticism". The discourse must he open to those Darticioants
who are "truthful or sincere in their relation to themselves and
can make their inner nature transparent to others." Finally, all
participants should be free "to command, to oppose or permit or
forbid so that one sided bindinq norms are excluded and formal
(1 A)
equality to initiate discourse is made practical".
In reality, Habermas1 general analysis has led him towards
uncovering the wider social forces dominant in advanced industrial
societies that have distorted forms of discourse and obfuscated
the underlying potential inherent in all speech acts for a non-
distorted communication. The direction of this analysis has
been towards revealing the one dimensionality of Luhmann's position,
specifically by locating the irreducible significance of social
interaction and practical reason in social development.
In Toward a Rational Society Habermas argued that throughout the
19th century the development of science and technology relentlessly
challenged non-technica1 concepts of progress at both 3 practical
and ideological level. Industrialism and secularism changed the
basis upon which people gave meaning to their world and made sense
of it. It changed the basis of legitimacy and authority in terms
of both meaning systems and the legitimate means to be used to
resolve problems. Science and technology became interdependent.
The productivity of labour was augmented in a systematic rather
than sporadic way as it had been done in the past. In other
words, technology and industrial, development became what Habermas
calls 1scientised1. ^
With the institutionalisat ion of science as a guiding base for
technology, economic growth has come to depend upon a scientised
technology.
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"As long as the productive forces were visibly
linked to rational decisions and instrumental
action of men engaged in social production, they
could be understood as the potentia 1 for a growing
power of technical control and not be confused
with the institutional framework in which they
are embedded. However, with the institutional-
isation of scientific-technica1 progress, the
productive forces have assumed a form owing to which
nen lose consciousness of the dualism of work and
interaction The quasi-autonomous progress
of science and technology then appears as an
independent variable on which the most important
single variable, namely economic growth, depends.
Thus arises a perspective in which the development
of the social system seems to be determined by the
logic of scientific-technical progress. The
immanent law of this progress seems to produce
objective exigencies, which must be obeyed by any
politics oriented towards functional needs then
propaganda can refer to the role of technology and
science in order to explain and legitimate why in
modern societies the process of democratic decision¬
making about practical problems loses its function...
This technocracy thesis can also become a back¬
ground ideology that penetrates into the consciousness
of the depoliticised mass of the population, where
it can take on legitimating power."
(16)
With respect to this phenomenon, Habermas' work advances beyond
either Weber or Lukac's in understanding the broad processes of
rationalisation and reification in capitalist development. They
failed to notice that an accompanying development to the transform¬
ation of the organisationa1 and procedural principles of the
capitalist state and economy was the alteration in what Habermas
chooses to call 'ultimate values'. By this idea he means that
ethics, norms and values become significantly alterned in terms of
their legitimatory appeal in a society that increasingly comes to
be dominated by instrumental reason. By adopting the categorical
dualism between work and interaction, Habermas has been able
to show how there are two irreducible components of socia 1 evolution,
the former developing through the generation and application of
technical rules and the accumulation of technical and scientific
knowledge, the latter developing through the accumulation of knowledge
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about social and moral consciousness, and reflexivity about
society and its symbolic systems, There is great critical
potential in this mode of analysis because Habermas has been
able systematically to integrate the instrumental or technical
sphere of the scientised productive forces with the sphere of
social consciousness at a theoretical level and importantly,
illustrate the eclipse of the latter by the former. Through this
intuitive separation it is possible to see that one of the major
problems with contemporary industrial societies is not the overarching
societal domination of Weber's rationalisation, Lukac's reification,
or Marcuse's one dimensionality as such, which all attempted to con¬
ceptualise in their different ways the emerging force of instrumental
or technical modes of reason, but the real problem is the
universa 1isat ion of technical reason at the expense of moral or
normative structures.
Scientific and technological practices are rooted in the need for
human beings to "seek their own self preservation and emancipation
from material necessity". ^ However, that basic human practice
can become repressive if not contained to its proper domain and
seeks a universal application to all things and all relationships
as suggested by Luhmann's thesis. It is precisely this tendency
that is at work when a technological concept of progress comes to
be seen as being synonomous with all forms of 'rational' social
development. The sphere of social consciousness and reflexivity
about social development, which Habermas conceptualises in
general terms as emanating from public 'communicative interaction',
is subsumed within a philosophical and legitimatory movement that
downgrades meaning and justifications not grounded in scientific
or 'purposive-rational' action (instrumental reason). Yet that
dimension of social development conceptualised as 'practical reason'
by Habermas can not be easily and totally reduced to economic and
technological development, Habermas' categorical dualism builds into
a dialectical Marxist model the original idea of 'truth claims'.
Men do not develop and acquire their humanity solely through sensuous
human activity but acquire moral and social consciousness about
(10)material forces which they seek to control and criticise.
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The dialectical tension therefore between institutional power and
participatory claims on decision-making, and access to the
political process more generally, is incorporated within the
categorical dualism which forms the foundation of Habermas1 social
theory. The real problem for him, and the problem that this
thesis is focusing attention on, is the public and institutional
space existing in our society within which highly complex scientific
and technological issues can be subjected to an examination by criteria
derived, in theoretical terms, from the sphere of social interaction
and symbolic consciousness rather than by an exclusive legitimatory
appeal to an instrumental reason located in the technical sphere
of work.
The political issue for Habermas is therefore a question of the
1renormatisation1 of complex scientific and technological decision¬
making. This becomes a significant problem because science and
technology have become the dominant and institutionalised form of
conceiving of progress, and the empirica1-analytica1 approach to
problem solving has become, at least for public and institutional
purposes, the only legitimate way to proceed in evaluating issues.
Science is also increasingly becoming the 'sense system1 shaping
the communicationprocess in the public inquiry system in ways
echoing Luhmann's thesis.
Only those who can address themselves to solving technical problems
will be accredited with legitimate status as 'experts'. The
real problem which this presents to society is that issues
of an essentially political, and therefore, of a socially conflictual
nature, will tend to be discussed in a way which separates questions
of technical utility and efficiency from wider social and moral
content. It will often be the case that those people who wish to
offer a radical re-appraisal of a project based on novel non¬
technical solutions will be truly innovative. They challenge the
parameters of conventional wisdom in much the same way that
'paradigms' in science are challenged by those not party to the
conventional scientific wisdom. The acceptance or non-acceptance
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of solutions to technological or industrial dilemmas are therefore
as much to do with entrenched political, economic and social interests
as scientific methodology or the safety of a specific technology/
(19)
as Kuhn has argued. However, as I will hope to demonstrate
further on in this thesis, there is plenty of evidence that
accepted scientific and technological solutions to problems are
resistent to novel criticismto the extent of a tendency to ridicule
any person or solution which does not operate within the dominant
industrial, economic or technological paradigms.
Critical discourse is therefore a central feature of Habermas1
Social Theory. His entire theoretical project relates to the
concept of an open and unrestricted public sphere as the ultimate
way to ground interests and subject instrumental reason to a form of
social control. The salient issue in all cases is to establish
the principle that particular interests can be made generalisable.
Distorted communication as a form of ideological manipulation
presents particular interests as universal without publicly and
openly subjecting them to the scrutiny of public debate. The
general concern which the critical theory tradition has voiced
is the depo1iticising effect which instrumental reason has on
the public sphere; its tendency to de-1 egitimate non-technical
views and forms of rationality. This tendency is, of course, clearly
articulated by Luhmann's approach to political analysis and contained
within his normative critique of modern political systems.
D i scussion
Both Habermas and Luhmann adopt a communications concept of power
but their concept of 'communication' is quite different. Luhmann's
underlying concepts of power and legitimacy are ultimately grounded
in the logic of a 'systems rationality' which forms the core of
his political analysis. Communication in Luhmann's analysis only
makes 'sense' as a means towards obtaining efficient relations
between discrete systems. Legitimacy is grounded in the efficiency
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of procedures rather than in the social and moral content of
meaning. Public opinion within Luhmann's perspective only has
the status of a phenomenon that can be manipulated to Increase
system stability. He rejects the idea, which is central to
Habermas' social theory, that public opinion can be an emergent
phenomenon of rational discussion and debate which can have a political
effect due entirely to its genesis in communal agreement. Public
opinion is a concept narrowly associated with a pre-existing consensus
by Luhmann and therefore he insists that it can only be understood
as the product of "provocation by those with necessary authority".
The relationship between formal concepts of 'natural justice' and
common-sense concepts discussed in Chapter 2 and the Habermas-
Luhmann debate can now be pointed up. There is a discernible tension
within current public administration between 'procedural' forms of
1 egitimacy(natura1 justice as a right to a formal hearing) and
discursive forms of legitimacy (natural justice as a right to an
open and independent debate about issues). The two legal principles
discussed in chapter two could be said to exemplify a tension
between the highly centralised control of the public inquiry
system on the one hand, and devolved control of the system from
the politica1-administrative centre on the other. The systems
theory presented by Luhmann suggests that the public inquiry should
be based on a formal procedural concept of 'natural justice' which
does not interfere with the 'efficiency' of the system's instrumental
role while fulfilling its expressive role by assuring the public
that their opinions are at least being considered. The current
interpretation of the audi alteram partem principle seems to
support a 'systems rationality' by restricting the concept of
'natural justice' to a formal procedural issue rather than one of
normative violation. Habermas' social theory suggests the
opposite. He conceives of a discursive form of rationality that is
grounded in an 'ideal speech situation'. If the nemo judex in causa
sua principle was broadly interpreted to take account of institutional
bias rather than simply individual bias then the public inquiry
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system would be more likely to sustain open access to issues and
participants, and importantly, be autonomous from the machinery
of government. Herein lies the main issue. Luhmann and Habermas
adhere to different models of knowledge. For Luhmann science is
the dominant 'sense system' which forms the communication language
in decision-making systems whereas Habermas places greater emphasis
on social and normative criticism within public institutions
that are genuinely open. Their views about the state and the
public sphere also differ. Luhmann regards the state as the
centre of control of complex systems concerned with steering
functions which seek to minimise the role of public opinion
and debate because these are considered disruptive in a complex
society. For Habermas, the state is a set of political
apparatuses of intervention and representation that should be
responsive to influence and direction by public opinion and debate.
At this point there is a need to convert the dynamics of the
Habermas-Luhmann debate into a framework of analysis that connects
the principles of control and power implied within their debate
to structural relationships within the public inquiry institution.
Their debate implies particular rules about the relationship
between different forms of knowledge and statuses of knowledge.
It also implies that power to initiate consideration of issues,
themes or information should lie at different levels of the
politica1-administrative hierarchy in the determination of policy
and decision-making. As their respective positions are to be
treated as dia 1ectica1ly related but integral features of the public
inquiry system, it will be useful to condense the Habermas-Luhmann
debate into one coherent theoretical structure. For this reason
I think it will be convenient for analytical purposes to relate this
debate to the vocabulary of classification and framing of knowledge
initiated by Basil Bernstein.
The discussion I have been engaged in has implicitly suggested that
there is an inextricable connection between i nst i tiiiona 1 structures.
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political processes and the principles of social control and power
that shape forms of discourse within public inquiries, Bernstein's
educational sociology has explored these interconnections in a
unique way that can assist my analysis.
The Classification and Framing of Public Inquiry Knowledge.
My starting point is Basil Bernstein's seminal paper 'On the
(21)Classification and Framing of Educational Knowledge'.
Bernstein starts his paper by emphasising that "how a society
selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates the
educational knowledge it considers to be public, reflects both
the distribution of power and the principles of social control".
It is my argument that this applies equally to the selection,
classification and evaluation of knowledge within the public inquiry
setting.
The concepts of c1 assificat ion and framing developed by Bernstein
are fundamental to his and my own analysis and require a full
exp1ication.
First the concept of classification. This refers not to what
is classified but to the relationship between the contents of
units of knowledge (one might consider this simply in terms of
discrete subject areas or expertise) and categories of people with
kinds of knowledge (scientists, businessmen, lawyers, public
inquiry reporters or laymen). So classification refers to the
principle of the relationships between categories, or as Bernstein
originally formulated this idea, to "the degree of boundary maintenance
between contents of different realms of knowledge'.'
To quote Bernstein on the educational experience, and inserting my
own appropriate categories,
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"Any social phenomenon is fundamentally a
structure of contextua1ised meanings. From
this point of view, a school (Read public inquiry)
creates a particular structure of meanings. At
one level we have groupings of teachers, ancillary
staff and pupils (professionals, technical and
lay people). These inter-actions take place in a
context - a building, or complex of buildings.
Communication of diverse kinds goes on between
teachers, between pupils, between teachers and
pupils (between participants within a public
inquiry) When we look more closely, we find
rules which underlie the diverse sets of
specialised meanings which regulate the inter¬
actions and practices These rules create
criteria, standards whereby persons acts,
communications are evaluated compared and
grouped "
(22)
The notion of classificat ion refers to the crucial area of boundary
relationships as constitutive of meanings in particular institutional
settings. These relationships obviously imply some form of power
in order to maintain and transform the boundary relationships between
different kinds of knowledge and statuses of knowledge. This
problem is handled by the concept of framing.
Framing refers therefore to the principles which underly control
of the relationships between categories. In the educational sphere
framing refers simply to the power implied in a given pedagogical
relationship between teacher and taught. In that context framing
refers to what may and may not be transmitted in a classroom.
It articulates the power to determine the criteria of relevance, the
pace at which knowledge can be transmitted and the selection and
sequence of relevant ideas and concepts. Bernstein states that
"framing refers to the controls on what is made available, how
it is made available, when it is made available and the 'social
(23)
relationships ". This can be readily applied to the public
inquiry setting if we transcribe the relevant categories. Whenever
Bernstein discusses the school I will conceive of the public
debate as a communicative process.
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The short hand concepts of collection codes, which refers to
strong classification and strong framing, and Integration Codes,
which refers to weak classification and framing, can also be readily
utilised within the public inquiry setting. The idea of codes in
educational sociology is well established. Ralph Turner refers to
'organising folk norms' in his paper on 'sponsored' and 'contest'
(2k)
mobility. There he was seeking to conceptualise the
dialectical inter-link between particular constellations of class
relations and the structures of regulating principles in educational
systems. Thus the degree of openness or closure in social
mobility and class relations has both a determined and determining
effect upon the way in which school and examination systems are
organised. These 'folk norms' represent an implicit normative
structure 'reflected in value judgements about selection strategies
and even pedogogical relationships'. Bernstein talks about codes
in a way similar to Turner. Education is founded on codes which
contain the "underlying principles shaping curriculum, pedagogy
and evaluation." Language and knowledge are both contexts within
which Bernstein seeks to link patterns of individual experience
and behaviour not only with the structure of the group, but also
with 'organising concepts' or 'themes' inherent in its sub-culture.
He suggests that
"The concept code refers to the transmission of
the deep meaning structure of a culture or sub¬
culture: its basic interpretation rules".
(25)
And also that:
"Imbedded in a culture or sub-culture may be a basic
organising concept, concepts or themes, whose rami¬
fications may be diffused throughout the culture or
sub-culture. The speech forms through which culture
or sub-culture is realised transmit this organising
concept or concepts within their gestalt rather than
through any one set of meanings."
(26)
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The idea of codes is therefore to be understood as an expression of
basix interpretative rules or concepts that generate an overall
structure of classification and frames of knowledge and meaning;
these codes are of course, transmitted, as Bernstein suggests
"within their gestalt rather than through any one set of meanings".
Relating these concepts to Habermas' concern about the 1scientisat ion
of technology and public opinion1, it can be said that the dominance
of certain forms of instrumental reason will tend to generate
patterns of boundary maintenance in the classificat ion and framing
of knowledge which rigidly insulate areas of expert or esoteric
knowledge and secure the status of a technical intelligentsia. Those
with 'scientific' knowledge will tend to be attributed greater status
in society in those contexts where policy is being formed or
decisions made. In the terminology of Bernstein's educational
sociology_, I would argue that a col 1 ect ion code represents the
dominant code in advanced industrial societies. One might suggest
that Luhmann's thesis favours the dominance of a collection code .
A col 1ection code however represents only one organising principle.
it articulates an approach to science, technology, politics and
social change conceptualised by the idea of technological progress
and a 'technical intelligentsia'. The idea of an integration code
in Bernstein's work articulates non-techno1ogica1 concepts of
progress as at least a meaningful complement to technological
problem resolution. It will express in a very general way, the weak
classification and framing of knowledge generated by the inter-
penetration of areas of knowledge and statuses of knowledge so that
scientific, technical and everyday common-sense questions will be
seen as inextricably linked with the political and social choices
(27)
facing industrial societies. The Luhmann-Habermas debate
clearly highlights the theoretical, normative and political
opposition between these two conflicting codes. The academic
conflict between Luhmann and Habermas, in the specific context of
the public inquiry system, will express itself clearly in the way
public debate is structured. It will take the form of a
particular pattern in the class ification and framing of knowledge
considered to be important by the Minister and Reporter.
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An important point to be made at this point is that the wider
social support for col lection and integrated codes will tend to
alter in different political contexts. The idea of an underlying
col 1ection code in society at one and the same time expresses a
generalised power and dominance accruing to an instrumental mode of
reason but it may also be politically challenged or supported
by action groups from time to time. For example, lay objectors
without credential led status will obviously have an interest in
the greater degree of participatory involvement in public inquries
implied by an integrated knowledge code. However faced with a
col 1ection code they may attempt to offer their challenge on the
level of competing credential led 'expertise'. The two dominant
codes will obviously be expressed with different degrees of priority,
and I will be seeking to analyse some major public inquiries in
terms of this framework in Part 2.
The codes imply distinct power principles underlying the relative
status accruing to different levels of expertise. The collection
code will tend to favour a distinctly hierarchical form of relation¬
ships within which the knowledgeable and the professionals will
determine the parameters of relevance of knowledge rather than
objectors without credentia 1 led status. The idea of framing in
relation to public inquiries refers to the power to determine what
is to be known and who will be allowed to initiate consideration
of particular themes or issues. The complexity reduction of
knowledge and information favoured by Luhmann's systems approach
to rationality, which seems to be generally institutionalised as the
dominant feature in existing public inquiry procedures, will be
founded on strong c1 assification and framing informed by science as
the leading 'sense system1 so generating an overall col 1ection
code. One would expect therefore a strictly hierarchical
organisational structure within the inquiry setting starting at
the top with the Reporter and Technical Assessor charged with
the task of containing discussion to a highly specific remit issued
by the-Secretary of State, down through credentia 11ed technical experts
to the lay public. Discussion within such a forum would be channelled
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through the formal legal representation at the public inquiry whose
task Lt would be to shape the evidence so that it addressed the inquiry
remit directly. The lay public who are often allowed space at
the end of most pub 1 i^c inquiries to express opinions, tend to do so
either as a written or spoken statement without cross examination.
Their status and their evidence will be distinctly insulated and
isolated as a qualitatively different type of input to the proceedings.
An important distinction should be made relating directly to this
last point. That distinction is between what I call engaged debate
(28) —
and disengaged debate. The former operates within the parameters
of official remits, the latter does not.
The discursive rationality implied by Habermas' 'ideal speech
situation1, obviously favours weak classification and framing in
order to facilitate public participation in decision-making and wide
ranging and radical discussion which will be capable of offering a
broad analysis and criticism of the foundations of the knowledge
offered in evidence. One might object that Habermas' perspective
would encourage a disengaged debate which might lead to anarchy
and frustration in making decisions. This is so only to the
extent that within the logic of his framework, the State would not
have the power to determine what is relevant through its control of
remits in the manner currently practiced. Instead remits or
problematic issues must emerge from public debate and consultation
rather than be imposed by the State. An integrated knowledge code
would facilitate this process. The weak societal power of
integrated codes is the focus of Habermas' ongoing critique of
industrial capitalism.
Now if both Luhmann and Habermas are understood as providing the
polar positions in the classification and framing model, then by
using Bernstein's concepts to analyse case studies of public inquiries,
we are also converting the Habermas-Luhmann debate into a form
easily used for empirical study. My analysis can be informed by the
complexities of their debate yet not be constrained to work totally
within its theoretical boundaries.
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This overall framework can further be used to identify the relation¬
ship between the public Inquiry and its discourse in relation to
the demands placed upon proceedings by commercial and production
interests on the one hand, and wider social and ecological interests
on the other. It can be asked, to what extent does the state assist
the needs of industrial applications at tbeexpense of opposition
interests in terms of the classificat ion and framing of.knowledge
established by technical remits and inquiry procedures? For
example, strong vertical framing within the public inquiry may be
combined with weak lateral classificat ion and framing with respect
to the i nquiries' relationships with industry and government economic
policy, but strong lateral classification and framing with respect'-
to the ecologist movement. This will manifest itself in a greater
willingness of public inquiries to acknowledge the relevance of
technical and commercial criteria, while down-playing environmental
and ecological criticisms of industrial schemes.
A particularly useful element of the c1 assification and framing
perspective is that general and sometimes very gradual changes
in either dimension operating independently can assist in
identifying points of stress and transformation in the power and
principles of control within the public sphere. For example,
public pressure to open up public inquiry procedures in terms
of framing,to allow a greater control and initiative to public
participation?wi11 obviously challenge the principle of strong
classification with respect to the relationships between different
categories of expertise, discourse, forms of knowledge and
ultimately in the relationship between public inquiries and the
State. It is also instructive to retain a perspective that
identifies two quite separate but significant dimensions of public
institutional practice. Changes in the classification of
knowledge, for example, while retaining strong framing could
identify a movement towards an Inquiry Commission structure. The
State could alter dimensions of institutional practice for ideological
and power reasons, giving the impression of greater consideration of
issues yet retaining hierarchical control principles. The idea
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of a Planning Inquiry Commission is to allow for a greater scope
for considering controversial and complex issues. By instituting
a commission structure that is not necessarily site specific in
planning matters, there Is obviously a recognition that a weaker
classificat ion of knowledge can often be beneficial in resolving
major planning controversies. Most opposition groups involved in
major public inquiries in Scotland have attempted to establish an
Inquiry Commission to examine their particular controversy.
What is often overlooked by opponents of industrial development is
that the institutional practices of the public inquiry have these
two dimensions of equal significance and that within the Inquiry
Commission structure it could be argued that framing is strengthened
further in comparison with that which obtains in conventional
inquiry hearings. For example, the Roskill Inquiry into the
third London Airport closely resembled a PIC and it was notorious
for forcing all evidence into a cost benefit framework. Only
information and knowledge that could be quant ifiably compared
within a cost benefit analysis was recognised by the Commission. One
might describe it as an exercise in bowdlerising all non-technical
knowledge.
The Outer Circle Policy Unit idea of a Project Inquiry, consisting
of different stages of open discussion moving towards an agreement
about specific issues, could be interpreted as an attempt to weaken
the strength of classification and framing. Yet even that proposal
is less radical than it first appears because the balance of
power between the State and the public sphere is very much in favour
of the former. The first stage of the Project Inquiry would still
be responding to a remit set by the Secretary of State. There is no
mechanism either within the planning legislation or within our
existing Parliamentary system that could decide the parameters of that
remit other than the government Minister concerned with the planning
application. This issue illustrates quite clearly that the basic
problem regarding participation and democracy in public inquiries
must be seen in a wider political perspective. The issue of general
government policies for development and planning combined with
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institutional reform of the inquiry system may be needed and may
require a wider social and political movement than so far seems
to have emerged in recent years, it is against such a wider
political objective that local action group activity may be judged.
The preceding outline is presented diagramatically in Figures 1
and 2. Figure 1 attempts to bring together the varying forms of
procedural structures that together manifest specific principles
of social control. Figure 2 is an attempt to relate the general
parameters of Figure 1 to already existing institutional forms.
The difficulty with all typological devices is that dynamic and
independently varying dimensions of institutional structures are
frozen. Public inquiries by their nature are very dependent upon
the social and economic stakes at issue plus the character of
the participants to determine their form. However, I would argue
that they are not as empirically variable in terms of the criteria
I have presented as one might intuitively think.
Cells 2 and 3, in Figure 2, perhaps need further explanation.
As there has never been a formally constituted Planning Inquiry
Commission nor a Project Inquiry it could be argued that it is
pure speculation to characterise them in terms of weak classification
and strong framing. Well t-hi s ite-not so. The procedural
structures of both institutional forms have been clearly set out
by the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 (1972 in Scotland )
for the PIC and by the Outer Circle Policy Unit document on
(29)
The Big Public Inquiry for the Project Inquiry. In both
cases the emphasis is on retaining strong framing by rigorous,
highly ordered presentation of 'the best specialist knowledge1
while adopting a flexible attitude about what issues may have a
bearing on the controversy in question, and indeed, what is to
be considered problematic within a wider, less site specific remit
generated by the relevant Ministerial department. Neither
institutional form entails a major redistribution of power nor
a constitutional alteration to allow greater devolved power to









































































































































































































































































contrast are more ad hoc forms. They are often a response to
Immediate events which determine the focus of debate rather than
a constitutionally generated remit. Even where local community
councils or res i dents'assoc iat ions sponsor communrty meetings
they are by their nature loosely structured affairs depending to
a greater extent on a judicious chairman and common-sense to retain
order in proceedings. Issues are very often identified and
generated by general debate rather than pre-given by an institutional
remit.
Now given that a general framework of analysis has been generated
it is important to re-state the central dilemma of the public inquiry
system prior to a closer examination of significant major inquiry
controversies.
From my argument so far it is clear that a crucial problem within
public inquiries is the pre-eminence likely to be given to the evidence,
first, of 'experts' as opposed to laymen, and secondly, to 'technical'
as opposed to non-technical 'experts'. The difficulty is actually
two-dimensional in this simple sense: ordinary non-technical objectors,
I wi11 argue, are discounted because they are both lay-persons
and also not equipped to grapple with highly complex technical issues.
The weight placed upon collection codes in the classification and
framing of knowledge is not conducive for stimulating a sense of
'fairness, openness and impartiality' in those participants in
public inquiries who fail to get non-technical evidence acknowledged.
For the sake of brevity I would suggest two modes of reasoning or
styles of argument can be identified within public inquiries which
are actually far less distinct than most public institutions would
accept; I will name them (a) the scientific/theoretical mode of
reason (Collection Code) and (b) thesocial/common-sense mode of
reason (integrated Code), My general argument will be that
contemporary industrial societies have effectively institutionalised
a collection code underlying the uses of scientific and technological
knowledge which assumes that science describes and explains the
world in ways foreign to common understanding. The dominance of
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a collection code is founded on the assumption that scientific
methods of enqui.ry are uncoupled from everyday life by employing
both a distinct language and methodology ( hypothetico~deductive)
which establish their own criteria for distinguishing between
sense and nonsense or truth and falsity. Characterising a
socia 1/common-sense mode of reason from the standpoint of the
dominant collection code, it is assumed to be based on values,
norms and habits of interaction which express subjective interests
of a social, political or economic kind. An Integration code as
an underlying principle of knowledge,is believed to be founded on
the 'negotiated' consequences of interacting vested interests
rather than on some idea of 'scientific objectivity'.
The problem with this approach to the uses of science, technology
and everyday knowledge is that it ignores the extent to which they
do in fact overlap and inter-penetrate each other. Each mode of
reasoning can be, and often is, treated as a distinct and insulated
'paradigm' admitting only a specific kind of criticism based on
mode specific rules. Demands for justification by the scientific/
theorietical mode of reason of the socia1/common sense mode are not
recognised or are discounted as meaningless and vice versa. However,
Kuhn has shown how values, ideologies and political commitments
are integral features of the development of science;, whereas
Habermas is important for asserting that social, political and
economic interests must also be subjected to rational critical
discourse; values, norms and interests should be capable of
discursive validation.
The question arises therefore, do public inquiries actually support
and reproduce the dominance of collection codes? The environmental
and planning dilemmas confronting contemporary society are inextricably
bound up with value choices which can not be discursively examined
if all problems are treated as technical ones resolvable only by
technical criteria alone. Even if one were to accept the dominant
public conception of science as a description and explanation of
an 'objective reality1, is there ample recognition that science
cannot assimilate all social and moral questions that might be
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relevant for making decisions about industrial development?
The public inquiry system has to straddle a line between being a
genuinely open institutional space within the public sphere and
being an administrative instrument of the state. The tension
created by the inquiry systems dual role will bethfe.object of
study in the second part of this thesis.
In the case studies that follow I will seek to examine both the
internal impact of the.c1 assificat ion and framing of knowledge
within the public inquiry process, and the external effect in
terms of the wider process of the formulation and presentation of
opposition. Given that I am hypothesising a high degree of dis¬
enchantment with the inquiry system because of its closed or
collected form of classification and framing of knowledge and
information, I will be enquiring into the consequences which result
for opposition groups and action groups intent on formulating and
presenting a wide-ranging opposition to development within the local
public inquiry system. I have pointed to the need to retain a
conception of the possibi1ity of action springing from the perceived
disjunction between formal and common-sense concepts of justice.
So in what follows I will be interested in examining that distinction
as a product of local action group involvement in recent large




"The main point to bear in mind is that,
although Scotland is an industrialised
country, the North Sea discoveries have
been made off the more rural and sparsely
populated areas. Consequently there has
arisen a'range of problems related to the
marrying of the oil industry with the
traditional economic and social structures
of these areas. In the main the crucial
factors are the scale of the developments
relative to the size of the communities
affected and the lifetimes of the various
developments."
(D.I. Mackay and G.A. Mackay
The Political Economy of North
Sea 0i1~ pages 111-112).
In this part of the thesis I will focus attention on specific
case studies involving major public inquiries into North Sea
oil and gas onshore developments.
In a letter from the Permanent Under Secretary of State at the
Scottish Development Department dated the 20th February 1975, accompany¬
ing SDD circular 14/1975 to Town and Country Clerks and local
authority Chief Executives, it was stated:
"Where contentious issues calling for an inquiry
arise, i t is-, important that the inquiry serves
efficiently as a means of open investigation
of the issues to be considered in arriving at
a proper balance between the various competing
interests". ,,,
It is precisely a test of this objective that the following case
studies will seek to evaluate. The general objective of the
SDD circular 14/1975 stated:
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"The fundamental purpose of the procedure
outlined in this Memorandum is to achieve
the objectives of openness, fairness and
impart Lai i.ty recommended by the Franks
Committee on Administrative Tribunals and
Inquiries in 1957, While at the same time
conducting the inquiry process speedily,
efficiently and inexpensively, without
detriment to the rights or interests of
any of the parties. No code of guidance
can be expected to cover all contingencies
which may arise but a Reporter appointed to
hold an inquiry should exercise his discretion,
in determining the procedure which should be
followed in circumstances which are not
envisaged by this Memorandum, by reference
to this fundamental purpose".
(2)
The memo seems to encapsulate the kind of dilemma that I have
theoretically discussed in previous chapters. It seeks to
reaffirm the general principles of the 1957 Franks Committee, yet
it gives an indeterminate discretion to Reporters to shape
inquiry procedures both in terms of their organisation and the¬
se lection and control over evidence.
Paragraph 5(d) of the letter makes it quite clear that there
does exist an implicit tension between what I would call reductive
and discursive approaches to the evidence. It emphasises:
"The importance of the role of the Reporter in directing proceedin
and it continues
"It seems to the Secretary of State that he
(the Reporter) should not necessarily be a
silent listner to the proceedings (My emphasis)
he should be free to seek any clarification he
deems necessary or to direct questions to issues
which he thinks will be important to the
Secretary of State's decision, but which may not
have been adequately covered in the evidence".
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This statement can, of course, be interpreted in different ways,
it could be argued that the Secretary of State may Initiate consideration
of issues which are broader in scope than those generated by a
specific planning application. Or alternatively it could be
interpreted in terms of what Luhmann describes as "complexity reduc¬
tion", the focusing attention and discussion on narrowly conceived
technical and economic issues.
Indeed the very circulation of the 14/1975 memorandum should be
understood in terms of the latter interpretation. It was circulated
after three lengthy public inquiries into North Sea oil onshore
developments at Dunnet Bay in Caithness, Delny in East Ross-shire
and Drumbuie in West Ross-shire, which was the 'straw that eventually
broke the Camel's back'. Those inquiries were long by usual
standards; the 1969 application by Grampian Chemicals to establish
a petro-chemica1 complex on a site near Nigg Bay led to a public
inquiry begun in Dingwall on the 27th February which was not
completed until the 2nd April (although the inquiry did not sit cont¬
inuously); the application by Chicago Bridge Ltd to carry out rig
construction on a site at Dunnet Bay led to a public inquiry begun
in Thurso on the 11th April which was not completed until the 5th
May (again the hearing was not continuous after the 27th April); the
Drumbuie inquiry into Mowlem-Tay1 or Woodrow's application to build
concrete oil rigs on a site at Loch Carron was continuous for
46 days. If placed in the context of these major public inquiries
Circular 14/1975 takes on a different complexion. The third
paragraph of the accompanying letter starts "the inquiry procedure
has recently been criticised as being in some cases too lengthy,
too combersome, too formal and too expensive". It should be asked
too lengthy, combersome, formal and expensive for whom?
Certainly a lengthy public inquiry can be a costly expense for
many objectors under the existing system. There is virtuallv no
orovision for meetina the costs incurred bv opponents, of indeed'
(3) '
for developers out of Dublic funds. However, that is unlikely
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to have been the source of concern and 'criticism1. The reason behind
the circulation of the memorandum and the attitude to planning
procedures implicit within its official discourse can, I believe, be
traced to the government's anxiety about North Sea oil onshore
development at a time of national economic crisis throughout 1973 and
1974.
At that time the Conservative government under Edward Heath was
constructing the Coastal Sites Bill which was an excellent example
of expedient state intervention which sought to 'abrogate' planning
procedures which might slow down the appropriation of oil. The
government of the day preferred to think of their Bill as a device
for "accelerating" planning procedures.
The world oil crisis created a climate of concern, possibly even panic,
within the Conservative government of the day. It was preoccupied with
the subject of procuring the oil from the North Sea in quantity as
soon as possible. To achieve this objective the Coastal Sites Bill
was to be forwarded as a national Bill presented by the Secretary of
State for Energy to enable the Government to acquire, using an
"accelerated" procedure if necessary, land which was urgently
needed. Gordon Campbell made it clear in the House of Commons on
the 31st January 1974, speaking as the Secretary of State for
Scotland, that the Bill was explicitly aimed at permitting an early
start to the construction of concrete platforms at Drumbuie. This
was made clear while the actual Drumbuie public inquiry was in
progress. The Secretary of State acknowledged that "the parties
at this inquiry may well fear that this announcement of Government
intention has substantially changed the basis on which the inquiry
has been proceeding and it may be that they would wish to seek an
(4)
adjournment to give an opportunity to reassess their position".
The whole purpose of the Bill was to 'avoid delays In the planning
process' at a time when the proposed industrial developments in the
Highlands were of 'vital national interest'. The social and
economic disruption of local communities was to be the sacrifice
in favour of hurried legislation to allow oil development to bypass
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the existing framework of planning procedures. The defeat of the
Heath Government short-circuited that piece of legislation and it
was not taken up by the succeeding Labour administration, but it
was enough in itself to reveal an impatience with the planning
inquiry system within the Scottish Development Department. One can
not avoid concluding that the public inquiry system was considered
by many in the Scottish Office to be a troublesome hurdle in the
way of securing essential industrial projects quickly; a hurdle
that had to be endured but which might be hurried along and possibly
weakened in the name of greater efficiency and informality.
The cases I propose to examine will all seek to analyse a particular
tension within the public inquiry system throughout the 19701s between
an administrative system seeking to reduce length and formality while
also attempting to be fully discursive and open. 1 will focus on
the public inquiry instrument as the centre of a controversy surround¬
ing the apparent irreconcilability in planning between administrative
efficiency and 'natural justice1.
It seems to me to be a mistake to view the public inquiry hearing
in isolation. It can exert an influence which shapes the wider
political and intellectual perspectives of people involved in
development issues. Whenever a major development project was proposed,
the task of mobilising local people, local petitions, demonstrations
and the formation of action groups, had as its object the task of
ensuring a recorded public debate. That could only mean a local
public inquiry hearing within the confines of the existing planning
1 eg i slatIon.
The emphasis which I want to give therefore is that the planning
process, in the context of major oil and gas onshore developments
throughout the 19701s, invariably involved a public inquiry at the
centre of the controversy which should be viewed as a system which
embraced the tota1ity of the opposition process. ^ Once the
option was taken by individuals and interest groups to fight a public
inquiry there were obvious implications for the input to formulating
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and presenting an opposition case. The type of information and
knowledge that could be utilised had to adapt to the logic and limit¬
ations of the local public inquiry system.
It will therefore be my intention to examine the public inquiries both
interna11y in terms of the themes and debates which they sustained
and externa 11y in terms of local attitudes and the organisation,
formulation and presentation of opposition.
Mention should be made at the outset of the fact that it is often
easy to criticise decisions that were taken in the past. Hindsight
is the kind of exact science that can overlook the real dilemmas that
confronted those people charged with the task of making difficult
choices in difficult circumstances. I think that in all the cases
to be discussed there were difficult decisions which had to be
made. However, if an institutional apparatus is to be evaluated with
a view to its future role and function then past decisions must be
examined with respect to how they might, at least, have been arrived
at more openly and democratically. They certainly must be critically
assessed in terms of how far they gave an adequate evaluation of competing
interests and views.
My general orientation to the public inquiry case studies is informed
by the value problematic stated explicitly in Chapters 1 and 2. I
believe that public inquiries are an embodiment of basic participatory
rights which have been secured historically allowing people certain
claims to be heard on matters which adversely affect them or the public
at large. I do not think the institutional space which exists for
public participation in public inquiries is adequate to ground a
genuinely democratic and open resolution of the technological, develop¬
ment and sociological conflicts which arise.
The case studies have been researched to a varying degree of detail.
The discussion of the Nigg Inquiries (1969 and 1975), the Dunnet
Bay Inquiry (1973), and the Drumbuie Inquiry (197*0 are all based on
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an examination of the inquiry transcripts, and the documents and
productions relating to the inquiries. There was not an opportunity
to attend those public inquiries. However the account of the Moss
Morran inquiry is based on attendance at the public inquiry,
examination of all relevant documents and interviews with principal
participants (See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the problems of
social enquiry relating to this controversy). I also monitored
events from the initial planning applications made by Shell and Esso
at the end of 1976 until the Secretary of State made his final
decision at the end of 1979.
In each of the case studies to be discussed different themes will
be highlighted. In general, Chapters k and 5 will be examining
the way the public inquiry system systematically excludes issues
as part of its routine process of taking evidence. Whereas Chapter
k wi11 generally review dominant themes in the four large public
inquiries held in the Highlands (Cromarty 1969 and 1975, Dunnet
Bay 1973, Drumbuie 1973-7*0, and seek to point up the operation of the
classification and framing of knowledge and information in the context
of the impact of oil on sparsely populated areas, Chapter 5 will be
more specifically concerned with describing how the classification
and framing of knowledge affects subjective views about the public
inquiry. Chapter 5 is therefore particularly concerned with the
relationship between the experiencecf participation in the public
inquiry and the participants perceptions of 'openness, fairness and
impartiality1 or 'natural justice'. Chapter 6 is a further develop¬
ment of themes highlighted in Chapter 5 on the Moss Morran controversy.
It will focus attention on the formulation and presentation of opposition
through the organisation of a local action group rather than within
the public inquiry setting. 1 will be seeking to show that there is
a correlation between the feelings expressed by action group members
of general acceptance of thepublic inquiry held in Fife, described
at the end of Chapter 5, and the 'technocratic' form taken by their
organisation of the local opposition campaign. Again the degree of
acceptance of the specific public hearing and the 'technocratic bias'
of these personnel at the core of the Action Group, will be understood




The theoretical vocabulary developed in the first three chapters
should be understood as a general orienting framework within which
I can place my observations of the public inquiry case studies. My
theoretical framework is therefore aimed towards the limited task
of revealing the structures of power and the principles of social
control operating within the public inquiry system by using the model
of the classification and framing of knowledge to make them visible.
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CHAPTER k
OIL DEVELOPMENT AND THE HIGHLANDS
'Cromarty: the Scramble for Oil'
The first point to make regarding the two major public inquiries
in East Ross-shire is that they took place in a context of an
established industrialisation process led by the siting of the
British Aluminium works at Invergordon in 1968, and amidst a
'scramble' for property and land for speculative industrial projects
to cash in on the riches to be gained from the forthcoming oil boom.
It was quite clear at the time of the Grampian Chemicals application
to build an oil refinery, that the real dilemma confronting local
people and the planning authorities was not development or no
1
development. Rather the issue was one of the scale, timing and
appropriateness of Grampian's project for an area that was under
threat of being completely swamped by industrial projects and develop-
(6)
ments. However, it must also be said that at the time
Grampian made their application the promise of an oil boom in
East Ross remained vague. Local appetites for work and money had
been encouraged by British Aluminium and a growing support was
given to local politicians who wanted to give a full commitment to
attracting oil developments into the Cromarty Firth area. Grampian
Chemicals can therefore be seen as a forerunner of companies that
would promise much to the area and deliver nothing. A company
profile might clarify this point.
Grampian like many speculative industrial outfits at that time,
were formed two months before' their planning application. To
quote from the public inquiry reports:
"Grampian Chemicals was formed as a limited
Company in January 1968 with a nominal share
capital of £100 of which 55% is owned by Planet
Oil and Mineral Corporation and b0% by Mr. Eain
Mekie Grampians registered office is the
address of a firm of solicitors in York Place,
Edinburgh. Its business to date has been
transacted from a residential flat at
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.,.3 Wilton Court, London. Its staff consists
of the Chairman (Mr. Mekie), Dr. Jenkins and
Mr. Morrison, It has no other employees."
The statement goes on to say that the Planet Oil Company from
Dallas, who were Grampians associates, had only been in existence
for two years and "like the Grampians Chemical Company, it has
not yet built or managed a petro-chemical complex". The major
mystery surrounding the application was whether or not they actually
had a viable project with capital backing and technical expertise to
ensure the safety and feasibility of the oil complex. Without
proven expertise in petro-chemica1s there was also a doubt about
whether they had sources of crude oil and markets for their product.
The late 1960' s and 19701s were noted for the number of similar
speculative consortia and projects in the Highlands that were
taken seriously on face value by governments and local authorities
eager to get oil out of the North Sea and converted into
money as quickly as possible. It is in such a context that the public
inquiry system becomes the front line planning institution to
facilitate a public and measured consideration of the full implications
of such speculative industrial projects.
Grampian Chemicals 1969 Public Inquiry.
The public inquiry was held because of an amendment to the Ross
and Cromarty Development Plan (amendment No. 6). Given the
proposed change of land use from prime agricultural use to
industrial use there was a statutory obligation on the local
authority to hold a public inquiry. Due to the sensitivity of the
project the application was called in by the Secretary of State
(81
for Scotland. What was particularly striking about the 1969
public hearing was the fact that 89% of the land proposed for a
petro-chemical site was regularly used as arable land. East
Ross-shire in fact is a very untypical area of the Highland Region.
For example, the North of Scotland College of Agriculture and
Hunting Technical Services Ltd submitted reports pointing out the
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uniqueness of the climate, altitude, geology and soils of the
area, comparing Ft favourably with East Lothian and stated that Lothian
(9)
was "considered to be some of the best land in Scotland."
In relation to Ross and Cromarty as a whole and adjacent counties
the report said:
"This region is of outstanding importance
containing the majority of the tillage, crops
and grass, and livestock with the single
exception of sheep. Almost all the high
output, high value production in the county
of Ross and Cromarty takes place in this one-
third of the area."
(10)
So prime farm land and four crofts were under threat. It
was an interesting case study to examine the public inquiries
success in balancing the longstanding agricultural base of the area
against the new industrial promise of oil. Issues and conflicts
that were to arise in future planning controversies in other
parts of the Highlands and Scotland, were first raised at this
early hearing.
There was no organised local opposition beyond several individual
objectors who, for the most part, were either long established
residents or middle class professional people who were not reliant
solely upon the local economy for employment. There were
important questions relating to the nature of local 'development1,
which were to be central to future public inquiries, but which were
not yet fully thematised in 1969. The controversy was
posed eagerfy 'n terms of industry versus agriculture. No
one seemed to be arguing against the idea of industrialising the
Cromarty Firth area beyond those middle class objectors who had
thought of the area in terms of retirement and amenity. Grampian
were promising local people and the local authority immediate
employment in the construction industry and a future long term
promise of ancillary industries which would typically be expected
to grow around a major refinery complex.
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However, two important issues arose. First, was there an
alternative site that would a 1 low the industria 1 project to
develop without necessarily damaging irreparably the agricultural
base of the area? Second, could the statements, promises and
evidence of Grampian Chemicals be taken seriously given their
speculative financial base and lack of expertise in oil refining.
These were important questions. How they were resolved by the
inquiry I consider helps to clarify some of the major
difficulties in the planning process. Could the local public
inquiry process adequately arrive at a decision based on a relationa1
idea that would seek to maximise the effectiveness of the competing
criteria (industrial and agricultural) without damaging either .(12)
( A relational idea is conceptualised as a technology, a design or
concept which explcitly seeks to reconcile competing concerns about
production, the environment and the local community social structure)
The public inquiry sat to address the narrow remit relating directly
to amendment Number 6 of the County Development Plan. Wider
issues could be forced on to the inquiry agenda only if there were
individuals or organisations willing to challenge the parameters
of the inquiries remit vociferously. There was obviously a lack of
a vocal opposition from the locality beyond those middle class
objectors i have referred to and as a consequence many issues
relating to the long term feasibility of the Grampain consortium
were not raised. For example, it could have been asked was this
really a viable industrial project or a sophisticated form of
land speculation? Given the admitted lack of expertise in managing
and operating an oil refinery what guarantees about safety and poll¬
ution could be given by the Company? What credence could be put on
statements of great urgency for the project made by Grampian and the
promise of future economic growth stemming from their proposed
development? It appeared these were issues beyond the terms of
reference of the inquiry and they were ignored.
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The mode of argument developed by the Reporter in making his
recommendations was indicative of a form of 'critical compromise1
generally adopted in relation to all subsequent North Sea oil
projects. What seems to have been argued at Dingwall in 1969, and
elsewhere later, was 'lets be safe than sorry in terms of development;
there is no sound reason for believing that anything will ever
transpire from this planning application, but we had better not be
too precipitate so we must suggest a compromise site or set down some
conditions and hope for the best because we can not be too fussy about
what industries we can attract to Scotland".
The objectors at the Grampian inquiry, mainly through the evidence of
the Highland Agricultural Executive Committee, effectively forced the
public inquiry Reporter to give serious consideration to an alternative
site because of a breach to the Town and Country Planning Regulations
1966 (Regulation 5) which required prior consultation with the appropria
agricultural executive committee before preparing or amending a
'development plan'. The Reporter admitted in his summing up that
"there can be no question that at the time the planning Committee
on the 6th December 1968 decided to deal with Grampians applications
by way of a further amendment, no consultation of any kind had
(13)
taken place with the Highland Agricultural Executive Committee."
This issue was judged by the Reporter to be minor, insisting that
even plans at an advanced stage of preparation could still have
allowed consultation. He did however recognise a failure by the
County Council to allow 'an exchange of views' and he was forced
to conclude that legal proceedings could technically be raised to
quash the amendment if passed by the Secretary of State.
This legal 'difficulty', combined with the controversy which might
surround the giving of outline planning permission to transfer prime
agricultural land for a speculative industrial project seemed to
concentrate the mind of the Inquiry Reporter forcing him to seriously
consider the feasibility and costs of siting the petro-chemical
plant on reclaimed land at Nigg Bay. The weakness of the
planning process is that a developer can not be forced to consider
another site and Grampain were not keen to consider Nigg Bay.
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Grampian argued against the alternative site in terms of (a)
cost (there would have been little apparent difference in the costs
of reclaiming Nigg Bay, but Grampian probably had difficulty
(1 M
enough raising the initial development capital.) (b) the time
factor (a specious objection given the speculative nature of their
plans) (c) and the lack of space for ancillary industrial
development (The Nigg area would not have prevented ancillary
industrialisation and again Grampian were unable to provide tangible
evidence that they even knew of companies awaiting the outcome of
(l6)
their planning application before eagerly joining them).
The Reporter eventually recommended the amendment should not be
approved and that a policy decision be made to reclaim areas of
Nigg Bay. Now the public inquiry probably arrived at the right
decision by default. If the agricultural lobby had not possessed the
resource of a legal technicality to pursue should the amendment be
approved, then I am uncertain that the same conclusions would have
been reached.
However, all such matters were to prove irrelevant. The Secretary
of State over-ruled the Reporter and argued that a wider perspective,
looking beyond the Grampian Chemicals application, required ammendment
6 to go ahead and the agricultural land at Delny and Polio to be re-
zoned for industrial use to act as an encouragement to industry to
locate in the Cromarty Firth area. It was clear that the Scottish
Development Department was not really concerned about the status
and viability of Grampian or indeed of the discourse which
constituted the public inquiry hearing. Their main concern was to
'gear up1 the Cromarty Firth area for North Sea Oil Developments first
and foremost. If Grampian's project materialised all good and well'
if not then large tracts of land would already by committed for
industry when or if it came. The limited nature of the local
public inquiry system was revealed. First, the breadth of
considerations was hampered by a narrow remit without any opportunity
seriously to investigate the applicants and their project. Secondly,
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nothing that flowed from the public inquiry seemed to count in the
Secretary of State's 'wider perspective'. The public inquiry seemed
to have been addressing itself to the wrong set of issues. The real
issue was effectively one of a new county development plan, not the
particular issue of Grampian Chemicals application. Further, there
was no recognition given by the Secretary of State that his 'wider
perspective' could well have allowed an industrial project to
proceed, involving complex technological issues, without an
adequate consideration of its technical and economic merits. The
distinction between decisions about land use strategies and decisions
about particular technological projects on part of that land is
important, and requires careful and separate consideration.
Both the public inquiry and the Secretary of State effectively
legitimised a speculative company and project without seriously
enquiring into their status. Grampian refused to reveal
information about their financial backing, their sources of raw
materials or what were to be their proposed markets. Little
consideration was given to the nature of the technology and its
compatibility with the environment beyond an unquestioning acceptance
of promises that levels of pollution should be and would be kept
within certain unspecified limits. The amendment was not
challenged by the agricultural executive and the areas of
land were re-zoned for industrial use.
The issues which were undeveloped at the 1969 public inquiry were
sharpened by oil developments in the area in the first "part of the
1970's which set the scene for a larger and more contentious public
inquiry in 1975 which more clearly thematised the issues about
'development'.
I think a brief review of the land deals and speculation in the
Cromarty area during the first part of the 1970's is important as
a prelude to a closer examination of the 1975 public inquiry into
an application by Cromarty Petroleum to build an oil refinery at
Nigg Bay.
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George Rosi.e' s invest i gat ions into land deals in the Cromarty
area in the 1970's quite clearly indicate the importance attached
to East Ross by international businessmen and speculators. ^
The good sheltered anchorage of the Firth, the reasonably good road
and rail links and a series of flat peninsulas jutting out into the
Firth, lying within easy towing distance of the major North Sea
oilfields, meant; "Land which for generations had belonged to local
gentry, farmers and distillers, suddenly passed into the hands of
a tangle of international companies based in London, Edinburgh,
(181
Italy, Idaho, Houston, or New York".
Some of Rosie's examples are worth mentioning because they provide
a context for the 1975 inquiry, bearing in mind the nature of
the Grampian Chemical Company and the fact that they never
proceeded with their pain to build an oil refinery.
First the case of Mr. Munro's 143 acre Balcomie Farm. That land
was sold to a firm called Brital Marine for £135,000 and they
subsequently sought planning permission from the local council to
'construct offshore structures' at a site at Evanton, previously
part of Balcomie Farm. Permission was given for this project
fairly promptly because Brital had maintained that they had
substantial backing from Richard Dunstan (Hull Shipbuilders) and
three Italian engineering companies, Micoperi, Saiperi and
Interconsu1t. However, it became clear through time that the
association between Brital, Dunstans and the btalian campanies
was fairly tenuous. The Italian's actually denied that they had
ever had a formal relationship with Brital and admitted only
that they had held some very preliminary discussions with them.
They publicly withdrew from Brital's plans as did Richard Dunstans.
So after only one year Brital sold their land for £2,000 an acre
and made £150, 000 proft.
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A similar case of land dealing resulting in no concrete industrial
project occured in 1973< Arthur Munro-Fergusqn, owner of the Novar
Estates held land on the edge of the Cromarty Firth which was
apparently considered ideal for a deepwater port, storage and an
industrial site. Munro-Ferguson joined a company set up by
Sir James Lithgow, the Glasgow shipbuilder, which was named for
local appeal the Evanton Development Company. So sitting on prime
land, with Lithgow providing the appearance of engineering and
industrial respectability, the Evanton Development Company attracted
the attention of two American financiers from Houston. They
eventually bought into Evanton Development and collectively they
renamed their organisation, again retaining a local flavour, the
Highland Resources Incorporated. This company in turn became
Highland Deephaven before Munro-Ferguson sold his land to the
company of which he was a director for £836,900. In a matter of
months from his initial association with Lithgow, Munro-Ferguson
vastly increased the value of his land through speculation. No
industrial projects have ever materialised on that site.
Similarly Taylor-Wood row bought up land at Alness and obtained
permission to build oil rigs of the concrete type which were later
to become controversial atthe Drumbuie inquiry. No industrial
project materialised. Mid-Continent, an American supply and
service company, bought land adjacent to Taylor-Wood row but
nothing has yet materialised from them either.
Whatwas striking about the wheeling and dealing in the Cromarty
Firth area throughout the 19701s was the number of small, under
financed, and largely speculative companies, that flooded the area
creating false hopes and resulting in a positively confusing situation
for the local authorities trying to plan for future development.
So starting with Grampian Chemicals and continuing through a series
of land deals in the area in the early part of the 1970's there
emerged yet another speculative development company that directly
links Grampian to the Cromarty Petroleum project and the inquiry of
1975.
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Through a network of companies stemming from a partnership between
a lincolnshire businessman, John Foulerton and the merchant bankers
Edward Bates, a property company known as Cromarty Firth Development
Corporation was established. It proceeded to buy up thousands of
acres in the region paying out nearly a £1 million to
Grampian Chemicals for their land at Delny and Nigg. In under
two years Cromarty Firth Development spent £k million. They were
joined by former Highland and Island Development Board personnel
(leading to parliamentary questions, and controversy) and publicised
ambitious plans for development throughout the Cromarty Firth area.
None of these plans came to' fruition and Cromarty Firth Development
became over extended and embarrassed by the huge interest charges
incurred financing their land deals. This predicament meant the
selling of the Delny and Nigg sites yet again to a company called
Alphaclass Investment Developments recently set up at the
offices of McRobert and Sons, Solicitors, 91 West George Street,
(19)
Glasgow. That development company became miraculously trans¬
formed into the Cromarty Petroleum Company. It had subsidiary
status from National Bulk Carriers, a giant American Company, but
its financial base was similar to Grampian Chemicals, £100 capital.
They submitted plans to build an oil refinery on the Nigg point
and the progress of that inquiry and its decisions are very instructive.
Cromarty Petroleum's 1975 Public Inquiry.
The public inquiry opened on the 11th February 1975 and continued until
the 21st April 1975. The specific remit for the inquiry was
clearly stated on the opening day; "The question at issue was whether
the Secretary of State for Scotland would make an Article 8 Direction
to enable the Council to grant planning permission in principle to
Cromarty Petroleum Limited subject to certain conditions."
Those conditions related to safeguards against pollution, visual
amenity and noise and vibration from the operation of the plant.
In addition conditions would be set down relating to the form and
timing of the construction programme, and highways and public access
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within the area of the application. The central features of the
remit continued: "The inquiry was not about whether or not there
should be a refinery somewhere else, as there was no proposal to build
one elsewhere. This enquiry is about the zoning of land for heavy
(21)
industry." So the remit sought to direct the inquiry to the
specific issue relating to 'crude oil storage, intermediate and
finished products storage above and below ground, a marine terminal
facility, refinery process area and associated administrative buildings'
(22)
on a particular site and no other."
Now the immediate problem which this presented to the objectors was
the fact that they could not expect to be successful in arguing
that site X would be better suited to theproposed project if the
developer insists that the chosen site Y may not be perfect but
for a variety of commercial reasons that is the site they insist on
(23)
using. Given the difficulty in such planning matters to get a
developer to considers alternative site, there is nothing that
anyone can do to force a developer seriously to consider locating
elsewhere. A developer can always suggest some fundamental
problem with an alternative site often based on unchallengeable com¬
mercial criteria which they will either refuse to make public or
partially conceal. So the onus is very much on the objectors to
make an overwhelming case that the planning application for the
site contained in the remit is absolutely unsuitable. If they
can not make such a case then they are more than likely to lose
the public inquiry stage of their opposition campaign.
A whole series of fundamental questions are excluded by the initial
construction of the Secretary of State's remit and it can be used like
a fly swat at any time during the inquiry proceedings to snuff out
a line of questioning which is considered too far beyond what
the Reporter considers to be meaningful, (That of
course, does not mean that it would necessarily have no bearing on
the application).
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The possibility of concentrating the inquiry on the exploration of
relational ideas which might inter-connect the technological,
commercial, environmental and social factors integral to a
particular industrial project, are consequently destroyed by the
forcing of complex issues into the narrow framework provided by the
Secretary of State's remit. On top of the remit there is imposed
a series of commissioned technical and environmental impact reports whi
in turn force inquiry time to consider a narrow exploration of the
specific technological problems involved in the planning application.
The nature of the technology advocated by the developer will invariably
be taken as given. "The question therefore quickly becomes trans¬
formed from, 'should this project be allowed at all', to'what ways
might it be assimilated into the existing environment'. And even
with respect to this latter emphasis there is a tendency for the
inquiry structure to be inadequate because the degree of assimilation
of a project into the existing environment is always in terms of
what Kuh:n might call 'secondary' rather than 'primary' elaboration.
By this distinction I mean that the remit and report system imposes
constraints upon the science and technology review, relating directly
to the assimilation of the project in terms of explicit, already
given, criteria and dimensions of assessment (secondary elaboration)
rather than an examination of more basic premises and underlying
assumptigins about the technology (primary elaboration). Secondary
elaboration relates to 'how' questions. Kuhn refers to the process
of treating scientific and technological problems as 'technical puzzles
where the under-lying rationales are not questioned, and competing
'solutions' are compared along similar explicit unquestioned working
(2k)
assumptions. Primary elaboration by contrast occurs in
relation to 'why' questions. It will seek to dislodge the rigidity
of 'mental sets' that take criteria as given. The nature of the
scientific and technological assumptions of an industrial project
will be looked at in terms of its legitimate status as 'the only
way to proceed'. i am suggesting that remits and the technical report
system combined with the local inquiry structure favour 'secondary





In support of Cromarty Petroleum's application were the Ross-shire
County Council, the HIDB and a local Action Group called support
Cromarty Oil Terminal (SCOT).
SCOT was effectively led by Liberal Councillor John Robertson who was
also a local farmer who had made a great deal of money in the late
19601s by selling off his farmland around Nigg Bay. The Sunday
Times of the 13th August 1972 said of Robertson that he is "one
of the architects and beneficiaries of what is happening at Nigg -
the rocks come from a quarry on his land - and he holds a sub¬
stantial vision of more prosperity to come because of the natural
benefits and strategic advantages his home ground enjoys as a
jumping off place for the best lump of the North Sea". Robertson
had consistently led the pro-development lobby around the Cromarty
Firth area. This was unsurprising given that he was on the right
side of the water to benefit directly from development, unlike those
representing the Cromarty Refinery Opposition Workers (CROW), who were
led by Ross and Cromarty District Councillor for the Black Isle areas
of Cromarty, Rosemarkie and Fortrose, Hamish Stuart. Both SCOT and
CROW were limited vehicles for the competing interests of local
politicians representing both sides of the Firth. SCOT drew its
support predominantly from those areas around Evanton, Alness and
Invergordon that were the centres of development and proposed
development, populated to a large extent by people who were incomers
to the area, either from Central Scotland or other distant parts of
the Highlands. The District Councils in those areas were in large
measure in favour of an expanded industrial base and were keen
to augment the limited base already started by British Aluminium,
M.K. Shand and Highland Fabricators. CROW were firmly based on
the Black Isle farming communities and pulled in small local business¬
men and tradesmen who felt threatened by the strain on local skills
and labour. Those who were dependent on the tourist trade, and
a variety of objectors defending the environment and amenity,
also supported CROW.
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The first point to be made about both organisations is that they
were very limited in terms of the kinds of activities they became
involved in. Both organisations concentrated their efforts on
petition collecting and of course formulating and presenting their
case at the public inquiry hearing. A closer focus on their
respective cases will provide a useful starting point for an
examination of the public inquiry.
John Robertson leading the arguments in support of Cromarty Petroleum
took an aggressive stance. He objected to there being a public
inquiry at all, because most of the objections were, in his view,
irrelevant. The real debate, he argued, took place six years
previously when Grampian Chemicals had forced an amendment to the
County Development Plan through the Secretary of State's intervention.
Robertson insisted that the issues which CROW were raising should
properly have been aired at that time saving the ratepayers £70,000 -
£80,000 (their share of the 1975 public inquiry bill). The area
around Nigg had been zoned for industrial purposes like the one being
proposed by Cromarty Petroleum and so there was nothing further that
needed to be debated except a discussion about the overall planning
(26)
conditions for the project. SCOT made an issue of their own
petition with about 6,000 signatures supporting the project. "The
aim of SCOT was to say that they wanted to see that Plan
implemented The weight of objection to the refinery did not
lie to any variation implicit in the alterations to the Development
Plan, but to the mere implementation of the Development Plan
itself". He continued:
"The Development Plan provided for an oil terminal
and whether or not the risk of spillage was a modest
one, as described by expert witnesses, or the horror
comic holocaust the Nature Conservancy tended to
indicate, was not a matter of substance".
Robertson focussed much of his evidence on the technical debates
which related to pollution which he considered eminently controllable.
However, during his cross-examination by objectors, Robertson, along
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with the evidence he led of his two fellow SCOT members, the real
personal conflicts in the area emerged,
Robertson objected to questions relating personally to him being
addressed to other witnesses. In particular he considered questions
relating to his land ownership and land deals and his association
(28)with the Grampian Chemicals as improper and wholly irrelevant.
It emerged also that he considered the opposition to be unscrupulous:
in July 1976 he wrote in a County Council note which was published
at the inquiry that "opposition to the refinery was a thing of
anonimity and shadows which gave every sign of being promoted by
some undisclosed agency for its undisclosed ends." Very dramatic
words tacitly aimed at B.P.'s interest in the aompet i t ion from tie ref i nery
but also revealing a major division within the region between
pro - and anti-development lobbies. More significantly Robertson
and SCOT were hostile to the public inquiry system altogether and
revealed an impatience with those who wanted to use the public
inquiry instrument to question the nature of development in the
area more broadly or who were seeking to question the status of
the developer. He made a defence of Cromarty Petroleum and
their project in general platitudinous terms. SCOT were generally
hostile to any attempt to examine their status. That was considered
"irrelevant" or "sinister time wasting".
SCOT's view was eventually given support by the Reporter during the
sixth week of the public inquiry in relation to the evidence being
led by the Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) . The NCC argued that
land on the nearby Nigg Point was a recognised nature reserve and
they believed an oil refinery was objectionable and threatening to
that reserve. The land in question, the NCC argued, had a formal
status as significant as the land zoned under Amendment No. 6 for
industry, and they were seeking a reversal of the approval given for
an oil terminal. Robertson sought clarification from the Reporter
"that the Conservancy submission, seeking a reversal of the approval
given for an oil terminal was not valid, and that the inquiry was
only concerned with conditions to
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be attached to it". The Reporter replied that "my interpretation is
that the matter of oil storage for the terminal had been determined
(29)in Amendment No. 6 to the County Development Plan". The issue
was only one of conditions attached to a refinery, not whether it
should be established. However, in response to Robertson's
rejection of the Conservancy's evidence, in terms that it "was nonsense
from start to finish and totally irrelevant and I can not understand
why they were represented at the inquiry", the Reporter at least
pointed out that "they have as much right as you, Mr. Robertson, to
give their opinion at the inquiry". One could perhaps take this
as an indicator, at least informally, that the Reporter took a
wider view of the hearing than SCOT. The Reporter indicated further,
however, the selective function that he has in directing evidence.
He stated to the NCC that "I am not trying to prevent examination
of evidence, but I am asking whether the inquiry should keep to
important principles and not to the almost pernickity details of
the number of birds involved." This was related to the birds
on the nature reserve that would be affected by the refinery. The
NCC could not accept that their "pernickity details" were not
relevant to the issue, but this was of no consequence. The Reporter
had indicated his thoughts on the matter and had undermined the basis
of the NCC's argument.
The main theme to emphasise is that SCOT were insistent that discussion
should be contained to the basic narrow remit of the inquiry; the
consideration of the conditions to apply to a refinery, not its
establishment. The Reporter was obliged to support that line.
The task of attempting to make a case against the refinery
development was difficult enough given such a narrow technical
remit. The main issues relating to the development had to be
raised within a very confined set of parameters which made the
opposition case extremely difficult.
The case marshalled together by CROW had to be more substantive than
SCOT's. The supporters organisation had, after all, Cromarty
Petroleum to field the relevant expert witnesses to deal head on
with the technological, commercial and pollution Issues. CROW
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had to prise open some small space within which to force the ecological,
social impact and economic levers which might at least cpnvince the
Reporter, if not ultimately the civil servants in the Scottish
Development Department and the Secretary of State for Scotland. The
preceding evidence made it quite clear that the points at issue were
particularly narrow. The establishing of an oil refinery was
not in question so CROW had to concentrate on the three main areas
which could still affect matters. First, the management and
organisation of the plant, secondly, the social impact on a
sparsely populated area and thirdly, the commercial prospects for
another refinery in the United Kingdom.
However, particular mention must first be made of an inter¬
vention by the Reporter during the fourth week of the inquiry that
had partially stifled CROW's other important line of argument - that
of questioning the status of Cromarty Petroleum and the viability
of their proposed project. This particular exchange is worth pointing
up as an example of the tendency towards strong framing within the
local inquiry format. I say tendency towards strong framing because
in the example below it was significant that the Reporter intervened
and re-affirmed his preference for a very focussed or engaged debate.
He stated an interest in encouraging a discussion of "planning
issues" relating directly to the remit, but he did not actually
prevent a line of questioning, axi importantly, he recorded that
exchange in his summary report. What is significant is that the
lawyer leading the cross-examination was allowed to raise the
issue but not pursue it. CROW did not raise the question of Cromarty
Petroleum's status in their own evidence, so subtly the Reporter's
intervention was effective,
Kirkwood Q.C led his cross-examination of E.D. Loughney, Managing
Director of Cromarty Petroleum, by asking about the ownership and
origins of Cromarty Petroleum, their relationship to National
Bulk Carriers and the fact that all three of the Company Directors
lived in America. Kirkwood then requested Loughney to inform
the inquiry about the nature of their Share Capital. As I have
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noted above, Cromarty Petroleum was a speculative association of
three individuals variously associated with subsidiaries of National
Bulk Carriers; Universal Tankships Inc. who owned 98 £1 shares
and Sea Tankers Incorporated who owned 2 £1 shares. The Share
Capital of the Company was £100. Now their objective was to
persuade Universal Tankships to put up about £30 million towards
the estimated cost of the refinery in 1975 of £150 million. That
money had not been guaranteed. They were relying to some extent
on the United Kingdom government grant of 20% on plant, machinery
and buildings. The substantial amount of capital required to
meet the balance of costs for the project would have to be raised on
international money markets, which they conceded were very uncertain
When pushed by Kirkwood QC on the precarious financial base of the
Company and asked about guarantees for the project particularly
with the history of land dealing in mind Loughney replied: "I can
not give a firm undertaking that the refinery, if permitted, would
be built. There was a possibility that we might not go ahead and
I can not give an assurance that the site might not be sold to a thi
(32)
party". At this point the Reporter intervened: "I question,
Mr. Kirkwood, the relevance at a planning inquiry of such
matters concerning Cromarty Petroleum's share capital, the owner¬
ship and origins of the Company, their relationship to National
Bulk Carriers, or indeed the fact that all three directors live
in America". Kirkwood's explanation for his line of questioning
in terms of the previous Grampian Chemicals Inquiry was unimpressive
as far as the Reporter was concerned:
"I appreciate that local people do not want a
repitition of the Grampian fiasco but I do not
want to have points, once made, prolonged. I
question whether the matter of the directors
of the Company is properly a planning issue."
(33)
So the definition of what was or was not a "planning issue" was once
again narrowly circumscribed. The whole issue of the status and
viability of Cromarty Petroleum was however, in my view, of crucial
relevance. There was a recent history of land dealingon the--back
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of promises for ambitious industrial projects, as I have indicated
above. The area was undoubtedly very strategic for North Sea
Oil developments and there was consequently a premium on industrial
land. It was of paramount importance that Ross and Cromarty
t.
Council break out of the continuing circle of land speculations
which resulted in tying up important zoned land forcing its price
up and leading to no tangible employment. The only people who seemed
to have been making money were the land speculators. Now one way
of ensuring at least a partial restraint on this process was to
make absolutely sure that Cromarty Petroleum was a probable
future employer.
Kirkwood Q.C for CROW revealed someth i ng about th i s process of restricting
land use in relation to Cromarty Petroleum. Loughney admitted through
cross-examination that he and his associates insisted upon a condition
being imposed on the land at Delny when still owned by Cromarty
Firth Development Ltd. When they bought their Nigg site, Cromarty
Petroleum made it a condition of their land deal that the Delny land,
part of the only major site in Britain that had already been zoned
specifically for oil refining, stemming from Grampian Chemicals'
1969 application, should not be sold to a competitor for that purpose.
That information was very revealing about the kind of practices that
should properly have been considered "planning issues" of wider
significance and perhaps part of a broader remit to examine development
and planning in the area. Such issues could not be, and were not,
pursued by the objectors,
CROW led their evidence through a Mr. Steven Berridge, senior
partner of Berridge International Consultants, Leicester. (Berridge
had been a Chief Chemist at Esso's refinery at Fawley) and Mr, G.
Kemp, a political economist from Aberdeen University, who were presented
as 'experts' to counter the evidence given by Dr. Ian Fells, Reader
of Fuel Science at Newcastle University and Professor Alan Tait,
Professor of Economics at Strathclyde University who had been
'expert' witnesses supporting Cromarty Petroleum. These 'experts'
were offering opinions both about the management of the refinery and
(34)
its economic viability. What became clear was that both sides
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accepted there was no economic justification for additional refining
capacity in the United Kingdom at that time, There was therefore
a decision to he made about a refinery based on speculations about
future market trends. One possible short run benefit that could
be estimated was the number of construction jobs created. However,
there was dispute about the exact numbers that were likely to be
drawn from the local area and the more fundamental issue then arose
about social impact of essentially migrant labour. The inquiry
forum seemed to provide a poor context within which a genuinely
discursive exchange could take place on the important social and
economic issues.
The local economy was obviously an area of concern to fishermen,
farmers, and hoteliers dependent upon the tourist trade. There had
been an earlier recognition of the importance of the agricultural
base of the area during the 1969 Grampian Chemicals Inquiry. It
was therefore another crucial test for the inquiry system, and
ultimately with the Scottish Development Department, to weight
the economic base of the Cromarty Firth area and surrounding country
in agriculture, fishing and tourism against the potentially
unfulfilled promise of oil. The traditional industries created both
a social and cultural stability within the area that could not easily
accommodate the demands of industrialisation. The agricultural land
zoned for industrialisation around Delny and Nigg in the Amendment
No. 6 had already indicated the attitude of the Secretary of State
to agriculture in relation to North Sea oil industries. The issue
ofmarine pollution did not figure prominantly in the 1969 inquiry
because the planning proposal had originally been made for an
inland site at Delny. However in the 1975 inquiry all the main
Highland Fishery Boards made strong presentations against Cromarty
Petroleum under the banner of CROW. Oil spillage around the Cromarty
Firth would be a critical factor. The local salmon, sea trout, sprat
fishing and offshore fishing industries had existed for many centuries
but it was generally recognised that fishing and oil refineries were
generally mutually exclusive. The oil refinery, for example, was
freely admitted by Cromarty Petroleum to have a possible life
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existence of only AO years. The fishery and agricultural lobby did
not consider that to be a fair trade off for the destruction of the
traditional industries of the area. What would the Reporter and
the Secretary of State make of such a choice?
The tourist industry was seasonal and many hoteliers who had
complained about industry in the past had dbne so very much with
an air of 'for God's sake don't make the servants too expensive'.
The issue for tourism in the Cromarty Firth area was one of survival
or death. Once an oil refinery was built at Nigg then Cromarty
village, for example, would inevitably become irretrievably lost as
a tourist attraction. However, the real difficulty was how can
such a case be made at a major public inquiry into an industrial
project. One way was certainly to demonstrate the financial gain
to the area, something like £b million each year. Such figures
could be demonstrated by numbers of visitors in hotels, something
(3$ )in the region of 800, 000 visitors. There could also be an argument
made for growth and investmentThese lines of argument were
presented but appeared insignificant against the vast sums of money
promised by Cromarty Petroleum.
Adrian Varwel1, the Social Development Officer for Ross and Cromarty,
and sociological researcher on the Aberdeen University Impact study
at Invergordon, gave evidence on behalf of the council which high¬
lighted probable points of strain on the local communities should
the refinery project materialise. But what was obviously an important
issue did not have one supporting production out of 28 tabled by the
County Council. Within a range of highly technical reports tabled
by both the technical experts and the environmentalist lobby, hardly
any mention of the issue was made beyond a short appendix to the
Council Impact Study written by Varwel1. CROW failed to give much
weight to the wider social impact of the refinery, beyond immediate
economic impact. One feature of the social impact debate was the
•obsessive focus on quantitative matters relating to the provision
of social workers and the like. This was obviously an important
i (37)
issue, but one that quickly became seen as 'the social impact problem'.
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Now these important issues: fishing, agriculture, tourism plus
economic viability and social Impact, were no.t dealt with in any
way which could lead to substantial conclusions one way or another.
A striking feature of the local public inquiry system is the tendency
to structure evidence around specialised knowledge and
experts rather than issues. Argumentation is not so much discursive
as adversary. The strong hierarchical organisation of status
means credentia1 led 'experts' relating directly to the narrow
remit predetermine the parameters within which debate can take place.
Objectors who wish to play the 'technology game' must compete to a
large extent on the terrain already established by the developers
given and unquestioned technology. This point 1 have already discussed
in terms of 'secondary' and 'primary' elaboration of technical
problem resolution. (I will develop this theme particularly in
Chapter 6 in relation to the organisationa1 constraints placed upon
local action groups, and below in the context of the Dunnet Bay inquiry.)
What this all leads to is a situation where neither the natural or
the social scientific effects of the proposed project are adequately
debated. No possible facility exists within the inquiry setting to
encourage the resolution of difficult scientific and social problems.
A statement of 'reasonable' sounding arguments and data are assembled
which seems to allow, first, the Reporter to take a shot in the dark
about which are more reasonable, and secondly, given the technical
stalemate and engineered inconclusiveness of the proceedings, the
Secretary of State seems to be able to carve out a space within which
to adopt a 'decisionistica11y' expedient political stand and confer
honours in accordance with his a 1 ready ex i st i ng politica1 and ideolog¬
ical strategy. This interpretation can be explored by examining the
conclusions reached by the Nigg Inquiry Reporter and the Secretary
of State's decision.
Conclusions and Decisions
Mr. Maycock, the Reporter at the 1975 inquiry, like his predecessor
in 1969, found against the applicants and recommended that the
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Secretary of State for Scotland withhold his permission. Maycock
concluded that there were major objections to the proposed develop¬
ment because of:-
(a) The impact it will have on the landscape of Easter Ross;
(b) The risk it would introduce of a major oil spillage, or a
series of minor spills, having a cumulative and perhaps
irreversible effect on wild life in intended national Nature
Reserves of international importance;
(c) The effects which such spills and any publicity relating
thereto can have on the population in, and visitors to, the
area;
(d) The short and long term effects which the development and
its associated activity can have on the fishing industry;
(e) The inhibitions and limitations that a privately owned marine
oil terminal designed to service only one industrial development
and constructed at Nigg Point, a key location in the context
of the Cromarty Firth, may impose on the future development
(R8)
of the Firth as a port.
Having outlined these major reasons for recommending rejection of
Cromarty Petroleum's plans, the Reporter rather fudged the issue
by admitting that he did not think such objections, of themselves,
were insurmountab1e. (This added to the vacuum created by the
inquiry process itself.) The real reasons he offered for rejection
were, first, he considered the lifespan of the refinery of 40-50
years rather poor value for the impact it would have, and second,
the applicants had failed to demonstrate that there was an economic
need for the refinery, at least not sufficiently urgent to warrant
pushing aside the major objections.
Now this conclusion, like the earlier 1969 Reporter's conclusion,
does demonstrate that it is possible to win at the public inquiry
stage even though fundamental issues relating to the status of
Cromarty Petroleum were ignored by the Reporter.
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There were important issues that required a broader based and more
extensive enquiry into how sparsely populated areas should respond
to North Sea oil. However, neither the political will existed in
government to wait for such considerations, given the desperate
need for oil, nor was there an adequate administrative apparatus in
existence other than a PIC, to facilitate a wider enquiry into
North Sea oil onshore development. Nevertheless, after two public
inquiries, two Reporters had found in favour of the objectors.
What would the Secretary of State's view of the matter be?
The first point to be reiterated is that where there is a lack of
agreement about an issue, and the inquiry system is not constructed
to obtain an agreed conclusion about complex issues, then the
Secretary of State can accumulate 1inconclusions1 to provide a
legitimate basis for taking decisive action in accordance with his
own or his department's perceived interest. A closer examination
of the Secretary of State's response to his Reporter's conclusions
demonstrates this:
"On fishing, the Secretary of State's conclusions
from the Report is that the issue is not clear cut.
(My emphasis) while noting the view of the
Reporter that certain steps could be taken which
might reduce the ill effects and agreeing that
these require further investigation, the Secretary
of State takes the view that there is conflict between
two major interests but that he should not allow the
possibility of some damage to fisheries to be
an over-riding consideration." ^g)
Continuing along similar lines, the Secretary of State admits:
"The objections about possible oil spills raise
difficult issues..... Because of the importance of
this issue a marine pollution assessor was appointed
for the inquiry. The assessor concludes that none
of the issues which could be decisive were clear cut."
m
Remaining on this theme the Secretary of State uses the lack of
agreement about marine pollution in relation to tourism to underscore
his viewpoint. Particularly important is the way predictions about
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future tourism are difficult toquantify accurately so this allows
the Secretary of State to adopt an aggressive sceptical stance:
"The Secretary of State agrees that these
considerations (oil pollution, risk to wild life,
spoiling of beaches) are of great importance,
though he is not convinced that the potential
effect on tourism would be as great as has been
suggested." ^
The Secretary of State fills the vacuum with a particular opinion
where it can be seen to be legitimated as 'reasonable' and
possibly 'responsible' fulfillment of an administrative duty to
decide.
Some alternative lines of legitimating 'official discourse' are,
first the 'snake effect' argument:
"As regards landscape, the Secretary of State accepts
that the structures at the refinery....wou1d be consp-
icious and, particularly when viewed from the Black
Isle and Cromarty, a major intrusion in a landscape
which is still primarily rural. It should be borne
in mind however that industrial developments have
already taken place at Invergordon and N i gg. In
the Secretary of State's view these developments have
already affected the character of the area.''^2)
Second, there is the 'trust on public servants' form of legitimation:
"The Reporter takes the view that a privately owned
marine terminal at Nigg Point could inhibit the future
development of the Cromarty Firth as a port. The
Cromarty Firth Port Authority has powers under the
Cromarty Firth Port Authority Order Confirmation Act,
1973 to control the use and development of the port."^^)
The question remains unanswered by the Secretary of State about the
liklihood of the Port Authority actually using its powers,
particularly in relation to public ownership and the development
of faci1ities.
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Third, there is the 'true of any major project1 form of leq i t imat ion.'
Here the unusualness of the proposed development is played down
in terms of its likely effects upon the locality » The sparsely
populated nature of the Cromarty Firth is de-leqitimated as 'special1.
For example, while agreeing with the Reporter that there would
exist;
"considerable economic and social difficulties
through overloading of thee existing local labour
force during the construction of the refinery and
the limited amount of permanent employment -
about 400 jobs - would have a relatively short
life, suggested as 40 to 50 years,"
the 'official discourse' continues:
"the Secretary of State gives rather different
weight to these factors. He agrees that there
would be likely to be some economic and social
disturbances during the construction period of
the refinery, but this is likely to be true of
any major project "
Fourth, the Secretary of State can quite simply 'pull rank'. This
is precisely what he did with respect to the Reporter's' assessment
that the refinery's expected life of 40-50 years was too short.
"The Secretary of State does not agree with the
Reporter's assessment In his view, this
period, spanning two generations, is long enough
to make an important contribution to the
development of the area."
In his overall concluding remarks the Secretary of State makes clear
that "the arguments in this case are finely balanced". The
coast is clear to overturn the public inquiry Reporter.
The 'official discourse1 constituting the Secretary of State's letter
announcing his final decision acknowledges that a major legitimation
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task of justifying the over-turning of the inquiry Reporter's
recommendations has to be undertaken. In general the 'official
discourse' of all Scottish Office Planning Circulars tacitly accepts,
and institutionally seeks to propagate, the Habermasian concept of
an 'ideal speech situation' by havinga pub 1ic inquiry in the first
place. As Luhmann observes about institutional practices like
public inquiries: "at the beginning, real uncertainty with
regard to the result has to be structurally guaranteed, this
means power has to be suspended in order that participation can be
motivated at all." So in order to impose aninstitutional form on
underlying conflictual relationships the idea of an open forum,
which will be dominated by rational discourse rather than naked
administrative or economic power, is presented to the public.
The public inquiry is, to reiterate my earlier argument, founded on
the public's acceptance that discourse will prevail and
facilitate 'natural justice' in the way suggested by Habermas:
"Discourse can be understood as that form of
communication that is removed from contexts of
experience and action and whose structure
assures us: that the bracketed validity
claims of assertions, recommendations, or
warnings are the exclusive object of
discussion; that participants,themes
and contributions are not restricted except
with reference to the goal of testing the
validity claims in question; that no
force except that of the better argument is
exercised; and that, as a result, all motives
except that of the co-operative search for the
truth are excluded". CnSi^.oio^y
The 'legitimation' problem which confronts the Secretary of State
in any case where the inquiry Reporter's recommendations are ignored,
is to repair the balance to any possible 'legitimation deficit'
which might arise as the public come to see, at least in their terms
that the public inquiry was not concluded on the basis 'of the
force of the better argument".
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Having adopted a series of justificatory devices to enable the
Secretary of State to appear, 'reasonable' in disagreeing with his
Reporter, the second task is to reconstitute the relationship between
the central decision-making centre and the locality. The obvious
area within which this re 1 ationshipcan be repaired is through the
conditions to be established controlling the development by Cromarty
Petroleum. Several different processes are at work. First, in
order to save his Reporter and technical assessor from complete
humiliation the Secretary of State will often recognise the
usefulness of his Reporter's observations about environmental and
safety controls. However in the case under discussion this practice
did not follow. The Reporter at the Nigg 1975 inquiry, rightly
in my view, suggested that conditions and controls attached to
Cromarty Petroleum's specific project should, if allowed by the
Secretary of State, apply only to that company. Meaning of course
that any other possible applicants should be looked at independently
on the merits of their project and technology. The letter
published by the Scottish Development Department simply states:
"The Secretary of State does not consider it appropriate for him
to make thisacondition of his direction". Presumably this was
meant to indicate that the zoning of the land for refining
purposes was the real objective as it had been in 1969.
However, the letter goes on to outline the areas of pollution control
desired by the Secretary of State, so creating an impression that
his decision was not based on a 'narrow' assessment of industrial
advantage. More pointedly he assures:
"Nothing in this letter precludes the planning
authority from exercising their powers under
Section 26 of the Town and Country Planning
(Scotland) Act 1972 to impose on the grant
of planning permission such additional conditions
as they may think fit."
- 140 -
And in order to assure the other authorities who have an interest
in the appl Teat i.on:_
"Any planning permission which the Regiona1
Council may give does not exempt the applicant
from obtaining other necessary consents, including
any required from the Cromarty Firth Port Authority."
(The letter concludes by rejecting all claims for expenses incurred
fighting the public inquiry).
Given the amount of time spent on the public inquiry hearing, not to
mention the rehearsal of many of the issues in 1969, it was not
surprising that the second disagreement between a Secretary of State
and Inquiry Reporter led many local people to feel particularly
disenchanted with the whole institutional process of the public
inquiry. Even local Conservative M.P. Hamish Gray remarked in the
local Ross-shire Journal that "It seems amazing that the Secretary
of State should have agreed to hold a public inquiry if he had no
intention of accepting the recommendations". He added though
that "I have no quarrel with his decision, however".
Hamish Stuart, Chairman of CROW, presents an example of how the
legitimatory effect of the Secretary of State's decision letter
can often have the desired result of re-assuring objectors that
the ultimate decision was taken for sound and justifiable reasons.
His reaction to the decision indicates a separation of the inquiry
process, which appeared to him to be well organised, "fair", "open"
and "impartial" from the nature of the decisions reached by the
inquiry. (A distinction found in other cases, notably in Fife, as
I will discuss in Chapter 5). He commented that, "we (CROW) do
not feel too greatly disappointed. The issue was finely balanced".
An indication that CROW lacked confidence in their own case perhaps.
The Secretary of State's approach certainly seems to have assured
many of the objectors that the inquiry system was capable of
arriving at such a conclusion; that the issue was 'finely balanced'.
\
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Stuart commented in the Ross-shire Journal that CROW fundamentally
disagreed with the logic qf the Secretary of State's, decision.
"In the long term the decision will serve only to worsen a situation
in an area which had come to depend on one construction project and
then another,..,. Eventually the cycle must end, and the ending of
it must be worse than had the project fallen".
The charitable attitude to the public inquiry system is partially
explained by a climate in which the general acceptance of the
industrialisation of a rural area had become established. The
feeling that fundamental arguments against industrialism had not
been adequately examined by the inquiry hearing was not strongly
felt. The impetus for a wider opposition movement against
Cromarty Petroleum did not exist.
What is difficult to understand is the absence of wide-spread
reaction against the whole inquiry system particularly in those
instances where the Reporter's recommendations in favour of the objector's
case are over-turned by the Secretary of State. There were undoubtedly
economic indicators which suggested to local people that the Cromarty
Petroleum project would not be realised for some time. The company
in their own admission had a great deal of work to do to organise the
money for the refinery. Many local objectors used to the unfulfilled
employment promises from other projects just did not think the
refinery would materialise and therefore there really was not any
point in pursuing a campaign against it. The impetus to extend
opposition against the project was therefore comparatively weak.
The opposition was revealed in the end to be a basically half¬
hearted attempt to ensure stringent conditions would be set down to
control the refinery rather than prevent it becoming established in
the first place. There was no social base for CROW outside the
leadership of the Cromarty district council, but most important of
all, the public inquiry system had in itself managed to assure people
that they had fully exercised their right to be heard, Snd everything
was satisfactory and fair.
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PUNNET BAY AND DRUMBULE
Sandwiched between the two East Ross-shire public inquiries were
two controversies which raised even more serious questions about
the adequacy of the planning system effectively to scrutinise large
scale industrial projects in sparsely populated Highland areas.
The public inquiries at Dunnet Bay in 1973 and at Drumbuie 1973~^
were both concerned with the construction of oil rig platforms
in remote Highland areas. They provide important information
about the local public inquiry system in a context where the potential
scale of impact from a proposed industrial development would have
been unusually extreme in relation to its proposed operating
environment. Nowhere in Scotland was the quotation from Mackay and
Mackay cited above more appropriate than at Dunnet Bay and Drumbuie.
The problems related to the "marrying of the oil industry with the
traditional economic social structures" of the Highlands seemed
to many to be irresolvable in terms which might defend small Highland
communities. Faced with the pressure of a government intent on
encouraging oil development at all costs, evidenced by the Coastal
Sites Bill, the public inquiry instrument became the most important
means through which local people and objectors could formally
challenge the oil developments and express their objections. The
public inquiry instrument was nowhere under closer examination.
It is perhaps important to state again that the public inquiry
system did provide a focus for objections. The controversies that
surrounded the development proposals for Caithness and West Ross-
shire became publicly available because of the institutionally
guaranteed right for people to voice their views about the major
impact on their communities in a local public inquiry. Nevertheless
beyond marking out development controversies for the public
imagination, the public inquiry system provided little genuine
opportunity for local people and environmentalist groups to halt
what seemed to be an inexorable process which seemed to subordinate
all interests except those of oil. The Drumbuie Inquiry seemed to
represent an exception to the rule prevailing elsewhere in Scotland.
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However,-if examined more closely Drumbuie represents the ultimate
in irony; an apparent total victory by local objectors winning
both the inquiry and' the Secretary of State over to their view
yet the very type of development rejected within the Drumbuie
inquiry was accepted simultaneously without any inquiry for a
site six miles away. 1 will examine the important issues of
Drumbuie below. First, I want to point up the strong classification
and framing of knowledge in the context of Highland development by
examining some central themes from the Dunnet Bay public inquiry.
Punnet Bay.
The controversy surrounding a proposal by Chicago Bridge to carry
out oil rig platform construction on a site at Dunnet Bay, Caithness,
was far more clearly centred on environmental conservation than any
of the other main public inquiries into oil development. The main
objecting groups to Chicago Bridge's plans were the Conservation
Society, The Association for the Preservation of Rural Scotland,
and The Scottish Wildlife Trust. There was evidence from the
Natural Environment Research Council and the Nature Conservancy.
The central issues revolved around the application for planning
permission to change the use of 103 acres of land forming part of the
foreshore and the sand dunes behind Dunnet Bay which was part of the
Caithness County Development Plan as an area to be developed for
tourism and recreation. The specific site area required by
Chicago Bridge was noted as of 'great landscape value' in the
Development Plan. In addition the area had been designated of
'special scientific interest' and officially notified as such
under section 23 of the National Parks and Access to the
Countryside Act of 1949.
Chicago Bridge were an American Company incorporated in Illinois
but they had been operating in Britain for the previous 19 years
building containment vessels for nuclear reactors, space simulation
chambers and a variety of other types of steel vessel for industrial
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use. Their main argument was that there was no other
suitable site available fqr the construction of oil platforms and
it was in Britain's 'national interest1 to allow essential oil related
development to proceed unhindered. This was an interesting theme
because having pleaded 'national interest' for their project, and
the unavailability of alternative sites, they were given planning
permission only then to decide that there was indeed an alternative
site in Ireland. No oil related development has ever taken place
at Dunnet Bay. Nevertheless it provides a useful case study of the
way in which priorities were set at the height of the oil scramble
in the early 19701s. And it is particularly revealing about
the way the public inquiry system failed to relate meaningfully to
technical and non-technica1 criteria in assessing development projects
Two pieces of evidence offered by the North Coast Conservation
Group of the Conservation Society are worth looking at; that
given by lan Carter, an Aberdeen University sociologist, who
questioned the very concept of 'development' in the context of
a sparsely populated Highland area, and John Busby, (a frequent
public inquiry witness in Scotland) who challenged the dominant
technology and engineering paradigm being used by Chicago
Bridge. Both pieces of evidence directly engage the central issue
of the Dunnet Bay controversy and provide a clear example of the
classification and framing of knowledge that operated at the time
of the so-called 'oil boom' years.
The Conservationist groups identified the main problem for the objecto
at the Dunnet Bay inquiry as trying to make their case "in spite of
the inquiry remit". The inquiry remit required "a quantifiable
assessment of the relative merits of allowing an industrial project
to proceed in an area of high amenity and scientific interest."
However, Dr. John Smith (Aberdeen University Geographer) leading
evidence for the objectors thought that there was "great difficulty
in trying to quantify the value of amenity and scientific interest".
He continued that "1 think this is where conservationists and
any reasoned person is at considerable difficulty and disadvantage
at this public inquiry, because it is net .possible to put a monetary
value on aspects of the landscape". ^ Smith identified a further
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limitation placed upon the conservationist case by pointing to the
difficulty of gettrng decision-makers to acknowledge "aesthetic arg-
(49)
uments against evidence on wage levels and so on".
It was precisely the nature of the taken for granted assumptions
about such apparent 'hard facts on development1 that Ian Carter sought
to challenge in his evidence. The real issue was, what concept of
'development' was assumed by the inquiry and : the decision-makers?
At the time Carter gave evidence at Dunnet Bay he had recently been
working on the application of the Andre Gunder Frank thesis on
Third World underdevelopment to the Scottish Highlands. Carter's
view was clearly divergent from the conventional wisdom of the
time on regional development policy. As he made clear in one of
the many articles he wrote at the time of the Dunnet Bay inquiry
"
any view of the Highlands as an area that
the various revolutions in agriculture, industry and
technology have passed by, is patently mistaken.
The Highlands are not independent of such processes -
they are the result of them. A number of conse¬
quences follow from this on Frank's assumptions.
Any attempt to strengthen the links between the
Highlands and the 'modern' economy through a large-
scale exploitation of indigenous Highland raw
materials will increase the underdevelopment of
the area by reinforcing the satel1isat ion of the
Highlands",
While the debate about underdevelopment models and regional policy
in advanced industrial societies has moved beyond Carter's position
of the early 1970's, the general principle that 'underdevelopment'
is the result of an active social process of interaction between
competing economic sectors and spatially organised centres of
activity rather than a static 'condition' remains. At the
Dunnet Bay inquiry the Frank model of underdevelopment was presented
to challenge the implicit model of development based on manufacturing
industry, and high technology as the only way to overcome the
stagnation of 'agricultural backwardness'.
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Carter opened his evidence by out 1ining what he considered was the
historical problem of Hi.ghland communities becoming over-reliant on
single industries, particularly those where ownership and control lay
outside the region. He illustrated this by reference to the early
19th century Kelp industry and the trade in black cattle. The
relevance of this historical perspective must have escaped the
assumbled hearing, because no reference was made to it in the
Reporter's summary report nor picked up in cross-examination.
However, it was important information to present to such an inquiry.
It was aimed towards underlining the need for a wider perspective on
the subject of 'development' and to examine the traditional assumptions
about what constituted development in the Highlands. It was seeking
to challenge the relevance of applying economic models in an
undifferentiated way regardless of historical, cultural and
economic context.
The crucial problem for Dunnet Bay, according to Carter, was the
potential for attracting second phase employment into the area
for wives and children, and the damage that might be done to the
local employment structure should Chicago Bridge be allowed to
proceed with their plans. Carter insisted that typically there was
"no overall concept of development" informing conventional regional
policy and suggested that a comparative look at other countries and
regions would clearly illustrate his main thesis. Chicago Bridge
would be operating in a more extreme economic context than even
developments in the Moray Firth, Easter Ross and in the North East.
In those areas there had discernibly been negative aspects to oil
development. As investment and industrial activity 'developed'
in the oil sector other sectors of the local economy had
contracted, social services were placed under strain, housing
became a.major problem both in the public and private sector^ and
the degree of 'dependence' of the local economy on international
centres of control increased.
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The specific argument against Chicago Bridge fe11 Into two parts.
First, in economic terms Ch.i'cago Bridge would; not be able to generate
industrial benefit to the local economy because it would be
involved in an activity at the end of the production chain. Oil
supply work would be preferrable for its potential to stimulate
activity in other economic units. There would also be an unusual
strain on local employment both in terms of attracting labour
away from already existing employers and also in terms of increasing
wage levels, possibly at the cost of the survival of some local
employers. "If there existed skilled jobs in the building and
construction industry prior to Chicago Bridge then it is quite likely
(52)that there would be none when they had gone." Second,
like all sparsely populated areas experiencing rapid industrialisation,
there were many social problems to be confronted. Migrant labour and
labour camps would be one problem given the lack of local labour
available. Inadequate and very short courses in welding for locals
proposed by Chicago Bridge would not, in Carter's opinion, be the
answer. The experience of such courses for the Nigg yards had
revealed this. (A brief remark Carter made about the increased
competition for local girls should planning permission be given
was given some prominance in the Reporters summarv of evidence to the
neglect of much of the substantive evidence offered bv Carter.
This miaht be an indication that his evidence was verv much
disenaaaed debate not considered to be of direct relevance to the
(53)
inquiry.) The totality of Carter's evidence was pointing to the
likely harmful economic and social consequences of locating an
oil rig site at Dunnet Bay and asking in what sense would it
constitute development.
The cross-examination of Carter was largely beside the point. His
main argument was that Caithness required a diversified economic
base at the very least; that diversification he argued should not
be narrowly interpreted nor should it ignore dependence on one single
industry which is controlled outwith the local economy. Carter was
sensitive to the need to understand the importance of a broad concept
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of diversification and pay attention to the location of decision-
makina power. He was questioned about unemployment if Chicago
Bridge were not to locate in Caithness, Cullen Q..C. for the
local planning authority separated the question of unemployment from
the wider totality of economic processes and problems of the area,
(so proving Carter's point that he lacked an 'overall concept of
development). He was puzzled by the suggestion that some forms
of employment might actually be bad for the area. And had not
Dounreay benefitted Caithness in terms of employment and providing
diversification? Carters response was to argue that all Dounraey
had done was divert attention away from the regions underlying
problems. Carter responded.
"The first report of the Highlands and Islands
Development Board contained a statement that they
interpreted their remit to develop the Highlands
by concentrating on tourism, forestry and
manufacturing industry. Over the years there
has been a disproprotionate concentration on
manufacturing industry".
Cullen Q..C. responded by suggesting that the success in establishing
manufacturing industry in the Highlands by the HiDB was halting
emigration. There was of course no recognition of Carter's wide
argument about metropolis satellite relations, Carters response to
Cullen was to emphasise that;
"the HIDB is staffed by people who have been
trained in planning schools who tend to regard
manufacturing industry as modern and other l^inds
of economic activities as somehow less modern.
There is a disparity between the HIDB's ideology
and its actions".
This thesis was given no recognition in the evaluation of the
evidence. The dominant concept of 'development' was, as suggested
by Carter's statement, that any form of manufacturing industry was
all that was required to contribute towards the development of a
regional economy. Dounreay was frequently cited as an example of a
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boost to the local economy which was also used as an example of the
beneficial effect for the area If Chicago Bridge were to proceed.
Assuming a similarity between Dounreay and Chicago Bridge in terms
of their economic effects, the Reporter questioned Carter;
Reporter: Would you not agree that Dounreay has benefitted
conditions in Caithness?
Carter: I think several people at this inquiry are consistently
and mistakenly, talking about Dounreay as if it was
a manufacturing indsutry. It is a public utility and
research agency which is controlled from the political
centre. It is easier to protest about its run down than
it would be with a multi-national company like Chicago
Bridge.
Reporter: Are you suggesting that even Dounreay has been
bed for Caithness? (My emphasis)
Carter: I would have been against the location of Dounreay
in Caithnessson the same principle that I am opposed to
oil rig construction in Argyll, Inverness, Ross-shire,
Sutherland, Caithness, Orkney and Shetland, Banffshire,
and some areas of Galloway. I would have been against
the development of Dounreay because it is against
the principle that one should not have a large
proportion of the labour force employed in one activity.
(56)
Carter did concede that Dounreay had obviously some 'benefits' for
the local economy but he insisted repeatedly that it diverted
attention away from underlying problems. His main criticism however
was that diversification was required and while he admitted to
being not competent to say how that might be achieved, the Chicago
Bridge project would, he believed, make the resolution of that
problem more difficult. By concluding his evidence by suggesting,
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"the worst thing that could happen to the HIDB is. that their
pretensions should be matched by their achievements", he summed
up his position and made it clear that his views wquld find no
echo in the Reporters assessment. The orthodoxy of traditional
economic models of development informed the underlying classification
of knowledge,
John Busby had been the first director of the Centre for Industrial
Innovation at Strathclyde University and was at the time of the
Dunrtet Bay inquiry an environmental consultant. He was particularly
concerned about the problem of relating engineering and technological
problems to their operating environments. Busby was, in other
words, concerned to resolve technological problems within a framework
that would be sensitive to environmental issues. His evaluations
were based on the location of a relational idea that could generate
an open relationship between the classification and framing of
knowledge. Busby stated his view clearly:
"We have to apply our minds a bit more to superior
technology to avoid the impact of these sorts of
large developments on the environment, and I
think that often the polarised interests could
be reconciled by applying better engineering technology.
I am suggesting that engineering design skills
can be used to attain environmental ends."^^
The thrust of Busby's evidence was a sustained criticism, explicitly
of Chicago Bridge and implicitly of the public inquiry system.
He wanted to make a case for an alternative method of building oil
rig platforms so that the environmental concerns being discussed
could be obviated. However, he was well aware that he had to offer
his evidence in a situation where the technology involved in the
project was ironically both problematic yet accepted as a given
beyond the inquiries remit to examine. The local public inquiry
system therefore becomes uniquely shackled. The specific remit
directed attention towards the engineering scale of Chicago Bridge's
project but within a local public inquiry there is no institutional
mechanism for scrutin i sing it thoroughly. In particular, Busby was
- 151 -
concerned by the way Chicago Bridge were supporting their case
by reference to the successful use of the same technology in Dubai
as that proposed for Dunnet Bay. It was merely assumed that the same
technological solutions could be used to resolve engineering problems
irrespective of the economic and environmental context. The
starting point was incorrectly based on a pre-existing engineering
paradigm. (In classical form, it was a case of Kuhn's notion of
secondary elaboration at the total expense of considering primary
elaboration).
Busby illustrated his argument with reference to the weather.
He suggested that discussions are often led in such a way that the
elements, (in this particular case the problem of working in
high winds,) are never considered in terms of whether or not the
project should be sited in a particular location at all. The
technical difficulties are always generated by the need to adjust
the project to the existing elemental factors that might effect
construction, namely high winds. The problem is very rarely
framed in such a way that non-technica1 or aesthetic factors of the
environment force similar re-consideration of the given engineering
model. The relationship between technology and the environment
is typically a slective one in which the emphasis is how to overcome
the difficulties set by a given site in terms of secondary rather
than primary elaboration of the engineering paradigm. Discussion
at the inquiry therefore spent some considerable time on the subject
of the difficulties in working through winter months when the wind
speeds at Dunnet Bay are normally very high. The site and
the technology were therefore treated as an unquestioned variable
which at the very most would have to undergo minor modification.
The more general recreational and scientific value of the area were
not even treated as independent variables that might effect work
practices. There was never any conception of the problem in terms
of finding a solution that was not mutually exclusive between
development or no development. Busby started from the opposite
direction. He argued that the existing use of the area ought to be
preserved, while also recognising the inevitabi1ity of the oil related
industries seeking rural sites to construct platforms.
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A relational idea should therefore be found, he argued, to preserve
as far as possible the environmental, economic and sociological
factors at issue. Busby sought to provide an engineering solution
to the apparent irroci1iabi1ity of the evidence offered by Chicago
Bridge on the one hand and Ian Carter and the Conservationists on the
other.
Mr. Kouka, Vice President of Chicago Bridge, had earlier specified
the conditions that their site would have to meet to be compatible
with their technology. He described Dunnet Bay perfectly. Patrick
Kelly, as employee of the company systematically excluded alternative
sites because of the failure to meet the criteria described by
Kouka. Significantly both of them rejected the Clyde estuary
because of the height clearance of the Erskine Bridge. However,
these criteria used for selection were based on the premis that the
objective was to find a site location that fits the requirements of
the pre-existing and unalterable technology. At no point in this
site selection process were the eggineers centrally involved let alone
anyone knowledgeable about the environment. The technology had
already been established and no effort was expended on examining
alternative forms of constructing the oil rig platform to accommodate
environmental constraints. It was precisely this approach to the
problem that Busby challenged:
The Scandinavians, for example, had already been using the idea
of floating docks for assembling oil rig structures, using
50,000 ton second hand oil tankers to avoid spoiling rural areas.
So Busby suggested;
"An alternative method of building the platform
which would cause less damage to the environment,
would be to sub-contract the manufacture of parts
to existing shipyards on the Clyde and assemble
the parts in a sheltered sea loch. This would
also save the company betweet £1 and £2 million and
save time in construction because work can start
as soon as the contract is awarded", ^g^
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He went on to describe how the severe weather conditions at Dunnet
Bay would, on his calculations, impose costs on production. Winds
of between 21 and 30 mph would blow 60% of the time, and as Kouka
had admitted, lifting would not take place in winds of above 20 mph,
so liftihg would be interrupted 50% of the time. The answer,
Busby argued, lay in subcontracting the prefabrication work to existin
shipyards where welding and heat-treatment facilities were covered.
The technology to re-assemble the parts in a sheltered lock were
described in terms of the existing Scandinavian practices and,
"The company save the £3 million to develop the
site, against which the pontoon would cost £1 million".
(5
Holiday accommodation in the Dunnet Bay area could be used to house
the smaller work force. In particular, he stressed that his method
of construction both recognised the economic need to develop oil
related work in Britain while also accepting the main thrust of
Ian Carter's evidence. Under his sub-contracting method employment
would be generated in those areas of West Central Scotland were
idle skills were available and the greatest need existed. As most
of the labour would be imported under Chicago Bridge's method
there was little loss to local opportunities by adopting his
suggestions.
Busby's evidence was too radical for the Developer or the Reporter
to accept. The Developers lawyer challenged Busby on the practicabili
of his suggested method of construction, taking great pains to
emphasise to the Reporter that Busby had no actual experience of the
design or construction of marine structures. Mackay Q..C. stated:
"Mr. Busby's suggestion that a land site need
not be used is answered by Mr. Kouka who said
that it would not be practicable to join the
members together while floating and it would
not be possible to have adequate quality
control. Mr, Busby has no experience in the
design or construction of marine structures and
it would, be out of the question to find his
proposals feasible (my emphasis). The
objections ought not to be sustained."
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A crucial point for emphasis arises here. The principles of framing
in the public Inquiry relates to credential led status to Initiate
consideration of what is to be known. In response to Busby's
suggestions Kouka totally dismissed the whole idea of using a
floating system to assemble parts constructed on the Clyde very
much in terms of Busby's lack of status; he did not have the 'right'
to be heard on such matters. Busby was classified as a "Planner"
and told by Kouka "in my view planners should not presume to decide
in advance what method should be used for constructing oil production
(6l)
platforms." But was this not precisely what Chicago Bridge
were doing assisted by an inflexible and inadequate public
inquiry system that was incapable of exploring Busby's method?
Having conceded in cross-examination that there ought to be competition
between different methods of construction, Kouka dismissed Busby's
evidence because he believed Chicago Bridge "already had" the best
method and Busby's suggestions were from someone not acknowledged
'professionally.1 Perhaps the true reason for rejecting the
sub-contracting idea was revealed by the Developers lawyer who stated
that his clients would be particularly concerned about a method
of construction that was "exposed to delay by industrial action".
He suggested that 'volatile' industrial relations on the Clyde
could hold up the entire project if there was a strike in one of
the sub-assembly units. Busby's reply was to "spread the sub¬
contracting around because the parts for the structure are all the
same". This was not considered an adequate response.
Neither Carter's evidence nor Busby's attempts to resolve the techn¬
ology/environment conflict, were particularly impressive as far
as the Reporter was concerned. He made little mention of Busby's
evidence in his conclusions, accepting unquestion i.ngly the views
of Chicago Bridge. Busby's method may well have been faulty and
in the last analysis inappropriate as a solution to the problem.
However, it revealed the inadequacy of the whole planning system,
dependent totally on a project presented by a private developer
and processed by an inflexible local public inquiry
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that could acknowledge evidence only if given by someone conventionally
credential led.
Permission was gi'ven to Chicago Bridge to build their oil rigs.
They decided however that an alternative site did after all exist
in Ireland. The beauty of Dunnet Bay, and its, qua 1ities as an
environmental resource, escaped the ravages of oil development, but
not becuase of arguments accepted within an effective process of
public debate but simply by pure chance. The local public inquiry
system was totally incapable of thoroughly examining all the issues.
The dominance of what I call a collection knowledge code meant it
was extremely difficult for objectors to penetrate the strong
classification and framing of knowledge which informed the Developer,
the Reporter, and one must assume,the Secretary of State for
Scot 1 and.
The exact reverse of the Dunnet Bay situation took place at
Drumbuie, and it is to that inquiry that I will now turn.
Drumbuie: "David and Goliath in Scottish Rural Development?"
Maurice Broady described the Drumbuie inquiry as a "David and
Goliath contest"
"What the Crichel Down inquiry was in the
1950's,the Drumbuie inquiry may well turn
out to be for the 1970's. .....In a David
and Goliath contest, it has indicated the
importance of considering factors of scale
in the planning of remote rural areas."
(62)
Broady, as an 'expert' witness for the objectors, was probably
overcome by the euphoria of the immediate victory in the public
inquiry battle to notice that, contrary to his view of David
slaying Goliath at Drumbuie, West Ross-shire lost the war. Drumbuie,
in retrospect, has become less known for the proving of the public
inquiry system as a defence mechanism against bad development in
rural areas, than as a classic example of how the procedures of a
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public inquiry have no wider implications beyond the immediate planning
applications. Further it illustrates how public inquiry decisions can
be cynically disregarded by the Secretary of~State in terms of informing
related decisions.
The main interest that I have in the Drumbuie case has less to do
with the specific planning applications made by Mowlem-Taylor
Woodrow to build concrete oil rig platforms, or the specific arguments
for and against those applications (they were similar to those
rehearsed at Dunnet Bay) and more to do with the underlying
reasons for rejecting the applications in relation to events which
occurred elsewhere. Drumbuie in my view was not as significant a
public inquiry, as I think, is generally regarded. It was long and
costly and apparently gave the impetus for a great deal of official
examination of inquiry procedures. Much of the activity in
my opinion was promoted less by the specific events of Drumbuie and
more by the obsessive scramble foroil and governmental anxiety about
err.shore benefits that might be lost abroad. Moss Morran, which I
will discuss in detail below, was far more interesting and in terms
of local action and controversy, far more vociferous. Drumbuie
in fact was a public inquiry held at the wrong time, and sat to
consider the wrong planning application.
In April 1973 John Mowlem S Co. Ltd. and Taylor Woodrow Ltd jointly
made an application to construct concrete oil rigs on 2k0 acres of
land at Port Cam* , Drumbuie, sparking off much local opposition,
while Howard Doris, a French Company aiming to do the same thing,
were simultaneously surveying a site near Loch Kishorn six miles
away relatively unnoticed. The land sought by Taylor Woodrow was
owned by the National Trust for Scotland and was inalienable. It
would have required an Act of Parliament to allow its use as an oil
rig construction site. However while highly technical arguments
were being rehearsed and attacked first at Balmacara and then in
Edinburgh over Mowlem-Taylor Woodrow's scheme at Drumbuie, Howard
Doris continued with plans to set up a site at Kishorn unhindered
by the public inquiry at Drumbuie and without any public scrutiny
of their scheme, except that given by local planners and the
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Scottish Office. The victory at Drumbuie was a hollow victory
because it sat for k6 days apparently rejecting the case for
industrialising Wester Ross while the Secretary of State contradicted
that decision by allowing Howard Doris to set up an identical scheme
only six miles away. It is the very fact that the Kishorn Develop¬
ment went ahead that indicates that the classification and framing
of knowledge which obtained at Drumbuie did not defend the rural
community, as optimistically proclaimed by Maurice Broady. Closer
examination will indicate that the victory at Drumbuie was a pyrrhic
victory founded on the real fact that it was legally and politically
far more difficult to allow the Mowlem-Tay1 or Woodrow scheme to go
ahead than reject it. By examining the 'official discourse1 of the
Secretary of State's decision the underlying classification and
framing of knowledge can be discovered.
As with the case of the Nigg inquiries, 'official discourse' becomes
a crucial area for analysis where the task is to make underlying
knowledge codes visible. It is founded on the implicit assumption
of an 'ideal speech situation' as 1 have mentioned. In those cases,
for example, where there is either a discrepancy between the inquiry
Reporter and Secretary of State, and the legitimation deficit has to
be made good where the appearance of administrative power over
democratic participation becomes blatant, (the case at Nigg) or
where it appears that democratic participation has been effective at
both levels of argumentation with the state (apparently convincing
Reporterand Secretary of State), 'official discourse' can be
analysed .o hunt for the underlying reasons why objectors arguments
were accepted when theoretically it was not anticipated. This
latter case applies to Drumbuie.
Like Burton and Carlen, I am in this case conceptualising 'official
discourse', in terms of a "paradoxical process whereby Official
Discourse has simultaneously to constitute an ideal addressee to
whom justification can be made and negate a specific material
(63)
situation which engendered that discourse....." The State
effectively tries to reconstitute an ideal conception of justice or
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at least, in the case of public inquiries, generate the view that the
decisions made can be discursively validated and were based on a
'sincere' attempt to make a 'fair, open and impartial' judgement.
We saw above in the case of the Nigg inquiry of 1975, that the
State justifies the imbalance between the power and participatory
modalities in decision-making by adopting an 'official discourse'
that does indeed seek to justify legitimation threatening decisions.
'Official discourse' becomes a form of "distorted communication" in
Habermas' sense, which seeks to repair the legitimation deficit
between the public inquiries instrumental and expressive function.
It is in short an ideological mechanism around which the dual
determination of politica1-administrative power operates; 'Official
Discourse' operates to make the non-public and non-discursive deter¬
minants of decisions opaque.
The letter of decision issued by the Scottish Development Department
on behalf of the Secretary of State summarised the main issues of
the Drumbuie inquiry; there was not an alternative U.K. site
for building the structures proposed by Mowlem-Tay1 or Woodrow; the
Department of Trade and Industry had stressed the governments feeling
of urgency in the 'national interest' that such structures should
be built in the U.K.; however there would be a great deal of noise
and visual impact; the pattern of living of the area would be
changed irreversibly and there would be an effect on the local
social structure; there would be dislocation of the local economy;
there was an inadequate infrastructure; and the disputed land was
in law 'inalienable' by virtue of the Schedule to the National
Trust for Scotland Order Confirmation Act 1935.
These were the issues that were debated in the inquiry and which
had to be sorted out. Now I would argue that in the case of the
Drumbuie inquiry there are two main factors that should be
isolated in order to reveal the true basis of the decision-making
criteria.
- 159 -
a) The governments Coastal sites Bill.
b) The inalienable status of the land in law.
I have already discussed the Coastal Sites Bill above. it was an
expedient measure by a Conservative government aimed at bypassing
the planning system "to allow an early start to work at Drumbuie".
Indeed the Secretary of State for Scotland effectively invited the
participants at the inquiry to give up the Drumbuie public inquiry
because they would effectively be wasting their time. However,
coupled with an overt and unabashed attempt at negating planning
procedures and the public inquiry, it was belatedly recognised by the
government that if the "inalienable" status of National Trust Land
could be over-ridden by an Act of Parliament then a harmful precedent
would be established. Who would give over land totfte National
Trust in future if it might be used for industrial or commercial
purposes? That was an important issue which the government
through the Scottish Office resolved by making it appear, ironically,
that Drumbuie was in fact a 'triumph' for local objectors and the
local public inquiry system. Through the 'official discourse'
the Secretary of State set out the reasoning for his decision not to
grant planning permission to Mowlem-Taylor Woodrow, giving the
appearance that the debate within the- inquiry had been crucial while
being silent about allowing Howard Doris to go ahead at Kishorn a
few miles away on land not owned by the National Trust.
There were six main sections in the decision letter. An
examination of the 'official discourse' that constituted that letter
is revealing about the obfuscation practiced by the Scottish
Development Department.
The objective of 'official discourse' in the Drumbuie case was to
disallow theplanning application while at the same time not under¬
mining the decision relating to Kishorn. The Secretary of State
having decided what he wanted, his civil servants went about constr¬
ucting his reasoning for him.
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In general the Secretary of State concluded:
that there could be economic advantages
to the United Kingdom from construction of the
Condeep design at Port Cam..,., The construction
of such platforms in the United Kingdom may not
be crucial to the extraction of oi1 from the
North Sea, but if a significant proportion of
work of this type has to be carried out abroad,
with the probable consequent loss of associated
orders, the foreign exchange burden would be
considerable."
(65)
So while the underlying fear is revealed, the Secretary of State
goes on to give the impression of concern about the social, economic
and infrastructure problems forthe Drumbuie area that would result
from the Mowlem-Taylor Woodrow scheme. So, he goes on, with respect
to noise and visual impact;
"It was clear at the Inquiry (the Reporter
concludes) that the project would involve
considerable noise disturbance for the
community of Drumbuie".
(66)
The Secretary of State it should be noted emphasises that 'the
Reporter concludes'. He continues with this emphasis for the
important reason that he wishes to begin to structure a case for
Kishorn by implication;
"The Secretary of State has noted also the
Reporter's view that Stage. 2 Construction
would compound the visual effect, particularly
in the wider context, beyond the limits of
acceptability. Against this the Secretary of
State has had to keep in mind visual amenity
alone cannot in every case (my emphasis) take
precedence over all considerations".
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Moving on to the controversial social effects upon the area.
"The Reporter concluded that the whole pattern
of living in the area would be changed irreversibly
by the introduction of the applicant's work force.
The way of life of the existing community would
not survive the impact and this was, in the
Reporter's opinion, too high a price to ask of the
people of South West Ross. ...the Secretary of
State takes the view that change is a feature of
any living community....but while accepting the
Reporter's conclusion in the present case that
the inflow of population would give rise to
difficulties, the Secretary of State does not
accept a general argument that the area as
a whole would necessarily be incapable of
absorbing incoming of population" (My emphasis)
(68)
Further, with respect to the local economy
"....the Reporter accepted.... that the project
was prospectively of limited duration..,dis1ocation
of the local economy might be followed by....
unemployment at the end of the life of the project.
The introduction of a project of this type into
such an area is bound to affect local wage rates
and the pattern of economic development. However,
although he is aware of the problems of this kind
which have arisen in areas already affected by
oil-related developments, the Secretary of State
does not regard this by itself as an argument
for limiting development" (My emphasis)
Again on the question of infrastructure, the emphasis was on the
untypical nature of the strain on infrastructure and the view that
while it was perhaps a major problem it was "of itself" not an
insurmountable obstacle to development in the area. My view is
thatby the evidence of the 'accumulated uncertainty' manufactured by
the 'official discourse', the Secretary of State indicated quite
clearly that he disagreed with the findings of his-Reporter. One
can only speculate, but on the evidence of his 'official discourse'
and the fact that Howard Doris went ahead with a similar development
at Kishorn, the only thing that stopped Mowlem-Tay1 or Woodrow
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winning planning permission from the Secretary of State was the
legal problem of the 'inalienability' clause attaching to the
National Trust land. What is particularly interesting is the way
the decision letter tries to downplay this issue in the context
of the wider balancing act of evaluating the arguments.
"The Secretary of State considers that he
should not leave out of account the inalienable
status of the land, and he has therefore made
allowance for this factor on making his
dec is ion...upon a judgement as to the weight
to be attached to the many factors involved....
planning permission should not be granted."
(7o)
Maurice Broady concedes that the 'inalienable' status of the land
was probably crucial, albeit that he optimistically argues that
Drumbuie was a successful case of community action.
" the decision was perhaps chiefly due to
the fact that to have allowed this development
at Drumbuie would have raised the difficult and
politically sensitive question of the inalienability
of land bequeathed to the National Trust".
(71)
The Drumbuie case should not be treated as a case of 'successful
community action' because it was not. The political sensitivity
attaching to the National Trust land was an abstract one in relation
to the real material impact that oil development would have had,
and has had, in the West Highlands. The fact that it was not
social, economic and infrastructure issues that informed the




Without exception the case studies of the major Highland public
inquiries discussed here illustrate the failure of the planning
system to adequately protect sparsely populated areas from
inappropriate large scale industrialisation. One significant way
in which this failure manifested itself was in the repeated attempt
to resolve conflicts of interest within a narrow institutional
framework that was unsuited to the task of balancing the need
for crucial onshore oil development with the undoubted social and
environmental damage that would be its inevitable consequence in
small isolated Highland Communities. Arguments concluded in terms
which expressed concern about traditional industries and established
community social structures, or which opposed industrial development
through the vocabulary of conservation and environmental protection,
found a decision-making system unable, it seems, to decipher the
message. In Luhmann's terms there was no 1actua1isat ion of shared
sense1 between the Secretary of State and local action groups.
In the next two chapters I wish to explore in more detail how the
public inquiry system operates to effect (a) objectors and
participants perception of the system by a close examination of the
Moss Morran inquiry, and (b) how the public inquiry system effects
the formulation and presentation of opposition in locally formed
action groups. The Moss Morran inquiry has been one of the most
controverisal of the recent 'big public inquiries' in Scotland. It
presents a useful case study of community mobilisation because it
was an inquiry controversy which was by far the most vociferous in
recent years. There was less acceptance of the public inquiry
system in Fife than there was in the Highlands, but even so, the
inquiry system works seductively as we will see.
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INTRODUCTION
Moss Morran: The Context of the Controversy
The basis of the Moss Morran controversy lay in the strong local
reaction against proposals by Shell Expro UK and Esso Chemicals Ltd.,
to build natural gas liquid and ethylene plants on a site in
Cowdenbeath in Fife, and in addition^to build and operate a tanker
terminal on the north shore of the Forth which would receive
processed feedstock by pipeline from Moss Morran to Braefoot Bay for
export. The Moss Morran site at Cowdenbeath has been designated for
industrial development since the 1950's and is situated in the heart
of an area plagued by industrial decay and high unemployment.
However the proposed tanker terminal at Braefoot Bay lies in between
Dalgety Bay to the west, which is predominantly a private enterprise
new town development, and Aberdour to the east, an old established
village sometimes used as a holiday centre. Needless to say the
main opposition to the oil companies' proposed developments have
come from the middle class areas by the Forth.
The Moss Morran controversy in actual fact is a conflict with many
dimensions. In addition to the generalised conflict between
industrialisation and the environment, the specific conflicts over
the Moss Morran and the Braefoot Bay sites of the Shell/Esso project
give rise to a conflict between two communities distinguished along
essentially class lines, although the question of the Cowdenbeath
Gray Park community's opposition sfightly complicates the neatness
of this formulation. In an article in The Observer (10.7.77) Brian
Wilson describes Shell/Esso's bid to establish a petrochemical complex
in Fife as "a textbook example of how different communities have
conflicting reactions to development proposals of the kind proposed
for Moss Morran and Braefoot Bay."
Dalgety Bay has a population of about 5,000 and it has been described
as the only 'private enterprise new town under construction in
Britain'. Something in the region of ninety five percent of the
houses are owner occupied. The theme of the hoarding at the entry
to Dalgety Bay proclaims the main idea behind its location;
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'beautiful homes by the Forth'. This projects the notion of a
residential suburb in a location well placed for the leisure pursuits
of a coastal resort. It is founded on the idea that sailing and
walking can be an integral part of the community's commercial appeal.
However the centre piece of this leisure resource, the Forth and
Braefoot Bay, is now being earmarked for a large industrial jetty
to load highly inflammable natural gases onto large tankers.
Similarly the appeal of Aberdour is founded on the idea that the
village is a refuge against the excesses of urban living. The yacht
clubs and the beach form a central aspect of a leisure oriented way
of life dependent to a large extent on the water surrounding the
Braefoot Bay inlet. The immediate concerns of the people of the
Aberdour and Dalgety Bay end of the project have obviously been
focused on the possible impact and change to a 'house-investment-
leisure way of life' which might result from the introduction of a
major petrochemical complex. The motivations of home ownership as
a major financial investment, and a leisure oriented concept of the
local environment, are not conducive for stimulating a broader concern
for industrial development and economic regeneration. Those are
concerns of a qualitatively different realm. The local village
communities of Dalgety Bay and Aberdour, and the surrounding environ¬
ment, are seen by locals as a resource to live with rather than to
work on. It is obviously perceived as an environment to reside in
and relax in rather than where one is industrious and 'develops' the
landscape into something qualitatively and quantitatively different.
The balance and separation between work and leisure should be viewed
not only as a difference in activity but also as a way of relating to
the environment, especially the immediate residential environment.
By contrast the main site of the project at Moss Morran is near the
town of Cowdenbeath where the majority of the population experience a
quite different social reality. It is an area of Fife where the
unemployment figures are traditionally high and were in excess of 18%
of the working population, even at the time of the controversy in
1976. The area was once heavily dependent on the mining industry but
the nearest productive pits are now ten miles away from Cowdenbeath.
Obviously the immediate concerns of the local people are generally
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determined by their daily anxiety about work rather than leisure, and
industrial development which might create jobs rather than viewing
the environment as something to be appropriated for aesthetic
consumption. Cowdenbeath itself is not particularly attractive and
there is no specific environmental quality about the area which could
inspire a reaction against industrialism. Since the 1950's Moss Morran
has been recognised as a possible industrial site with a potential to
accommodate large scale industrial development. Even though it is an
area which has never been officially designated for industrial
purposes in any development plan there have been projects such as
heavy engineering, oil refining and bonded warehousing associated
with the site in recent years.
The Immediate History Of The Planning Application
The political concern for overcoming Fife's economic recession has
been the central factor concentrating the minds of all local
politicians. Regardless of political party, the majority of local
politicians have taken a public stand on the commitment to bring
industry and jobs to Fife. The public management of this identity
was the crucial factor which subsequently led to the lack of formal
political support for the opposition groups against the Shell/Esso
project.
In March 1976 a German consortium was reported to be interested in
the Moss Morran site. This consortium was represented by a Herr
Philip Schmidt. The so-called 'German connection' was eagerly
pursued by local District and Regional councillors who made several
trips to Germany before the whole affair began to look decidedly
fraudulent. Schmidt had no backers, and indeed the very legality of
his activities were under some doubt. There was obviously some
concern about reputations and about the efficiency and effectiveness
of local politicians to actually bring a major industrial project
to Fife.
Meanwhile Shell Expro UK were fighting a public inquiry at Peterhead
to enable them to build their NGL plant. However, due to difficulties
over the harbour (the official oil company reason) Shell suddenly
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withdrew from that inquiry and it was never completed. Shell were
later publicly censured for their conduct, and they had to meet the
bill for wasting public money at the Peterhead Inquiry. Full
costs were awarded to the objectors. *
July 1976 they shifted their attention to Moss Morran, partly because
the 'German debacle1 had drawn their attention tothe;site as a possible
alternative to Peterhead. With some already existing public and
political legitimacy for a petrochemical development, the Fife sites
must have appeared slightly less of a hurdle to the oil companies
intent on gaining planning permission quickly.
The interest of Shell and Esso in Moss Morran following on so soon
after the failures of the German debacle obviously contributed to
an early commitment to the whole idea of a petrochemical plant for
Fife among local politicians. In November 1976 Shell Expro announced
that they would be submitting a planning application to build an
NGL plant at Moss Morran and associated tanker terminal facilities
at Braefoot Bay. In January 1977 Esso Chemicals Ltd., also
announced their intention to seek planning permission for a possible
ethylene plant and in March of that year followed" up their first
application with an application for permission in principle for
downstream development. It was at this time that the opposition
movement started to form and become extremely vociferous.
See Robert Moore The Social Impact of Oil: The Case of Peterhead.
Rout ledge & Kegan Paul , 1982 for a discussion of the original She'll
application to build an NGL plant in Peterhead. Moore propounds
several, theories about the reasons underlying Shell's withdrawal
from Peterhead. The most likely reason seems to be a combination
of bad advice to Shell from the Scottish Economic Planning Department
about the Peterhead harbour and poor forward planning and research
on the part of Shell themselves. Moore suggests other theories
including covert pressure to move the project to Moss Morran because
it was an area of high unemployment. Interviews with Regional
planners indicated some contact with Shall after the "German debacle"
but they doubted whether anyone could pressure the oil companies
to do what they didn't want to.
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CHAPTER 5
PARTICIPATION AND DISCONTENT IN THE PUBLIC INQUIRY:
THE CASE OF THE MOSS MORRAN CONTROVERSY
In this chapter I want to look back to Chapter 2 and examine the
theme of 'natural justice' in the empirical setting of the Moss Morran
inquiry, and look forward to my description of the formation of the
local opposition groups in Fife by setting out the structural
inequalities of the inquiry which, I believe, partly sustained their
commitment to resisting Shell/Esso beyond the public inquiry. To
recap my argument in chapter 2, I conceptually distinguished between
'common-sense conceptions' of justice, rooted in the situational
experiences of, and interpretations made by, people in their everyday
lives, and formal legalistic and administrative conceptions of
justice, grounchUn the 'elaborate network of legalistic structures
which constitute the judicial review of administrative action'.
My argument was that this fundamental distinction can help explain
legitimation deficits within the public inquiry system. Formal
conceptions of 'natural justice' articulate the institutional reality
of the public inquiry institution controlled from the administrative
centre of the state and procedurally structured in accordance with
formal legal views of 'fairness', 'openness' and 'impartiality1. The
power realities of the formal conception of 'natural justice' can be
dissonant with 'common-sense' views held by lay people who interpret
justice in accordance with their situational interest in participating
as much as possible in the making of decisions which might affect
their lives. A legitimation problem in the public inquiry system
could arise if the formal conception of 'natural justice' is judged
by 'common-sense' notions and found wanting.
Political actions, and wider social movements for change to the
Inquiry system, are to a great extent dependent on the_success or
faMure of the institutional system actually to appear to be just
and to actually appear to be "fair, open and impartial". We are
to a very large extent within the realm of situational perceptions.
So this chapter wi11 concent rate on both the public expression of
disenchantment with the local inquiry system by participating
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objectors in formal settings, and also to the individual private
interpretations of the local inquiry system. Why, for example,
do people who seem to be perceptive about the shortcomings of the
public inquiry system not make more effort to challenge it either
during the course of a hearing or outside in a wider movement for
reform? These are important orienting questions which guided my
analysis of the Moss Morran controversy. I will concentrate on
the actual public inquiry in this chapter and leave the wider
political and organisational issues for the following chapter.
I will present my argument in the vocabulary of classification and
framing which I also introduced in chapter three. It is a presumption
throughout my presentation, as it was in the case of the Highland
Inquiries, that there exists in all major public inquiries a
tension between the systems rationality of strong classification
and framing and the discursive rationality of weak classification
and framing. I will divide my account by first presenting a
description of the procedures and evidence of the public inquiry
and second the individual perceptions and accounts of the public
inquiry process.
Background Issues
There were several general factors involved in the Moss Morran
public inquiry that were important for placing the controversy in
context. First, it was government stated policy to encourage
the conversion of North Sea gases into high value added products,
either for downstream manufacture (plastics based products and
the like), or for export as the raw material for manufacturing-
industry. The fractionation of natural gas liquids into propane,
butane, and ethylene was considered by the Government in 1977
to be of paramount importance if the country as a whole was to
get maximum benefit from, and efficient use of, a scarce North
Sea resource. It was therefore a background assumption
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at the outset of the public inquiry that the government and the
Secretary of State for Scotland would obviously give some priority to
a project, like that being proposed by Shell/Esso, which would
contribute to the realisation of government North Sea policy. Local
objectors were extremely sensitive to this underlying pressure.
Second, the public inquiry began with the general knowledge that
there were at least two credible alternative sites to those chosen
in Fife, albeit that the time and money needed to prepare one of them
was problematic. Shell had already partly fought a public inquiry
for their project at Peterhead. Laboratory tests on the structure
of the Peterhead harbour completed in Holland had alerted Shell to
the fact that a new harbour would effectively have to be constructed
if they were to proceed with their plans in Peterhead. The problem
hinged on the time and money that would be needed for this. Shell
had already undertaken commitments to supply an American source with
fractionated gas products within a certain time period. It transpired
in the Moss Morran inquiry that financial penalty clauses were
attached to that commitment and Shell were obviously not keen to
prolong their project any longer than necessary. The cost involved
in building a new harbour was also considered to be prohibitive.
However, as far as objectors were concerned, Peterhead was a feasible
alternative site. There were sites at Nigg which were available, as
I have already indicated in the previous chapter. Nigg did appear to
many people to be ideal for both Shell and Esso's purposes. The site
was already zoned for petrochemical development and it was removed
from centres of population. This in itself, one might have thought,
was enough to commend it to the SDD if not the oil companies in
comparison with Moss Morran and Braefoot Bay. The problem that Shell/
Esso saw was the difficulty of getting labour and accommodation in an
area already heavily under strain, especially with the oil rig yard.
The costs of laying a pipeline from the land base at St. Fergus to
Nigg would probably have been similar to the cost of laying such a
pipeline to Fife and the time factor involved in such a project would
also have been similar, to that proposed for Fife.
The third important factor forming a background to the controversy
was the concern for safety. Knowledge of major disasters at
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Flixborough and in America had caused general concern in the local
communities and press. This concern was intensified when a plant
designed, financed and partly built by Shell, similar to that
proposed for Fife, exploded in the Persian Gulf State of Qatar only
three months before thestart of the Fife inquiry. In that explosion
seven people were killed and many injured. The irony of that case
was that Shell had stressed the significance of their Qatar plant
design at the Peterhead Inquiry and had boasted how they had built
storage tanks in Qatar "according to BS 47^1". A year later on the
3rd April 1977 those very same storage tanks exploded.
The fourth and most significant factor was the fact that local objectors,
having regard for the issues I have mentioned, pressed continually and
unsuccessfully for a Planning Inquiry Commission (PIC). Many people
not even involved in the planning controversy felt that there was no
more appropriate case for a PIC than the location of a major petrochemical
complex. As I indicated in Chapter 2, all the criteria for a PIC were
met by the Shell/Esso planning applications, In addition it was public
knowledge that the siting of petro-chemica1 plants along the eastern
coastline of the United States had been halted, A moratorium had
also been called on the siting of chemical and gas developments near
to populated areas in many middle eastern countries. Also there had
never been a systematic policy developed for Britain on siting
dangerous industrial plants. It was believed, especially by local
objectors, that the Shell/Esso project presented an ideal opportunity
to conduct a rigorous and far reaching investigation of the technology
and chemistry of gas fractionation as a prelude to developing an overall
national policy. The objectors were therefore pressing for the
setting up of a PIC, They were convinced that only such an institutional
framework could investigate the complexities of the Shell/Esso proposals
and a local public inquiry was considered to be very inadequate
by comparison. Knowledge of the Highland inquiries had not
instilled much confidence in the local inquiry system. The site
specific nature of all planning inquiries, whether they be local
or PIC's, was obviously a problem overlooked by the objectors, but
many locals felt that a PIC would at least be able to force a wider
consideration of alternative sites than a local public inquiry. The
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refusal to use a broader framework was interpreted by many local
objectors in Fife as the primary example of the formal infringement
of the community's 'natural justice'. As I have discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3 the use of a local inquiry system can be understood
in the terms set out by Luhmann's system theory; complexity
reduction and incorporation of conflict and dissent into a narrowly
prescribed framework. 'Natural justice' however does not attach to
third party interests nor communities, and in terms of formal
administrative criteria, Viatural justice' is not infringed by
forcing people to argue their case within the confines of a local
public inquiry rather than a PIC. However, local people did not
adopt such a formalistic perspective. The system for them was unjust,
certainly not considered to be open and above board and, given the
government's publicly declared support for NGL fractionation projects,
certainly not impartial. So given these four important background
factors the public inquiry process began with local people already
feeling that the principles of Franks had been infringed. Petitions
and letters were consistently sent to the Secretary of State urging
that a PIC be set up.
In a letter dated the 22nd March 1977, Ougald Eadie wrote to the
Secretary of State as Chairman of the Dalgety Bay end of the Action
Group saying that the Shell/Esso project:
" highlights the need for a thorough and objective
investigation into all aspects of the proposed developments,
in particular the safety and environmental aspects. We
believe that such an investigation will only be possible
through the machinery of a Planning Inquiry Commission....
As you are no doubt aware there is a great deal of cynicism
about the effectiveness of the normal public inquiry
procedure and we trust that you will be prepared to break
new planning ground by ordering a special inquiry and
thereby showing that in the eyes of your Governmen.t, people
matter more than profits."
Eadie's plea followed up an earlier, legalistic appeal from
Dik Mehta, the Aberaour Chairman,on the 2Ath February 1977 which had
directed the Secretary of State's attention to Section kk of the
Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972 which detailed the
appropriate criteria for setting up a PIC.
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There was a lack of success in these attempts to get a PIC set up.
The Joint Action Group were left in the position of having to face
up to the reality of fighting a local public inquiry in a fairly short
period of time. The Secretary of State for Scotland announced in
May that a local public inquiry would take place starting on the
13th June 1977- The Joint Action Group were then faced with the
problem of having to organise their case with very little time,
considering the complexities of the issues involved. A PIC would have
lightened their responsibility to research and present the critique
of the Shell/Esso project and would probably have delayed the start
of the investigation by several months. The Action Group however
pursued the only reasonable strategy open to them, to press for the
inquiry to be put back. They requested a two months postponement.
The Secretary of State only gave them a fortnight's postponement;
the enquiry was to start on the 27th June 1977 and would be scheduled
to last three to four weeks. There was, however, added pressure
placed on the participants in the inquiry with the statement that it
was hoped by the Secretary of State that matters could be expedited,
if possible to complete in a shorter time period than that allowed
for. The disparity between the Action Groups aspirations and what
they actually achieved prompted Joint Action Group Chairman Dik
Mehta to state in the local press:
"It is difficult to escape the feeling that everything is
being carefully planned to make it as difficult as possible
for the objectors to present their case effectively
There should be full allowance for the fact that objectors
have limited resources and time to prepare their case.
Sadly, it appears the boot is firmly on the other foot and
no opportunity is wasted to put the boot in where it hurts."
It became clear that both the failure to obtain a PIC and later
failure to obtain at least a postponement to the start of the local
inquiry, contributed to a general feeling within the Forth Communities
that there was no point in having a public inquiry at all. They felt
there was not going to be any 'justice' accorded to them. They were
convinced the public inquiry would be a charade, purposely structured
to weaken their case.
The pre-inquiry meeting convened by Mr. Bell, the inquiry Reporter, on
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the 3rd June 1977 was therefore to be the first formal opportunity
for objectors to confront the realities of the local inquiry system
and articulate their distrust of it.
The Pre-Inquiry Meeting
Prior to the commencement of all major public inquiry hearings a
pre-inquiry meeting is convened by the inquiry Reporter. Mr. Bell
convened such a meeting for participants in the Moss Morran inquiry
in Dunfermline Town Hall on the 3rd June. The objective of the
meeting was informally to set an agenda for the public inquiry, and
record the names of those who would be either exercising their right
to speak, and in the case of third party interests, those who wished
to request the inquiry's discretion to be allowed to speak. The
meeting was not however arranged to create a feeling of informality.
The hall was arranged in a formal court-room way. Each grouping or
interest was given instructions on its allotted area within the hall*,
the spatial allocation of the pre-inquiry meeting was to be the
arrangement that would be retained for the public inquiry itself.
The Reporter used the pre-inquiry meeting to assert his authority
and indicate the nature and purpose of the public inquiry; he
stressed that it was not as formal as a court of law, yet he
asserted his intention to oversee an efficient and speedy inquiry.
Its objective was to provide the Secretary of State with informed
evidence about the applicant's proposals. An important factor
relating to the nature of the inquiry procedure was significantly
established at that early meeting. Mr. Bell stated that it was
customary for the applicants (Shell/Esso) to state their case first
and thereafter the various parties would cross-examine the oil
companies' specialist witnesses before calling their own witnesses
in support of their case. So following this procedure, Shell and
Esso would commence their case, followed by sympathetic organisations
such as the Forth Ports Authority and the local authorities and the
objectors would present their case and witnesses last. Independent
witnesses such as the Cremer and Warner consultants and the Health
and Safety Executive were to be called at the convenience and
discretion of the inquiry. Evidence was therefore to be presented
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around specialised knowledge and experts. This format was presented
by the Reporter as the only conceivable way of proceeding. Yet when I
questioned Mr. Bell at a later date he admitted that there was no
necessity to structure the public inquiry in this fashion. He said
that it would have been possible to structure the proceedings around
major issues. This would have had the advantage of allowing a more
open discursive process to evolve and would have avoided the common
difficulty found at many public inquiries of cross-examiners missing
questions or points with one witness and finding a general unwillingness
or refusal by the Reporter to recall the witness at a later stage to
answer questions that might not have emerged at an early stage. Mr.
Bell's attitude was that he would have considered structuring the Moss
Morran inquiry around issues rather than expert witnesses if any of
the parties had requested it. This, however, obscures the real issue.
Parties at the pre-inquiry meeting were not informed that the procedure
of the inquiry could be organised around issues and Mr. Bell presented
his suggestions about inquiry procedure by stressing that "it is
customary to allow the applicants to proceed with their case first."
It is also fairly obvious that the time and cost factor is paramount
in the Reporter's mind when conducting a major controversial hearing.
The objective was obviously to expedite matters and with as
little cost as possible. So organising proceedings around experts
meant that there was a controllable process of cross-examinations which
would more likely commend itself to the inquiry Reporters' Office and
the Scottish Office than the radical innovation of organising evidence
around issues. The advantage of a legal type of format for inquiry
Reporters lies in the criteria that can be adopted to legitimate
interventions; the form and content of a question is far more easily
controlled than perhaps the uncertain and possibly damaging
interruption to a flow of argument and debate. If debate is organised
around issues then the criteria for the Reporter's interventions and
control over the debate is less clear. The simple guidelines employed
by Reporters, that cross-examiners should not give evidence and should
restrict their questions to the remit of the technical expert, can be
very inhibiting for an open public discussion. However it provides
easily identifiable criteria and a legitimate excuse for a Reporter's
intervention should the official parameters be over-stepped.
- 176 -
Having agreed the format of the inquiry without any initial controversy,
the Reporter set out the limits of his own tolerance. He warned
against repetition of evidence (what is or is not considered to be
repitition is solely judged by the Reporter) and repetitious cross-
examination. He was particularly concerned that prolonged and
"unnecessary" questioning of witnesses might lengthen the public
inquiry unduly. The Reporter then interpreted his job as being strict
when necessary and to prevent time wasting taking place. He would, he
added, be concerned to conduct an inquiry that 'addressed itself to
the remit given to him by the Secretary of State1. This, of course,
excluded many issues that were to be of concern to the objectors.
The oil companies were represented by top barristers. Shell were
represented by the then Dean of Faculty and current Lord Advocate for
Scotland, Lord Mackay. He indicated the witnesses Shell intended to
call (9 witnesses; 2 were also to be assigned to Esso). Esso,
represented by Mr. I. Ki rkwood Q..C., announced they would be presenting
7 witnesses in addition to Shell and 2 of them would also give evidence
for Shell. The information was then given by the oil companies that
they planned to take 16 days to complete their evidence. The Reporter
was disconcerted by this information, given that he had hoped the whole
inquiry would be completed in just over three weeks. By the time
proceedings had come round to the objectors tension had discernibly
crept into affairs. The atmosphere of the meeting was highly formal.
It was obviously constructed to suit the lawyers and many lay objectors
were visibly intimidated by the process. The objectors had experienced
a series of failures in their attempts to widen the basis of the public
inquiry. They had received repeated refusals to hold a PIC and the one
concession given to them, a fortnight's postponement, seemed to many of
them to have exacerbated their difficulties by pushing the inquiry into
the middle of the school summer holidays - a point that many objectors
with family responsibilities and holiday plans felt to be particularly
devious of the Secretary of State. The final blow came to them, of
course, when the oil companies announced their proposed plan of
presentation.
The Action Group were angered by what they believed was the oil
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Companies' apparent contempt for the objectors and again requested that
the public inquiry should be postponed. They requested a two months
delay to prepare a case in response to the vast case being organised
by the oil companies. This was immediately refused by the Reporter,
who announced a willingness to sit continually into mid August if
an end to the inquiry was in sight. He stated that he could not
in any case give consideration to a postponement until the public
inquiry had commenced. Dr. Edmunds, representing the Conversation
Society, angrily interrupted, claiming that sitting into August
"already found in favour of the oil comapnies because there was a
disproportionate amount of time to be devoted to their evidence.
(2)This public inquiry has already decided the issue. it is a farce."
The Action Group pursued their criticism of the inquiry format by pointing
out the increased burden that would be placed on objectors in terms
of the cost of hiring legal counsel and arranging leave from work.
The Reporter was prompted to remark that the oil companies were indeed
"indulging in overkill." He requested them to reconsider the
timing of their case. However, he was not able directly to instruct
them to shorten their presentation and would have been unable
effecitvely to control the number of technical experts to take the
stand. Ironically the main burden of his remedy was aimed, not at the
oil companies, but rather at the objectors and their cross-examinations.
The Reporter stressed that the only way the objectors could realistically
hope to shorten the proceedings was to;
"....contain your questions to relevant issues and
avoid time wasting repetition. It has been my
experience at other inquiries that it is the
objectors and not the applicants who are the main
culprits for prolonging matters unnecessarily."
So two important forms of constraint were at work on the objectors.
First the administrators were intent on keeping down the length of
the inquiry as far as possible and the Reporter would be seeking ways
to realise that objective, and second the oil companies' presentation
"overkill" had the effect (whether intended or unintended can only be
speculation) of constraining the objectors' cross-examinations because
of the limited time and money available to objecting parties to pay
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for legal assistance and advice.
A sense of the strong classification and framing of knowledge and
information was evident at this early meeting. The sense of injustice
felt by objectors prior to the public inquiry was increased by the
events of the pre-inquiry meeting. The objective of a meeting to set
an agreed agenda and timetable for the inquiry in an informal and
cooperative environment therefore ended with bitterness and distrust.
Indeed the last words of the pre-inquiry meeting, and those which were
to set the scene for the public hearing to come, were uttered by the
Joint Action Group Chairman, DikMehta:
"I hope, Mr. Bell, that this inquiry will be completed within
four weeks. I am convinced, after listening to the exchanges
at this meeting, that the objectors' requests for a planning
commission were correct. It is the firm opinion of the
Dalgety Bay and Aberdour people that a 'Commission' is a far
more appropriate instrument for dealing with this highly
complex technological project than the inquiry procedure we
have been discussing here today. The applicants are proposing
a hazardous industrial process and a local public inquiry,
which is already turning into a farce, is most unsuitable.
Unless the oil companies' evidence is reduced in proportion to
the time allocated for objectors to give their evidence, then
I am permitted to inform you that the Joint Action Group will
have to consider withdrawing from the public inquiry altogether."
After assurances from the Reporter that their case would be given a
"sympathetic and fair treatment" the meeting was adjourned with the
objectors totally unconvinced.
The most basic insecurity felt by objectors was the belief that no
matter what transpired in the public inquiry, the ultimate decision
would not flow from the proceedings. Even if the objectors were to
win the public inquiry they were well aware that the Secretary of
State could over-rule that decision. Many members of the Action Group
expressed views that can only be described as extremely pessimistic




On the opening day of the inquiry there were to be demonstrations
outside the Town Hall. The objective was to gain as much publicity
for the Action Group as possible and convey the public image of a
highly organised and vociferous opposition movement. It was believed
that such a display would act as a warning to the officials and oil
company personnel that the objectors were not prepared to be
intimidated. In actual fact the demonstration was relatively small.
It consisted of mainly women and children, no more than 30 in number,
waving home-made banners and posing for press photographers. There
was no attempt to extend the demonstration into the Town Hall to
disrupt the inquiry proceedings. After half an hour most demonstrators
dispersed and only a small number remained quietly at the back of the
Hall to listen attentively to the first morning's proceedings. It was
clear from the outset that the inquiry hearing would be conducted in
a quiet and uncontroversia 1 way.
Shell commenced their evidence by presenting their UK Managing Director.
The objective was to provide witnesses who would speak to general
policy matters and then move to the finer technological detail with
later witnesses. Having spent some time going through' his precognition
and trying to assert the view that Shell was a 'moral company',
William Bell, Shell's Managing Director, was then cross-examined by
Joint Action Group Chairman, Roger Harris, who was particularly keen
to establish in public the flawed nature of the local public inquiry
system at the outset of proceedings.
Harris - You may not be aware that there is a widespread public
feeling that what we might be going through here is in
fact just a rubber stamping charade, in that you have
some prior agreement with the Government. Would you
confirm that that isn't in fact the case?
Mr. Bell - I can assure you from this side there is no suggestion
of a charade and I can only assure you that there is no
prior agreement with Government at all.
>
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Harris In that case can I ask whether Shell/Esso will be
prepared to stand by the results of this public inquiry,
whatever the Secretary of State might have to say about
it following the public inquiry?
Bel 1 I think the answer has to be yes. But on the other hand,
1 am not familiar or sure whether there is any further
process that one goes through.
Harris Can we accept your answer "yes"?
Bel 1 Can you give me an example?
Harris There is a very clear case. If this public inquiry finds
in favour of the objectors, are Shell/Esso prepared to
accept the findings of the public inquiry, because this
hasn't been the case in the past?
Reporter - I think the question Is aimed at the distinction between
my making a recommendation that I oppose the application,
but the Secretary of State differs.
This predictable statement from Bell, and the exchange initiated by
Harris, is in one sense insignificant. It could have been anticipated
and reveals nothing of real interest, it might be argued. However
it quite clearly demonstrates the not Insignificant fact that the
public inquiry, of itself, was not regarded as having any morally
binding force on interested parties to adhere to its findings, yet
those parties were still prepared to continue with their participation.
Administrative and economic expediency wi11 always be used by maior
applicants as reason enough to go ahead with their project regardless
of whether it can be justified in the court of public debate. It
is because of this that the proceedings are, it could be argued,
ritualistic to the extent that this major contradiction is obscured




by the trappings of the formal processes of the inquiry. However,
our conception of 'ritual' must be understood here in the context of
the tension between power and participation characterising the
local public inquiry system. The notion of ritual in the anthro¬
pological literature can have connotations of overly integrated social
practices and behaviour which does not fit well with the conceptual
vocabulary I am employing of a contradiction between 'formal' and
'common-sense' views of justice. The important question is how can
a public inquiry appear to be a "rubber stamping charade" to objectors
and yet also act to integrate their thoughts, feelings, and behaviour
enough to passively participate in the proceedings? I have already
indicated that objectors participating in the Highland inquiries were
not particularly discontented. Steven Lukes conception of 'political
ritual' can assist here. He defines ritual in the following way as:
"rule-governed activity of a symbolic character which draws
the attention of its participants to obiects of thouqht and
feelinq which they hold to be of special significance
political ritual should be seen as reinforcing, recreating
and organising representations collectives that the
symbolism of political ritual represents, inter alia, particular
models or political paradigms of society and how it functions.
In this sense, such ritual plays....a cognitive role, rendering
intelligible society and social relationships, serving to
organise people's knowledge of the past and present and their
capacity to imagine the future It helps to define as
authoritative certain ways of seeing society....it deflects
their attention from other forms since every way of seeing is
a way of not seeing. I suggest that we should go beyond the
somewhat simplistic idea of political ritual expressing-
producing-constituting value integration...and instead take
up the fertile idea that ritual has a cognitive dimension....
within a class-structured, conflictual and pluralistic model
of society." (A)
Lukes is concerned that rituals be understood as ways of exercising
power "along the cognitive dimension". A whole series of questions
are posed by him about who prescribes the rules, specifies the
objects of thought and holds the rituals in special significance.
Lukes argues that the 'concept of political ritual' can be applied
to many institutions not normally thought of as being rituals, and
interestingly he states: "Most obvious of these are the elaborate
and public forms of judicial and quas i - jud i c i a 1 activity. He
goes on to talk more specifically about the law rather than the
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"public forms of quasi-judicial activity" that interest me. Murray
Edelman however has written specifically on the ritualistic in
administrative practices (in his case business regulation). The
regulation of business by state administrators is often justified
under the values of public interest, fairness, and the protection of
rights which sustain "an impression that induces acquiescence of the
public in the face of private tactics that might otherwise be expected
to produce resentment, protest and resistance.The dialectical
tension arises because 'participation' is used to enforce rights
which ordinary people believe are their possession to control decisions
which affect their lives, yet that very participation is often used as
a means to passify, incorporate and generally exercise 'power' by
shaping the way people come to see and make sense of the administrative
process.
What is crucial is that we are talking about perceptions,
not actual institutional mechanisms chat prevent injustices or the
the like taking place. Harris's charge ot 'charade' was predicated on
his perception of the symbolically flawed nature of the public inquiry
system. Yet it did not appear to be sufficient in itself to encourage
the objectors to abandon their participation in the 'ritual' or seek
to destroy it by disruption. "Pne interesting question, therefore,
that emerged from that early exchange was what factors pertaining to
the public inquiry system encourage objectors to continue their
participation even though they have concluded that it is unfair,
fraudulent, or in their own words, "a charade"?
What became clear from subsequent lines of questioning by the objectors
was that they did actually participate fully in the inquiry. They
sought to put as much pressure as possible on the witnesses and to
argue their case fully with due deference to the Reporter and his
procedural instructions. It is my view that there are definite stages
of disenchantment with the public inquiry which must take place
sequentially. Harris's exchange took place before any serious attempt
was made to fight the inquiry. In short, the cognitive must always
have a firm material or institutional location. Participants in public
inquiries must actually experience the futility and failure of their
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ritualistic participation before the conditions for a negative
reaction are created. There will obviously be a tension between what
appears to them (in the public inquiry case an apparently open, fair
and impartial quasi-judicial setting controlled by an apparent
impartial adjudicator assisted by 'experts' and lawyers) and what they
intuitively feel. (This is a charade, the decision has already been
made.} The connection between these two dimensions of perception, and
the thing that resolves the tension between them, is experiencef^It
is therefore a journey through these stages of disenchantment that
must first be travelled before final verdicts on the inquiry system
are made by participants. Those verdicts must be based on the
individual experiences of the classification and framing of knowledge
as it affects particular contributions of evidence and cross-examination.
The inexorable force of an inquiry system that insists on strong
classification and framing of knowledge therefore can have two
consequences for objectors opposing a large company. First, they can
experience a growing feeling of inadequacy as they struggle to handle
the increasingly complex technological detail. They may attribute
blame to themselves because they accept the terrain of technical debate
to fight on unquestioningly and sense that they are inadequate to
compete whi1e the inquiry is fair. Second, they can feel
disenchantment with the system because it excludes systematically
issues that they wish to pursue and so a sense of the
'inauthenticity' of the system grows as the stages of disenchantment
grow. Both experiences were found among the Joint Action Group in
Fife. So political ritual is ultimately rooted in the
classification and framing of public inquiry knowledge. The concept
of power that lies behind the col 1ection code of narrow technical remit
and strong classification and framing stifles the opportunity of lay
objectors to reality test their understanding of what is significant
and what they think should be of central concern to the public inquiry.
At that point a contradiction between formal and 'common sense'
conceptions of justice surfaces, destroying the 'taken for grantedness'
of the inquiry process, and exposing a contradiction between the
ritualistic and symbolic in the public inquiry and its actual procedural
mechanisms. The public inquiry as a symbolic structure and as an
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institutional mechanism are experienced as disconnected. A process
of disenchantment rather than a process of social integration can
be expected to follow. (ft)
Several examples may be cited to demonstrate the 'disenchantment' with
the public inquiry in the evidence process, First, there
were several attempts- made by the objectors to broaden the
discussion by questioning the oil company techical witness
about the underlying moral and qualitative factors involved
in the project. In the first example the oil company
witness doggedly refuses to participate in an exchange which lay
beyond his remit. Harris for the objectors pursued a line of
questioning around the theme of 'conscience'. He had already forced
the Shell Expro Managing Director to admit that they were intent on
adhering only to a political decision from the Secretary of State
and were not, of course, prepared to be bound by the Reporter's
decision alone. Harris perceived his task as pursuing his 'debunking 1
role further by pressing Dr. Jack Taylor, the Shell General Projects
Manager, on the subject of an employee's conscience. What would his
career chances be if he were to reveal a moral aversion to Shell's
plans?
Harris - Can you tell me what would be the situation if you, as
an individual felt it against your conscience by carrying
this through to complete the destruction of the Forth
Estuary, if that was your view as a matter of conscience,
what would your position be if you put forward that
view publicly?
Taylor's initial reaction to such a question was to look for cues
from both his company's lawyers and the Reporter as to how, or if,
he should respond to such a question. After a long hesitation
he requested a clarification of the question.
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Harris - If one of your staff got up at an inquiry and made it
clear that it was against his conscience to carry this
development through, what would be your attitude as his
employer towards him?
Taylor - I would be astounded to begin with because I would find
it very difficult for an employee, who is familiar with
all the facts involved, to arrive at that conclusion.
Harris - You don't think that would affect his position in the
company or his future promotion prospects?
Taylor - No, it is not the job that I am asking him to do. If he
performs in his job that is fine.
Harris - You wouldn't consider he wasn't performing in his job
if at this inquiry he said that he thought that this
development was wrong?
Taylor - It is a hypothetical case I find difficult to envisage;
but if that occurred, no. (9)
The form in which Harris pursued this line of questioning demonstrates
a lack of commitment to its purpose. It was either extremely naive
or extremely inept. Taylor did not have any difficulty deflecting the
attempt to disarm him and he required no assistance from the Reporter.
It was an important line of questioning however, and should have been
pursued far more extensively. The real issue was whether the Shell
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company could publicly justify their project in relation to the competing
non-technical values that were challenging them. To avoid an
exchange on such matters does not legitimise the oil company's purely
technical orientation but merely highlights the narrow discourse
sponsored by the inquiry. The Reporter, by failing to request a
consideration of such matters, was consistently seeking to move
proceedings along towards matters that directly related to the
remit. To argue that "matters of conscience" are not relevant in a
major public inquiry, as many people at the inquiry privately stated
and the Reporter implicitly acknowledged, is an argument that points
up the inadequacy of the system and the dilemma of a decision-making
process which seeks to depoliticise debate. The reai issue is
not whether it was realistic for Harris to expect a genuine response
and exchange with Dr. Taylor on such qualitative matters, but
rather that such a line of enquiry should seem so out of place,
preposterous or naive in the first place at such a major inquiry.
Why should wider social and moral themes be excluded? It could be
objected that it was the way in which the topic was raised that was
the problem. Non-technical issues require a more subtle inclusion
into the debate, and Harris did not pursue his line of questioning
with any skill. However, it is quite clear that no justification
beyond the technological soundness of the project was considered
relevant by the Secretary of State's terms of reference. The questions
of wider social and moral significance were treated as an unexamined premise
upon which the Secretary of State was to make decisions of a purely
technological nature. The remit provides for a technological
exchange of evidence only. The oil companies' 'moral position'
which had frequently been extolled at the Moss Morran Inquiry
was left unchallenged and unspecified. Indeed their own statements
prior to the inquiry, and contained in their precognitions, were
aimed towards assuring the public that Shell and Esso were an
Internationally known and reputable company that adopted a 'moral
position' with regard to the communities that host their plants.
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However the purpose behind their rhetoric became questionable
whenever they failed to explain more fully the implications of the
issues that they themselves introduced into the controversy. It
appeared that, 'non-technical concepts' were to be accepted without
question. A prime example of this was found in Mr. Bell's (Shell
Managing Director) precognition. He talked about the "responsibility"
that Shell accepted to act with "fairness" and even "generosity" towards
local people who might be disturbed by the development. Bell talked
in terms of Shell's willingness to give 'unreserved guarantees' to
local people. However when questioned about this in the inquiry there
was little information revealed about what exactly the status of these
'guarantees' was.
Mehta (Objector) - Can we take this as a guarantee by Shell that they
will purchase all houses in the Dalgety Bay and
Aberdour area where the owners of the houses can be
shown to have justifiable grounds of complaint, and
that you will do so at the full market value of the
properties disregarding the nuisance that you may be
causing and the effect on house prices that may
have resulted?
Mr. Bell (Shell) - No, what you can take is that we will give a full
and fair investigation and we will then have to find
out just how justified the complaint is and what the
various remedies might be, but I certainly do not go
so far as to say that irrespective of the outcome of
the machinery by which this complaint might be
investigated that we will give the full purchase
guarantee at market value.
Mehta - If, having established that a complaint was
justifiable, would you then be prepared to purchase
at market price? ^
After some hesitation, Bell declined "to give such an undertaking in
a public inquiry". His precognition also stated Shell's willingness
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to "anticipate" complaints but he was unable to elaborate on what
this might mean. I assume that this was a code word for communicating
that the design of the plant would be such that complaints might be
unnecessary or would not arise. Shell were using rhetoric
without first anticipating a need to clarify what it should mean to
objecting parties. The Reporter again failed to request Shell to
provide a more detailed statement about the guarantees they were
offering. Such 'negotiable' matters were not to be discussed at the
public inquiry. They were matters that were to be discussed between
the local authorities and the oil companies at some future date. This
much was made explicit by the Reporter. The fact which remained was
that the public inquiry was constituted for the purpose of examining
the technical and spatial matters relating to planning not its social
political and normative aspects. But if such matters were not to be
subject to public scrutiny and debate at a public inquiry then it
would be highly unlikely that they would be openly discussed anywhere
in the future. Without subjecting such matters to the public inquiry's
scrutiny, and the Secretary of State's consideration, it is unlikely
that Shell and Esso would ever have to detail what they actually meant
by 'guarantees' in such a way that they might act as a constraint on
their future action. The issue of such unspecified 'guarantees' and
checks on development was to arise again.
No clearer example serves to illustrate the narrowness of the evidence
process than the exchange between the Action Group advocate (Booker-
Mi lburn) and Den Hartog of Shell. it points up more clearly than the
example of Harris's cross-examination on the 'conscience' theme the
refusal of 'expert' witnesses to move beyond their technical remit into
the potentially hazardous area of 'moral' issues.
Den Hartog hesitated, and the discomfort of having to place the
technical issues alongside the non-technica1 led him to seek guidance
from his colleagues and his advocate. Booker-Mi 1 burn intervened -
"I would not have thought you would have needed to wait to answer that?"
Booker-Mi 1 burn - Which comes first, money or human life?
- 189 -
Den Hartog - 1 should say what comes first is quality of human
life. duality of human life, which may mean in
certain cases that a certain amount of risk has to
be accepted by the community to be prospering. And
I think if we were not there doing anything our
country, the countries we live in, this world we
live in, would not" have the same quality of life
as we have now.
Booker-Mi 1 burn - Well, I appreciate that if I get into my car to drive
the benefit I get is that I get here in comfort
quickly, but if I set up my house in Aberdour, and
along comes Shell and sets up a petro-chemica1
complex, I didn't ask for it, I don't want it, it is
of no benefit to me, is that not a justifiable way
of 1ooking at it?
Den Hartog - May I refuse, Mr. Reporter, to answer this sort of
question? I thought my terms of reference here were
as a technical man.
Reporter - I think you have been very forthcoming in your answers
a 1 ready.
I think you have got more co-operation out of this
witness than perhaps you expected. (The last remark
was aimed at Booker-Mi1burn). (12)
There was obviously little mileage in pursuing such themes with the oil
witnesses. The Reporter also showed an unwillingness to direct the
discussion towards a serious consideration of such qualitative, even if
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somewhat ambiguous matters as "quality of life". The possibility
of developing this line of questioning as part of a wider examination
of the oil companies' international performance was never tried, The
only attempt seriously to explore the relative weighting between
technical, economic, social and environmental factors in a major inquiry
had been the use of cost benefit analysis by the Roskill Commission
into the third London Airport. Such a method, with all its inadequacies,
was never seriously countenanced at the Moss Morran inquiry. The
solution there was far more simple: ignore the issue completely and
concentrate on describing the technology to be used in the petro¬
chemical complex!
However, there was a category of witness supporting the Shel1/Esso
projects that could be challenged far more effectively (at least for
public consumption within the inquiry) that was the non-employee
witness. Three witnesses speaking in favour of the project came in
for particular attack by objectors: the landscape architect, the
planning consultant who picked the site, and the Convenor of Fife
Regional Council. The remits of these witnesses seemed to be
firmly located beyond the technical sphere and, due to their exaggerated
respect for the technical domain of debate, many members of the Action
Group singled those witnesses out for particular attention. Of
particular note was the challenge made against Robert Steedman, a
partner in a prestigious firm of architects. Among the awards his
firm had received was a premier award in the Business and Industry Awards
of European Heritage Year for landscaping the B.P. tank farm at
Dalmeny on the opposite side of the Forth.
The advocate representing Shell led Steedman's evidence by prefacing
his questions with a list of accolades conferred on Steedman for
his work. Quoting the assessor's remarks about his work at Dalmeny:
"The assessor stated that the siting, the concealment
of the plant by brilliant landscaping, the burying
of the pipelines to the tanker terminal, and the
extreme care taken over safety and prevention of
pollution are worthy of the highest praise." /"j?\
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Cross-examining for the Action Group, Robert Carnduff fastened on to
the theme of the distinction between the architects achievements and
the subsequent condition of his sites under-production conditions*
Referring to the Dalmeny site, Carnduff enquired:
Carnduff Have you looked at this recently?
Steedman Not in the last year.
Carnduff So, in fact, your knowledge of Dalmeny is
largely based on the original scheme of things
and not on the present state of affairs?
Steedman I drive past it regularly too.
Carnduff On the motorway?
Steedman Yes,
Carnduff Are you aware of the land slips taking place on
the southern face at the present moment?
Steedman No.
Carnduff Are you aware of the extent of grass cover at
the plant at the present moment?
Steedman Yes, that is sheep, a lot of it (hesitatingly)
Here, Steedman conceded that B*P* were using sheep as a way of keeping
the grass down: this was a practice of course that was not supposed to
happen according to the original plans*
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Carnduff And as you observed the problem with the trees
also seems to be the sheep. Did the trees
form an important part of the scheme?
Steedman We wanted trees, yes, 5,000
Carnduff How many are there with leaves on them today?
Steedman have not counted them.
Carnduff I counted them this morning and there are
none - this may not be within your control,
but it is within the control of the operators
of the plant and it would appear they deem
sheep to be a more satisfactory method of
keeping the grass down than any other method.
I wonder if you know how Shell and Esso intend
to cut the grass within their areas where
you are proposing tree planting?
Carnduff went on to point out that deciduous trees had been planted at
Dalmeny meaning, of course, that they afforded no cover for the tank
site during the winter. Steedman had not considered this matter in
relation to Braefoot Bay. More pointedly Carnduff pressed Steedman
on his own report, specifically his failure to establish how his plans
would fit in with Shell/Esso's production,
Steedman 1 never thought of production, 1 wrote that




I am sure that Shell/Esso have very much in mind,
that if there is a conflict between production
and visual aspect, production must hold
sway. Is that not likely?
! should think that it is likely.
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The whole issue was then raised that landscape conditions were
legally complied with by BP at the planning stage but subsequently
ignored at the production stage, Steedman had also conceded that
some visual aspects of landscaping may be subordinated to production
exigencies at Braefoot Bay. Steedman could only counter that "many
issues have yet to be considered". He could not answer the question
on how he could ensure his landscaping conditions were not violated
when the Braefoot Bay terminal was operational.
Carnduff - It seems there are an awful lot of points which
have not been considered and yet you are being
asked, Sir, (Reporter) to form an opinion on a
scheme which seems to include most of its points
not fully considered and this bothers me a great
deal because I can't argue at any later time than
now.
Harris took over the cross-examination of Steedman and pursued, yet
again, his concern that all decisions be made with a 'clear conscience'.
Steedman's hesitation in answering Harris on "matters of conscience"
was due to what he admitted was "uncertainty about philosophical
questions". The final dethronement of Steedman came when he admitted,
that as the landscape architect for the project, he was "unsure of the
zoning status of the land surrounding Braefoot Bay".
Harris - Well, as a member of the general public that
would not give me a great deal of confidence in
your firm, if, going to a major project of
national importance like this, you hadn't taken
the trouble to find out what the official
zoning of land was.
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The cross-examination had succeeded in penetrating beneath the rhetoric
of Steedman's awards and status to reveal the reality that land¬
scaping is hardly an adequate counter to the realities of petro¬
chemical production. The conditions controlling the visual aspect of
major industrial plants are invariably violated under production
conditions. Further crucial areas of knowledge were unconsidered by
the oil companies and the specialist architect did not indicate a
grasp of basic knowledge about the site which would have inspired at
least a modicum of confidence in his abilities in the eyes of the
objectors.
The evidence and cross-examination of Professor Alexander Mclndoe,
the planner who selected the site, provided a second opportunity for
objectors to express scepticism about 'expertise'. Mclndoe had been
involved in many of the major inquiries, first representing the
developers and then representing the objectors. He had spoken in
favour of Chicago Bridge's project at Dunnet Bay yet had supported
the objectors at Drumbuie. He was a particular target for the
objectors because it was felt that planning and the selection of sites
was an area where technical expertise can be more readily challenged
owing to the subjective factors that must inevitably be incorporated
within the choices planners make. Mclndoe had also turned down the
Action Group preferring to support Shell/Esso. This factor in itself
did not endear him to the objectors.
Early in his evidence Mclndoe issued a challenge to the objectors:
"If anyone can tell me where they think an alternative site might be,
I will tell them why I would reject it in advising my clients". ^
Mclndoe was determined to establish his 'expertise' on all matters
relevant to site selection. A particular theme running through his
remarks was a distinction between the professional 'expert' and the
public. This first emerged when questioned on his view on the adequacy
of the public inquiry instrument, specifically on its efficacy for
revealing the detailed merits and demerits of alternative sites.
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Mclndoe stated quite categorically that the inquiry system was
adequate but with respect to alternative sites that was an area of
specialist knowledge best handled by "professionals". Mr. Young,
the solicitor representing Donibristle Investments, questioned
Mclndoe further.
Young - Do you think in the circumstances that we have here,
that the objectors to Shell's proposals at Braefoot Bay
can provide an adequate test?
Mclndoe - You are putting the question, you are criticising, let me
say this in an absolutely serious way. The objectors
sought to retain me and had they been successful in doing-
so the case might have been better presented. You have
got to have a lot of highly specialised knowledge and
experience for this. I think the objectors have done
very well, I have listened with great interest over the
last ten days. (16)
The patronising remark at the end of Mclndoe's statement serves only
to emphasise his belief in his own 'professionalism' and 'expertise'
and the implicit rejection of laymen who would be presumptious enough
to challenge it. He was further questioned on the Edinburgh Airport
inquiry as part of a general question on public inquiries. That
inquiry cost objectors vast sums of money to no avail. Mclndoe used
this topic to point up his view that professional knowledge can be
crucia1 .
Mclndoe - There was never a case against Turnhouse. I was asked to
appear on both sides and I refused because there was never
a case against it. Some people have said if you can't win
Turnhouse you won't win anything, but objectors have won
half a dozen of the really major onshore projects, they
won Drumbuie, Portkill and won the Cromarty inquiries.(17)
The import of his remarks was that the 'expert' can determine the
feasibility of a project, and hence its likely success or failure in
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a public inquiry before opposition is embarked upon. By implication
the Edinburgh Airport objectors wasted their money. By implication
so too were the Dalgety Bay and Aberdour Action Group, because
"there was no alternative site" according to Mclndoe. He had been
remarkably successful in picking the right side to be on in most of
the major inquiries which only underlined his arrogant and aggressive
stance aimed towards 'de-authorising' or 'de-1 egitimating' the
objectors on these planning matters. Mclndoe fully embraced a belief
in 'professional expertise' in a way that none of the oil company
employees had done. When Mr. Jamieson of the Joint Action Group
finally challenged Mclndoe's 'professionalism' then the tension I
earlier remarked upon, a de-legitimation tension, clearly revealed
itself.
Mr. Jamieson was a particularly sceptical member of the Action Group
and he in particular had been concerned to question the oil company
'experts' from a position of what I can best describe as 'naive
enquiry'. Jamieson adopted a rather facetious stance when questioning
witnesses. He appeared on the one hand to be recognising their status
but on the other explicitly seeking to question that status by asking
(im)pertinent questions which he described as "the kind of question
the ordinary man in the street would wish to put". Jamieson's cross-
examination of Mcindoe clearly demonstrated a clash between his lay
common-sense and the taken for grantedness of Mclndoe's professional
status.
Throughout the inquiry the assumption that the Moss Morran/Braefoot
Bay sites had been chosen because they were surveyed as the best
possible choice had gone unquestioned. However, Jamieson wanted to
know what actually constituted a 'proper thorough survey'. He
wanted to know what was meant by that phrase and whether the
alternative sites suggested by the Action Group and others at Both
Kennar (near Grangemouth), Kinneil Kerse, East and West Weymss,
Hunterston, the Cromarty Firth and the two alternative sites near to
Braefoot Bay, Trinlaymire and St. David's Bay, had all been given the
same 'thorough survey' as that given to Moss Morran, and Braefoot Bay.
Mclndoe became irritated when Jamieson continued to press him on this
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issue. Jamieson eventually established that Mclndoe chose the Fife
sites, not on the basis of thoroughly surveying a number of possible
sites, but by fitting together the oil companies' site requirements
with Scottish Development Department costal planning guidelines.
The Braefoot Bay area fell within the "preferred development zone"
in the SDD guidelines but it was also a site which was designated as
not necessarily available for development. This meant that any
development proposed would not automatically be approved but the
onus was on someone to oppose development and demonstrate that development
would be bad, * It was the kind of area that placed the burden of
argument on others, not the developer. Mclndoe therefore commended
the Moss Morran/&£efoot Bay sites to his oil company clients who
then 'thoroughly surveyed' them. Having surveyed the preferred
sites Mclndoe and the oil companies set about justifiying that
selection by identifying reasons which they could argue ruled out
alternative sites. Once the general arguments were constructed
against alternative sites, then a 'thorough survey' would not be required.
This procedure was considered highly dubious by Mr, Jamieson who kept
questioning Mclndoe on his ability to undertake a 'thorough survey'.
The Reporter, lending assistance to Mclndoe, restated his earlier
challenge that people should identify an alternative site and
Mclndoe would say why he could not recommend it. The Reporter was
anxious to move Jamieson towards a more specific planning issue. He
indicated that he was satisfied with the survey of alternative sites
and was troubled by Jamieson's repetitive stance which the Reporter
concluded was time-wasting.
* See Scottish Development Department 'North Sea Oil and Gas'.
Coastal Planning Guidelines' (The Blue Book) where the distinction
between preferred 'Conservation Zones' and 'Development Zones' is
explained.
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Mr. Jamieson - I wish only to establish whether or not a proper
thorough survey was done of alternative sites.
Mclndoe - I carried out this survey and for the first time in
my life I am hearing the suggestion I don't know how
to carry out a survey comprehensively and properly,
It was clear that as far as the Reporter was concerned the site survey
issue was not to be allowed to continue and Jamieson was eventually
requested to address himself to another set of questions. However,
to many people among the objectors this was clearly a case of the
Reporter restricting discussion of a highly significant issue. From
the Reporter's point of view it was quite clearly not an issue. The
alternative sites all had major obstacles which prevented their
selection and the fact that they had not been surveyed in the
same way as the chosen site was largely beside the point as far as
the Reporter was concerned. He obviously believed their
detracting features rendered such 'thoroughness' redundant. However,
it is questionable whether all of the alternative sites should
have been ruled out. The sites at Cromarty, Bothkennar and
Kinneil Kerse were all acknowledged as possible alternative sites
by the oil companies themselves. Cn)
Adrian Grant representing the Conservation Society began his cross-
examination by critically commenting on Mclndoe's style of giving
evidence in which he made many aside remarks which seemed to have
gone unchallenged by the Reporter and others. Grant was particularly
concerned to draw the Reporter's attention to these asides.
Grant - It is interesting that the asides that you make, and
I hope that the Reporter is very conscious of the asides
that you make which normally go unchallenged.....
For example, you said that it would be adverse to
national energy policy not to have these things
at all. Now as far as I understand it
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we are in the middle of a great debate about energy and we
are about to have a White Paper, so either there is some
covert relationship between yourself and the Minister of
Energy and you have already decided this and debated it,
and it is in itself a public relations exercise, or else
you don't have the right to say that...(20)
Reporter - You are really making a speech rather than putting a
question.
The Reporter's intervention demonstrated the ease with which discussion
and debate is constricted and easily interrupted within the formal
evidence format of presenting and organising information. Grant's
line of enquiry was reformulated for him by the Reporter, "He is
challenging your statement that this accords with energy policy; could
you substantiate it? Your claim that this is in accordance with the
(21)Government policy on energy." The reformulated question allowed
Mcindoe to defend his statement easily by referring to Production R/I
which was a letter to the Reporter from the SDD of the 1.6.77 stating
Government preferred policy with respect to oil and gas. What it
avoided, of course, was the status of the very concept of 'national
energy policy' at a time of general debate in politics and society.
Grant was concerned that the statements included in production R/l
might be treated as a conclusive, sacrosanct and objective statement
of what government policy finally was. The reification of issues in
policy documents obscures their partial and conflictual nature. Grant
however failed to open up discussion on 'national policy1 except to
indicate that there were "significant groups" in society who seriously
challenged the unquestioned assumptions about oil and gas production.
However, it was clear that production R/l was being treated by
Mcindoe as a conclusive statement of government policy and by
implication debate had ceased. The Reporter and the SDD took a
similar view. It is likely that production R/l was used as a yard¬
stick against which the Moss Morran/Braefoot Bay developments would
be measured in terms of policy fulfillment. What was clear at the
inquiry was that production R/l and its contents were not to be
debated. However, it was surely worthy of greater attention than was
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given to it. it was a document whose background assumptions hung
over proceedings but were hardly ever alluded to far less questioned.
Grant never succeeded In drawing out its provisional status and so its
damage was allowed to go unstopped.
Mclndoe was never challenged directly by the Reporter in the course
of giving his evidence. The Reporter was more discernibly irritated
by Grant's beligerent style, particularly on the occasion when he
questioned the 1 factual1 status of Mclndoe's figures about future job
numbers associated with the NGL and ethane developments. The Reporter
again intervened to stop Grant making points and insisted that he
restrict himself to formulating questions. This took place even
though the format according to the Reporter was "not to be as formal
as a court of law". The Reporter seemed curiously unwilling to support
Grant's important theme throughout his cross-examination that many
of the productions and 'facts' were highly speculative and provisional.
To restrict cross-examination at all times to posing questions about
those 'facts' rather than engaging in a debate about their construction
inevitably leads to frustration and anger in the cross-examiner who
constantly fails to get any formal recognition that his or her
perspective has a status worthy of equal recognition to that of the
'expert' witness. The status of evidence should be determined by its
ability to be discursively validated. Only by such a mode of grounding
its worth will evidence be capable of re-assuring objectors. If
objectors are allowed only to present evidence within a predetermined
lowly position on the hierarchy of credibility then their evidence
will, from the start, be considered in a different light to that of
the technical expert. Evidence should be presented in such a way that
debate about its underlying principles and issues should be allowed to
follow. As Habermas suggests, an 'ideal speech situation' requires
the possibility of a "radicalisat ion of the argument". That can only
be achieved by freeing the cross-examiner from the formal constraint
of posing questions only.
There was a general controversy throughout Mclndoe's evidence about
the status and relative worth of 'experts' and 'the public'. This
was highlighted particularly in the cross-examination led by Grant
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who had observed that Mclndoe selectively used 'public opinion1 as a
1 egitimatory concept when seeking to give 'authority' to his general
statements yet 'de-authorised' lay opinions when his 'professionalism'
or 'expertise' had been challenged. Mclndoe, for example, had
referred to some unspecified concept of 'public opinion' when he
argued that the public were in favour of the Moss Morran end of the
project and that many were also in favour of the Braefoot Bay
development on the basis of their perception of its 'undoubted economic
and industrial merits'. The 'public' were being used selectively in
a supportive role for his argument when it suited him yet when it came
down to evaluating the merits of the technical and planning issues,
Mclndoe believed that this was "only for professionals". In reply to
the charge that he played 'expertise' and 'public opinion' off against
each other to suit his particular arguments Mclndoe stated,
"I am sorry, the point I am trying to make is this: there are
397 objections, I think, and there were not many of them with
reference to Moss Morran, and those which were, there is no very
strong objection; this is an objection that is not unnaturally
concentrated, not confined but concentrated, at Braefoot, and
on the experts. What I said was if the experts have the facts,
which the lay public rarely have, if the experts have the facts
then, if they are professional men giving us sound and genuine
opinion, I think on the whole they should carry more weight than
members of the public who don't have the right facts." (22)
It was precisely the question of what constitutes the 'right facts' and
'professional status' that was at issue. The inquiry, through the
intrusionsof the Reporter, failed to recognise the provisional nature
of the 'facts' and indeed the 'expertise'. When Booker-Mi 1 burn asked
Mclndoe, "Who decided whether something is of national economic
importance?" and got the reply, "People with knowledge." then the
difficulties confronting objectors at the Moss Morran hearing were
revealed with great clarity.
The almost total reliance on 'expertise' expressed by Sir George Sharp
(Fife Region Convenor) and Dunfermline Provost Les Wood, representing
the local authorities, underlined the attitude of allowing privileged
status to professional 'expert' knowledge. Sir George Sharp stated
strongly in reply to a charge that the Fife Region, in supporting the
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Shell/Esso project, were clutching at straws, that "the Region is not
clutching at straws, the Region is comprised of responsible elected
members and officials who view objectively any suggestions for
development". Sir George firmly believed that the combination of
Shell/Esso's 'expertise' and the 'wisdom' of the Secretary of State
for Scotland, then Bruce Milan, would ensure the safety of the NGL/
ethane project. Provost Wood, in turn, had deflected questions on the
health risks from carcinogenic agents such as P.V.C. and vinylchlorides
which would inevitably be emitted as a by-product of petrochemical
industry, by expressing a total reliance on both the "technical people"
advising him, and the Cremer and Warner consultants. Both politicians
did not believe there would be any safety problem otherwise their
advisers would 'surely' have informed them. This apparent strategy of
naive faith in 'expertise' was difficult to dislodge by objectors who
could only rely on the perceptiveness of the general audience and
the Reporter to note the weak foundation upon which policy decisions
in Fife about major technology developments seemed to rest.
The objectors had little faith in the competence of the local authority
representatives and one way in which they chose to demonstrate this
lack of competence was over the issue of the land purchase option
agreed between the local authorities and Esso under the Community Land
Act. At the time of the public inquiry Esso had not finally decided
to go ahead with their cracker project and were seeking outline
planning permission in principle only. Sir George Sharp, as Fife
Region Convenor, stated confidently that an option to buy back land
from Esso, at its current use value as agricultural land, was
protected by the Community Land Act 1975 should Esso decide not to
proceed with the Ethane cracker within a four year period. Beside the
fact that Sir George publicly contradicted the general local authority
line that the project would only be viable if both NGL and ethane
cracker were built, he also had failed to acquaint himself with the
exact nature of the agreement entered into by the local authorities;
the option had not been as he presented it to the public Inquiry. Dik
Mehta, a lawyer by training and co-chairman of the Joint Action Group,
had investigated the relevant sections of the Community Land Act 1975
which covered such options. His attempt to de-1 egitimate Sir George
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on this issue was met by some resistance from the Reporter, who
was reluctant to acknowledge Mehta's line of questioning. Mehta
pointed out that the relevant legislation enabling public ownership
of development land under the 1975 Act made it clear that the "price
the local authorities will have to pay to Esso will be the cost to
Esso subject to inflationary indexing or the market value at the time
when the option is exercised, whichever is the lesser. Buying out at
market value of the time must mean the market value as industrial
1 and (my emphasis), but by that time it will have the benefit of
(23)
planning consent for industrial use."
Reporter - I don't know how much further you can take this to help me
Mr. Mehta. It may well be with your professional knowledge
you could have advised the Council better than they have
been advised, but the relevant fact that I draw from this
production (Community Land Act, 1975) is that in the event
of Esso not proceeding with their development, the Regional
Council has the option to acquire the land, and what
bargain, whether they have made a better bargain than they
could have done or a worse bargain is not going to influence
my recommendation to the Secretary of State on what is
before this inquiry the fact that there is machinery
for allowing public ownership of the land should the
development not proceed is relevant, but the actual details
of the bargain, unless the bargain is so very bad that there
is no prospect of any local authority ever implementing it,
apart from that extreme case it would not be relevant. {2k)
Mehta raised again that there was in fact a real issue if the local
authority could only purchase "at the inflated industrial value which,
of course, they will never be in a position to do financially." The
Reporter was not convinced that this was an issue and Mehta was
therefore discouraged from taking the matter further at that point.
Content that he had at least revealed the lack of awareness of the
issue by both Sir George Sharp and the Reporter, he decided to raise
the issue again with the Fife Regional Planners, who Sir George
considered to be the "experts in such matters"; the "experts" he
relied upon.
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When the planners representing the three local authorities took the
stand Mehta again raised the issue., William Taylor, (Fife Regional
Director of Planning) admitted that Mehta was correct and Sir George's
evidence, that the land could be bought at its current agricultural
use value, was wrong. Esso would therefore be able to sell the land
at its full industrial market value, which would include planning
permission. The planners also admitted that it would be highly
unlikely that the local authorities would ever be in the financial
situation to afford to purchase the land and Esso would then be free
to sell the land to whomsoever they chose. The Reporter with some
reluctance allowed Mehta to underline the fact that the land values
issue was a highly significant one. Mehta's view was that the issue
came within the Reporter's statement that the bargain struck in such
land purchase agreements was the interest of the public inquiry because
the "bargain is so very bad that there is no prospect of any local
authority ever implementing it." The attitude of the Reporter to this
issue can be indicated by the reference to it in his summary report;
in section 8.68 the Reporter simply alluded to the fact that William
Taylor, "on advice and information received was satisfied as to the
terms in that regard."
An important issue was avoided. Esso had not presented details of
their Cracker project, and on the basis of very limited information,
outline planning permission would attach to land which could then be
sold to another party at a future date without the detailed factors of
their industrial project being available for public scrutiny in a
public inquiry. Public funds would be unavailable to allow local
authority ownership and control of the land. It Is perhaps arguable
that the land purchase option of itself was insufficient to stop the
project, but it was an issue that required Esso to be more specific
about their proposals and clarify the likelihood of their proceeding
with ethane production in Fife. Only on the basis of further information
could the public, the local authorities, the Reporter and the Secretary
of State know whether the land issue would be important or not. In
fact the world market overproduction of ethane made it look highly
unlikely that the ethane Cracker would ever be built and certainly not
within the four year period envisaged at the inquiry. The issue raised
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by Mehta was therefore highly significant and prematurely curtailed.
Sir George Sharp's reliance on his "experts" did not contribute to his
status within the inquiry. They had revealed that his knowledge was
limited and that he was yet another part of the symbolic structure of
the oil companies' supporting evidence. The favour and assistance
he received from the Reporter did little to appease many objectors who
saw matters from their standpoint as yet another crucial issue being
swept under the inquiry carpet without adequate recognition from the
Reporter,
Dik Mehta concluded his pursuit of the land purchase theme by suggesting
that Esso regardless of their ethane project will likely make a trading
profit if the public inquiry led to outline planning permission:
Mehta Then Esso would be free to sell the land elsewhere (other
than to the local authority) with the benefit of the
planning consent which was granted?
W.Taylor Correct <
Mehta Would this not be the reason why Esso have been so
keen to take up options which they acquired for the
purchaseof the land and not the explanation which
had been given to us before of their earnest intention
to proceed?
W. Taylor - I wouldn't be able to answer that on the basis of my
knowledge. A lot of factors may relate to why Esso
have taken or have not taken up options. It might be
entirely dependent on the time scale for which
Ind i v idua 1 s are prepared to give options.
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Mehta - But they could make trading profits on the operation in
the circumstances I have just described to you?
Taylor - They might, 1 would need to know the details.
Reporter - I don't think I want to know the details, you have conceded
they might. Carry on.
Mehta - The local authority have lost the benefit that the
Community Land Act was designed to afford the Community
in cashing in on the development value of land created by
planning consent. (25)
This was the fundamental issue and one which the Reporter was not keen
to acknowledge.
The Technology Debate
In addition to the 1de-1 egitimation' tensions in the evidence process
and the classification and framing of knowledge around specific non¬
technical themes there was the issue of the technology safety which
contributed greatly to undermining objectors confidence in the
inquiry. Again the issue had to be understood in terms of the
classification and framing of knowledge. The fundamental issue
was one of what would or would not be admitted into the 'credible
technology failure scenario'. What would provide the public inquiry's
model of the likely safety hazards?
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The most prominent issue was related to the potential for an open
flammable cloud of vapour resulting from an escape of refrigerated
liquid hydrocarbon (propane or butane). What was problematic was the
'credibility' of such an event occurring. The objectors acquired the
services of Professor D.J. Rashbash (Professor of Fire Engineering)
and Dr. D. Drysdale, a specialist in hazardous petrochemical fires,
and they argued that an open flammable cloud explosion over Aberdour
or Dalgety Bay was the single most important hazard in relation to the
Shell/Esso project. Further, Rashbash and Drysdale concluded that
such a disaster was highly possible and that Shell/Esso, Cremer and
Warner and the Health and Safety Executive had all dangerously under¬
stated its likelihood. The difficulty revolved around-the refusal by
Shell/Esso and Cremer and Warner to accept the credibility of such an
event happening given their insistence that the design and operation
of the plants would be exemplary. Rashbash's opinion was that the
risk of an open flammable explosion should be reduced to a probability
of occurring less than once in a million years. He criticised both the
oil companies and Cremer and Warner for failing to attempt to quantify
the potential risk.
Discussion in evidence and cross-examination therefore concentrated
largely around the methods of calculation and the assumptions used in
estimating the effects of spills of hydrocarbons and the subsequent
open flammable cloud explosion. There were obviously differences
involved in the calculations made by the respective fire hazard
experts, but little recognition that the academic and highly confusing
technological discussions were crucially dependent upon the variable
of human error. For example, the inquiry spent some considerable
time hearing about the estimated times calculated for a vapour cloud
to travel. While the developers were refusing to accept that this
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event would ever happen, Rashbash and Drysdale seemed to be engaged
in an abstract theoretical exercise in building hazard models.
The Moss Morran inquiry setting, like the Highland inquiries before
it, curiously seemed inappropriate for examining such issues,
ironically, as it had been set up as the central part of its work
and was generally considered by the Reporter to be central to the
issues to be considered. So on the one hand science and technology
rather than other non-technical themes were systematically placed on
a pedestal by the underlying collection code organising the
proceedings, yet the inadequacy of the inquiry format and restricted
terms of its reference reduced this central theme to a bizarre and
highly abstract academic debate between highly specialist experts.
Much of their evidence, which was given a special place in the hearing,
was largely beside the point because the finer details of the effects
of an explosion were not the issue but rather whether such an event
can be adequately prevented. The whole issue was doomed to
frustration by the lack of space and time available in a local public
inquiry to thoroughly explore the quantitative risks of an explosion.
The real risk which emerged from the public inquiry was that there was
no basis for deciding the technology debate other than by the
unacknowledged selection of crude sectarian criteria which were based
on the expedient need for employment and the uncertainty about the
future economic gains from downstream manufacturing developments.
However, such criteria also paradoxically reintroduced unacknowledged
economic and sociological factors as the true basis of the decision¬
making process. The technical experts on fire hazards effectively
confused the basis upon which the issues were actually to be resolved.
The public inquiry could not provide the time to thoroughly investigate
and research the crucial fire hazard issue which at the very least
required a wider scientific and technological constituency to adequately
examine the problems. A public inquiry with one technical assessor
and a host of partisan technical 'experts' was not really adequate.
So the central exchange between the Cremer and Warner consultants and
Rashbash and Drysdale was essentially obfuscatory; there was certainty
that an explosion near or in the Braefoot Bay plant would be lethal and
the likelihood of such an event was effectively incalculable given the
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highly variable human factors that provided the weak link in any
safety system. There could be no decision based on purely scientific
and technological evaluation. The decision inevitably had to be based
on different qualitative criteria whi1e appearing to be based on sound
scientific knowledge and information, due to the technocratic
constitution of the public inquiry. It was precisely this fact that
some objectors perceived. They viewed any risk of an explosion as
reason enough to locate the project away from populated areas. The
fact that the scientific evidence forwarded by the Action Group was
considered sufficient to establish at least the possibility of an
explosion meant any decision in favour of Shell/Esso should only be
firmly based on a wide investigation which eradicated any possibility
of risk. Their concern was again framed in a desire to see a PIC
constituted to examine the issues more widely. The failure of
science to eradicate their fears, coupled with a sense of the public
inquiry's inability to ensure proper consideration of the technical
themes, exacerbated their disenchantment with the local public
inquiry system.
Throughout the inquiry there was a significant disagreement about the
safety of the technology. The oil companies insisted throughout that
there would be no novel technology used in the Moss Morran/Braefoot
Bay project. While conceding that much of the technology was highly
advanced, Shell and Esso insisted that they had a vast experience of
building and operating NGL and Ethane plants. The objectors were
focused on the high number of major petro-chenica1 explosions and
fires around the world and argued throughout that the safety of
Shell/Esso's technology was highly problematic. They relied largely
on the apparent statistical frequency of explosions and could not, as
such, adequately present a detailed technological challenge to the
Shell/Esso experts. So as the objectors were unable to provide such
expertise then the issue of the novelty of the technology tended to
go by default. This was yet another area where the constitution of
the public inquiry around 'expertise' was paradoxically weakened by
the absence of a structured place for a high level critical input from
'expertise' not attached to the applicants' case. If the objectors
at a major public inquiry fail to gather the requisite information and
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'expertise' then a critical technology evaluation simply can not
'inform the minister' who is left with a partial technology evaluation.
Yet another area where the local public inquiry format reveals its
inadequacy occurs precisely when novel technological solutions are
offered. A Conservation Society witness (John Busby who had appeared
at the Dunnet Bay inquiry) with a background in engineering and the
manufacture of chemical products suggested an alternative layout for
the plants to minimise the hazard risk, specifically the proximity
of the flare stack to the plant and the plants to each other. He
suggested a linear layout or at the very least a lazy S. His evidence
was received with much hilarity as it had been at Dunnet Bay and
after hostile questions by the oil companies' lawyers the evidence was
promptly ignored. The Reporter's conclusions made no recognition of
the argument that the technology might be considered novel or that
the plant design might be re-assessed. To give such recognition would
require the oil company experts to give a wide re-assessment to their
designs and working assumptions. The public inquiry forum seemed an
inadequate place to ensure that such a process would take place.
In order to gain an impression of the cumulative impact of the public
inquiry process on the participants, it is necessary to examine the
perceptions of the system as revealed by the main objecting parties
and the oil companies involved in the inquiry.
The Public Inquiry: The Aftermath
Following the completion of the inquiry all the principal participants
were interviewed. The objective was to obtain an understanding of the
varying perspectives on the public inquiry from the main participants,
especially the oil companies and the main objectors.
The Oil Companies' View^^
Jacobs, Shell's public relations man, opened his account by stating
that his company was pleased at the way the public inquiry had gone.
In his view Shell and Esso had won the argument in "an open and
impartial public setting". The oil companies were therefore expecting
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to win the public inquiry. The Reporter, he believed, would find in
Shell/Esso's favour but they fully expected the Secretary of State to
allow their development even if the public inquiry went against them.
Jacobs supported this view in terms of the "soundness of our project
for both the local and national interest". Whether or not more subtle
pressures were being applied can only be matters of speculation. As
far as the oil companies' public relations sections were concerned,
victory would fall to them because of 'reasoned argument'. "That was
their story and they were sticking to it. Jacobs would not accept that
any other constraints or pressures were or could be exerted on the
Reporter or the Government.
The case presented at the public inquiry by Shell/Esso was effectively
organised by their lawyers who set down guidelines about types of
information required, types and statuses of witnesses, and indicated
the kinds of arguments that might impress the Reporter. The structure
and presentation of the case was therefore largely taken out of the
hands of the oil company representatives. The oil companies simply
had to find the appropriate witnesses and information when called for.
It was felt that many of the lines of questioning from the objectors
were both irrelevant and extremely naive. Roger Harris (Joint
Chairman of the Action Group) was particularly mentioned for his
insistence on raising 'moral' issues and implying that the 'experts'
representing the oil companies' case were attending the inquiry under
duress. Harris was considered to be a time-waster. Jacobs indicated
that every man who spoke for the oil companies was convinced about the
integrity of the project. "No pressure has ever been placed upon an
individual in my company who thought a project was impracticable or
dangerous", argued Jacobs. Such differences are ironed out, he said,
at the early stages of planning. If someone remains unconvinced about
a project or lacks full commitment after the internal debates and
conferences have ceased, then, said Jacobs, he is simply moved to
another project. It was obvious that Shell/Esso would not select
witnesses who felt unable to defend their project in public, but he
was evasive about the import of Harris' question which was raising
the underlying tension between commercial pressure and technological
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safety. On the question of 'morality' which had confronted the Shell
witness Den Hartog, Jacobs said he and his colleagues were particularly
annoyed at that line of question. He doubted whether it should have
been tolerated at all.
"The morals of an individual or the morality of an argument are
irrelevant in a public inquiry. We were interested in the
technical issues. There were too many irrelevant questions about
philosophies and morals."
Jacobs pointed to the evidence given by John Busby for the
Conservationist Society regarding a linear or lazy S design layout for
the plant. That was, for the oil companies, an example of the failure
of the objectors adequately to challenge the oil companies'
technological proposals. "I believe John Busby's evidence did more
harm than good for the conservationists' case. He shifted about on
unfirm ground with his arguments which were largely unworkable and
facile", said Jacobs. if Busby is compared with the Shell/Esso
'experts', accord i ng to Jacobs, then the "integrity and knowledge of
our people is clear to see". Jacobs did concede that the Action Group
had performed well and some of their information was impressive. He
conceded that a strong Action Group "kept the oil people on their toes"
but he was satisfied with the public inquiry instrument and deflected
questions about its appropriateness for processing highly complex
technological issues. He was not worried about the planning system
and the fact that, had there not been a well organised Action Group,
their project might have been passed by default. This was not an
issue for him. He believed In the NGL project and assumed that its
virtues were evident, "otherwise the local authorities would not have
supported it". There was therefore no recognition that the form of
institutional mediation in planning was significant and there was a
blind faith expressed about the possibility of local politicians and
planners to perceive the nature, effects and worth of an industrial
development independently of public inquiries. Indeed Jacobs indicated
that public inquiries are perhaps a necessary but troublesome hurdle
for industrialists, and while convinced that the Moss Morran inquiry
was fair and well conducted by the Reporter, he implied that it tended
to "make a principle out of frustration", to use Luhmann's terminology,
by time wasting.
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It was clear from Jacobs1 comments that the oil companies were more
specifically concerned with the Action Group^ and the possibility that
they would engage in various methods external to the inquiry to hinder
the project, than they were with the public inquiry system. The
problem, as Jacobs saw it, lay outside the inquiry process. He was
specifically concerned at the way exogenous factors might impinge
upon the evaluation of their development. For example, following the
start of preliminary tests in Mortimers Deep (tests that Shell/Esso
indicated would take place when giving evidence), Donald Stodart,
acting as both an objector and Chairman of the Regatta Committee,
wrote to Jacobs complaining that the tests would disrupt local sailing
and sent copies of the letter to the Reporter and the local press. He
followed this up by sending a further letter to the Reporter detailing
an incident at the Cowes regatta when a Shell tanker interrupted the
sailing. These incidents were considered to be irritating and not
to be taken particularly seriously. But Jacobs argued that it was
indicative of a situation tantamount to subjudice where objectors
"were trying to influence the Reporter after the public inquiry had
been completed".
There was a very real concern expressed by Jacobs that the planning
system is imprecise at "the margins". The inquiry could be re-opened
at any time and an Inquiry Commission could technically be set up
even after the time and expense incurred fighting a local public
inquiry. This formal uncertainty combined with a vociferous Action
Group intent on manipulating the system and possibly bending the
system to their aims, was the real concern. Jacobs was insistent
that the concern of Shell/Esso was not in terms of any uncertainty on
their part about their project, but rather that the Action Group would
seek to disrupt and slow down the progress of their planning application.
In particular there was concern that "a minority of hot-heads will
resort to damaging plant and machinery and inveigle mothers and babies
to sit down in front of bulldozers". However, Jacobs expressed the
general view that the public inquiry had satisfied local objectors by
allowing them at least the opportunity to express their opinions. This
he believed was only "right and proper", and he continued, "if the
Reporter is over-ruled by the Secretary of State in favour of our scheme
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there will no doubt be an accusation that the decision is 'political1,
however the arguments and issues have been publicly recorded now and
most people who attended the inquiry will know the decision will be
based on the weight of evidence presented by us at the public inquiry".
There was therefore great confidence on Jacobs part that Shell/Esso
had in fact won the technical arguments and that the project did make
economic sense. There was no recognition that between the oil
companies and the Government anxiety to realise a commercial project,
the concerns of the objectors, the local communities and the
environmentalists might be squeezed out, particularly as neither the
deliberations of the inquiry nor the Reporter would be binding on the
Secretary of State.
The Regional Planners' View
I arranged a meeting with Mr. William Taylor, Depute Chief Planner for
Fife Region, and Mr. Peter Sutie, his second in command and number 3
in the overall hierarchy of planners in Fife under Mr. Maurice Taylor.
William Taylor had given evidence at the public inquiry speaking for
the Regional Council. Fife Regional Planners contributed the majority
of the input into the Fife Regional Report and had the main
responsibility over the Shell/Esso project. Our discussion ranged
over the historical background and difficulties surrounding the Moss
Morran site and the planning system in general and the place of the
public inquiry instrument within the planning system in particular.
Taylor stressed the technical nature of their work initially,
emphasising that their main task is to identify land for specific
purposes. For example, since the 1950's the site at Moss Morran had
been regularly considered as an area where industrial development
might take place. Having regard for the drainage, terrain, and
identifying, for example, the potentially high foundation costs for
any building, was the job the planners undertook', whether to build on
that site having regard to these technical matters was an issue for
private industrialists and local and central government politicians.
He recognised that there Is an inevitable political content to planning
matters but he was quite clearly indicating that he was a 'technical
person' providing information only for a subsequent political choice
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to be made elsewhere. Both Taylor and Sutie expressed the view that
there was a lack of clarity among the public about the planners' role
in major development controversies like Moss Morran. They are always
confronted by the difficulty, as far as they see it, of far more
political influence being attributed to planners than actually exists.
There was some urgency felt about utilising Moss Morran, particularly
because the Cowdenbeath area had such a high unemployment rate.
However the problem of finding a site on the Forth to complete a
petrochemical scheme was always recognised by the planners as the
single most difficult issue because it would entail re-zoning agricul¬
tural and leisure use land for a controversial industrial use. Both
Taylor and Sutie freely admitted that the real problem was that the
local public inquiry instrument was totally inadequate to handle the
level of controversy raised by using Braefoot Bay and Mortimers Deep
as a tanker terminal handling dangerous petrochemicals.
Both planners thought the Moss Morran inquiry had been "extremely
competent and fair". They believed the lay public expect "too much
openness" from public inquiries. Taylor stated, "Whenever a major
development is being arranged there are always highly confidential
commercial and technical issues that must be protected from premature
public awareness". The Moss Morran site had to be tested for its
feasibility and normally, they said, a general technical and commercial
audit has to take place before a developer can publicly declare any
interest In a site. Taylor and Sutie admitted that very often
planners, local politicians and Scottish Office officials know about
these arrangements and the interest being shown by a developer well
in advance of the general public. The real problem identified by Taylor
and Sutie is that the public want too early an involvement or
participation in such controversial development issues. "They want to
object to something before it even gets proposed." And even within
the public inquiry, the planners believed there had to be areas of
information which had to be protected from public knowledge. They
commented that the Action Group were naive in expecting clear answers
to some of their searching questions about "commercial viability".
Taylor and Sutie were not particularly troubled by Esso's application
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which was seeking only outline planning permission in principle. Their
view was that such an application had to wait to clarify the commercial
viability of the project judged by uncertain market conditions.
Planning permission would allow a company to respond to market
viability quickly. They recognised however that the overall issue
about the desirability of an NGL plant without an ethane cracker was
one that had to be examined, but they argued that was a separate issue
from whether a public inquiry should process outline planning
applications in principle without an assurance that the project will
materialise.
The planners also rejected the criticism of public inquiries in terms
of their formality. There had to be order and structure to the
proceedings. They recognised that there was a legitimate concern
about the increasingly influential role being played by lawyers in the
big controversial public inquiries. William Taylor agreed that an
arrangement which structured evidence around identifiable controversial
issues rather than expertise would be desirable. He sympathised with
cross-examiners who were stuck with a witness unable to answer the
question posed and a Reporter unwilling to allow the re-call of
another witness who would be able to answer the question. So the
planners recognised that order and structure were necessary for any
form of public debate or inquiry but the form and nature of structural
constraints need not be as restricting as current local public inquiry
practice.
The planners thought that the most justifiable criticism made by the
Joint Action Group at the Moss Morran public inquiry was about the
confusion characterising the planning system which "used a local
public inquiry to hear objections of national significance. The
situation often arises whereby local people debate issues which have
an element of national interest attached to them". William Taylor
argued that there was a need to distinguish between "national1 issues
that were "national by precedent" such as the case of National Trust
inalienable land desired for development as in the Drumbuie case. That
kind of issue can be dealt with adequately, Taylor argued, by a local
public inquiry. However, the issue at Moss Morran was of a different
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order. The issue there, regarding national policy on North Sea gas,
had immediate economic and commercial importance with national level
political implications. It had been government policy to encourage
conversion of North Sea gas to high value added products and that
was not an issue that could be appropriate 1y dealt with within the
confines of a local public inquiry. There was the additional issue
which concerned the objectors over the safety of the technology
involved in the project and the safety risks attached to the siting
of the plants near to populated areas. That issue could have national
implications. However it was not an issue for the planners who took
the technology issue as a given. Throughout the Moss Morran inquiry
the technology issue was never recognised by any party,other than the
Joint Action Group, as novel, so therefore no wider Implications were
attached to it. Presumably this was the view also taken by the
Scottish Office. The planners believed the Action Group had not
grasped the 'real' national issue,that surrounding national gas and
oil policy. Only the Conservation Society adequately centred their
evidence on that issue, but the Action Group did not pursue it. They
tended to see the only national issue as that of the safety of the
technology and consciously distanced themselves from the
Conservationists, weakening their case and isolating the
Conservationists.
It was clear that the Fife planners wished to adopt the role of
pragmatists. Their skills were to be regarded as technical ones.
They insisted that their role in the Moss Morran planning application
was purely "professional and organisational", applying technical
planning knowledge to the production of easily understood reports upon
which political decisions could be made. Their view of public
participation was very much conditioned by their professional self
image. They conceded that the public had legitimate concerns about
the planning system but there was nothing radically wrong with the
form of public participation that currently exists. They tended to
see the problem with public inquiries less in terms of public access
and participation, which if anything they saw as encroaching too
early into delicate planning controversies like Moss Morran, and more
in terms of a need to locate the most appropriate level of public
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debate for planning issues with national implications. The Moss
Morran controversy clearly did contain national level issues in terms
of gas policy and the safety of petrochemical technology. Some form
of inguiry commission would, therefore, seem the most appropriate
vehicle through which to arrive at an appropriate destination whereby
local and national issues could be thoroughly balanced and debated.
However, the Fife planners in the end seemed to be perfectly satisfied
with the Moss Morran inquiry, partly, it would seem, because they did
not view the problematic issues as those centering on the technology.
The planning issues relating to Braefoot Bay were whether it would be
appropriate to re-zone the area for industrial purposes given its
current limited use for leisure. The planners tended to accept that
the use of Braefoot Bay as a tanker terminal was, in the circumstances
of high unemployment and industrial decay, fully justified. While they
were more than willing to discuss the deficiences of the planning
system and the public inquiry instrument in general, they seemed
to feel satisfied that the Moss Morran Inquiry had not suffered from
those general deficiencies and had adequately covered and publicly
debated the crucial issues as they understood them.
The Action Group's View
The Action Group obviously did not share the level of satisfaction
with the public inquiry which was expressed either by the oil
companies or the planners. However, the general attitude towards
the public inquiry varied. Some participants felt that the Reporter
had been "fair and efficient", while others felt he had interrupted
too often and occasionally positively helped the oil companies' case
by failing to recognise important themes being raised by the
objectors. This latter criticism seemed to focus less on the Reporter
actually stopping information being given, which he rarely did, but
rather on the Indications he made at the inquiry that certain themes
"were not helping him" or were irrelevant and did not engage the remit.
The Reporter often dissuaded cross-examiners for the objectors from
pursuing particular lines of question. He tended not to do this in
an overtly authoritarian way and as a consequence many members of the
Action Group felt frustrated rather than directly critical of the
public inquiry or the Reporter. Herein lies a major paradox.
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Messrs Helm, Sutcliffe and Jamieson from the Aberdour end of the
Action Group revealed a contradictory view which illustrates this
point. in their view Mr. Bell, the Reporter, was a "fair man". He
generally conducted the inquiry fairly, although Jamieson had
particular comments to make about his report and interpretation of
evidence. There was however a unanimous feeling that while the
inquiry was "fair" it was also a "political charade" and a "farce"
whose purpose was "purely to legitimise a decision which had already
been taken prior to the start of the inquiry". It was said by many
Action Group members interviewed that they intuitively felt that
their participation in the public inquiry would be a waste of time
but they kept hoping that perhaps it would make a difference. Once
the inquiry was completed they realised that their first
feeling had been correct.
Jamieson was particularly angered by the public inquiry process.
He complained that Esso should not have been allowed to participate
in the inquiry seeking only outline planning permission in principle.
Without presenting the inquiry and the public with any detailed
information about their project, he believed Esso had "got away"
without having to provide details of their future development which
effectively meant that their end of the scheme was beyond public
discussion and beyond any possibility of the public stopping them .
Further he thought the format for presenting evidence allowed the
oil companies to "shuffle their witnesses like playing cards". They
consistently "passed the buck" in Jamieson's view and by sticking to
their "so-called1 area of expertise they made cross-examining difficult
for objectors who could not attend the inquiry on a daily basis because
of business or domestic constraints. The whole system was in general
considered to be too inflexible and not adjusted enough towards the
difficulties confronting objectors. Particular witnesses came in for
criticism. Professor McIndoe was accused of "consistently refusing to
answer straight questions with straight answers". Jamieson in
particular felt a lack of support from the Reporter in his cross-
examination of Mclndoe. The Reporter was criticised for a failure to
support lines of questioning which were considered to be important to
the objectors1 case. However, this never seemed to amount to a full-
-220 -
scale condemnation of the Reporter who seemed to retain credibility
in the eyes of most objectors.
Helm and Sutcliffe commented on how imbalanced the Moss Morran inquiry
had been in terms of technical expertise. The Action Group were lucky
to have had so many local people with some knowledge of
the NGL project. However, detailed knowledge had been lacking, with
the exception of Professor Rashbash and Dr. Drysdale. They commented,
"the cost of expertise was loaded in favour of Shell and Esso. it is
difficult for groups such as ours to find the money and time to present
all the relevant facts." Jamieson added that the real failure of the
inquiry, in his view, had been that rather than publicly exposing
sound technical facts about the Shell/Esso scheme all it had done was
"bring out inferences and implications". In particular, Jamieson had
complained at the inquiry and subsequently about the draft report from
the Reporter that the evidence was replete with conditionals and
uncertainties. The oil company experts, Cremer and Warner and the
Reporter seemed to be content with phrases like "there should be no
air polution problems", or "damaging levels are unlikely to be reached"
(27)
or "smell is un1ikely to present a problem". These were in his
view all indications of a lack of scientific and technical rigour which
the inquiry needed. it never managed to resolve any of the significant
technological or nuisance issues. For Jamieson "either something is
or is not". He was concerned that uncertainties were passing as
unquestioned "facts" in the Reporter's draft report.
"What is a fact? Some sections of Mr. Bell's report give the
impression that the items included under his heading of 'findings
in fact' were agreed by all parties. This is just not so. They
were agreed only by the Reporter and the privileged 'experts' at
the inquiry without taking objectors' views on board."
it was also a strong impression that the best the Action group could
provide in technical expertise was still inadequate properly to examine
and debate many of the technological issues. They^of course,
consistently framed this in terms of a request for an inquiry commis¬
sion. They appeared to recognise the limits of their technical case
although they all seemed to be totally convinced that their viewpoint
was correct; the technology was dangerous and Shell/Esso had not
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thoroughly ensured a level of safety from their plants sufficient
to warrant siting their scheme near to populated areas. Helm and
Sutcliffe said thev believed the main block on their opposition
campaign through the public inquiry was that they were constantly
forced to prove their argument against the oil companies. They argued
that throughout the inquiry it had been made fairly clear from comments
made by the Reporter and by the construction of the remit, that the
NGL and ethane cracker project were presumed to be feasible unless the
objectors could prove otherwise. So by implication, they
believed, the inquiry assumed that the technology, the commercialism,
and the financial benefits for the area were presumed unless they
could be challenged and disproved by the Action Group. This obviously
placed far too much of a burden on local objectors with their lack of
time, finance and expertise.
However, having identified possible prejudices to their
case emanating from the institutional structure, very often the main
brunt of the objectors' criticism seemed to be aimed towards the oil
companies who were portrayed as the main bete noir of the controversy.
An Interview with John Cowie, the founder member of the Dalgety Bay
Action Group, revealed a distinction which I found many objectors
shared. Cowie said,
"I draw a distinction between the public Inquiry and the public
inquiry system. I think the public inquiry in Dunfermline was
very fair as a procedure. The Reporter conducted the inquiry
efficiently and well. The planning system is very unfair.
Local people opposed to large multi-national companies are kept
in the dark. It Is difficult getting basic information out of
them, and there is no financial help given to local groups to
assist them in putting their case together."
Cowie was particularly critical of the secrecy that surrounded the
Initial interest in Moss Morran by Shell. The oil companies had been
less than forthcoming in their public meetings held in 1976 and 1977
in Dalgety Bay and Aberdour. The planning system in Cowie's view
seems to favour development from the outset.
It is worth pointing up that Cowie was instrumental in framing local
opposition to Shell/Esso in technical terms. He is a scientist and
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was particularly concerned with the safety issue which had been given
a privileged place within the inquiry as part of the major technology
debate. Helm and Sutcliffe similarly had been interested in the
technical arguments surrounding the issue of tanker design, and the
technical issues surrounding sailing hazard. That too had been a
central feature of the technology debate and they agreed that the
public inquiry itself had been 'fair'. Jamieson, who adopted a
slightly more idiosyncratic stance and was less of a 'technical man',
had tried to expand the discussion of planning issues in the inquiry.
Along with Aberdour joint chairman, Roger Harris, they had tried to
raise 'moral' issues and pose 'common-sense' questions that were
awkward to answer. They were less satisfied with the public inquiry.
Harris had frequently issued the charge that the inquiry was a 'farce'
and he and Jamieson were less willing to make the distinction drawn
by Cowie and shared by many of their Action Group colleagues.
Cyril Burt, another active member of the Joint Action Group, conceded
that he thought the actual public inquiry procedure was 'fair' in
itself. Burt argued further that it was difficult opposing Shell/
Esso on a purely local level. He wanted an inquiry commission to
enable the national issues to be raised and he criticised the Reporter
for not allowing more recognition of the national dimension to the
controversy. However, the main problem for Burt was a sense of
frustration that the objectors had not been able to mount a more
effective inquiry case. He was placing part of the blame, therefore,
on himself and his colleagues as much as he was on the system that
contained their opposition campaign. The public inquiry itself was
considered to be 'fair' it seemed because it allowed "everyone to
express a viewpoint". There seemed to be no perception of what lay
beneath the appearance of an 'open, fair and impartial' public inquiry.
In particular, the main activists involved in formulating and present¬
ing the Action Group's case were all relatively satisfied that their
central arguments had been expressed and publicly recorded. There
was no recognition that the public inquiry instrument is an integral
factor which shapes and constrains not only the knowledge and
information debate in the inquiry but the total opposition movement.
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Mr. Carnduff was critical of the inquiry remit, "What was at 'issue'
was predetermined by the SDD. There was no discussion of artificial
harbours, hardly any recognition of national policy issues and that
meant there was little opportunity to talk meaningfully about alternat¬
ive sites." However, he again accepted that the public inquiry
procedure had been 'fair'. His main criticism was aimed towards the
oil companies who he considered gave misleading information about
future employment figures and dangerously under-estimated the risks to
the local community from their tanker terminal. Carnduff was himself
an oil employee working for BP at Grangemouth and had been, in his
own words, "less concerned with environmental issues". He was
satisfied that the main technological issues had been expressed in the
inquiry. He tended to see the controversy solely in terms of the
'safety of the technology' which seemed to have been well discussed in
the inquiry. His main criticism was not that the inquiry had failed
to discuss the issue but that it was too 'local'. He wanted the same
issues to be discussed in a national context, it would appear less
because he believed such a forum would be more thorough, but
strategically it would take the focus off Braefoot Bay. This seemed
to get to the heart of the general view held by the Action Group;
their concern for an inquiry commission was predominantly strategic.
They were satisfied that the crucial issues had been debated in the
local public inquiry. It was also the case that such a viewpoint
coincided with a concern solely with the technology issues.
Dik Mehta, the Joint Action Group Chairman from the Dalgety Bay side
of the opposition movement, underlined this view. "The Inquiry
Commission objective was largely strategic. The main technological
issues were more or less adequately handled in the local public
inquiry." Mehta's view seemed to imply that the case against Shell's
NGL plant design, as 'not a well proven design' given the Qatar
disaster, was made adequately at the inquiry but the local context for
evaluating that information was constraining. In other words, there
was a direct link between the idea of the technology being
unpredictable and siting the plants away from populated areas, and the
need for an institutional structure which could ensure an evaluation
of other possible sites, and make the issue less site specific to Fife.
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Then the pressure could really be lifted from Braefoot Bay. So again
the Action Group seemed to be fairly satisfied with the public inquiry
in terms of the 'technology debate1 which was in reality their only
concern but they preferred a nationally based institutional structure
to assess other sites rather than investigate the technological
arguments 'more thoroughly'. Mehta admitted that much of their
information was obtained by "pure chance" and in a completely
unsystematic way. However he was confident that they had in fact
uncovered all the relevant facts and had presented them well at the
inquiry. He disagreed with any suggestion that the Action Group,
rather than the public inquiry system, had failed to identify the
crucial issues.
The Action Group activists within the public inquiry had all concen¬
trated their efforts on the safety issue to the almost total exclusion
of other issues. Dik Mehta made their position clear:
"Most of us in the opposition committee agree that it is
generally a better principle to have a wide spread of
individuals and interest groups opposing Shell and Esso
rather than one large umbrella organisation controlling
everything. In actual fact, many of us are not against
petrochemical developments as a basic principle. Our
concern is solely with the safety risk to our community.
We do agree with:some of the aims and arguments of the
Conservation Society but we think they were much better
presenting their own case unfettered by us."
Mehta, being concerned mainly with the technology issue, was therefore
able to give a qualified approval to the Dunfermline inquiry; qualified
in the local/national terms I have indicated. Mehta, like others, made
the distinction between the public inquiry and the public inquiry
system. Having fought the Edinburgh Airport runway extension as part
of an Action Group who spent over £25,000 and won a public inquiry
that was later over-turned, he viewed the problem as located at the
level of the planning system as a whole. He did concede that even
within the local public inquiry process there is only an "illusion of
participation", but, it seemed, not because there was anything
intrinsically flawed in the inquiry procedure but because of the overall
planning context in which it was placed.
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This tension identified by the Action Group obviously seemed to sum
up their experience of the inquiry system with the exceptions of
Jamieson and Harris. This view, however, was not shared by the
Conservation Society which ted sought to introduce themes from outside
the limited inquiry remit.
The Conservation Society
Adrian Grant had experienced hostility and resistence to many of his
lines of questioning during the public inquiry and very little
recognition of its relevance. Both Edmunds and Grant had been
frustrated in their attempts to broaden the scope of the remit from
the outset. Both agreed with the general line of criticism about the
'localised' focus of the inquiry. They did not readily submit to
the argument that an Inquiry Commission would necessarily have helped
their case. Arguments relating to the use of scarce resources of
national importance was a governmental level issue. The whole
controversy was therefore misconceived. The real debate should first
have been focused on a national oil and gas policy. An issue which
could not be resolved within the planning sphere but instead should
have been under consideration at a national political level. They
also believed that virtually no recognition was given to environmental
factors at the inquiry. The whole emphasis was so heavily loaded
towards essentially redundant discussion of technological issues that
largely missed the point. Edmunds was particularly concerned about
the health risks attaching to emissions from the petrochemical industry
that would grow and eventually hope to attract downstream plastic works.
In other words, the concept of 'safety' was too narrowly conceived.
Both were concerned to a greater extent than the Action Group about the
procedure of the inquiry. Grant had come up against frequent warnings
from the Reporter about his tendency to "make speeches" rather than simply
ask questions only during his cross-examination of witnesses. Edmunds
was critical of the bias towards the oil companies in terms of the
procedure being aimed towards satisfying their timetable rather than the
objectors. They were not satisfied with the Moss Morran Inquiry and
did not accept the kind of distinction drawn by many Action Group
members. They had, of course, experienced far more frustration
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because the issues that they believed were crucial were not fully
recognised by the inquiry format. Edmunds had found many errors and
misconceptions in the Reporter's draft report to which he had responded.
"There appears to be under-reporting of points made in cross-
examination of supporters as against the frequent mention of
objectors "conceding" points made when they were cross-examined.
E.g. paras. 10.3 and 10.k, also 10.12, contrasting with complete
absence of points on possible market and ecological difficulties
caused by a world "outburst" of disposable plastics if all
proposed ethylene plants were to go ahead throughout the world,
made by me in questioning Mr. Pott. The same applies to points
made against other objectors, which I have not time to go into
further. There is a complete absence of mention of my main
Statement of Evidence, dated June 1977, on the Conservation
Aspects. In view of the heavy weighting of resources, but no
numbers, of supporters as against the objectors, it would seem
only fair that more than the present 76 pages for objectors'
points should be allowed, when one compared that number with
the 253 pages for supporters' evidence. Therefore my statement
should go in largely unabridged, it being only 1 j pages. Other
ommissions included the lack of reporting of the Swedish
chemical expert's statement that the Stenungsunde plants
constituted a "rape of the archipelago", although evidence is
included from Professor Mclndoe and George Sharp about the
alleged lack of their environmental impact, based on a visit
lasting only a day or two. As you know, objectors were not
taken on this visit, although their money as rate-payers was
used for it, so the least you can do is to present every bit
of their handicapped case." (28)
This quotation crystallises the critical view of the inquiry held by
the Conservationists. It clearly indicates an awareness of the way
in which information is shaped by the system in a way not expressed
by the Action Group.
The Gray Park Committee
The experience that the Gray Park committee had of the public inquiry
was brief. Messrs. Carrie and Fitzsimmons gave evidence on one day
only. They admitted to being quite ignorant about, public
inquiries, the planning system and most of the issues discussed at
the inquiry. Their main criticism of the public inquiry procedure
was reserved for Cullen QC representing the Regional Council for his
aggressive questioning of Mr. Fitzsimmons. They both felt that the
process had been extremely intimidating and while the Reporter had
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done much to re-assure them and make them, feel at ease, Cullen had
been particularly annoying. Carrie and Fitzsimmons felt that their
position was self-evident 1y just. The community was being unfairly
threatened and they resented being cross-examined as if they were in
a court of law. Beyond such personal observations about their
experience of giving evidence the Gray Park people were generally
unopinionated about the public inquiry system. Some members who had
not attended the actual inquiry did repeat the general view that they
did not think that the inquiry would make any difference; Shell/Esso
would inevitably win. However, their main concerns did not focus on
the inquiry system as such. Their main battle, as they saw it, was
with their local authority over housing. The public inquiry did not
seem to them to be a crucial variable in their calculations. Most of
them accepted that Shell/Esso would build their NGL plant and ethane
Cracker. The real question for them was what negotiated settlement
could they win for their local community.
it is perhaps worth noting that there was an obvious difference between
the Gray Park Committee's style of opposition to Shell/Esso and that
of the Joint Action Group. Social class, education and linguistic
competence had a significant part to play in this. The formality of the
public inquiry itself did little to assist the Gray Park people to present
their case as best they could. They undoubtedly felt more at ease
engaging familiar targets in debate about their case, such as their
local council and council representative, than getting heavily involved
in a public inquiry that seemed to require skills that many of them
lacked. Important issues are raised by this regarding how it is possible
to represent working-class people at a public inquiry that will inevitably
call for debating and analytical skills that few working-class people will
possess. Suffice it to say that an integrated knowledge code, similar
to that suggested in my analysis, would contribute something towards the
re-evaluation of views and arguments not based solely on technical
credentials. Working-class participants in public inquiries organised
around an integrated knowledge code would objectively be less disadvantaged
than at present but the question of what will motivate them to participate
in a process of public discourse is a large one, although this is not an
issue confined to working-class people.
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Cone 1uding Rema rks.
In general, as the classification and framing in the public inquiry
favoured a collection code it followed that those participants in the
inquiry concerned pre-eminently with technology issues and related themes
were more willing to allow a qualified pass mark for the actual local
public inquiry procedure. The Joint Action Group's views support this
observation. They generally seemed to be satisfied with the inquiry
procedure because it did, to a greater or lesser extent, recognise their
main input in the 'safety of the technology' issue and they were less
bothered about the Reporter or his interventions. The Conservation
Society represented the alternative view. Their concerns were delimited
as outside the inquiry remit, as disengaged debate, from the outset.
Those Action Group members such as Messrs. Jamieson and Harris who had
been thwarted in their wide ranging cross-examining of technical witnesses,
and who sensed a lack of support for their intentions from the Reporter,
were also more hostile to the inquiry procedure than the 'technocrats'
within the Action Group,
It is quite clear that the local inquiry procedure is conceptually
and politically separated off from other preceived deficiencies in
the planning system by many participants and as a consequence a great
deal of acceptance of the system follows. The disenchantment that
grows about the planning system appears limited among those people
steeped in the technological debates. Even those who do feel more
aggrieved with the planning system as a result of their experience in
giving evidence, and in cross-examining opponent's evidence, tend to
personalise their criticisms in terms of the deviousness or
unscrupulousness of the oil companies and their personnel, as many
Action Group members tended to do.
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There was no perception of the principle of power underlying what I
have termed, the classification and framing of knowledge. Even the
Conservationists who seemed to be the most articulate critics of the
inquiry procedure, viewed the problem in terms of the wrong
institution or institutional sphere handling the problem: the problem
was one caused by a failure to decide upon a national policy at
government level, true enough, but they saw nothing at work shaping
knowledge and information within the inquiry setting. Edmunds
criticism of the draft report was of a stylistic nature. It was the
ommission of certain 'facts' from the report that concerned him, not
the epistemic principles informing the construction of these 'facts'.
I am perhaps expecting too much of participants. I do not think it is
a case of participants failing to experience the principles of
classification and framing at work in the inquiry as such. Rather they
fail to connect the inquiry procedure to the wider system of power
which it forms a part. They do not formulate the problem at a level
that requires a wider political movement to change the system. Burt
of the Action Group made it clear in a BBC Current Account programme
on Moss Morran in 1977 that, had the Action Group their time again,
"we would fight a far less civilised and much more dirty campaign".
However that did not seem to lead to any conception of future action
aimed towards changing the system that they had just experienced as
unfair. This can be partly explained by exhaustion after fighting a
long battle and a big public inquiry. It can also be explained partly,
I believe, because many Action Group members actually thought the
inquiry procedure was 'fair1. It appeared to them to be satisfactory
and not something to be changed as such. The feeling that the public
inquiry procedure was 'fair' succeeded in establishing a confusing and
1 1 cont rad i ctory consciousness' about the whole public inquiry system,,
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Their fori-iiu/ci^c1 of the problem in terms of the strategic division
between local and nat ional institutional structures avoided the
underlying reality of collection codes as opposed to integrated codes
shaping the principles upon which the controversies were to be decided.
Planning Commissions and even Parliamentary forums would likely adopt
a similar principle for classifying and framing knowledge as that used
in the local inquiry.
The Action Group's continued obsession with getting the public inquiry
re-opened or establishing an inquiry commission was indicative of their
failure to penetrate beneath the appearance of 'openness, impartiality
and fairness' to an underlying reality requiring a concerted effort
for change. So where does this leave the distinction I have drawn
between forma 1 and common-sense concepts of justice? It is quite clear
that all participants in the public inquiry make sense of proceedings
at the level of 'appearances'. The inquiry process does allow a
structured input from anyone who wishes to 'express a view'. The views
of objectors are presented with little or no cross-examination at the
end of the inquiry hearing and are consequently never directly
confronted by the Reporter and never 'appear' to be directly rejected,
although they very often are in reality.
Perhaps a more complex explanation can also be offered. The Action
Group members who formulated and presented the opposition case against
Shell and Esso very quickly shaped their opposition to engage the
central issues determined by the Secretary of State's remit. That
formulation took place obviously prior to the public inquiry hearing
and the Action Group went prepared with a set of arguments and a
collection of productions that were determined on the
one hand by the dictates of a planning system geared towards a
collection code in the classification and framing of knowledge, but on
the other hand was constructed by the Action Group's own work and
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deliberations. It was both determined by and determining of the
practices that took place in the local inquiry because it represented
the Action Group's version of the controversial issues, but a version
that had been subtly determined by the technocratic bias of the public
inquiry system. So most members of the Action Group were content that
the public inquiry had been 'fair' because they misrecognised these
two elements of the formulation and presentation of their
case when discussing the actual public inquiry procedure; what the
inquiry 'appeared' to want discussed became synonymous with what many
Action Group members themselves wanted discussed because they tended to
perceive the issues as narrowly resolvable technical dilemmas. I will
develop this in the following chapter when I examine the formulation
and presentation of opposition.
As far as the Conservation Society was concerned they were more
generally critical of the public inquiry system. They saw no
particular virtue even in the public inquiry procedure. First, their
case was by its nature generalised; it was one which sought to
articulate the environmental arguments that are not, by their nature,
controversy or site specific, as were the Action Group's. Their case
was uncompromising to the inquiry remit. The Conservationists were
more aware that the issues they were forcing the inquiry to consider
were disengaged debate with respect to the inquiry remit and they
experienced resistance to their views as a result. Unlike other
objectors, the Conservationists did receive some hostile cross-examin¬
ation of their evidence. At the level of the localised format, the
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Conservationists viewed matters similarly to the view expressed by the
Action Group. However their feelings should not be understood in terms
of an affront to a 'common-sense' concept of justice. They
tended to .view the local public inquiry form of
processing the issues as premature, that is the issue was essentially
'political' and not planning in the sense that policy decisions were
required before an inquiry could become meaningful. Decisions had
first to be resolved politically in terms of national policies before
they could effectively enter the planning sphere. This was a
particularly narrow conception of 'polities', but one firmly held by
Dr. Edmunds and expressed also by Adrian Grant.
It is observable that wherever there is a lack of an agent to assist
participants to perceive the underlying realities of the system then
it is difficult for ordinary objectors to articulate their concerns
fully. The nature and complexity of the planning system seems to
engender a 'sense' that something is not quite 'fair', but it seems
that the Joint Action Group and the Conservation Society in Fife were
unable to concisely identify the problem. We can talk about this
perceptual problem in terms of 'common sense' because it contained a
sense of grievance with the public inquiry system that was intuitive
rather than subs tan t i ve. Indeed the public inquiry procedures and the
processing of the planning application all adhered to the formal
dictates of administrative practices. It was still sensed however as
somehow unfair in the eyes of those participants objecting to the Shell/
Esso scheme; the system may not have been 'unfair', but it was not
'fair' either.
There will always be a legitimation problem with the public inquiry
system so long as it takes no account of the matters that objectors
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consider important in the construction of the agenda and the remit.
In purely formal terms the public inquiry is an instrument of govern¬
ment, but as I have argued, it is also an institution of the public
sphere straddling the boundaries between the state and civil society.
The dialectics of power and participation enshrined in the very
structure of the public inquiry contains the kernel of the contemporary
problem with the system. It is of little use government officials,
politicians and lawyers articulating formal views of what is 'fair'
and 'open1. As Senior has remarked, "a public institution is not
what its creators intended, or the law lays down that it should be,
but what it has become in the public mind". Similarly it is of little
use telling people in Dalgety Bay and Aberdour or members of the
Conservation Society that the Secretary of State was satisfied with
the conduct of the inquiry and the deliberations emanating from it when
the public think it has singularly failed to consider significant issues
that are felt to be important and neglected.
In the following chapter I will examine the influence of the inquiry
system on the formulation and presentation of the opposition movement.
It will be shown that the public inquiry system embraces not only what




THE FORMULATION AND PRESENTATION OF OPPOSITION TO
SHELL/ESSQ IN FIFE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE ORGANISATION OF LOCAL OPPOSITION AND THE
PUBLIC INQUIRY SYSTEM.
In this chapter I will report on a study undertaken to observe the
effect of the public inquiry system on the formulation and presentation
of local opposition. The objective will be to describe the inter¬
relationship between the organisation and style of opposition of the
local Action Group in the Moss Morran controversy and the constraints
imposed upon the organisation by the in,put requirements of the public
inquiry. This chapter therefore seeks to extend the argument made
in chapter 5 regarding the association between a technical orientation
to the controversy and a high level of acceptance of the public
inquiry system.
The Moss Morran controversy represents a good example of the way in
which the public inquiry creates a system of political incorporation
of opposition. I will describe the 'instrumental philosophies' of
the main contending interests and the connections between them. I
will suggest that the local opposition groups, particularly the joint
Action Group representing Dalgety Bay and Aberdour, failed to transcend
the constraints of the system and therefore not only failed to
challenge Shell/Esso as effectively as they might but also contributed
little towards reforming the public inquiry system that some individual
members felt was in need of radical change.
The argument I will make is that the controversy can be characterised
by an overall process of attrition: a heated and vociferous community
based reaction, and a counteraction by the oil companies and local
authorities in the early days leading up to and focusing on the public
inquiry hearing, but thereafter a slow wearing away of pub 1ic community
activity surrounding the development proposals. There has been both
an occupation and vacuation of the public sphere during the course of
the planning application.
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The Dalgety Bay/Aberdour Action Group and Gray Park.
The prime mover of the community reaction was Dalgety Bay resident
John Cowie. It was he who had pursued an interest in B.P.s activities
on the Forth several years before the Moss Morran issue broke. He
had written to the newspapers about liquid gas petroleum tankers
travelling up and down the Forth to Grangemouth and had sought some
assurances from B.P. about the danger risk to the communities on the
north bank of the Forth.
Cowie had also become conscious of the possible ramifications from
Shell's initial interest in the Moss Morran site in the summer of
1976, He was of opinion even then that a Natural gas liquids
fractionation plant at Cowdenbeath would require a tanker terminal on
the Forth and that could only mean either St. David's Bay or more
likely Braefoot Bay. His concern led him to write letters to the
press and generally discuss the matter in the local community. He
was often accused of scaremongering and 'trouble-making', and his
connection locally with the Scottish National Party had resulted in
a 'reputation' going before him for 'stirring things'. It was
public knowledge, for example, that Regional Councillor Davidson (a
local supporter of the NGL & Ethylene project) considered Cowie to be
'prematurely causing anxiety about Shell on the basis of unfounded
rumours'around about late 1976. ^
Initially Cowie found some support for his concerns within the
Dalgety Bay Residents' Association. This led to a group of individuals
with some technical knowledge of petrochemicals setting up a sub¬
committee to examine the idea of an NGL plant and tanker terminal
on the Forth. Cowie along with fellow residents Dugald Eadie
and Eddie Norman, who was an industrial chemist, set about collating
information about Shell's project and activities and then later
produced a technical report for the purposes of convincing
Dalgety Bay people that there was a matter of concern that required
their concerted action.
- 236 /-
Meanwhile Cowie had produced a leaflet which was delivered to all the
houses in Dalgety Bay pointing out the dangers of an NGL plant and
terminal. That leaflet was then obtained by Aberdour resident
Roger Harris who distributed it in his own community, much to the
consternation of some members of the local ratepayers association.
Ill feeling generally characterised the official relations between
the two communities at this time. Some Aberdour people, in particular
those in the Ratepayers Association, believed Cowie was 'sticking
(2)his nose in where he had no business just to cause trouble.1
This was based on the assumption that Cowie had distributed his
leaflet, which he had not in fact done.
It was on the basis of these initial moves to generate concern within
the two communities by the Forth that.the first strirrings of concern
became open. It should be stressed that a great many people were
both ignorant about the Shell proposals and quite unperturbed by
them when they were informed of the possibilities of a petrochemical
complex on their doorstep. This equally applies to many Action
Group people who became involved in the opposition campaign at a later
stage (Chairman Dik Mehta for example was not involved at all in the
early days). The concern and community reaction which grew sub¬
sequently was very much something that evolved and changed in the
months leading up to the public inquiry. It needs to be emphasised
also that had it not been for the efforts of a few concerned individuals
then the whole planning process would have been far advanced before
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local people became aware and involved in the issue. There is
a striking absence of an institutional mechanism which can involve the
public in major planning developments at an early stage. The whole
procedure at the present time is geared to presenting the public
with an already established scheme to which they can express approval
or objections. It is only when official planning applications have
been made, (with all that implies about 'informal' discussions between
politicians, industrialists and the government development departments
behind 'closed doors') that the public are even given basic information
about the planning proposals. The acceptance of this situation as
'reasonable' was behind the Aberdour Ratepayers Association (RPA)
refusal to make official objections to the principle of a petrochemical
development in the area. Chairman of the RPA Mr. Lochtie had
intervened to curtail discussion about the Shell/Esso scheme at an
RPA public meeting because he felt that it was premature to object
to something which had not yet been officially proposed. Mr.
Lochtie was an active trade unionist and admitted to me that he
was in favour of the project because he was concerned to bring work
to the area. He had travelled to Glasgow prior to the RPA meeting
to meet Shell representatives and they had influenced his attitude.
As long as assurances could be given about safety then he was in
general support of the scheme.
The early differences of opinion about the likely danger to the
communities from Shell's plans led to some heated public meetings in
both communities. In the case of Aberdour, a series of semi-
private meetings among some local people were arranged because the
(3)
RPA refused to initiate any official action at all. Some local
people had felt that the very idea of a petrochemical complex
should be opposed and opposition had to start immediately with or
without 'official' backing by existing local organisations.
Out of a series of public and private meetings two Action Groups
emerged; the Dalgety Bay Gas Project Action Group and the Aberdour
Ratepayers Association Action Group Sub-Committee. Both sets of
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objectors were essentially autonomous organisations but they had
sought 'official1 public identity to legitimise their claim to speak
with a community mandate. Existing community organisations (Residents
Association S RPA) were used for initial organisational objectives
only. The two groups were effectively rooted in community members
outwith those organisations prior to the Shell/Esso proposals. Community
mandates had been more of a concern for the Dalgety Bay people than the
Aberdour group. The latter group were rrore informally organised and
communications were based far more on an 'unofficial' grapevine than
in Dalgety Bay which was a newer and more heterogeneous community.
Public meetings were more likely to be called in Dalgety Bay than
Aberdour. The structure of informal communications which had been
built up over the years in Aberdour was obviously missing in the
relatively new environment of Dalgety Bay. The two groups worked
independently yet they kept communications between them open. There
were few formally constructed meetings between the two action
groups. They collected information about petrochemical hazards,
collected money for the campaign, distributed leaflets and an
occasional newsletter up until a few months before the public
inquiry.
Many members involved in the opposition campaign described the relation¬
ship between Dalgety Bay and Aberdour in terms of the former providing
(k)
technical information while the latter provided the management drive.
People such as Cowie and Norman from Dalgety Bay knew a great deal
about the chemical processes involved from their professional work,
and Aberdour Action Group Chairman Burt, a bank manager, Roger Harris,
a managing director of a clothing firm, Peter Drum, a public relations
man, and John Sutcliffe; a managing director and leader of the
yachting interests, were able to contribute resources of knowledge
and facilities which were crucial for organisational functions. In
addition, the joint Action Groups were able to draw on Mr. Carnduff,
who worked for BP at Grangemouth, and Mr. Stodart a marine architect
knowledgeable about tanker design. Overall both groups had the basis
of an exceptionally well organised opposition campaign.
The communications system within the opposition campaign became
very informal. Meetings in local pubs, or telephone coversations
characterised the communication structure. As the months passed
from November 1976 until about May 1977 certain individuals became
more involved centrally. The core of the opposition campaign
became occupied by those who were able to contribute some major
technical or organisational ability to the objectors' case. It
was at such a comparatively late stage that the Joint Action Group
Chairman Dik Mehta came to the fore because he was a lawyer and
would be needed to lead their case at the approaching public
inquiry. And it was also around about the same time that the groups
publicly became a 'Joint Action Group'. A strict division of labour
was instituted in order that the public inquiry case could be
adequately prepared and the Action Group began a process of
'autonomisation' which I will describe below.
The community nearest to the Moss Morran site at Cowdenbeath is
Gray Park made up of 64 council houses and flats about li miles
from the main site. The people living there did not display a
consistent attitude towards Shell/Esso's plans. Their opinions about
the project ranged from general approval in 1976 to hostile
opposition by the time of the public inquiry hearing.
Overall their campaign, if that is what it can be called, was
characterised by little public activity founded on a small financial
base, and only one day of representation at the public inquiry.
There was a dogged reliance on some notion of their ultimate rights
as council tenants which they felt must be considered in the last
resort. However, 1 discerned an outer shell of blustering and bluffing
about fighting to the end in front of the T.V. cameras, which was
the stance taken by the committee members. A more realistic
acceptance of the realities of the situation was expressed by residents




The opposition to Shell and Esso can be neatly divided into groups
operating under the umbrella of the Joint Action Group and groups
articulating a broader environmental case outside the ambit of the
local objectors' parties.
The yachting interests were the main group which sought an
independent voice within the overall campaign being organised by
the Action Group. Indeed it could be argued that it was the sailing
interests, particularly in Aberdour, which helped sustain the ongoing
campaign. Messrs. Helm and Sutcliffe who were leading figures in
the sailing fraternity were also central figures in the organisation
and construction of the local Action Group case. It would be
justified to argue that the single main concern for the Aberdour end
of the opposition campaign after safety was the possible curtailment
of sailing activities on the Forth. The sailors decided to
develop their case almost as a sub-committee of the overall joint
Action Group campaign because they wanted to play down the impression
that they were defending a middle class minority leisure pursuit
against the need for jobs. They contributed money to the opposition
campaign but drew on the pool of funds for their own purposes even
though presenting a common face with the Action Group to the public.
A similar strategy was hoped for by the Conservation Society. The
society had been in a process of decline in Fife, and Kirkcaldy
doctor, Dr. Edmunds, was virtually the sole representative of the
society in the area. The depleted resources of the Conservation
Society meant they had hoped to present their case at the public
inquiry under the leadership of the Action Group's legal counsel.
However, the case being forwarded by the Conservation Society was
felt by their legal representative Mr.Booker-Mi 1 burn to be too
'radical' to be associated with the manufactured 'reasonableness'
of the Action Group. It was quite clear that the issues about
national oil and gas policies, re-injecting the gas back into the
sea until a policy for its use was decided upon, and general concerns
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about industrialisation and the environment, were themes which were
politely listened to but were never on the inquiry agenda and quite
clearly overstepped the bounds of the limited inquiry remit.
The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds made a token appearance
at the inquiry, and along with other national bodies such as the
National Trust for Scotland, they failed to become actively involved
in the controversy. indeed the RSPB withdrew their objections half
way through the public inquiry.
The Oil Companies' 'Moral' Position
At an early stage in the study it became clear that the oil company
representatives had made an impact in the local communities by their
presence in local hotels, and from being identified in the local press.
Local people would refer to the "oil companies' public relations
boys " and were conscious of their 'smoothness1. There was a
distrust of these oil representatives because of the role that oil
reps involved in public relations work were popularly believed to
play, namely, smoothing down the rough surface of opposition to instil
a feeling of forthcoming benefit to the community; local people
seemed to be aware that they were being courted and were equally
unimpressed. From early contact with people in both Aberdour and
Dalgety Bay it was clear that the oil companies were not overtly
seeking to convert local people to their project in any simple
sense. It is the way of planning controversies that views tend to
become fairly entrenched, especially in the early stages when
plans have not been published and imaginations can have a free play.
So it was interesting to ask the oil representatives what they
thought their job was, and more pointedly, what were they attempting
to achieve as local representatives of Shell and Esso in Fife?
A meeting was arranged with Mr. Aylwin of Esso Chemicals Ltd., and
Mr. Jacobs of Shell Expro UK Ltd., at Esso's rather makeshift small
office in Stafford Street in Edinburgh. Indeed the type of
accommodation which a large company such as Esso Chemicals was forced
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to occupy was indicative of the hurried adjustment to events that
the company had made in surveying Fife for their proposed Ethylene
plant. ^ It is not without significance that the office suite was
generally empty of furniture, telephones were deposited on the floor
and there was only one secretary and Mr. Aylwin holding the fort for
Esso Chemicals in Scotland. Mr. Jacobs similarly recounted his
own situation. Shell had been first onto the scene in Fife and
as they too had no established office in Scotland they had to
appoint him to the task of setting up an office to handle all
problems which might arise locally. What were they seeking to
achieve and what were the local problems they had to resolve?
Jacobs of Shell said that his task was quite clear. He aimed to
be a focus for the media and for local people. He thought it was
important that some visible representative of the company, especially
such a large company as Shell, should be on hand in the local community
to answer questions relating to his company's project. Public
meetings had to be organised and he undertook that job. Additionally,
he thought it extremely important that key individuals with political,
economic and opposing interests should be met and engaged in an
ongoing dialogue about the proposed development. Jacobs had arranged
a number of formal and informal meetings with different people in
the area. When he first arrived in the area he had opted to stay in
the Aberdour Hotel for three months and this in particular had enabled
him to meet and talk to local people in the bar and on the streets
and in shops.
With respect to grounding thissaries of activities, Jacobs stated that
there was a clear cut reason why he was involved in the kind of work
he was doing and why Shell had considered it to be important;
namely that Shell were above all else a "moral company1.1 It was
stressed that once Shell had lodged their planning application they
had no further legal obligation to remain in the area. However,
as a large company which had to operate in many different locations
all over the world it was considered important by the Shell company,
he said, to follow a 'good neighbour policy'. What was not clear
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from Jacobs' statement was whether Shell's 'moral' position and 'good
neighbour' policy were adopted as part of a public relations strategy
because to overtly behave in any fashion other than apparent concern
and interest for the local people's well-being would be politically
and tactically damaging to them. Jacob's suggested that Shell,
as a leading company in world business, had a responsibility not
only to its share-holders, but also to the environment and communities
within which it operated its industrial plants. Neither oil
representative would accept the interpretation of their activity as
'public relations' and insisted that 'moral', legal and business
responsibilities did not give rise to contradictory company behaviour.
It is not clear exactly how the different elements of a large
company's ideology and its commercial practice can be related without
some problems of 'lack of fit'. However, both Jacobs and Aylwin
discussed the issue of the company's 'morality' as if the matter was
self evident. Aylwin suggested that the issue was very clear; both
Esso and Shell had demonstrated their 'integrity' and that there
was no contradiction in a "good company bringing a good project"
to a community so that everyone could benefit. Employment and
economic growth would be generated within the local community,
he argued, and the oil companies would be able to devlop a worthwhile
and profitable industry developing Britain's North Sea resources.
Both men felt that all interests would benefit from a major petro¬
chemical development in Fife, both locally and nationally.
However, when the actual subject of liaising with local communities
was pursued it became clear that the role which the oil representatives
had to fulfil had a much more distinctly strategic and tactical
function than they would admit. Both men were very conscious of
the difficulties involved in communicating an 'accurate' and 'honest'
view of the proposed projects to local people. There was a great
deal of so-called 'rumour mongering' going about local pubs and
shops in Dalgety Bay and Aberdour. The oil companies wanted to
combat 'inaccurate' accounts of their projects. They were concerned
to ensure people knew the 'truth' about the proposed projects,
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"nothing more and nothingless". They felt ideas were circulating
about the proposed NGL and Ethylene projects which were conveying
completely the wrong view of the nature of the development; many locals
were unsure exactly what an NGL or Ethane Cracker were and many people
were confusing the Shell/Esso project with proposals for an oil
refinery development. People were apparently having visions of
gigantic oil slicks in Aberdour harbour and smelly, noisy industry
which would spoil the whole environment around the North shore of the
Forth. Jacobs and Aylwin saw it as their task to correct this skewed
view of their companies' project in order that good relations
between their companies and the local communities could be forged
for future co-operation. They also considered it important to combat
some of the moreinflamatory ideas being disseminated by the opponents
of the project in order that the opposition process did not 'get
out of hand' based on sheer propaganda.
Both Shell and Esso believed that the best way forward in a situation
of a major planning controversy was to rely on sound judgement based
on 'reason' and argument about the 'facts' of the development.
Once local people were made aware of the exact nature of the develop¬
ment through public meetings and exhibitions then both Shell and Esso
were confident that they would come to see that the oil companies
were not seeking to "exploit and rape" their local environment for
no return. The local landscape on the Forth would be altered,
possibly altered irretrievably, but they did not accept this would
destroy the area entirely. The extent of the impact, they believed,
could only be assessed by a close examination of their plans and what
was actually going to be proposed, but both Jacobs and Aylwin said
they had been confronted by ignorance about the nature of the
development and an unwillingness by local people to be open to reasoned
argument about the projects. Their function was "to organise a
response to that type of blind rejection to their project."
Jacobs recounted the case of a woman who had objected vehemently to
him at the company's exhibition in Aberdour about the development but
had also enquired about the possibility of Shell being interested in
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renting her second house for incoming executives. This type of
person was considered hypocritical, and there were believed to be
many like this according to Jacobs, but revealingly, he did admit
to admiring this attitude of "taking hold of chances as they became
available. " And it was that type of underlying attitude which he
believed needed to be brought out by the oil companies and
cultivated. Neither of the oil representatives would accept the
popular view that local people were entirely against the project
anyway and they believed that many betrayed an ambivalent attitude
which could perhaps become adjusted towards an acceptance of the
development should it eventually come to Fife. It was up to the oil
companies to convey the idea of personal benefit to those who would
'adjust' to the needs of the oil companies. So it was clear that
both Alywin and Jacobs had as their objects to ensure the oil
companies' case was not lost in an ava1anche ofopposition 'propaganda
newsletters ', and to establish a presence in the locality as a
public focus.
By way of broadening the discussion about the oil companies' stance
in Fife it is instructive to introduce the distinction which Daniel
Bell draws between an "economising mode" for judging a society's
needs and a "sociologising mode". Despite the rather clumsy terminology
Bell provides a useful conceptualisation of the shift in the public
orientations of large corporations regarding their performance in
industrial life. To state Bell's thesis briefly: the free market
as the most efficient mechnaism for the allocation of scarce resources
among competing ends has come into question. Society has become
"uglier, dirtier, trashier, more polluted and noxious". The
'externalities' of industrialisation have brought forth a "new
criticism" which is creating the situation whereby the large corpora¬
tion is becoming subordinate to a new mode of economic rationality,
namely the "sociologising mode". Sociological factors are now
crucial in the valuation of commercial processes and there is an
explicit "effort to judge a society's needs in more conscious fashion,
and to do so on the basis of some explicit conception of publ ic interest."
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"The theoretical virtue of the market is that it
co-ordinates human interdependence in some optimal
fashion, in accordance with the expressed preferences
of buyers and sellers (within any given distribution
of income). But what ultimately provides direction
for the economy, as Veblen pointed out long ago, is
not the price system but the value system of the
culture in which the economy is embedded Accordingly,
economic guidance can only be as efficacious as the
cultural system which shapes it". ^
It is the growing awareness of this "new criticism" and the develop¬
ment of what amounts to a dominant managerial ideology of our time
revolving around the notion of the "public interest" which rationalises
the mode of activity of the oil companies and against which Shell
and Esso's statements about corporation 'morality' must be assessed.
One can only speculate about the links between the multi-national
oil companies and the government. However, it is highly likely
that both Shell and Esso were clear about their main task; to court
the local politicians, and in particular, focus their efforts on
convincing Fife Region and the Scottish Development Department that
the NGL and Ethane projects were 'essential' for the 'national interest'.
Both oil representatives frequently used the terms 'public interest'
and 'national interest' freely. They obviously believed that the
interests of the oil companies and the country as a whole were
synonomous. There was never any intention of the oil company
representatives,therefore, of being genuinely open to the views of
the local objectors. They were quite clearly treated as a problem
to be 'handled'. Shell/Esso were obviously prepared only to
exert a minimal effort on that task. Jacobs admitted that he was
certain the oil companies would win the public inquiry and would
get permission to build their plant from the Secretary of State.
Thereafter, he believed, the opposition would evaporate.
The significant fact about the oil companies pre-inquiry activities
was the way they forced the local opposition groups to frame their
response within a technical framework not of their choosing. The
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exhibitions and public meetings sponsored by Shell/Esso obviously
sought to present their project consistently as a scheme to be admired
technically. The local objectors therefore had to respond to an
already established technical terrain upon which to engage in debate.
This process was exacerbated by a local public inquiry system disinclined
to encourage a broader evaluation of issues.
The Formulation of Opposition: The 'Autonomisat ion' Process.
The major paradox of the opposition to Shell and Esso in Fife was
the relative weakness of local opposition in reality despite its
appearance as an extremely well organised and broadly supported
campaign in the effected communities. It was a campaign which
brought forth many compliments from environmentalist groups and the
media. The major comment that was made of the whole controversy was
that there was nothing else that any group could possibly have done
that was not done by the local Joint Action Groups from Dalgety Bay
and Aberdour; ^ that it was a major indictment against our planning
democracy that the locals still did not manage to prevent the
development. Indeed the level of organisation was extremely polished
and sophisticated. The literature produced by the Action Group
was of a high quality with expensive packaging and professional
presentation. Their handling of both press and television was
similarly very professional. The Moss Morran controversy was
given a wide national and even international coverage. The
technical research was excellent and well presented at the public
inquiry. So why at the end of the day did the Secretary of State
for Scotland allow the NGL and Ethane Cracker projects to go ahead?
The short answer can be formulated in general theoretical vocabulary
along the lines I have already indicated; there are complex
structural relationships between State and economy which predetermine
issues by working through a series of institutional mediations
like public inquiries which contain, shape and manage complex contr¬
oversies insuch a way that legitimises and obscures the fact that
it is not democratic public participation and the rules of
'natural justice' that determine decisions but rather the structural
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needs of capital accumulation. This was undoubtedly the case at
one level. Economic crisis, high unemployment and the promise of
producing and fully utilising a high value added resource were all
criteria that were not conducive to a liberal consideration of the
nicieties of public participation and local objections. However,
the real issue for local people was never about such basic economic and
industrial dilemmas. The main thrust of local opposition was
about safety and the environment. It had never been formulated in
terms which would challenge the priorities of government economic
policy or question the necessity of the project in the first place
(although they did question the need for an ethane cracker given
the existing and projected market demand for such a product). The
real issue for local people was simply the siting of the two plants.
Perhaps it is here that the paradox can be located; the Action Group
took a far too parochial perspective on the issues in so far as
they viewed the opposition process as something to be waged
locally, and crucially, they allowed the local public inquiry system
to determine both the form and content of their opposition campaign.
Perhaps I can illustrate this theme best by describing how the Action
Group organised their public inquiry case in relation to other forms
of possible activity and other opposition groups.
The Joint Action Group was the central opposition group around which
other groups revolved. The Gray Park residents and the Conservation
Society were distinct, with their own problems and arguments to
make, but together with the.Da 1gety Bay abd Aberdour people they formed
the core of the opposition movement. The relationship between these
different elements of the local objectors reveals a great deal about
the tactical orientation of the joint Action Group and their
willingness to submit to the input requirements of the local public
inquiry system.
The period leading up to and Inc1uding the pub 1ic inquiry into Shell/
Esso's proposals can be characterised by a process of autonomisation
which is a concept I will use to orient my description of the formulation
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of the opposition campaign. The concept of autonomisat ion refers
to a process that was discernible to me whereby the local Action Group
became increasingly separated from identification with its community
based support. This was facilitated by an accompanying process that
I can best describe as 'personalisation' as the opposition became
presented as being synonomous with an inner elite of publicly known
individuals who came to be viewed as the opposition, particularly
by the media, rather than simply representing the wider community
constituency. This observation is, I believe, consistent with the
theoretical argument that 1 introduced in chapter 3 where I suggested
that a dominant feature of the local public inquiry system is the
tendency to 'reduce complexity' in the manner prescribed by Luhmann.
The systems rationality of the local public inquiry system therefore
exacerbates the tendency towards autonomisat ion by forcing objectors
to address themselves to the highly technical issues of the planning
application to the neglect of other important non-technical themes.
The result of this was that increasingly technical expertise became
the main input requirement for direct involvement at the centre of
the opposition campaign. Public debate wasremoved to the realm of
the 'expert' and discourse within the community and between the
community and the decision-makers was by-passed. As the gap between
an Action Group formed out of technical expertise and knowledge and
a community of largely lay people widened, the Action Group became
identified as the opposition and initiated actions and strategies
autonomous 1y. Without there being any semblance of a Community
directed campaign two dangers arose. First the important link
between the community and the Action Group became weak. The question
about the exact nature and extent of the community support for the
Action Group became questionable when it appeared that only a handful
of committed individuals were organising and sustaining the opposition
movement. A major strategic and organ?sationa1 weakness presented
itself to the Action Group; a mass community support for the
campaign was no longer visible nor could it be relied upon to retain
enthusiasm and commitment to the opposition objective. Second,
the administrators politicians and the representatives of the oil
companies were able to discard the opposition as increasingly the
work of 'middle class agitators'. Without the pressure of a
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mobilised community of nearly 8,000 people the Secretary of State
and the administrators were less likely to compromise.
It is important to stress again that both the Dalgety Say and the
Aberdour sections of the Joint Action Group grew out of existing
community organisations. In the case of Dalgety Bay, the Residents
Association had provided a base and in Aberdour the Ratepayers
Association. However, what was clear initially was the broad
community wide interest in the Shell/Esso proposals. Over ^00 local
people had actually written letters of objection to the Scottish
Development Department and many more had attended public meetings
and public exhibitions. At early meetings, as I have indicated
above, the concern among all local people was to organise their campaign
in such a way that those fronting the Action Group would be seen
publicly as speaking legitimately on behalf of local people, with
a community mandate.
However, the 'mobilisation phase1 of the campaign was relatively
short lived. The period from September 1976 until the end of
January 1977 was the first phase characterised by confusion about who
and what was being proposed for the area. There were initial fears
about the full implications of an NGL plant and a general level of
community activity was obviously aimed towards clarifying questions,
finding out information, writing letters to the press and organising
public meetings as part of a collective act of re-assurance rather
than a constructive attempt to resolve these confusions.
The Dalgety Bay end of the opposition campaign, spurred on by John
Cowie who was feeling at least pleased that his pet hobby-horse had
been given some kind of recognition, organised a community sense
of urgency far more quickly than Aberdour. On the 2Ath September
1976 a Resident Association newsletter was issued promptly on the
back of initial press reports that Shell/Esso were interested in
Moss Morran, with Braefoot Bay as the likely terminal site. With
an impressive summary description of the proposed project the Dalgety
Bay Residents stated:
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"We think that as a community we should object on two
grounds. Firstly, that it means we would have a
F1ixborough-type hazard on our doorstep, and secondly,
that it is highly undesirable that any spot near deep
water in the Forth should be used indescriminately for
developments of this kind. It is an example of the
worst kind of 19th century industrial vandalism. It
would make much more sense both environmentally and
commercially to concentrate development of this kind
in a few centres". ^
The newsletter went on to call for "information and expertise". It
was the gradual dominance of the technical experts even at such an
early stage of the opposition campaign which started the process
of distance between Action Group and Community. Subsequent newsletters
and activities, such as exhibitions, were aimed towards formulating
objections on grounds that would fit the input requirements of the
(9)local public inquiry system. The Action Group were involved
inevitably in trying to mobilise an interest and concern in local
people about Shell/Esso's project, which consisted initially of
exhortations to write official objections, but they were also faced
with the task of organising and constructing a case and marshalling
information that would be effective at the level of technical argumen¬
tation, and crucially, of guiding and leading local opinions towards
the 'right kind' of objections. ^ So my argument is that a
major dilemma or contradiction revealed itself at an early stage
between the demands of social and public mobilisation on the one
hand, with the need to encourage as visible and active a
participation as possible by local residents, and the need for highly
specialised technical knoweldge on the other, which of its nature
tends to exclude participation to those who have the technically
relevant esoteric knowledge .
The inevitable outgrowth of this contradiction was that the early
concern for community meetings and community mandates in phase
one of the opposition campaign gave way to a more individualistic
and zealous campaign by an inner core of committed people with
technical knowledge in phase two from early 1977 until the public
inquiry, continuing in this pattern after the public inquiry.
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The political issue which this process of autonomisat ion highlights
can best be understood in the terms I suggested in chapter 3; there
was a strong association between the dominance of a col lection
knowledge code in the public inquiry and the prominence of 'technocrats'
in the Action Group. For example, the political dilemma that faced
the joint Action Group was how to sustain a broad campaign which
fully engaged the oil companies and the Scottish Office in debate and
argument while also mobilising support for their other actions within
the local community. The problem of achieving a balance between
these two tasks was not assisted by uncertainty about the extent of
ongoing support and interest by local people who seemed to be less
and less involved in the issue. While it may have been desirable to
fuse discourse and action to form a balanced strategy, the increasing
emphasis placed upon technical expertise within the Action Group led
them to become preoccupied with a technical discourse at the expense
of other forms of activity. The significant feature of this
development was the belief that reason and argument alone were
the main resources upon which to rely in the fight to stop the
Shell/Esso project. The strategy of organising a campaign beyond
the local community quickly became subordinate to the compulsive
requirementto gather more and more technical data to use in the public
inquiry against Shell/Esso. Out of this situation the 'technocrats'
and the 'intellectuals' came to form not only the main combatants at
the public inquiry, but more significantly, the core of the Action
Group. Their interest lay overwhelmingly in the complexities
of the plant technology and the argumentation process per se. They
seemed to lose sight of the broader non-technica1 issues that were
concerning local people, particularly leisure and the environment and
they took no view on the criticisms that might be made of the public
inquiry system, except to continually press for a PIC on strategic
rather than critical grounds.
Now to argue about the technology of Shell/Esso's project seems to
me to imply a particular logical structure, namely, that what is
problematic is the question of whether or not an NGL and Ethane
plant can be assimilated into the local environment. By arguing
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forcefully against the safety and reliability of the technology, the
Action Group implicitly accepted the terrain of empirical science as
the ground upon which to fight. It is an acceptance that the issues
are debatable and resolvable in accordance with some notion of
'rational' technical criteria. The issue, however, had always been
one of the politics of site selection and at a basic level about
relative values and priorities. It really did not matter to local
Dalgety Bay and Aberdour people that it could be shown statistically
that the proposed plants were unlikely to explode. For even if
they were completely safe the local people just did not want a
petro-chemica1 complex sited in their locality.
The dominance of the 'technocrats' in the Action Group also led to the
contradiction of their broader aim of forcing the,Secretary of State
to hold a Planning Inquiry Commission. The Action Group had quite
rightly pointed out that legislation had specifically set up the
PIC framework for controversies like the Moss Morran affair. The
Action Group also rightly argued initially that only a PIC could ensure
the breadth of consideration of all the issues involved. They did
not have the expertise, they argued, to fight a public inquiry involving
complex technological issues. However, that is precisely what they
tried to do. It is commendab1e on one level, but perhaps politically
and strategically limiting on another. They inadvertently undermined
one of their main objections to Shell/Esso, that of the threat to their
communities 'way of life', by concentrating on the technical arguments,
and more significantly, they became fully incorporated within the
local public inquiry system by actually making the local inquiry
structure work by forming the 'opposing team'. The Action Group
was therefore caught up in a classic dilemma of reproducing the
system, of which it was often critical, by virtue of its participation
in it. Anthony Giddens has recently contributed to a greater under¬
standing of this dilemma by emphasising the importance of "time -
space relations inherent in the constitution of aj1 social interaction".
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"According to the theory of structuration, an
understanding of social systems as situated in
time - space can be effected by regarding structure
as non-temporal and non-spatial, as a virtual order
of differences produced and reproduced in social
interaction as its medium and outcome." (My emphasis)
(11)
It is therefore not an issue about whether the Action Group should
have participated in the inquiry, rather it is an issue about the
grounds upon which they participated, or were compelled to participate,
given the nature of the system. The real point to be made is that
the local public inquiry system forces the local objectors into a
particular framework of opposition, one which is easily controlled
by the political administrative centre, and one which they inevitably
recreate by forming an indispensible part of the institutional
mechanism that makes public inquiries work, namely the public and
the objectors. So unless the constraints of the local public inquiry
system can be broken then opposition will be institutionalised
in accordance with the systems dictates.
Perhaps one possible course of action for the Action Group that might
have been anticipated was the adoption of a wider organisational
strategy involving the nobilising of local people to more direct
forms of action. A campaign of civil disobedience might have been
ancitipated, given the anger felt by some local residents about the
(12)
Shell/Esso scheme. Cyril Burt had after all stated on a BBC
television programme that "had the Action Group their time again then
they would fight much more dirty and much less fair". Some effort
could have been expended on courting the national environmentalist
groups for greater levels of assistance and support. In short
one way to transcend the institutional constraints of the local public
inquiry system would have been the adoption of a far more radical
approach which sought to extend the campaign beyond the locality
and on other fronts than simply the public inquiry. However, the
attempts by the joint Action Group to do this were less than successful.
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The Gray Park Overture
The first attempts at organising a campaign beyond the Dalgety Bay
and Aberdour areas was an overture by the Joint Action Group to the
Gray Park community nearby the main Moss Morran site. The Gray
Park people were faced with a potentially far more disruptive prospect
than those people living near Braefoot Bay. They were threatened
by the certainty that if the project went ahead their whole
community would be destroyed. The houses were only 1£ miles from
the main Moss Morran site.
I met and interviewed the Gray Park Committee on several occasions
and also spoke to many of the residents. The Committee had been
hurriedly formed by two local men Mr. Hume and Mr. Harvey. They
had, by pure chance, read a local press comment about the technical
impact report by Cremer S Warner which stated that the Gray Park
people would almost certainly have to move to accommodate the
NGL and Ethane plants. They also learned at the same time that they
only had three days remaining to make formal objections.
Initially the Gray Park people had favoured the proposed project.
They were all working-class people who had experienced unemployment
both directly and indirectly and they welcomed the possibility of
new work coming into their area. At the public meeting on the 15th
February 1977 held in Dumfermline Town Hall, the Provost, Councillor
Les Wood, had presided over a meeting which had left the residents
assured that they could remain in their houses if they wished.
Wood stated that "generous compensation would be paid and a new community
would be created if there was any possible danger to Gray Park
(13)
residents from the Shell/Esso project". Wood reported on a trip
he had made to the petro-chemical complex at Fowley where, he said,
new houses had recently been built (3 years previously) near to the
perimeter of the complex. They were valued at £20-25,000 at that
time. He also assured them that noise and inconvenience to residents
from construction work would be rigorously controlled to minimise the
disruption to those residents who wished to remain in Gray Park.
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Not surprisingly the Gray Park people had become acquiescent in their
attitude and rather complacent about possible threats to a community
which, for many of them, had been the only place they had ever lived.
There was a three generation family living in the street, and others
had lived there for periods of up to bO years. The local council
had recently completed a renovation programme in the street which had
meant people living in temporary caravans while the houses and flats
were modernised and decorated at substantial cost to the local
council. It was generally believed the Council would not spend
money on improving houses they intended to knock down. However
attitudes quickly changed when the Cremer and Warner report was
published.
The Gray Park community was an obvious Group for the Joint Dalgety
Bay and Aberdour Action Group to join with. They had, it appeared,
a common objective to stop the Shell/Esso project and whereas the
Action Group could provide intellectual and financial support for
their case, the Gray Park people could provide a symbol of solidarity
and a strong emotional lever against those'Who would contemplate
dislocating a 1 defenceless 1 and long long established working-class
community for the short-term profit of multi-national capital", as
(14)
one Action Group member had stated to me. The failure of
the connection partly lies in the nature of the Gray Park community
itself but also in the nature of the Action Group campaign and the
people involved in it.
The first thing that occurred to me when talking to the Gray Park
people was that they were generally undecided about what it was they
wanted; did they want to remain in their present houses with
a community intact, albeit living beside a potentially dangerous
petro-chemica1 complex, or to use the opportunity to gain some
compensation money and a new house elsewhere with the possibility of
the community dispersing? It also emerged that the 'community spirit1
to often proclaimed was perhaps less pervasive than first appeared.
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The small committee in Gray Park, like the Action Group by the Forth,
seemed to have slightly different priorities to the rest of the people
on the street. For example, one young couple I spoke to had only
recently been allocated a house in Gray Park and had only lived there
for two years. They reported two other young couples in the street
who were in a similar situation. They all had young children and
generally "felt different from the rest of the street". They felt
as if they were outsiders. Everyone was friendly enough and would
say hello but the. younger couples had little social contact with the
more established people who formed the committee. They actually
wanted to move from Gray Park. First, residents with children tended
to welcome the idea of a move to an area where their children would
have better access to school. The Gray Park street is quite far
removed from Cowdenbeath. The younger couples also hoped that a
move would mean getting a house rather than the flat they presently
lived in. The couple I spoke to positively favoured the Shell/Esso
project. The husband was then employed at Rosyth Docks and had
been looking for work nearer Cowdenbeath for some time. They had
friends in the building trade who.they believed would benefit from
the construction work. Their attitude to all work had been shaped
by their knowledge of friends and relatives who had experienced
unemployment in their area for years. Since the mining industry
contracted work had been scarce and they believed work was far more
important than "people sailing fancy boats down at Braefoot Bay."
A young unemployed man, Mr. Skelton from 43 Gray Park,annoyed the
committee by publicising the fact that some residents were in favour
of the Shell/Esso project and wanted to leave Gray Park. Skelton
made a voluntary statement to thelocal Cowienbeath and Dunfermline
Press. He and his neighbours Mr. Blakely from number 48 and
Mr. King from number 22 had all refused to sign the Gray Park petition.
It also emerged that some older residents also refused to sign the
petition. Mr. Hume and Mr. Harvey stated to me that they "were all
outsiders anyway" and implied that they were not to be taken seriously.
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It is in the light of these underlying facts that the Committee
should be assessed and the difficu1ties of the Joint Action Group's
overtures should be understood.
The immediate concern of the Gray Park Committee was that their own
case would be subdued within the avalanche of sophisticated rhetoric
coming from the Joint Action Group. They had a basic fear that their
efforts to take the centre stage would be prevented. The Gray
Park Committee members had been galvanised into public action and
on the whole they were enjoying the local noteriety the controversy
had given them. Mr. Hume in particular had said that the Gray Park
people would never be moved and that "they would resist eviction
in front of the television cameras". Two other factors seemed to
convince the Committee to reject involvement with the Joint
Action Group. First, they believed the Dalgety and Aberdour people
were "different" from Gray Park people. They were relatively well
off and did not have as much to lose as Gray Park. People both in
Gray Park and in nearby Cowdenbeath distrusted the motives and goals
of the Dalgety Bay and Aberdour objectors and the Committee did not
want to be "tarred with the same brush". Secondly, several people
in Gray Park as well as theCommittee disliked the style of campaign
that the Joint Action Group were organising; they felt there was too
much show and publicity and they did not feel comfortable about
actions like the procession the Joint Action Group had staged for the
press and television at Braefoot Bay. It became clear that the
Committee were unsure what the reaction from local Gray Park residents
would be to a connection with the Joint Action Group. As 1 have
indicated there was far less resolve in Gray Park to fight
Shell/Esso than was publicly presented and the Committee realised that
to join with the Joint Action Group would exacerbate the divisions
and conflicts that existed.
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So Gray Park defended their independent voice but effectively organised
themselves into a Committee to ensure that the compensation paid for
moving to an alternative area was acceptable, and if possible, to try
and ensure the Community was kept intact for those who wanted to remain
in it. Their campaign was really to make a public claim for those
goals at the public inquiry and ensure a public record of them. The
realities of their situation as council tenants also confronted them.
A refusal to move could, they believed, mean being struck off the
Council housing list. They lacked the freedom and autonomy that
owning property would have given them, as they believed it had given
the Joint Action Group people. A fight for compensation and a reliance
on basic rights as tenants was the only ground they had to stand on,
and they could not risk confusing that fact by incorporation with an
Action Group who were making a quite different case.
The overture by the Joint Action Group to Gray Park therefore proved
to be fruitless. Several attempts were made to convince the Gray
Park Committee to change their minds but they were all unsuccessful.
The failure of the overtures meant no effective contact at all between
the two opposition groups. It was a pattern that repeated itself
in connection with the Conservation Society who were the main
opposition group voicing the environmentalist and ecological argument.
In that case the Joint Action Group were more directly to blame for
the dissociation which resulted.
The Conservation Society and the Action Group.
The Conservation Society is a national organisation which has three
main environmentalist concerns; the conservation of natural resources
(oil and gas being particularly crucial concerns), and the prevention
of pollution to the environment and a broad concern about population
growth and food production. It was the-Edinburgh and East Scotland
branch which became involved in the Moss Morran controversy through
the initial work and concern shown by a Kirkaldy NHS consultant in
bacteriology, Dr. Edmunds. He had been the founder member of the
Fife branch of the Society. However, throughout the latter part
-260 -
of the 19701 s the Society had been slowly winding down in Fife through
a lack of interest. However, prior to the Moss Morran controversy a
few younger people had become involved in the Society leading to
some internal differences in philosophy and political orientation.
During my interview with Dr. Edmunds he related to me the first
appearance at a meeting of a young activist in the Society named
Adrian Grant. Grant later became involved in the public inquiry.
At a meeting of the Society being held in Kirkcaldy, Grant questioned
the relevance of matters then under discussion and made suggestions
about strategy "that were generally unpalatable to the older members."
Grant viewed ecological matters in intrinsically political terms and
wanted the Conservation Society to adopt a more overtly radical stance.
Dr. Edmunds by contrast said "the philosophy of the Conservation
Society has traditionally been different to that which guides other
ecological groups. Some groups espouse values which I consider
border on anarchy. I see the philosophy of the Society as expressing
a concern for traditional values. The Society is aimed towards
encouraging moderate methods of preserving our environment within
a more orderly and disciplined society." ^ Dr. Edmunds went on
to say that he was against the values of the radical commune movement
that he had confronted within the broad ecological movement, but he
was also eager to stress that he considered his own opposition to
continual growth was not conservative in our present materialist and
consumerist society. In summing up the Conservation Society, Dr.
Edmunds insisted that it was, and always hadbeen, apolitical in
terms of the conventional conception of the political spectrum.
He totally rejected the view put forward by some of the Society's
younger members that the problems of the environment and the world's
scarce resources could be resolved by political will and a radical
redistribution of political power. He reiterated his view that
order and discipline were required in both the development of science
and society.
Adrian Grant represented a different breed of activist in the
Conservation Society. He had offended older members of the Society
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at his first appearance at that Fife meeting of the Society by calling
younger members out of the Hall before the meeting had been concluded.
Grant was the Chairman of the Scottish Section of the Society. He could
not accept the apolitical view adopted by Dr. Edmunds and took a
radical anti-growth and de-?ndustria1isat ion stance which was not shared
by a major section of the local society.
Now the important point to draw out is the fact that the Joint Action
Group had early contact with the Conservation Society and sent members
to 'sit-in' on Society Meetings and in turn Dr. Edmunds had travelled
to meetings in both Dalgety Bay and Aberdour. The various strands
of Conservation Society philosophy were therefore revealed to the
Joint Action Group at an early stage. Early contacts had been
followed up and Dr. Edmunds related to me an enthusiastic account of
a meeting held on the 11th January 1977 in theStaff Club of the
Kirkcaldy Victoria Hospital about Moss Morran which had been
attended by leading members of the Joint Action Group, Messrs.
Harris, Jamieson and Burt. At that meeting an investigative visit
to Grangemouth was arranged and John Cowie, another leading Action
Group member, accompanied a party of Conservation Soviety activists
to the oil refinery to see the extent of the development and learn
first hand about its problems and the environmental difficulties it
presented to the local area.
As far as the Joint Action Group were concerned the Conservation Society
seemed to offer a useful source of specialist knowledge. Many of the
Society's views were new to Action Group members and some admitted to
finding even Dr. Edmunds rather radical, let alone Adrian Grant.
However, the initial contacts and meetings had led both the
Conservation Society and some members of the Joint Action Group to
believe that their respective cases would be presented at the public
inquiry as an integrated part of the Joint Action Group. The
Conservation Society in particular had welcomed this move because
they lacked funds and were pleased that the Action Group barrister
would be presenting their case. However other members of the Joint
Action Group .took the view that to associate too closely with the
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Conservation Society would give the impression that local objectors
were anti-industry and they wanted to focus concern on the safety
issue. In conjunction with the Action Group barrister Booker-Mi 1 burn,
the Joint Action Group waited until the opening of the public inquiry
before publicly announcing that they would be presenting their case
independently from the Conservation Society, much to the distress and
annoyance of Dr. Edmunds who had single handed prepared their case
purposely without the input of the more radical Grant. Dr. Edmunds in
particular stressed the fact that the arguments he made at the public
inquiry were effectively tailored to dovetail with the Action Group.
He stressed that he was in fact far more 'radically' anti-growth and
anti-industrialism than he appeared at the inquiry, Grants views
notwithstanding.
Grant did however make many interventions to cross-examinees I have
already indicated in the last chapter, and argued that the gas fields
should be closed down until a national policy was constructed. His
views also took a far more overtly critical view of our overall value
system. John Busby speaking for the Conservation Society also offered
suggestions for a radical design of plant layout which must have
seemed to the more conservative participants in the inquiry as largely
beside the point. However what is significant, 1 think, is again
the revelation that those who favoured a narrower technical focus
for objections and public debate were dominant within the opposition
movement. Those who were interested in a wider remit and more expansive
debate (the very things that would have been hoped for in an Inquiry
Commission, had it been set up) were isolated within the opposition
movement and institutionally differentiated as an integral feature of
the public inquiry system. The Action Group barrister shaped and
advised on presentation in such a way that the focused technical
arguments dominated the opposition case.
The wider political connection with the ecological movement was therefore
short lived. The Join't Action Group having failed to join up with
Gray Park and having consciously decided to dissociate themselves from
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the Conservation Society more and more developed their own insular
campaign and idiosyncratic initiatives.
The last possible movement towards extending the Action Group
campaign to join other opposition groups came with attempts to meet
and co-operate with Farmers in Angus who were shaping up to oppose the
proposed pipeline from St. Fergus to Moss Morran. Cyril Burt, one
of those who had courted the Conservation Society initially, made
early contact after the Angus Farmers had initiated a correspondence.
The objective for some members of the Action Group was to become
directly involved in advising and working to oppose the route
of the pipeline as a way of extending their opposition beyond the
locality. This contact however never fully materialised because,
I would argue, the Action Group had become totally incorporated
within the local public inquiry system. They were more and more
concerned to fight their opposition to Shell and Esso through the
existing planning framework. The information they sought was
always conditioned by the need to present highly technical information
that would either force the Secretary of State finally to agree to a
Planning Inquiry Commission or at the very least re-open the local
public inquiry at a later date. The foresight and the political
will was lacking in the Action Group to organise on a wider front.
The subject of civil disobedience had been raised by some members
of the Joint Action Group as a possible last resort strategy.
However, the support for such action was believed to be very
limited and it was never a subject that was actively on the agenda.
The immediate post-inquiry activities were as always to continue to
gather technical information. John Helm, a member of the Aberdour
sailing lobby and active Action Group member, had suggested disrupting
the public inquiry along similar lines to the strategy adopted by
John Tyme and the motorway opposition group in England. That
strategy had been rejected by the other active members of the Action
Group. Helm made it clear to me during an interview that the
problem of the borderline between law and illegality had troubled
the Action Group. He had personally been in favour of more 'creative'
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tactics and his suggestion of painting the rocks on the Braefoot
Bay shore white to disrupt marine tests was one of a number of
strategies he thought the Action Group might have adopted. It was
admitted by Helm and others I interviewed in Aberdour and Dalgety
Bay, that such initiatives were not mandated by their communities
nor were any of their particular initiatives. There came a point
where the mandate to act and respond to events and circumstances
was assumed. The members heavily involved in the Joint Action
Group were developing their own strategies and taking their own
initiatives. If sitting in front of the bulldozers was undertaken
then that would be down to individuals making their own decision
whether or not to participate.
The main line adopted to extend the campaign was that of 'publicity
and public relations.1 As the information gathering exercise
continued following the conclusion to the public inquiry, the Action
Group decided to produce some sophisticated literature to publicise
the issues involved, as they saw them. The photocopied newsletters
were replaced by three publications that were expensively produced
and professionally laid out.
One of the Action Group activists was a Mr. Drumm who happened to be
a Scottish Office, public relations officer attached to the Scottish
Development Department. Drumm admitted that he had been involved
privately with the opposition movement but for obvious reasons relating
to his career he was unable to be publicly associated with the Action
Group. He had received reminders about his position at his place
of work. Drumm's expertise and advice on publicity material was
evident in producing the publicity material. A newspaper format
entitled The Daily Horror was published detailing explosions,
photographs and short reports ±>out highly inflammable gases from
around the world. A short booklet called Hostage to Hazard was
professionally produced detailing the Shell/Esso proposals, the
main argument against the project made at the public inquiry, and an
analysis of the evidence which recommended again, the setting up of
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a Planning Inquiry Commission. Hostage to Hazard was sent to members
of Parliament to elicit their support with the words "these proposals
affect a large area of Scotland. Next time it could be your constituency."
A further publication was made of a booklet called Nought for your
Heritage which concerned the environmental impact of the proposals,
particularly on. the historic Incholm Abbey on an island off the shore
of Braefoot Bay. The booklet was aimed to "stir the consciences of
all those bodies such as Churches, the National Trust for Scotland,
the Department of the Environment, the political parties and all those
other bodies entrusted with the preservation of our heritage and
our environment - and who have so far remained disturbingly quiet -
to make their protest." The particular effect of these publicity
initiatives were relatively hard to gauge. They had the additional
boost of attracting media attention. What seems to have happened
is that knowledge about the Shell/Esso project was extended, and
perhaps made a little more clear, presented in the way it was by
the Action Group literature. The reputation of the local objectors
was undoubtedly enhanced. They attracted many comments about their
campaign, mostly favourable, praising their stamina and organisation.
However, it is questionable whether an expensively produced booklet
sent through the post to a member of parliament was the most effective
way to go about stopping the Shell/Esso project.
Given their complete incorporation within the planning inquiry system,
the best strategy that the Action Group adopted in the post-inquiry
stage was to press for a re-opening of the inquiry by introducing
new technical material. This was the favoured strategy of those
remaining activity in the opposition movement who were on the whole
those who had technical knowledge about petro-chemicals of one sort or
another. The keen local helpers had retired to the sidelines at an
early stage and once the public inquiry had been concluded there
seemed to emerge two main strands of the campaign left; the technology
critique and the legal manoeuvre. First, the greatest effort was
made to collate technical information that could force the Secretary
of State to re-open the.public inquiry even if he would not force
the setting up of a Planning Inquiry Commission.
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The most significant development of the post-inquiry period was the
discovery that radio waves were being considered a hazard at the St.
Fergus Gas Plant near Peterhead. The nearby naval base at Crimond
had caused some alarm when it was reported in the press that naval
radio signals could be a potential ignition source. The Joint
Action Group were on to this piece of news in an instant and transformed
a small news item of a technical nature into front page headlines.
They gathered their own data on the Forth area and submitted a report
directly to the Secretary of State arguing that structures of plants
proposed for Moss Morran and Braefoot Bay might attract energy from
radio waves being transmitted either by ships on the Forth, or more
likely from the Independent Broadcasting Authority transmitter
at Barns Farm behind the Braefoot Bay site. The Secretary of
State was about to reach the conclusion that the Shell/Esso project
should be allowed when the Action Group report forced a delay and an
in depth investigation of the radio waves issue. The Health and
Safety Executive were instructed to investigate and so the final
decision about the project was delayed. In addition to this
move a local Dalgety Bay resident who had not been directly involved
in the campaign passed on an American report to the Action Group
on the siting of NGL plants. That report was exclusive to the Action
group and to their credit they got the maximum media coverage for
the report which stated clearly that a high level policy decision
had been taken in Washington not to site any NGL plants near to centres
of population. The report also questioned the need for new Ethane
Crackers given the over capacity of Ethane worldwide. This report
was again submitted directly to the Secretary of State with a
request that the public inquiry be re-opened to enable an open con¬
sideration of the findings of the American report.
In both cases the reports succeeded in delaying a final decision.
The Secretary of State finally agreed to instruct the IBA to move
their transmitter at the oil companies expense. The American report
was however effectively ignored.
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Following the failure to get the inquiry re-opened on technical
grounds the Action Group adopted a second manoeuvre that of taking
a legal action to get the project stopped. In 1980 in Harris versus
the Secretary of State for Scotland there was an attempt to use the
courts to negate administrative decisions. This issue goes back to
my discussion in chapter 2 where I revealed that the only basis an
objector can have for requesting the courts assistance, in what are
considered administrative matters, is in a case where the lawyers
decide that there has been a breach of the rules of'natural justice'.
The whole concept of 'natural justice,1 as I have already argued, is
so formally defined by lawyers that its violation is virtually impossible
to prove if formal access has been given to the planning procedures
and there has been an agreed format for exchanging information and
participating within the public inquiry. The decision made by the
State Minister is virtually unchangeable.
The recourse to law by the Action Group was their particular gesture
to publicise the need for reform of the public inquiry system. As a
gesture it was probably doomed to failure and probably fruitless
because they failed to recognise the need to organise on a wider
basis. Their interest in reform has become muted since it now
appears that they have lost the war as the bulldozers move into prepare
the sites in Fife. It is now questionable whether there is any
political will left to seek an ongoing strategy to force a serious
re-consideration of the local public inquiry system, especially its
use for considering highly complex technological issues with national
implicat ions.
Concluding Remarks.
It is clear that it can not be expected that people directly fighting
to defend their own immediate interests will take a wider perspective.
It is perhaps more pertinent to question the role of the national
environmentalist organisations and the politica1 parties for their
failure to initiate a broader consideration of institutional change
to the public inquiry system. There has obviously been lacking an
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organisation to act as a catalyst to bring disparate Action Groups
together. The problems of local private troubles must be made
into what C.Wright Mills calls 'public issues'. The public controversy
surrounding the local public inquiry system must begin to have a
particular political direction, preferrably as part of a wider
consideration of the re-distribution of power in our society from
institutions of the state to those rooted in the public sphere.
It is unclear though how any radical alteration can take place to
the system of political administrative institutions that serve us
until there is a co-ordinated attempt to identify the major
structural problems inhibiting genuine public participation and
influence in the local public inquiry system. That movement, it
seems to me, will have to be initiated by those directly confronting
the 1 inauthenticity1 of existing institutional practices, and it
must lead ultimately to a broader movement for change. The
containment of action and opposition to the local communities
directly affected is likely to retard a wider social and political
movement emerging.
The real issue is again one of establishing as a procedural principle,
that decisions and debate must be subjected to an institutionally
secured public scrutiny. The overwhelming impression that I was
left with having observed the formulation and presentation of
opposition to Shell/Esso in Fife is how paradoxically the very
constitution of the local public inquiry system tends to remove
discussion and decision-making from the public sphere. The fact
that the ultimate right to decide on planning issues lies with the
appropriate Government Minister is fairly clear. What is often
overlooked is the fact that the process of 1autonomisat ion1 that
I have described has the effect of ultimately by-passing the local
community public sphere in two related ways. First, by the necessity
to code input for the local public inquiry in terms of a collection
code which recognises 'expertise' above all else, the layman is
informally kept out of the central debates, and more politically
- 269 -
debilitating, kept out of his or her own community action group.
The central figures involved in the Moss Morran opposition movement
were all people who were bearers of some esoteric technical knowledge
or skill. Secondly, once the processes of 1autonomisat ion' and
'personalisation' had occurred the^Action Group initiated actions
and engaged in dialogue about the Shell/Esso project directly with
the Secretary of State. Once the public inquiry had been concluded
there was no longer any institutional mechanism that existed to
sustain an ongoing publicly oriented debate. The result of this was
that a kind of 'corporatist' exchange became established between
the major interests. The general public were no longer privileged
to participate in these debates and the decisions that might flow
from them. The strategy of information exchanges and consultations
which bypass the public sphere is one which the central government
seems to favour as a means of representation. It tends to be less
protracted and certainly less costly than re-opening a public
inquiry. It could be argued, and I make that argument strongly, that
ironically the period after thelocal public inquiry was probably
the Action Group's most productive period. They were able to get
both the Secretary of State and the oil companies to seriously
re-examine their assumptions about safety. The Action Group did
in fact discover enough new information to warrant the re-opening
of the public inquiry. The fact that it was not re-opened seems
to me to indicate a preference by the Secretary of State for direct
correspondence and dialogue with the local objectors without the added
complication of open public scrutiny. The radio waves issue was one
which had not been raised in the public inquiry and one which deserved
an open and extensive examination. It was an issue that met the
criterion of being 'new information' and for that reason alone the
public inquiry should have been re-opened. The refusal to re-open
the inquiry down-graded it as an institutional mechanism. Its worth
is taken increasingly into question when it is assidiously avoided
by theSecretary of State.
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Having shaped down the range of issues to those relating specifically
to the technological controversies, which were admittedly extremely
important, the local public inquiry system fai1s to provide a forum
for adequately exploring those controversies. This problem is not
helped by moving from an apparent mechanism of public openness to
one of private correspondence and government sponsored investigations
which are not genuinely accountable to public questioning and discussion.
Why was the local public inquiry system not capable of identifying
the radio waves issue in the first place? Why was there not a broader
international examination of comparative policies towards the siting
of petro-chemica1 plants? The obvious answer seems to be that
despite administrators and politicians alarm over the time and cost
of large public inquiries,the pub 1ic hearings that have been set up
to consider oil and gas development have been far too restrictive
in terms of time and remit. One could be forgiven for thinking
that there was a contempt for the public inquiry instrument by
government. The Planning Inquiry Commission is obviously not preferred
by Government because of the expansion it would entail in the class¬
ification and framing of knowledge and information. However, most
of the major public inquiries held in Scotland have technically
qualified to be set up as a PIC, the fact that they have not been
is further evidence of the overwhelming preference towards the system
rationality I have already discussed and the tendency to control
Action Groups by 'corporatist style1 exchanges as far as possible.
The reform of the public inquiry system must therefore be based on a
recognition of the wider political constraints and obstacles but
perhaps more importantly, it must be based on a reflexive stance by
objectors and Action Groups of what the system dees to the formulation
and presentation of their own opposition campaign. The preoccupation
with institutional discourse must inevitably give way to wider forms
of political action. Unless an Action Group orcollection of Action
Groups re-focus their attention away from their individual battles
to the greater 'war' which confronts them it is unlikely that a
social base ban be established for genuine reform, far less radical
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transformation of the local public inquiry system. The controversy
about the local public inquiry system seems to cease with the final
decision issued by the Secretary of State. Very little momentum of a
cumulative nature remains to press for a change to the system before
the next controversy arises. It is to the necessity for institutional
change that I now turn in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
TOWARDS A CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE
In Toward a Rational Society Habermas poses a very important question
which precisely identifies the central issue confronting any attempt
to reform the public inquiry system; namely, "how is it possible to
translate technically exploitable knowledge into the practical
consciousness of a social life-world?" The way in which this
issue is currently resolved in the public inquiry system is to treat
all knowledge as synonomous with scientific and technical understanding.
The dominance of collection knowledge codes effectively excludes
knowledge derived from the "action-orienting self understanding of
social groups".
Exactly why this situation has arisen in industrial society has
concerned thinkers before Habermas. Georg Simmel, for example,
(2)addressed this issue in his development of 'formal' sociology.
Central to Simmel's sociology is the distinction between the content
and form of socia 1 1ife. The content of socia1 1 i fe is constituted by
a variety of individual drives, motives, interests and purposes. Also
included within this concept of content is the raw idea of technology
and work shorn of their social form which Simmel understood as the
materials which build up to constitute 'sociation or social forms'.
Such contents "are factors in sociation only when they transform the
mere aggregation of isolated individuals into specific forms of being."
He goes on :
"In accord with our purposes, we give these materials
certain forms and only in these forms operate and use
them as elements of our lives." /,\
As the above quotation describes, social forms are the outgrowth of
human purposes, intentions and needs which Simmel understood as serving
social existence.
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The problem he identified was that:
"these materials, these forces and interests, in a
particular manner remove themselves from the service of
life that originally produced and employed them (my
emphasis) They become autonomous in the sense that
they are no longer inseperable from the objects which
they formed and thereby made available to our purposes.
They come to play freely in themselves and for their
own sake; they produce or make use of materials that
exclusively serve their own operation and realisation."
w
In the same piece Simmel discusses how cognition, as a content of
social life becomes autonomous. He goes on, "exact knowledge of the
behaviour of things is, in fact, of extraordinary utility for the
maintenance and promotion of life. Yet cognition is no longer used
in the service of this practical achievement: science has become
a va1ue in itse1f. (my emphasis) It quite autonomously chooses
its object, shapes them according to its own needs, and is interested
in nothing beyond its own perfection."
The extension which Simmel makes to this idea of the 'autonomisation
of contents' assists in broadening the problem from that of technology
and the dominance of instrumental reason in public inst i tut ions to
a second problem level, that of institutional forms themselves.
He developed the idea of the 'autonomous form'. For example,
I have been pointing to the transformation of the concept of 'natural
justice' from the embodiment and expression of a commonly perceived
sense of justice to a formal legalistic term determined by formal
legal and administrative criteria. I would argue that 'natural
justice' is a content of sociation in Simmel's sense which is
realised only through institutional forms such as public inquiries.
However, rather than the content determining the form the reverse
has taken place and the 'common-sense' underpinning to the notion
of 'natural justice' has been eclipsed. Simmel suggests that just
as contents such as technology and science become autonomous so
to do forms like institutional structures. "The forms in which
this process results gain their own life, it is freed from all ties
with contents. It exists for its own sake of the fascination which,
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in its own liberation from these ties, it diffuses". ^
In public inquiries thus process is evident. Rather than a means
to obtain public participation and enlightenment about collective
problems containing technological, environmental and sociological
dimensions, public inquiries become straight jackets into which
issues, arguments and knowledge must be fitted and distorted by
1scientism1.
The 1autonomisation of the institutional form1 conceptualises the
difficulty confronting- attempts to make public inquiries more open
and responsive to the needs, wishes and purposes of those people most
affected by large industrial developments. In the remainder of
this chapter I want to suggest how the critical theory of Habermas
can clarify the conceptual difficulties involved in relating 'technical'
to 'practical' forms of knowledge. I will examine Habermas' thesis
on knowledge constitutive interests and suggest that implied within
the theoretical problem of how to reconcile 'technical' with 'practical'
forms of knowledge interests there is a suggestion that the emerging
politicisat ion of the ecology movement throughout Europe could well
be the location for a unified theory and practice aimed towards
changing decision-making structures in industrial society.
Knowledge Interests and Decision-Making Processes
In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas sought to "radicalise
epistemology by unearthing the roots of knowledge in life". The
thesis was argued that there are distinctive "cognitive strategies"
which are rooted "in the natural history of the human species."
Substantively this guiding idea led Habermas to develop a trichotomous
model of human interests, structured activities and sciences all
located in the human species' efforts to produce their existence and
reproduce their "species being". As an extension of a critical
reformulation made of Marx's concept of 'sensuous human activity',
Habermas identifies the irreducible domains of work and interaction
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and develops this insight by arguing that there are three anthropologically
rooted strategies for interpreting life; the practical, the technical
and the emancipatory. These different interests unfold in distinct
activities and media namely language, work and power which are in
turn located within three identifiable sciences which correspond
with these interests and structured activities; hermeneutics,
empirical - analytic science and critical theory. Each science
contains a different set of criteria for distinguishing objectivity
and truth. Therefore the main focus of Habermas's critique of
Luhmann is that he failed to locate his analysis within a framework
that encompasses the practical and hermeneutic moments in life experience.
Luhmann's analysis is one-dimensional, setting political and ideological
objectives in the guise of a greater realism yet failing to incorporate
the real significance of language and power as important mediating
resources within all human societies. While Luhmann eschews the
very idea of the public sphere as out-dated and idealist he fails
to appreciate that the moral concepts which he considers so irrelevant
do actually represent a major obstacle to the complete destruction
of the public sphere because they are rooted in anthropological
interests and are not an historically specific and ephemeral ideological
aberration.
It may be objected that Habermas1 insistence on finding categorical
distinctions which other thinkers do not acknowledge results in a
false set of distinctions where there are none. It is argued that
Habermas is wrong to conclude that the empirica1-ana 1ytic sciences
are guided solely by an Interest in technical control and that his
concept of instrumental rationality and scientific method is too
narrow, particularly since it appears that he fails to incorporate
many insights from the post-Kuhnian philosophy of science. My
interpretation of Habermas however is grounded in the institutional
analysis of an actual politica1-administrative system, namely the
public inquiry. From that position it is clear that while Habermas
may be wrong if he is arguing that there is something intrinsic to
the empirical-analytic sciences that guides them towards technical
control, (over nature and social phenomena), historically, and in terms
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of contemporary public appearance, it seems that instrumental reason
takes on an imperialist position in relation to other ways of knowing.
As Richard Bernstein observes "It is a fiction.,..to suggest that
there are categorically different types of inquiry and knowledge,
but it is not a fiction to see how the battle of competing technical,
practical and emancipatory cognitive interests continue to rage." ^
The battle referred to by Bernstein takes a particular form within
public inquiries and one dominant interpretation of science and
technological method is, at least for public consumption, clearly
evident. The cognitive interests identified by Habermas represent
what I believe are distinguishable political positions in the power
struggle over the classification and framing of knowledge in public.
The empirical—analytic sciences are historically being shaped in a
direction unsympathetic and hostile to emancipatory interests, if
this is conceptualised in terms of the classification and framing
of an integrated knowledge code.in contemporary society. If enclosed
within an integrated code, the guiding interest lying behind the
empirica1-analytic sciences could conceivably be directed in a more
emancipated direction, that is, aimed towards the articulation of
hermeneutic with nomological knowledge. Similarly, it must be
acknowledged that the same emphasis must be applied to the other
cognitive interests identified by Habermas. There is nothing
inherent within hermeneutics and critical theory which guides them
towards emancipation. The whole problem of what can motivate
people to seek co-operation and overcome distorted communicative
forms is a very difficult problem not so far dealt with by Habermas
and beyond this piece of work to resolve. However the question I
wish to address is what institutional form can relate the cognitive
interests in a way which might contribute to the resolution of
that problem.
Habermas' work on knowledge interests has recently been subjected
to criticism by Russell Keat in terms of the knowledge constitutive
separation of object-domains and the problem of applying hermeneutic
(8)
categories to the technical sphere. Keat's criticism can be
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confronted and used to clarify the issue I am concerned with.
In figure 3, derived from Russell Keat's critique of knowledge
interests, Habermas is represented as developing his theory of
knowledge constitutive interests in relation to distinct object-
domains on the foundation of his categorical dualism. Despite this
formulation by Keat of discrete parallel elements, Habermas acknowledges
that work and interaction are only moments within an analytic complex
"instrumental action is embedded in communicative
action (productive activity is socially organised in
general). But I see no reason why we should not
adequately analyse a complex i.e. dissect it into
parts." (9)
He therefore acknowledges both the interpenetration of work and
interaction and the fact that it is not a question of one type of
action that is governed by norms and the other by purely technical
and instrumental criteria. The conceptual distinctions are drawn
depending on which aspects or components of a complex predominate.
This view of Habermas1 project is rejected by Russell Keat. In
his diagram he constructs a critique which seeks to illustrate an
interpretation of knowledge constitutive interests which he claims
allows Habermas
"no philosophical space for claiming that the
ontological differentiation of nature and society
is objectively, non-interest-constitutive1y based,
he at the same time denies the possibility of a
1hermeneutics of nature that is an objectificat ion of
'nature' (as, say, a teleological or communicative
realm) by the practical rather than the technical
interest."
Keat goes on to criticise Habermas for implicitly endorsing a
dichotomy between subject and object "and hence, between a science
of the subject and a science of the object". This criticism is
based on the following passage from Knowledge and Human Interest













































"Marx, on the contrary, does not view nature under
the category of another subject, but conversely the
subject under the category of another nature. Hence,
although their unity can only be brought about by a
subject, he does not comprehend it as an absolute
unity. The subject is originally a natural being
instead of nature being originally an aspect of the
subject, as in idealism. Therefore unity, which
can only come about through the activity of a subject
remaining in some measure imposed on nature by the subject.
The resurrection of nature cannot be logically conceived
within materialism, no matter how much the early Marx
and the speculative minds in the Marxist tradition
(Walter Benjamin, Ernest Bloch, Herbert Marcuse,
Theordor Adorno) find themselves attracted by this
heritage of mysticism. Nature does not conform to the
categories under which the subject apprehends it in the
unresisting way in which a subject can conform to the
understanding of another subject on the basis of
reciprocal recognition under categories that are
binding on both of them".
(11)
The criticism being made by Keat is that Habermas can at the very
frost develop only an tnterest-re 1 ative concept of truth because he
ties all knowledge to underlying cognitive interests ground^in human
life and its reproduction. The difficulty that such a position
holds for developing a critical theory of the public inquiry system
is that is appears that logically Habermas1 work provides no basis
for conceptualising the control and direction of technical interests
and categories within the object-domain of science and technology
by recourse to practical interests and categories derived from the
social sphere.
Habermas has already responded to this line of criticism in
Theory and Practice.
"In previous investigations 1 have brought out the
connection between knowledge and interest without
making clear the critical threshold between communication
which remains tied to the context of action and discourses
which transcend the constraints of action. To be sure
the constitution of scientific domains can be construed
as a continuation of the objectivations that we undertake
in the social life-world prior to all science. But the
claim to objectivity genuinely raised by science is based
on suspension of the pressure of experience and decision
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and it is only this that permits a discursive testing
of hypothetical validity claims and thus the generation
of grounded knowledge. Against the objectivistic self-
understanding of the sciences, which refers naively to
the facts, an indirect relation to action can be shown
for theoretical knowledge, but nothing like a direct
derivation from imperatives of life practices (which I
never asserted in any case).... The interests which guide
knowledge preserve the unity of the respective system
of action and experience vis-avis discourse; they
retain a latent nexus of theoretical knowledge to
action throughout the transformation of opinions into
theoretical sentences and their translation back into
action-orienting knowledge. But in no way.... do
they affect the difference between validity claims
which are recognised as a matter of fact and those
which are rationally grounded."
(12)
As Thomas McCarthy makes clear, Habermas wants to keep separate
"the constitution of the objects of possible experience" and
"the argumentative vindication of validity claims1.1 In his 'Post¬
script to Knowledge and Human Interest.1 Habermas argues:
"The objectivity of experience could only be a sufficient
condition of truth if we did not have to understand
theoretical progress as a critical development of theory
languages which interpret the scientific object domain
more or less 'adequately1. The 'adequacy of a theory
language is a function of the truth of these theories
(theoretical statements) that can be formulated in that
language. If we did not redeem these truth claims through
argumentative reasoning, relying instead on verification
through experience alone, then theoretical progress would
have to be conceived as the production of new experience
and not as the reinterpretation of the same experience.
It is therefore more plausible to assume that the object¬
ivity of experience guarantees not the truth of a
corresponding statement, but the identity of experience
in the various statements interpreting that experience."
(Uf)
My preference is to interpret this problematic issue within the
context of Habermas' overall political framework aimed towards the
realisation of an authentic political public sphere. This aim must
seek to institutionally control science and technology by an integrated
rather than col 1ected knowledge code to enable the full efficacy of
































































































































































































the objectificat ion of nature and social reality, while separable
processes, can nevertheless be unified by an enlightened human
subject. My version of this is based on a public political process
framed within a public inquiry that seeks to modify the practical and
technical categories in accordance with a relational idea unifying
the technical and practical interest (See Figure 4.)
In figure b, for example, I do not conceive of the human subject in
the abstrac^as Keat does, but I locate the subject within an
institutional framework consisting of a system of rules and procedures
that are geared towards seeking an enlightened articulation of the
'practical' with the 'technical' interests. The logic of this
framework is to conceive of both nature and social reality as
constitutive of an object domain for a synthesis of a critical
theory of society and technology with a critical social ecology.
However, I do not underestimate the difficulties involved in establish¬
ing such a concept. Critical theory seeks to provide analysis and
concepts with practical intent. It is therefore necessary to begin
to connect the theoretical concerns of this thesis with the wider
political problems of their realisation.
The Public Sphere, Social Movements and the Reaction Against
Instrumental Reason.
The central political hiatus in critical theory since its creation
by the Frankfurt School has been the absence of an addressee for its
analytical insights. Horkheimer and Adorno, for example, concluded
very early in their work that the working class was no longer the
historical agent for transforming capitalism. ^ The lack of an
identifiable class orcjroupto which critical theory might address
itself has been a major point of criticism levelled at the contemporary
work of Habermas and his associates. However, the criticism is
misconceived. The appeal being made by contemporary critical
theory is not to an ungrounded reason as many of its critics have
(l6)
suggested. Habermas in particular has been concerned to
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uncover the potential for reason and understanding that is inherent
in the structure of speech itself but which is often obscured by
ideological distortions in contemporary social and political institutions.
The objective of Habermas' project is to demonstrate that a non-
relativist concept of reason and legitimation can be established through
argument within an open and unrestricted public sphere. The appeal
is therefore to the inherent potential of self-reflection and dialogue
to reveal truth and distortion rather than to a specific social group.
Nevertheless, there is in addition an emerging recognition by Habermas
and others that many of the values and objectives of critical theory
are influencing contemporary grass roots movements, and an addressee
for a critical theory of capitalism may be found in some of the new
social movements offering a challenge to advanced capitalism. In
the area of planning and the environment, for example, a criticism
of capitalist industrialisation is being formulated by groups
protesting about the ecological destruction of the environment and
the proliferation of civilian and military nuclear power.
Habermas has recently acknowledged the potential inherent within
these emerging social movements for seeking radical political and
economic changes in capitalist society.
"If we ask ourselves what these various movements of
protest have in common, I would say that they reveal
an increasing sensitivity towards, and readiness to
rebel against, secondary dysfunctions of capitalist
growth. There is a rising awareness of the 'infiltration'
of capital into areas of life which until now were shielded
from it by tradition, and within which the values of capit¬
alist society were not hitherto dominant. Such currents
do not represent the classical potential for protest
delineated by Marxism, although workers are naturally also
involved in them. Their social composition is heterogeneous."
It is due to these observations that Habermas has re-assessed his
argument about the de-politicisat ion of the public sphere. In
Legitimation Crisis he suggested that the public sphere is again
becoming a "conflict zone". Richard Weiner has suggested that
Habermas has now adopted a position whereby;
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"The public sphere is understood as emerging
inter-subjectively out of the communications of
participating subjects having intentions of
creating new institutions and practices, historical
consciousness and a sense of collective identity
they are bent on developing. These communications....
negate the legitimacy of the already instituted
channels of political decision-making and bypass them
in their struggle to develop a more rational quality
of life for the social whole
The emphasis is on the communications and intentions
that become embodied in innovative practices manifested
in contemporary grass roots movements." ^g^
The concept of the public sphere expressed by Habermas recently is
one in which social movements act as the bearers of "new normative
principles" and provide a "qualitatively new framework of experience"
(19)for people. The connection between his persistent concern
with the concept of the public sphere and his recent excursions into
language and communication is made explicit by this interest in
social movements; they create a public space within them for
argument about the "validity claims of legitimacy and authority",
and crucially, he argues they could have a significant role to play
in changing public institutions and decision-making structures.
I am therefore suggesting that the ecology movement and the peace
movement, as central groups within a wider social movement against
what Habermas calls the "secondary dysfunctions of capitalism",
could be the grounding for a new link between the theory and practice
of a critical theory of the public sphere. (See figure 5). Whether
or not one can attach meaningful labels to emerging social movements
and bodies of thought is less important than acknowledging that both
critical theory, and the ecology and peace movements, share a political
position which rejects the dominance of instrumental forms of
rationality and the unfettered growth of capitalist industrialisation.
For the want of a more appropriate label, one might call the emerging
perspective a 'critical social ecology'. Its ingredients seem to
be, first, the extension of the idea of ecology beyond environmenta1ism
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to embrace the social, political and economic foundations of a new
knowledge which seeks to integrate nature and social reality, and
secondly, the conception of new institutional decision-making
structures as an integral feature of the challenge to the hegemony
of instrumental reason in late capitalist society. Murray Bookchin
has recently articulated this idea:
"The ecological project conceived as a project of a
radical social ecology would thereby provide the
bases for a rich critique of prevailing ideologies -
bourgeois and socialist alike - that would transcend
the traditional 'radical' critiques of political economy.
It would open the way for a discussion of new forms of
organisation (for example the affinity group ), new
forms of struggle (direct action, conceived as self-
management, not merely the occupation of nuclear power
plant sites) new forms of citizenship (self-activity,
viewed as forms of self realisation). The ecological
project, so conceived would provide the social
gymnasium for shedding the sense of powerlessness
that threatens to reduce the public sphere to a
bureaucratised substitute for all forms of human
consociation".
In relation to the specific issue of reforming the local public inquiry
system in Britain, I am suggesting that local action groups must begin
to get 'plugged in' to the wider based movement that I have described
if radical changes are to be realised. In the.case studies that I
have described there was little evidence that locally based action
groups were capable of providing a social base for a wider reform
movement or indeed that they even wanted a change to the existing
public inquiry system. Without exception, the controversies at
Cromarty, Dunnet Bay, Drumbuie and at Moss Morran, ceased with the
final decision made by theSecretary of State for Scotland. The
question is, what hope, if any, is there that a wider social move¬
ment, rooted in the ecology and peace issues, will emerge in Britain
and try to change thepolitical administrative structures that currently
exist in the direction my analysis has suggested?
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There are two distinct issues involved in answering this question,
First, a great deal will depend on the degree of unity or conflict
internal to the grass roots movements. It has to be acknowledged
that groups concerned about ecology and the nuclear issue hold
distinct views about the problems and solutions confronting
(22)advanced capitalist society. It is therefore highly likely
that any challenge to alter the decision-making structures of the
capitalist state will come only when the struggles and conflicts
within these movements have been settled in favour of those
factions on the left. Secondly, a great deal will depend on the
willingness or success of tbe major political parties to integrate the
concerns of the grass roots movements. This latter issue raises
an important point about whether or not the success or failure to
1
par 1iamentarise1 the issues raised by the broad ecology movement
will strengthen or weaken their objectives.
The Politics and Ideology of the Ecology Movement
Muller-Rommel has recently pointed to the quite distinct ideological
composition of the various ecology parties throughout Western
(23)
Europe. In his review of the origins of such parties he
identifies three types. First, there are small socialist parties
that existed prior to the development of the environmentalist movement
in Europewhich tave traditionally incorporated ecological issues within their
political programme as part of their broad critique of capitalist industrialism.
Secondly, there are parties described as 'post-materialist' that
have been consciously formed to appeal to an environmentally
conscious electorate. These parties attract support from liberal
and conservative electors as well as from people with socialist
leanings. The ecology party in Britain is of this type. Thirdly,
fTsny Western European societies have a tradition of liberal and
agrarian based political parties that have represented the environ¬
mentalist cause for some considerable period within the formal
political structure. Examples cited by Muller-Rommel are the
Centrum party in Sweden, the Democrates '66 in the Nether 1ands and
Venstre in Norway. While it is clear that the broad environmentalist
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movement attracts support across the traditional political spectrum,
and is therefore difficult to classify on the ideological left-
right axis, it is probably the case from the evidence produced by
Muller-Rommel that those parties who take a broad view of ecology
as something more than environmentalism, direct their critique
against capitalism0 These are groups or parties that have a concern
about the relationship between environmental destruction and the
economic and political processes that characterise capitalism.
In terms of the social class composition of these parties here again
the issue is not clear. The ecology movement in general is often
characterised as being middle class but Cotgrove has recently shown
that simply to view the ecology and peace movements in this way will
tend to give the impression of a greater degree of conservatism than
(24)
actually exists. In terms of occupation many members and
supporters of the broad ecology movement may well be in non-manual
and professional jobs but their location in terms of the overall
productive process tends to be marginal. Cotgrove argues that:
"....we have identified a group of individuals with
a distinctive ideology,...environmenta1ism is an
expression of the interests of those whose class
position in the 'non-productive sector1 locates
them at the periphery of the institutions and
processes of industrial capitalism. Hence their
concern to win greater participation and influence
and thus strengthen the political role of their
members. It is a protest against alienation from
processes of decision-making and the depoliticisat ion
of issues through the usurpation of policy decisions
by experts, operating within the dominant economic
values." ^5)
Cotgrove's position is similar to that of Alvin Gouldner who argues
that a distinct 'new class' has emerged in advanced industrial
society which is separate from the traditional propertied bourgeoisie,
(26)
petty bourgeoisie or the proletariat. However this 'new class1
is internally divided between a technical intelligentsia and humanistic
intellectuals. It would be wrong however to conclude that the
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broad ecology movement consists of only humanistic intellectuals who
are opposed to the dominant values of capitalism. Muller-Rommel1s
data leads us to the view that the ecology movement attracts the
support of many members that Gouldner and Cotgrove might describe as
part of the technical intellegentsia of the 'new class'. Indeed
Muller-Rommel concludes that many of the 'post-materialist'
parties of his type 2, similar to the ecology party in Britain,
have attracted older and more conservative supporters who have
been unable to pursue their interests in environmental issues through
the mainstream political parties. It is therefore likely that a
significant factor determining the future potential of the ecology
movement to seriously challenge political structures in capitalist
society will depend upon internal conflicts between their competing
factions,
The argument suggested by Gouldner however is that the 'new class'
has a common interest in a "culture of critical discourse" which
unites its various factions. Gouldner argues that the 'new class1
shares a common socio-1inguistic and educational background and
an interest in applying reason to the resolution of social and
political problems. While designating the 'new class' a "flawed
universal class" because of its unrealised potential to replace
conflict and violence with discourse and reason, Gouldner nevertheless
argues that it may be "the best card history has yet dealt". The
problem with this line of argument is that in pinning so much hope
on the 'new class', he ignores its tendency to exacerbate the
division between intellectuals and ordinary people. And it is
likely that divisions will emerge in the ecology movement between
those who want to make wider connections with working class'political
action and those members of the 'new class' content to engage in a
technical discourse with those holding politica1-administrative
power, A great deal will depend therefore on the direction of
protest that the broad ecology movement takes. An issue raised by
this subject is the future relationship between the broad ecology
movement, including the peace movement, and political parties. The
crucial point here is whether or not the problems initiated by the
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grass roots movements are taken up by the large political parties
(2?)
seeking to 1 par 1iamentarise1 the ecology issue.
Ecology and the Parliamentary System
The dilemma that confronts all grass roots movements is whether they
can achieve significant institutional change by staying outside the
formal political process or whether by joining the parliamentary
system through the electoral process or by support for a large
political party, they compromise the radical nature of their
objectives.
There is some evidence that environmentalist groups have actually
bought about greater levels of public participation in science and
technology policy formation. The evidence is however not decisive
either in support of pressure group politics or parliamentary politics.
Dorothy Nelkin, for example, has examined various experiments in
(28)
public participation in Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands,
in all of the case studies looked at by Nelkin a combination of direct
action and electoral support for parliamentary candidates led to
specific attempts by government to set up more open and democratic
decision-making structures. However, the evidence also seems to
suggest that the failure of such experiments to meet the full demands
of the radical wing of the ecology movement was partly to do with
the political compromise inevitably imposed upon all parties prepared
to engage in formal political participation. Nelkin suggests, for example,
that 'study circles' in Sweden designed to improve public
participation in planning contributed to greater levels of support
for the government's science and technology policy. This could
hardly have been the intention of the ecology parties who considered
those policies to be bad. With a lack of a clear set of objectives
on the part of the ecology parties it seems that many radical objectives
can easily be submerged in governmental responses aimed at 'formal'
rather than 'substantive' participatory schemes.
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It may well be that the choices confronting the ecology movement
in the 1980's and beyond are limited. For example, in a modern
complex state with corporatist tendencies is it feasible for the
ecology movement to restrict itself to pluralist pressure group
politics? As Cawson points up, the modern state typically consists
of two sectors of politics, a corporatist sector involving the
main functional groups for the management of the economy and a
pluralist sector dominated by pressure group politics focusing on
(29)
Parliament. The only way the ecology issue is likely to
force itself on to the political agenda is through the main party
system. The question is, of course, about reform rather than
revolution. The radical programme suggested by my analysis would
realistically have to be enclosed within the potentia 1 of a social
democratic party of the left to achieve institutional change.
The relative success of the ecology movement in the rest of Europe
compared with Britain seems to be conditioned by the willingness of
major pariiamentary parties to take up the ecology issue initiated
by grass roots movements. While some scepticism may be justified
with respect to the changes effected by the Scandinavian countries
in increasing public participation in planning, it has to be
conceded that the strength of parties such as Venstre in Norway,
and Centrum in Sweden (regularly collecting about 20% of the vote
at general elections) has kept the issue of'democracy and planning1
firmly on the political agenda. Similarly, the success of the
more radical form of ecology party* namely Parti to Radicale in
Italy, in getting a number of candidates elected to the national
parliament, has been instrumental in opening up debate about public
control over the proliferation of civilian and military nuclear
power. The situation in Britain is quite different. The low
level of representation of the ecology issue at government level in
Britain compared with the rest of Western Europe is undoubtedly
due to the absence of a system of proportional representation.
This is a question which I do not wish to consider except to note
that the possibilities for electoral reform are perhaps greater in
contemporary Britain than ever before. However, another
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crucial reason why ecology has not become a significant political
issue in this country has been the traditional support of the labour
and trade union movement for economic and industrial growth policies.
These policies have always been rejected by the ecology movement but
now there is some evidence that the traditional hostility of the
Labour party to 'middle class environmentalism1 is being modified.
Cotgrove for example indicates quite clearly that the degree of
difference between trade unionists and environmentalists is narrowing,
"....like the environmentalists, they too give high
priority to non-economic goals and values. In short,
trade union officials reject a crucial element in the
domiant social paradigm - the simple hegemony of economic
values. They, like the environmentalists, see the
need for the public interest to override market
mechanisms."
This kind of relationship between traditional parties and movements
of the left and the grass roots ecology movement is an important
one because of the need to ensure that institutional change in the
area of planning is shaped by the input requirements of ordinary
working people. It is perhaps worth referring back at this point
to the case of Gray Park and the Moss Morran controversy. It was
apparent in that case that working class people who lacked education
and articulateness were completely lost in the stilted informality
of the public inquiry hearing. It is difficult to conceive of a
decision-making system located within the public sphere, and geared
towards open debate, that will not rely upon linguistic skills and
the ability to discuss complex and often abstract ideas. Ultimately
there have to be forms of representation for people who are
incapable of participating in discursive processes like public
inquiries. However, part of the problem is not the possession or
lack of 'middle class qualities' but the rigid adherence to a limited
concept of competence and relevance. The Gray Park representatives
at the Moss Morran hearing lacked status because of the way the
existing system is premised on credential1ed expertise. The kinds
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of political changes desired by radical grass roots ecology groups
are those which open up decision-making processes to allow an integrated
knowledge code to become established. What will transpire in the
future is difficult to predict but I would suggest that if the
radical elements within the emerging grass roots movements establish
links with the political left in politics, then it is conceivable




THE OBJECTIVES AND PROBLEMS OF STUDYING
THE MOSS MORRAN CONTROVERSY,
When my research project began in 197^~75 it was my intention to focus
exclusively on the large public inquiry controversies in the
Highlands, The objective was to study the public inquiry system in
the context of North Sea oil onshore development and contribute towards
the sociological understanding,of the social impact of oil. However,
the main public inquiry hearings that 1 wished to examine had already
been completed by the time my research was begun; Grampian Chemicals
in 1969, Chicago Bridge and Mowlem-Taylor Woodrow in 1973-7^ and Cromarty
Petroleum in 1975. However, I was fortunate to receive a research
grant from the SSRC North Sea Oil Panel in 1977 to examine the
'Formulation and Presentation of Opposition to Shell/Esso in Fife1.
Th i s afforded me the opportunity to study the Moss Morran controversy in
greater depth than the Highland inquiries. In particular, I was able to
interview the participants in the controversy .
Ideally the task of observing the development of the Shell/Esso
controversy should have begun during the period between July 1976
and November 1976 when Shell first announced they would be submitting
an official planning application. At that time the controversy was
just emerging, and my enquiries could have been based on an understanding
of how knowledge and understanding of the NGL project first became
known. However, my research into the local opposition against the
oil companies did not begin until May 1977 when many of the issues and
personalities central to the controversy had already become established.
The major task of my research was to produce an account of the ways in
which arguments, opinions and feelings about proposed industrial
development are formulated, organised and presented, but I had to
recognise a crucial period had already elapsed before my sociological
investigation had begun. The oil companies had just completed
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their tour of the locality presenting their exhibition of the
proposed plans for the NGL and ethlene plants when I first entered the
research area at a local Action Group exhibition. I was faced with
the task of reconstituting the events which surrounded the public
debate between the local people and the oil companies in the midst
of being immersed in the local opposition exhibitions, which obviously
placed a very partial interpretation on the issues. The arguments
and the problematic issues were however coming to fruition around about
May 1977 when my research began, and I do not consider the initial delay
seriously hampered my project.
Initially the objectives of my research project were to understand the
interrelation of competing views about the Moss Morran development, and
to give some consideration to the notion "way of life". This
concept had been bandied about at many development controversies. I
was convinced initially that there was a need for information, as
opposed to assumptions and suppositions, about what is meant by the
phrase 'way of life1 as used by many of the parties at various
Highland public inquiries. It was an interest in these informal,
processes therefore which guided my enquiries at the beginning of the
research project. I gradually placed decreasing emphasis on the concept
of 'way of life' because it seemed to me less significant in Central
Scotland than it had been in the Highlands (see Appendix 2).
However, it was always my intention to place the public inquiry hearing
at the centre of the controversy in so far as it provided a focus for
the actions and debate about the proposed development plans. The
Action Groups and other objecting parties seemed to me to be very much
geared to presenting their objections to Shell and Esso in the public
inquiry forum and obviously the character and procedure of that
instututional system would have in impact on this task. As I have
mentioned above, the planning system in general had fallen into some
disrepute following the controversial decisions that had been made
at other planning hearings, particularly in the Highlands,
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The local people were concerned about the;potentia 1 for making their
case fully within the existing local public inquiry system. So
obviously the public inquiry itself could not be relegated to some
position of insignificance, and my interpretation of this part of
my research in terms of a concern for information about informal
processes, rather than the formal processes of the public inquiry
system, had to be made with the above qualifications in mind.
At the outset it was decided that the methods of enquiry to be
employed in the research should obviously fit the needs of my
research objectives and the limited resources I had at my command.
Two factors should be emphasised. Neither the object of studying
informal social processes nor the financial provision for my
research required that a formal questionnaire be compiled and administ¬
ered. The focus of attention therefore had to be sharply delimited
in order that I could make some meaningful observation of the
political interaction. I decided to concentrate my efforts on the
parties who would be participating in the public inquiry. It did
not appear to me to be possible to widen the scope of my research
activities to systematically tap the views and personalities that
might be peripherally involved in the controversy. For example,
initially there were some people in Cowdenbeath who had shown some
public interest in the proposed development to the extent of commenting
at public meetings or writing to the local press. In addition there
were many people in the locality of Dalgety Bay and Aberdour who
were obviously involved in the controversy because they would experience
the impact of any development that took place and would have opinions
about that impact. However, I had to make the decision to concentrate
my efforts on the 'semi-official' expression of those concerns purely
because of my limited time and the inability for me to tap all those
opinions and feelings without a more expansive research stragegy.
The methodology utilised to gather information falls simply into three
categories; primary and secondary literature search and analysis,
participant observation, and a series of losely structured interviews
with principal social actors.
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The kinds of data available to me have been varied. ! obtained from
the Scottish Office (SDO) letters which had been written either to
the Secretary of State for Scotland or the local authorities by objectors
and various interested organisations. The Action Groups provided me
with community newsletters, and published newspapers and brochures
which they had prepared at intervals during the controversy. The
oil Companies, the Conservation Society and the Local Authorities also
provided me with different kinds of circulars, technical reports and
correspondence. In addition to that kind of material I referred to
local and national newspapers, and the productions and transcripts
of the public inquiry hearing,, Overall it was possible to gain quite
a comprehensive view of the various dimensions of an evolving and
changing public controversy from these kinds of data. This
material can be used to trace out the development of thinking on
the subject of the gas project. Views expressed initially at early
public meetings or in letters to the press were founded on uncertain
knowledge and information. People were groping towards an understand¬
ing of the complex issues and the wide ranging implications of Shell and
Esso's plans and this uncertainty can be identified in the early
productions and public statements made by local opposition groups,
Tape recordings of those early public meetings were acquired from an
individual objector, and if was possible to trace the beginnings of the
reaction through to its mature public articulation. By 'plugging in'
to the ideas, assumptions and style of debate as exemplified in the
letters, brochures and other literature referred to, a descernible
pattern of change was observed in the organisation of the opposition
campaign by local people which I have described in Chapter six,
At various times it was possible to observe the .act i v i t i es of the local
opposition groups at exhibitions, public meetings and at protest
marches. There was no similar opportunity to observe public meetings
organised by the oil companies or attend any of the oil companies'
exhibitions because the research project was begun too late, as I
have explained above. The description of my research activity in
terms of 'participant observation' must be strictly qualified
however. At all times when I was observing or talking to opposition
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groups at meetings or other events my identity as a sociological
investigator was established. I did not at any time, for example,
attempt to take the part of the groups or individuals I was studying.
This would not have been possible in any case. The central methodological
dilemmas of participant observation were not overcome satisfactorily in
so far as I was able to employ that method of observation at all in
the strict sense that it is used in the standard sociological literature.*
I use the term 'participant observation1 in the context of this thesis
to refer to the fact that at various crucial points in the research
I attended, and was therefore to some extent, involved, in events
and meetings and that further I observed the social processes of those
events and meetings for the purposes of this research project.
Following the conclusion of the public inquiry hearing I undertook
a series of interviews with principal actors who were involved in
the controversy. These interviews were additional to those interviews
and discussions 1 had undertaken before and during the public inquiry
period. The major difference was that I sought to question the
principal individuals more systematically than 1 had managed to achieve
in the period prior to the public inquiry.
Overall the methods used in my research were conditioned by the
financial and resource limitations but also importantly they were
determined by the fact that I was attempting to gain some leverage on
the informal social processes involved in the formu1 ation and presentation
of an opposition case. One also has to adapt to the types of information
that are immediately accessible to the researcher. This is precisely
what I tried to do.
The initial problem that I was confronted with upon commencing my
research was the unwillingness of the local objectors organisations to
talk to me in the period immediately prior to the public inquiry
hearing. Having introduced myself and my research project by letter
the local Action Group discussed me at their meetings and decided to
assign one of their members to liaise with me. it was made quite
clear that this arrangement should not be interpreted by me as
* See Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman Small Town in Mass Society
Princeton University Press, 1968, 2nd edition and Colin Bell and
Howard Newby Community Studies Allen £ Unwin, 1971.
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indicating the local objectors unwillingness to co-operate with
my research more fully at a later date after the Dublic inauirv,
I was abletomeet and talk to some of the principals involved in
the opposition movement by simply turning up on their door step
or engaging them in conversation at the various public occasions
that drew them out, such as the public exhibitions they held about
the oil companies' plans,
it should be stressed that there are significant problems involved in
gaining the co-operation of local objectors fighting a complex public
inquiry. For example, requesting them to share scarce time and effort
to discuss matters in the midst of their preparations for the public
hearing can be resented. There are two problems therefore which
seem to be particularly emphasised when studying local political
interests involved in the public inquiry process (a) disquiet about
the researchers confidentiality and discretion once in possession of
stretegic information, this was especially problematic in the
eyes of the local objectors 1 studied because I was simultaneously
in contact with the oil companies and people in the S.D.D.
at New St. Andrew's House; (b) how to gain co-operation without
being intrusive at a time when the very people being studied are very
busy grappling with the task of preparing a highly complex case without,
it should be added, any public assistance at all in the way of financial
resources and research facilities.
It was due to this problem of non-access to the local Action Group
members in the period prior to the public inquiry that I undertook
some informal questioning of local residents in the communities of
Dalgety Bay and Aberdour, and in the Gray Park Community near to the
main site for the development at Moss Morran.
Surveying Local Opinion
The object of the exercise in door knocking was to listen to the opinions
of as many and as varied a collection of people as I could in the
Dalgety Bay, Aberdour and Gray Park communities. I attempted to make
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the exercise as systematic as possible, but I was more intent on
reaching people who were not necessarily deeply involved in the
organised forms of opposition. I was initially able to talk to
people who attended the Joint Action Group exhibition in Dalgety
Bay such as the larger shore houses , the co-ownership houses
and the relatively small area of council houses, to find out if
there was any difference, no matter how subtle, between those with a
large private investment in their property and those with a
comparatively small investment. Predictably the private house
owners were more actively against the development proposals and
were more than willing to talk about the issue. The council tenants
were more taciturn and treated me as they might a 'door to door
salesman1. This made it difficult to gain any impression of their
feelings. Unfortunately, due to an earlier victory by members of
the Residents Association, there is no public house in Dalgety Bay
where one might seek out potential conversationalists. However,
it came across that most of the council tenants were either in favour
of the project or unconcerned one way or another. One council tenant,
Mr„ Bill Ford, was actively campaigning in favour of the project,
although his efforts were limited to petitions and interventions at
public meetings and on the whole he failed to gain any significant
support. I talked to 28 people by this method in addition to my
interviews with Action Group members.
Aberdour proved to be more uniformly against the Shell/Esso development,
although I did find people who were basically in favour of the project
as long as firm assurances could be given about the safety of the plant
at Braefoot Bay.
In both communities I found a great deal of ignorance about the nature
of the Shell/Esso project. Many people seemed to be under the
impression that what was being proposed for Braefoot Bay would be similar
to an oil refinery. The differences between an oil refinery and an
NGL plant are quite significant in terms of their potential pollution
effects and I got the impression that people were objecting to
some rather vague idea which collapsed the ideas of oil, gas and
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industry and treated it as being synonymous with either Teeside or the
Clyde. I am not suggesting that the Shell/Esso plants would not
cause some environmental pollution, but the difference between a constant
aroma of hydrogen sulphide often to be found at the Grangemouth oil
refinery and a comparatively smell free atmosphere normally associated
with NGL and Ethane plants, could have influenced people's views
about the project had they been aware or informed about the differences.
The communication process within the community about the scheme was
revealed at an early stage to be lacking. In addition to those
people who expressed opinions about the project that were uninformed,
there were many people who relied totally on the circulating Action
Group literature for their critical perspective on the issue; often
people would speak passionately against the proposals and with dogmatic
certainty about its dangers, however, when pressed it was invariably
revealed that their sole source for information was the odd newsletter
pushed through their letter box by the Action Group.
Ignorance about the Shell/Esso project and the p1anning process was
particularly found in the Gray Park community. There was a distinct
difference of view expressed to me by residents when I first spoke
to them in May than subsequently came to be the 'official' Gray Park
view. I undertook a similar 'door knocking' exercise in Gray Park in
addition to arranging a series of systematic interviews with the six
residents forming the Gray Park Committee. I managed to talk with twelve
residents by door-knocking.
Many Gray Park residents expressed approval of the development proposals
when questioned in private. With three exceptions they thought the
development would be beneficial for the area of Cowdenbeath. Most
people were totally ignorant about the nature of the NGL and Ethane
plants being proposed and had received no information from any source
regarding this aspect.,
Research Irritations
A major research dilemma confronted me near the beginning of the research.
I discovered that I was competing with a host of other researchers
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seeking to observe and tap the same information from essentially the
same people as myself.
Several postgraduate students were involved in various projects concerning
both the opposition groups and the planning process. In one case a
researcher from Stirling University sent out a batch of questionnaires
to principal members of the opposition campaign and other interested
parties. Despite wide publication of my project in SSRC newsletters
circulated to most institutions of Higher Education, and the
inclusion of my research project in the registry of research into
North Sea oil developments produced at Aberdeen University, 1 found
that my competitors were ignorant of my existence.
The Moss Morran controversy had received a great deal of media publicity
and had obviously become an ideal focus for a variety of research
projects. The problem was how to deal with a classic research
problem, that of contamination of the subjects being studied. There
is obviously a limit to how much co-operation people will give to a
researcher and how many questions they will answer,
It was decided to co-operate as far as possible in exchanging information,
and in the case of the Stir1ing researcher it was agreed to undertake
some joint interviewing. This arrangement proved to be very beneficial
because it allowed a more comprehensive coverage of issues using the
method of extended interviewing or conversation. Joint interviewing is
particularly suitable when one is conducting a structured conversation
rather than a formal interview with a questionnaire; the momentum of
the conversation can be maintained and the risk of missing some point
is lessened when notebooks can be compared afterwards. It is
regrettable however that the Moss Morran controversy was being over-
stud i ed.
The Pub lie Inquiry.
The public inquiry continued for a period of three weeks. I attended
the hearing on a daily basis, normally spending about four to five
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hours per day listening to the proceedings. I relied upon both the
precognitions of evidence and the inquiry transcripts and summary
report for the recording of the specific arguments and evidence.
During the inquiry I concentrated on the communication process in
accordance with the theoretical framework I had developed; viewing
the inquiry process as an instrument of government of the political-
administrative centre which sought to resolve the dilemma of its
'instrumental' function of shaping down the complex arguments to
enable a technical resolution of the issues, and its 'expressive'
function in allowing an open and expansive hearing of views in
accordance with the principle of 'natural justice'.
My view of the inquiry process was that conflict and tension would
arise in the inquiry proceedings around the problem of the inquiry
remit to embrace a broader theoretical and factual exploration of the
issues, i.e. the political economy of the oil companies and broader
safety and ecological issues. I was interested in observing the
mechanisms and the process whereby the communication process is
managed so as to address the specific remit rather than to allow the
discursive approach favoured by objecting parties.
The Structured Interviews
In the period immediately following the public inquiry hearing I
arranged a series of more systematic interviews with principals
involved in the controversy. I selected my interviewees in relation
to the public inquiry; I delimited the focus of my study to those
who participated either in the public inquiry or preparation of
material for presentation at the publ ic inquiry. I arranged
interviews with members of the Dalgety Bay/Aberdour Joint Action
Group, members of the Aberdour Ratepayers Association, Yachting
interests, private objectors, the Conservation Society, Gray Park
Committee, Regional Planning Officials, Representatives from Shell
Expro and Esso Chemicals Ltd.
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The interviews with the objectors' organisations, with the exception of
the Conservation Society, were jointly conducted by myself and the
Stirling researcher. I interviewed the oil company personnel and the
planning officers by myself and exchanged information on these inter¬
views with the Stirling researcher who had obtained some interviews with
selected local councillors.
The format for the interviews was that of an extended structured con¬
versation. Most of the interviews were in the homes of the interviewees.
The planning officials and the oil company representatives were inter¬
viewed in their own offices. The object of the interviews was to go
armed with a series of questions to structure and guide my discussion
with the interviewees but to allow the conversation to flow and so
record as much detail and information about the formulation and
organisation of the various campaigns without being intrusive or to
over structure the discussion.
Following each interview conducted by myself and the Stirling researcher
a comparison of our respective notes was made and we discussed the
information in our possession. We filled out our notes and underscored
points to be raised with future interviewees, especially when we were in
possession of information about the future interviewee which we wanted
to corroborate. Arguments raised by one party would be used to raise
issues or questions to confront other parties with. For example,
descriptions of events or organisational structures and functions
offered by one person belonging to the Action Group, for example,
would be presented to another in order that they could comment on it or
offer a quite different description or understanding. In this way
it was hoped that our notes could be constructed in the form of a
dialogue between the parties, This procedure proved to be fruitful
and it was made more easy by the fact that two rather than a single
interviewer were conducting the discussions,
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Appendix 1 I
ON THE CONCEPT 'WAY"OF'LIFE'
Perhaps the most significant comparative issue to isol ate i n d i scussing
the Moss Morran issue in relation to other similar controversies in
the Highlands, is that of the threat to a community's 'way of life'.
Obviously the case of the Drumbuie public inquiry, for example, was
expressive of a conflict which was fundamentally based on the 'way
of life' of a sparsely populated community0 And similarly the case
of the Shetland Islands highlighted important issues about a
community's 'way of life' which embraced a broad social and cultural
tradition. Clearly the Moss Morran issue did not represent a situation
where similar established social and cultural practices were under threat.
The community of Dalgety Bay is populated by a fairly mobile middle class
set of people who are well integrated into the market oriented industrial
society of central Scotland. Aberdour is essentially a residential
community of either retired or middle management people commuting to
Edinburgh. What comes to mind, regarding the threat to a 'way of
life' in a situation of possible large scale industrial change, is the
distinction between col 1ective and privatised dimensions of the phenomenon,
The situation which faced the sparsely populated communities of Wester
Ross was a sudden and irretrievable change to a set of collective social
and cultural practices that people 1ived. The threat to this set
of collective practices and traditions was conditioned by, and delimited
by, the peculiar coa1escenceof geographical, demographic and historical
factors which resulted from a sparsely populated environment which
was no longer to beasparsely populated community. The types of
social gatherings, informal social networks, the freedom of multiple
occupational sets, were directly and historically an outgrowth of the
isolation of the region. The overlap between these different dimensions
of life were finely tuned. By contrast the social and economic
factors which condition the lives of the residents of Dalgety Bay and
Aberdour I discovered tend towards thecreation of a privatised life
style, especially in Dalgety Bay. The possible disruption to a 'way
of life' in such a social context is slightly more impervious to
sociological analysis.
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The experience of the Gray Park community is the closest aspect of the
Moss Morran case that throws up similar collective threats to a
particular 'way of 1ife1„ The heterogeneity of interests which makes
for a comparatively more privatised life style in Dalgety and Aberdour
is less evident in the midst of the working class collectivism of the
Gray Park street.
I would underline the notion of a '1ived way of life1 in connection
with this discussion. The particular features of the Dalgety Bay and
Aberdour communities' 'way of life' which could be affected by the building
of a tanker terminal is their leisure patterns. Activities connected
to the boating or yachting pursuits on the Forth, or walks by the
shore around Braefoot Bay could be interfered with. However,
changes to the community with respect to work patterns, sudden overload on
the area's infrastructure, and the social and psychological conflict
attendant on the influx of large numbers of migrant workers or people
with different cultural habits, is unlikely to happen, But it was
precisely these kinds of problems which confronted the people of
Wester Ross, Dunnet Bay, * Easter Ross, and the Shetlands. I would
therefore suggest a further distinction between a broad impact on
'way of life' and a partia1 impact.
Certain consequences result from these differences. It seems apparent
to me from my initial research and thought on this subject in relation
to the Moss Morran controversy, that the people of Fife affected by
the proposed project do not spontaneously relate their fears or
experience of the issue in terms of a threat to a 'way of life'. It
will not seriously interfere with the way they actually 1ive their lives,
This of course, is not the case in the Highlands where the disruption
of the Kishorn site has had a broad impact on all the dimensions of
the lives of the local indigenous population.
* The proposed oil platform construction yard which was the subject of
a major public inquiry involving Chicago Bridge did not materialise,
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With the benefit of hindsight in 1982 it is now possible to see
that the Cromarty Firth area would have been ideal for Shell/Esso,
albeit that the gas gathering pipeline has been shelved for the
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me that he was able to relate the impressions of the inquiry from
Esso's point of view as well as Shell's. He considered that they
had a 'joint' view of events. With respect to specific questions
about whether Esso were intending to proceed with their Cracker,
Jacobs assured me that these could not be answered for some
considerable time and Mr. Aylwin would be unable to enlighten
me on that issue even if he had been present. So content with
the knowledge that my task was to gain 'impressions' of the
public inquiry from the oil companies' perspective, I was resigned
to the fact that 1 was unlikely to get access to anv of the
technical people without a great deal of time and travel expense
being incurred, so I listened to Mr. Jacobs account, aware that
to a large extent it had to be accepted as a personal perspective.
27. Letter from Mr. Jamieson to the inquiry Reporter, Mr. Alexander
Bell, York Place, Edinburgh, dated 11th October 1977
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Footnotes Chapter 6.
1. This information was obtained from tape recordings given to me
by John Cowie of public meetings held in Dalgety Bay and Aberdour
in 1976 and 1977. Oil representatives were participants at some
of these public meetings.
2. Chairman of the Aberdour Ratepayers Association Mr. Lochtie was
particularly incensed by the leaflet incident. His concern was
based, I suspect, at the emergence of a local social movement
against Shell and Esso that was outwith the existing community
institutions and control by local officials like himself.
3. Due to the official resistance to setting up anAction Group
under the auspices of the RPA, many Aberdour people convened
meetings in houses and pubs to organise a response to Shell
and Esso. These meetings were arranged on a word of mouth
basis but were technically open to anyone who was interested
and heard about them.
4. Action Group members who were interviewed from both communities
agreed with the description offered here. Although Carnduff
and Stodart were Aberdour residents and were significant contribute
to the technical understanding of the project the spread of
knowledge between the two communities was fairly balanced.
Mr. Diess, the Treasurer and Judy Hope, press relations, were
Dalgety Bay residents who knew little about the technical issues,
whereas Burt and Mehta came to know quite a bit about the
technical issues through time.
5. It is important to note that Shell Expro UK Ltd and Esso Chemicals
Ltd were separate companies from their larger parent corporations.
Shell Expro had been formed in 1964 to manage Shell UK's
petroleum and production interests. Esso Chemicals Ltd was
formed in 1965 as an affiliate of the Exxon Corporation of
the United States. As separate companies they had no Scottish
Offices in their own name.
6. Daniel Bell The Coming of Post-Industria 1 Society Heinemann,
1974, p 279.
7. This was a frequent remark made on television, radio and in
the newspapers.
8. Dalgety Bay Residents Association newsletter dated 24th September
1976.
9. There was obviously some discussion within the two Action Groups
about what strategy they should adopt. People such as Cowie,
Norman and Mehta, who were involved at the core of the Action
Group, immediately formulated their objectives in terms of
ensuring a public inquiry was held. Most activists shared
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their view and the main activity became geared to preparing a case
for presentation at the public inquiry with all that implies
about the kinds of information and expertise that would be
effective.
10. Many Action Group newsletters were aimed towards informing
the community about the details of the Shell/Esso scheme in
terms of the technologi safety issue. They explicitly suggested
to locals what issues would be themost effective to adopt in
letters of objection and in participation within the public
inquiry. Perhaps the realism of the Action Group members about
the public inquiry system revealed by this stance adopted in the
newsletters obscures a 1ack of knowledge and interest by certain
key members of the Action Group in broader non technical issues.
11. See Anthony Giddens Central Problems in Social Theory, MacMillan,
1979, p3.
12. I am not advocating civil disobedience as an effective strategy.
However, the significant difference between the oil related
public inquiries in Scotland and John Tyme's campaign against
motorways in England, was the latters specific challenge to the
public inquiry system. The disruption to themotorway inquiry
arose because Tyme and his various accomplices did not accept
the public inquiry instrument in the way most objectors in
Scotland seem to have. Tyme was an unusual person in the fact
that he was willing to work full time to co-ordinate action
throughout the country. No such person has so far emerged
in Scotland. The main contrast between Tyme and the Fife
objectors nevertheless remains, the formers willingness and
ability to organise his campaign on a national basis, involving
the co-operation of the disparate objectors groups and organisations
from different localities, and the latters determination to wage
a discursive battle solely within their local public inquiry.
13. Dunfermline Press, 181h February, 1977.
14. Related to me by Mr. Jamieson of Aberdour in an interview in
John Sutcliffe's house in Aberdour in September, 1977.
15. Related to me by Dr. Edmunds in an interview held in his home in
Kirkcaldy 6th October, 1977.
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